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This book is an attempt at writing a scholarly work. It displays the author's
understanding of what economists basically know about multi-market competition.
This topic is obviously important: multinational firms and conglomerates are
examples of multi-market firms. Their mutual competition is shaping the economy
that others (government, employees, suppliers) act in. It is gratifying to see how
much thought economists have already given to these issues. These thoughts are the
subject matter that I have been grappling with for some years. In the course of this
process I had help from numerous colleagues. Most of this occurred in the everyday
life of an economics faculty. Let me mention some in particular, while apologising
to those that I now forget. Thanks are due to my promotors Hans Maks, who
tolerated my non-linear approach towards economics, and to Arjen van
Witteloostuijn, who went out of his way to assist and cooperate. Lex Borghans, Hans
de Graaff and Hans Peters, members of the game theory group, helped me improve
my knowledge of this field. I also gratefully acknowledge comments from Hans de
Graaff (throughout the book); Steven Maijoor on chapter 6; R. Cairns and Dan
Kovenock on what eventually became chapter 7; and Geert Duysters and Sjef Stoop
on chapter 10. I owe much to the organisers and participants of the 799/ Suwi/ner
Con/ere/ice on /m/ajrna/ Organ/zar/on, S/ra/eg/c A/anagewien/, am/ /n/ernûrio/w/
Co/npenrive/jew in Vancouver. Surely the most inspiring conference I ever attended,
and one that changed the content of this book (especially chapters 2 and 6). And I
would like to thank my parents and Ayen whose impatience was a major impetus to
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Part I contains an overview of the main
themes of the book. It motivates these
themes and discusses key concepts,
ideas, and theories. It also introduces
the structure of the book.ï TH/1 PROLEGOMENA
Chapter 1 provides a motivation for the dissertation by pointing to the
importance of some current industrial economic developments, such as
globalisation of competition and business strategies. An understanding of these
processes requires, I submit, building an interface between industrial economics
and strategic management. This book's contribution to an interface consists of
a conceptual framework.
1.1 A REAL WORLD MOTIVATION
This book is about competition among multi-market firms. These firms represent
important companies such as multinational enterprises, diversified and vertically
integrated firms. Three types of developments made studies such as this book
relevant. Internationalisation in the world economy, globalisation, and European
integration have challenged firms about where and how to compete. Various
developments, such as rising wages, technological and organisational changes, and
the increasing speed of imitation forced firms to identify, invest, and more fully
exploit their resources (assets and 'core competences'). Improvements in internal
organisation, information technology, and (airline) transportation made it possible for
international firms to coordinate hitherto internationally decentralised activities. As
a result, firms have reconsidered their running of multi-market activities. A firm may
raise the returns to its investments by using an advantage in one market as a leverage
instrument to achieve a competitive advantage in another market (Bulow er a/.,
1985). To achieve this end, it coordinates strategic intent across its markets.
Coordination of strategic intent is a recent phenomenon. Until recently many
multinational firms competed on a market-by-market basis (Hout, Porter, and
Rudden, 1982; and Prahalad and Doz, 1987). Hout « a/. (1982) distinguish
international firms that compete in multidomestic and global industries. A
mw/riJowiesric (that is, multinational) firm will coordinate finance and marketing, as
well as some R&D and component production. But strategy and operations are
decentralised to overseas subsidiaries: 'the company competes with other
multinationals and local competitors on a market-by-market basis.' (p. 103). The
g/o£a/ firm instead formulates 'strategy on an integrated, worldwide basis. ' (p. 100).
For instance, 'A [global] company may set prices in one country to have an intended
effect in another.' (p. 103) Globalisation, therefore, refers to a firm's internal
strategic decision making process rather than to the geographic extension of its sales.
As an illustration, Prahalad and Doz (1987) show that in the colour television
industry Philips (initially) competed with the Japanese firms on a market-by-market
basis. Its Japanese competitors, however, acted from an integrated, global,
perspective. The advantages derived from this strategy compensated for their initially
smaller scale than Philips. iu mjurm ?l>fi*y!<ii *»•• :n *
The drive toward globalisation is, therefore, a prime motive for this study.4 Chapter 1
Another motivation can be found in the ' 1992' European integration process. It will
facilitate trade within the E.C. by taking steps that reduce transport costs and limit
protectionism by national governments. The Commission of the European
Community (the C.E.C.) has this to say on its motives:
"The intention being to encourage businesses to anticipate the overall objective
and to include a European dimension from now on in their strategic planning.
Together with the general worldwide economic recovery, this business reaction
to 1992 is the principal reason for the revival in investment in the Community,
which has now become a more attractive region for foreign investors. ' (C.E.C,
1989, p. 2-3)
Including a European dimension in one's strategy can have numerous meanings, of
course, but the above and other statements clearly suggest that businessmen should
develop an integrated view on competing and cooperating in the E.C. Most
descriptions of globalisation and European integration primarily focus on product
markets. Yet they will also affect some input markets, such as the labour and capital
markets.
Firms need to coordinate their actions in input markets with their competitive
strategy in product markets. A very famous case where a firm failed to do this is
IBM's introduction of PCs in 1981:
'Clones were the unintended outcome when IBM chairman John R. Opel
approved a crash program to get into personal computers. He dispatched a team
of 13 engineers to Boca Raton, Fla., to come up with a computer that could halt
the advance of companies such as Apple, Commodore, and Tandy. (.) the team
at Boca Raton was given one year to come up with an answer to the Apple II.
To meet the deadline on their "Acorn" project, they broke the IBM rules. (.)
[They] turned to outside suppliers for key hardware and software and signed up
computer stores to sell the new machines. In the process, IBM inadvertently
played kingmaker.' (fiurinitt JVeeAr, 12-8-91, p. 47) •••• -.:.-...,„,.
The new kings, of course, were Intel and Microsoft. Potential competitors could
easily clone the IBM standard by buying their key components from them, as did
IBM itself. This taught IBM an important lesson, witnessing its new proprietary
'standard' OS/2: Decisions on whom to acquire inputs from can be vital for the
evolving market structure. This also suggests a 'global' perspective on strategy: a
rational firm needs to consider the ramifications of its strategy to a// markets in
which it participates. This refers both to interactions between input and product
markets (that I will call the vertical dimension of multi-market competition), as well
as to interactions among product markets (the horizontal dimension).
1.2 BRIDGING STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND INDUSTRIAL
ECONOMICS
This book intends to contribute to an integration of several theories. In particular it
sets out to build an interface between industrial economics and strategic management.Prolegomena
Its underlying assumption is that industrial economics and strategic management are
distinctly different types of theories (or paradigms). They often cover the same
research objects, e.g., competition, allocation of scarce resources, strategic decision
making, and satisfaction of consumer needs. As a consequence, they offer points of
agreement as well as differences; and their differences should not be taken strictly.
There is an ongoing integration process of both fields (to which this book hopes to
contribute). Integration blurs the distinctions, and obliterates their clear-cut identities.
Economists such as Caves and his colleagues Porter and Ghemawat, for instance,
straddle these 'markets' in a conscious attempt to exploit analytical spillovers.
Statements in this book about differences of strategic management and industrial
economics do not, therefore, deny that considerable overlap exists. After clarifying
the notion of integration, I will mention some differences and agreements of
industrial economics and strategic management.
There are costs involved in an integrative approach. This book focuses on
insights that the fields just mentioned may share, rather than on those that divide
them. That is, integration is not to be understood as adding up theories A and B to
get a theory C which is better because it entirely encompasses A and B. Integration
instead implies a selection of elements from either side. This points to opportunity
costs: selection implies a choice and a loss. For example, the book focuses on
theoretical rather than empirical studies of industrial economics. It also focuses on
strategic management theories of strategy content, while ignoring its analyses of the
strategy process. Moreover, it has a positive rather than normative content: it is
about what profit maximizing firms do, rather than about what would be socially
optimal for them to do. '
The normative approach of industrial economics, on the one hand, is generally
associated with competition policy and antitrust litigation. Questions have been raised
about whether industrial economics is in a concrete way informative to antitrust
litigation (Schmalensee, 1979; Spence, 1985; Porter, 1985b; and Neumann, 1988):
'Competition policy has been dominated by politics.' (Neumann, 1988, p. 155)
Strategic management has little friendliness to spare for antitrust, blaming it for
creating adversary relations between government and enterprises (Willard and
Savara, 1988, pp. 69-70). In the 1980s industrial economists developed rationales for
a more cooperative relationship between government and business. Antitrust action
directed against a 'dominant' domestic firm should avoid weakening its competition
with a global competitor (Spence, 1985, p. 372; and Porter, 1985, p. 392). National
welfare may benefit if the government subsidizes the domestic firm's R&D or
imposes a tariff on a foreign competitor (Brander and Spencer, 1981; Spencer and
Brander, 1983; Krugman, 1984; and Cheng, 1987). A government may have to
impose a tariff in order to countervail another government's export subsidies (Dixit,
1984, p. 11). If research and development spill over between firms, i.e., if
technology diffuses, welfare may improve if firms internalise these spillovers by
cooperating in R&D. Antitrust should be eased to allow such forms of cooperation
1. Business theorists might call profit maximisation a normative assumption rather
than a positive one (e.g., Caves, 1980, p. 77).6 Chapter 1
(Ordover and Willig, 1985; and Jorde and Teece, 1991). U.S. and European antitrust
is indeed permissive of cooperative research (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988,
p. 1137). Industrial economics, therefore, has come to appreciate some of the
'normal business practices' that since Adam Smith had been confused with
conspiracy. This development has set the stage for industrial economics coming
closer to strategic management.
Industrial economics' positive content, on the other hand, is where industrial
economics and strategic management learn from each other, contribute to each other,
and (try to) build bridges (Caves, 1980; De Bondt, 1985; Shapiro, 1989; Saloner,
1991; Hendrikse 1991a; and Thépot and Thiétart, 1991). Models in industrial
economics have become sufficiently specific and powerful to be of use to strategic
management theorists (e.g., Porter, 1980 and 1985; and Ghemawat, 1991a). The
large amount of modelling on capacity investments, R&D, advertising, etc., has a
direct bearing on corporate strategy. Moreover, an industrial economics - strategic
management interface may add realism to abstract theorising and suggest useful
avenues for research. As Caves (1980, p. 88) argues:
9t
y* 'economists' preconceptions have steered them away from business strategy and
no organization as an area of research.'
In the 1980s economists seem to have found back the path to strategy and
organisation. They have something to offer, as Caves (1980, p. 82 and 88) argues:
analytical (microeconomic) rigour that seems to lack in business studies. Industrial
economists are particularly meticulous on the firm's objectives. This has given rise
to extensive debates on profit maximisation versus sales or growth maximisation, as
well as to more recent debates on the agency costs of non-owning managers.
Strategic management did not initially appreciate this point as much as it should,
which led to vagueness on this issue (Caves, 1980, p. 65"). Microeconomic analytic
mea/u therefore can be used to serve strategic management research aim, which is
the approach taken in this dissertation.
An integration of industrial economics and strategic management must come to
terms with striking differences. First, there are some differences in mer/iorf. Current
industrial economics has its roots in microeconomics and game theory. Its approach
is deductive: it uses first principles (e.g., consumers maximise utility), with
mathematical reasoning (e.g., maximisation of objective functions over a convex set
of constraints) to derive hypotheses and (e.g., social welfare) implications. Strategic
management is inductive: it tries to generalise from case studies and statistical
observations. It seems to have a scavenging (integrative) approach to theoretical
postulates.
The subject-object relationships in industrial economics and strategic management
differ as well. Industrial economics considers firms and entrepreneurs the ofyecM of
its analysis. The analysis itself addresses two types of subject: the government, for
the sake of antitrust and competition policy advise, and the researcher himself, whose
intellectual excitement is at stake. These, at least, are the two industrial economies'
objectives explicitly mentioned by Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 3). There is no
presumption in this venerable handbook that entrepreneurs might learn something
here. Strategic management theorists seem to place more emphasis on the interactionProlegomena
with strategic management practitioners. Managers, that is, are treated as subjects
rather than objects. The textbook by Hatten and Hatten (1988, p. xii), for example,
addresses the reader as a manager who is going to apply the book's frameworks.
This distinction goes along with (predominantly) different data that are being used.
Strategic management makes intensive use of the case study method. This requires
data from firms which often can be acquired only if the firms involved cooperate.
A <fou/>/e W may arise, i.e., a cuitf/jro ÇMO, where firms offer data only in return
for the researcher's expertise.* Research is based on interaction between subject and
object, therefore. Industrial economics, on the other hand, predominantly uses
publicly available data.' No double bind arises and contact is usually established with
government agencies.
Industrial economics and strategic management also differ in the weight given to
research topics. On the one hand, industrial economics focuses on product markets
and on strategies by firms to improve their position relative to (potential)
competitors. It uses game-theoretical modelling to focus on the subtle interactions
between firms, which depend on the sequence of decision making, information, and
beliefs. The input side of the competition is usually curtailed by assumptions such
as that firms have access to the same (or similar) production functions. On the other
hand, strategic management focuses on the firm's heterogeneous, firm-specific
resources, e.g., its human capital, brand name, e/c. These are sometimes called its
assers Û/K/JW//J (e.g., Porter, 1980, p. 348) and explain its sustainable competitive
advantages. The analysis of the product market competition is relatively
underdeveloped. Implicitly lurks the simple but powerful theory that sustainable
competitive advantages translate over time into market share gains. This book tries
to build a bridge here by means of a multi-market setting, which focuses both on
product markets and resource markets.
Another difference in the relative weight of research topics is industrial
economics' focus on entry deterring strategies and strategic management's focus on
entry strategies. In the light of Bain's pioneering activities it does not come as a
surprise that industrial economics has an overriding concern with entry deterrence
strategies. Empirical evidence on whether firms do consciously deter entry is scanty
(Smiley, 1988; Gilbert, 1989, p. 118; and Hall, 1990). Strategic management's
concern with sustainable competitive advantages offers some support for a focus on
entry deterrence.* Both disciplines assume that the incumbent firm brings its
competitive advantage (whether a first move or ownership of resources) to bear in
competition with (potential) newcomers. More than industrial economics, however,
strategic management matches its interest in entry deterrence strategies with an
interest in established firms' entry strategies. Diversification studies are the most
••O">
2. I owe this comment to my colleague B. van Diepen.
3. Industrial economic game theories increasingly turn to case studies as well.
Boundaries between industrial economics and strategic management are diminishing,
as I will argue later.
4. Hatten and Hatten (1987b, p. 341) actually equate competitive advantage to a
barrier to entry.8 Chapter 1
important example.* .*
The industrial economics part of the integration effort in this study is a selection
of theories. It draws from the 'old' as well as from the 'new' industrial economics.
The former has as its dominating figure Joe Bain; it is verbal and empirical in
nature. Mathematical models are rarely used, and most analysis is based on diagrams
(e.g., Modigliani, 1958). The new industrial economics is based on game theory and
microeconomics. Its achievements have been exposed in such books as Tirole (1988)
and the Handbook edited by Schmalensee and Willig (1989). From these two streams
I make an idiosyncratic selection. Both strands made useful contributions, but these
have to be identified with care.
Bain's (1956) limit price theory was an important improvement over
Chamberlin's (1933) exclusive attention to acrua/ entry, by focusing on incumbent
firms' anticipation of /raten//û/ competition. But Bain did not go far enough. He
allowed the incumbent firm to prepare for entry deterrence, but he overlooked the
possibility that the potential entrant, for its part, may prepare for entry. Both the
incumbent firm and the potential entrant may be committed players. For example,
Gelman and Salop (1983) explore a case where the entrant makes a commitment to
small scale. The incumbent monopolist loses less by allowing this entry than by
deterring entry through a low price (/Wo économies). Bain's analysis gave rise to
/ncumfte/tf games where incumbent firms deter entry by passively reacting
(unsophisticated) potential entrants (De Bondt, 1985, p. 153). Innovation studies gave
rise to ewry ga/nes, where firms identify and compete for entry into new markets.
Integrating these perspectives remained a 'future research issue' for a long time,
witnessing De Bondt's statement in 1985:
'incumbent strategies [as reviewed in the paper] still view entrants as relatively
'•• unsophisticated (.) The incorporation of more symmetry in the sophistication of
the strategies of all rivals, both entrants and incumbents, is probably essential for
a useful bridge to business strategy analysis.' (De Bondt, 1985, p. 153) 'The
sophistication of new rivals in reality is likely to go further than rational
expectations as to what the industry equilibrium will evolve to." (De Bondt,
1985, p. 154)
Multi-market analysis is such an integration: it focuses on related product markets,
whose incumbent firms are potential entrants into each other's markets. The
established firm in each market is committed (e.g., by capacity) for a role in the
game (whether as entrant or as entry deterring incumbent firm). This accords with
strategic management's natural focus on existing firms in their dual role of
incumbents and potential entrants.
1.3 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK < —.— . ,
The aim of the framework in this book is, like any conceptual framework, to serve
5. For instance, Rumelt (1974), Wernerfelt (1984), Roberts and Berry (1985), Hatten
and Hatten (1987), Lambkin (1988), Ramanujam and Varadarajan (1989), Clarke and
Brennan (1990), and Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991). ..„„., ., ,„•..«,,•Prolegomena
as an orgonùi/tg /?rinrip/e. It provides a set of concepts and ideas that organise (our
understanding of) a complex part of the real world. It is essentially a verbal
achievement, a story to accompany the disparate modelling that has evolved on
multi-market firms. The reader wiU find that numerous ideas (perhaps all) in this
book were voiced earlier. For example, a focus on established firm entry dominates
P.W.S. Andrews's work. If the language in this book seems a 'new bottle for old
wine', I can only repeat others' experience that old wine is often the best.
The multi-market framework may guide research by providing concepts,
intuition, and analogies. Here, the 'proof of the pudding is in the eating'. Only if the
framework actually succeeds in informing research can it be said to function as such.
Future research issues in the afterword may give a hint of the areas of future applied
work. I admit in advance that this ra/ucrio aJ/w/wrem constitutes a rather informal
test of the framework. But then, frameworks cannot be tested.
The conceptual framework in this book is not a figment of my imagination. It is
born out of a careful study of the work of prominent economists. Specific sources
of inspiration are the literature on diversification, integration, multiproduct firms,
contestable markets, multinational enterprise, inter-brand competition, transaction
costs and international trade. The book therefore contains surveys that go beyond
reiterating economic theories. It offers an asessement of their contributions. Some
economists I will refer to rather prominently are not even mentioned in the best
known handbooks on industrial economics. Partly this is, I believe, an act of justice.
Each 'new' view implies a reassessment of who the important forerunners were.
P.W.S. Andrews and H.F. Lydall receive pride of place, while from my point of
view Bain's (1956) contribution has been exaggerated (see chapter 3). The book also
has critical as well as constructive aims. Critiques are required to get rid of obsolete
views that deter progress (see part II).
The constructive aim of the book appears especially in part III which proposes
a standardisation of terminology used by economists, and thus, may facilitate
communication. Current papers in the literature usually are isolated contributions to
multi-market theory. They are bound to develop related insights by means of
idiosyncratic terminology. For example, what this book refers to as multi-market
spillovers is also called multi-market economies (Scott, 1982, p. 369), joint
economies (Bulow «a/., 1985, p. 509), synergy (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985, p.
95), spill-over effects (Ayal and Zif, 1979, p. 90), and interrelationships (Hill, 1988,
p 67). In another example, multi-market collusion is also called mutual forbearance
(Feinberg, 1985), spheres of influence (Scherer, 1980, pp. 340-342), and live and
let live philosophy (Kantarelis and Veendorp, 1988). As a consequence,
communication failures arise. For example, Calem (1988) does not refer to the paper
by Bulow er a/. (1985). This indicates the formative stage of the theory. The book
might contribute towards ushering in the mature stage of the product life cycle of
multi-market theory.
1.4 CONTENTS OF THE BOOK ^uh s rtrwi (Oft? h rr.-,<!pW »>fiV d
The next chapter, chapter 2, gives a short exposition of the multi-market competition
framework. Part II traces the history of the debate on established-firm entry from the
1930s up to the 1980s. Chapter 3 brings to the fore some early analyses of10 Chapter 1
established-firm entry. It also shows how for a long time the predominant concern
with incumbent firms' entry deterrence pushed entry strategies into the periphery of
industrial economics. Chapter 4 argues that industrial economists developed the sunk
cost concept when they became aware of the importance of factor market
imperfections to product market competition. Part III gives a detailed exposition of
the multi-market competition framework as it evolved in the 1980s. It recognises the
interaction between multiple (product and country) markets (chapter 5) as well as the
interaction between product and input markets (chapter 6).
Part IV gives some explorations of the framework. It uses tools discussed in part
III to explore leading theories explored in part II. Its function is heuristic and
illustrative rather than conclusive. Chapter 7 contains a contribution to a debate on
the theory of contestable markets. This theory begs the question who the potential
entrants are, that can hit-and-run with short entry and exit lags, and without sunk
entry costs. A recent debate points to established firms in related markets. This
contention can fruitfully be examined in a multi-market framework. In fact, this
debate gave rise to the notion of multi-market competition in this book.' The topic
of chapter 8 is the use of capacity investments as an instrument in competition.
Capacity investments have implications for product markets (that can be served by
the capacity) as well as input markets (where capacity or complementary factors are
traded). The incumbent firm's entry deterrence focuses on the investment's
consequences either for related product markets (if the potential entrant is established
in a related product market) or for an input market (if a </e «ovo entrant needs yet
to acquire its inputs).
Part V discusses the importance of market boundaries, and changes thereof, for
multi-market competition. Chapter 9 discusses the interaction between market
definition and business strategies. It suggests the contours of a dynamic markets
perspective, which may be helpful in understanding cases where market boundaries
fade, and firms' strategies both anticipate and respond to this. Chapter 10 illustrates
the argument for the case of the computer and consumer electronics industries. Their
market boundaries are fading, and they seem set to converge into a unified
multimedia industry. The afterword reiterates limitations of the book which may
anticipate future research issues.
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6. Van Wegberg (1990) provides a different inspiration to the present dissertation.
It explores the cross-over t/y/iam/'cs in classical (Ricardian and Marxian) political
economy. These dynamics imply that profit opportunities in a market call forth entry
of capital from other markets. This affects the supply conditions in those markets.
This induces cross-mobility of capital until a long run ('classical') equilibrium has
been established.2 A GUIDED TOUR THROUGH THE BOOK
Chapter 2 contains a summary of the multi-market competition framework
which I explore in this book. Each firm is active in a setting of (horizontally
and vertically) related (product and input) markets. Multi-market competition
provides an industrial economic specification of Porter's ewen*/eû" riva/ry
framework, where a firm vies for profits with (industrial) buyers, suppliers,
and (potential and actual) competitors which supply (im)perfect substitutes.
! ..-ait-.''•.••::»-""*. • ; ' -™ |" !.n-;.- «-£ iff-
2.1 INTRODUCTION'
This chapter summarises the key ideas and concepts of the multi-market
competition framework. It gives a feel for what the next chapters have to offer,
while trading off this 'feel' for some precision. Definitions of concepts are
preliminary only; see later parts for 'definitive' statements and references. First it
introduces the multi-market setting in which firms coordinate their competitive
moves and countermoves. Next, it discusses some of these moves. Important to
multi-market competition are the firms' resources, the factor markets where they
are traded, and the product market activities in which they are used. JI>:S8.
2.2 SETTING THE STAGE: RELATED MARKETS
The economy is a chessboard of markets, as figure 2.1 may illustrate. In a very
general context, it refers to value chains running from factor (input) markets to
final (consumer good) markets. Point of departure in the figure is market 12,
where an intermediate product is traded. In markets Fl to F3 inputs (e.g., factors
or other intermediate products) are supplied to industrial buyers which are
suppliers in markets II to 13. The buyers in markets II to 13 are firms which
cater to the customers in markets Cl to C3. Markets F4, 14, C4, ere, are the
associated markets of the Fl, II, Cl, ere, product in a different location (country
or region). These are re/ared mortew if they are connected by links. There are
three links to consider: shared participants (buyers or sellers), shared instruments
(assets) in the production or consumption processes that underlie market
transactions, and coordinated behaviour. There are degrees of relatedness, of
course. The book will concentrate on cases where relatedness is salient, such that
actions in one market will affect a firm's actions in another market.'
-T»
1. Parts of this chapter are based on Van Witteloostuijn (1990b), Van Wegberg
and Van Witteloostuijn (1991), and Van Witteloostuijn and Van Wegberg (1992).
2. Chapter 9 will discuss the obvious implications of relatedness for market






































Related markets can be distinguished in vernca/fy re/ored marte», where
inputs flow from one market to the other (from markets Fi through Ii to Ci, i =
1,2,3) and /iorizo/ira//y re/a/ed martett, if their products are substitutes or
complements in production or consumption. The latter applies to the same
product traded in different locations or different products that use the same
production or consumption process. This scheme may serve as a framework to
encompass several types of competitive moves by an established firm. It enriches
the description of (potential) competition in a market by drawing in the
interaction with other product or factor markets.
The figure captures both rtrea/5 from and opporrumries in the environment.
Opportunities arise for entry into related markets. In terms of figure 2.1, an
entry move from 12 to C2 is an instance of forward integration. An entry move
from 12 to F2 is an instance of backward integration. If firm 1, an incumbent
supplier in 12, diversifies into market II, it reaps the economies of scope that
may exist between the production functions used to supply the II and 12 markets.
Product cannibalization may occur if it enters market 13 that, say, trades a
(highly) imperfect substitute for the I2-product. If the 12- and 13- products are
complements instead, firm 1 benefits from a positive spillover that its I3-sales
may have on its I2-sales. Firm 1 may enter market 15 to exploit economies of
scale between the 12- and I5-market.
If the direction of the arrows is reversed, Figure 2.1 is a restatement of
Porter's (1980, p. 4) exrem/eo* r/va/ry scheme within a multi-market context. That
is, firm 1 faces threats from the environment as entry occurs by means of
backward integration (from C2), forward integration (from F2), diversification
(from II or 13), and imports (from 15). The figure illustrates the symmetry in theA Guided Tour 13
framework between the potential entrant's entry strategy and the incumbent firm's
entry deterrence strategy.
The figure may also identify the firm's sra*eMdm: *i)ilwsit*«iJ8u
p "A stakeholder is any individual or organization whose behaviour can directly
• ^ affect the firm's future but is not under the firm's control (.) there is an
! ; exchange of goods and services for money, or of approval for results,
between the firm and such groups.' (Hatten and Hatten, 1988, p. 66)
Suppliers, competitors, customers, and other actors suggested by figure 2.1, are,
therefore, stakeholders who are connected through exchange of goods and
services.' Stakeholders who 'approve' of the firm's performance are the
government, unions, and other social groups. The definition implicitly assumes
imperfect competition, for individual actors in perfectly competitive markets
cannot affect a firm's future.' Stakeholders may contribute to the firm's
performance, but they may also impose costs upon the firm. They too represent
threats and opportunities. How do firms interact in this setting?
2.3 THE COMPETITIVE GAME IN MULTIPLE MARKETS
The topic of this book is the competitive interaction among firms across different
(product and resource) markets. A parable may illustrate the interaction. How do
football clubs, like Ajax and AC Milan, compete for prizes? By preparing
themselves for the fight in the football stadium, one gathers. These preparations
imply competition in several dimensions and 'markets'. Football clubs compete in
the markets for players, sponsors, and broadcasting time. Clubs may not only
prepare for battle by improving their own skill in the arena, but also by
weakening their opponent through actions in the other markets. For instance, AC
Milan might contract Ajax's best players. Firms exhibit the same characteristics.
Consider two firms which compete in, say, output level (qj, i = 1,2) in a
homogeneous product market (a Cournot duopoly). Figure 2.2 illustrates.
The point of intersection (C) of the reaction curves (R<, i = 1,2) gives the
familiar Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Prior to the product market competition,
firms may commit to actions that affect the location of these reaction curves. This
prior commitment stage turns the game into a two-stage game. The resulting
competition has been called strategic competition (Ulph, 1987). There are two
effects (see chapter 8). The own e#ëc/ is that a firm prepares for product market
competition by reducing its marginal costs through, e.g., a capacity or R&D
investment (Dixit, 1980; and Brander and Spencer, 1983). If firm 1 invests to
reduce its marginal costs, it shifts its own reaction curve outward. In equilibrium,
this increases its output level and reduces firm 2's output level (from C to C,).
An alternative is the cross e#ecf, where firm l's strategy is to raise the other
firm's marginal costs (Salop and Scheffman, 1983 and 1987; and Dixit, 1986). It
thereby shifts firm 2's reaction curve inwards. This too reduces firm 2's output
3. A more general definition would include as stakeholders actors who co//ecfivcfy
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realise the cross effect
as well as the own
effect. These scenarios contain actions in a related market that will affect the
product market competition, as the next sections suggest. Multi-market
competition relates two elements that will loom large in this book: the importance
of the firm's resources and the competitive interaction across product markets.
2.4 RESOURCES, MULTIPLE MARKETS, AND RETURNS
Resources are the firm's (in)tangible assets, both those that are valued in the
firm's annual accounts and those that are not (invisible assets). In a conventional
definition of /won/re.? as capital, their productive services are inputs in the firm's
production function. The presence of stakeholders allows a wider definition that
includes relationships with stakeholders who contribute to the firm. In this book
resources may, for instance, refer to consumers' trust in a firm (goodwill),
reputation with suppliers, close relationships between government and the firm,
«c. Resources have in common that they are durable (they are not completely
used up while being used) and they raise the firm's value (by an amount which
itself is the wa/we of the resource). Many relationships with stakeholders have
these characteristics. This extension of the concept of resources (or capital assets)
seems to have been pioneered by Japanese firms. In the 1950s Japanese firms
owned little capital in the conventional Western sense (capital goods, patents,
ere). To compensate this, they began to convert lasting relationships with
suppliers, employees, government and consumers into alternative resources.''
Lasting relations with suppliers led, for example, to just-in-time production. This
raises the firm's value by cutting its production costs.
A 'folk theorem' in strategic management is that firms derive a sustainable
competitive advantage from the ownership of efficient resources. The
4. Womack, Jones and Roos (1990, p. 48-69) record the history of /can
prodHcr/o/i at Toyota from the late 1940s to the late 1950s. They focus on
Toyota's evolving relations with employees, suppliers and customers.A Guided Tour 15
Wov ^ /te /îrm has sought to analyze this view (Penrose, 1959;
Wernerfelt, 1984; Ghemawat, 1991b; and Grant, 1991). It argues that factors of
production are often heterogeneous, that is, different between firms. Examples are
locations, teams of managers and scientists. Tb convey a competitive advantage,
the firm's resource has to be efficient relative to product market rivals. The profit
derived from the resource, which equals its value minus the costs needed to
attract it, is an (efficiency) nenr. A firm faces three decision problems about its
resources, which are linked, but have been treated separately by most literature.
The first one is to match its efficient resources and its activities. . ~ —~; *.« «
2.4.1 Matching Activities to the Finn's Resources mono» âril , 'yrgm^'
Resources that 1) generate a rent and 2) are used intensively in a market (activity)
are known as jmzfég/c/actors (Barney, 1986b). The associated policy advise is to
focus on activities where the firm's efficient resources can be strategic factors. It
can adjust its activities in a vertical direction (in the value chain) and in a
horizontal direction (across product markets). For example, if a firm's know how
is an efficient resource, it may enter a knowledge-intensive industry while
undertaking only those steps in the associated production process that are
knowledge-intensive. It makes an extensive use of its efficient resources if, by
means of entry and exit, it adjusts its served product markets to those that use its
efficient resources intensively. Given that it wants to supply a product, a firm
may undertake itself those steps in the production process (or value chain) where
it is efficient relative to rival suppliers. It may contract out to suppliers the other
steps. The associated instruments are make-or-buy decisions, forward and
backward integration, investments and divestment. The activity choice raises three
related issues: which resources should the firm focus on, which activities should it
undertake given its resources, and how should it exploit its resources in several
product markets?
Considering the first question, firms may have numerous resources, which
differ in relative efficiency. For each of the firm's resources, exploiting its
potential to generate rents may require (horizontal or vertical) strategic moves in
value chains and product markets. If the firm owns a variety of resources, the
associated strategic moves may be contradictory. The firm may avoid conflicts by
focusing on a small subset of efficient resources, that can be exploited by a
consistent strategy. Such a bundle is known as a cone competence. Prahalad and
Hamel (1990, pp. 83-4) define the core competence as follows:
^ Tirst, a core competence provides potential access to a wide variety of
-**""* markets. (.) Second, a core competence should make a significant contribution
to the perceived customer benefits of the end product. (.) Finally, a core
competence should be difficult for competitors to imitate.' -•,...•
They add that a core competence is likely to be a team of assets rather than an
individual asset, 'a complex harmonization of individual technologies and
production skills' with internal coordination and learning (Prahalad and Hamel,
1990, p. 84). ,-,,, ,„„ . „,.- . , ,,.. .,,^- ....„., ,„,,„ .,,,„.*,,„ ,~:^;^».16 Chapter 2
The second question suggests that a firm may raise its rents from a (shared)
resource or core competence by using it in several product markets. As Teece
(1982, p. 45) argues, X3d Jno»ïi,i. ,«i :
'a firm's capability lies upstream from the end product -it lies in a
generalizable capability which might well find a variety of final product
applications. '
This leads to the important concept in strategic management of jy/œrçfy: „-,:, $,ff
'synergy', the economics of one business in a symbiotically beneficial
relationship with those of another, is based on precisely these shared
resources.' (Clarke and Brennan, 1990, p. 11).
This synergy concept (an economy of scope) is used to explain or guide
diversification strategy (e.g., Teece, 1982; Yip 1982a; Hatten and Hatten, 1987;
and Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989, p. 526).
Finally, the question arises which organisational forms a firm may use to
realise synergies. One particular form, internalisation, occurs if a firm makes an
internal use of the shared resources by entry into a related product market, thus
becoming a multi-market firm. Contracts are another form, where resource
suppliers provide shared resources to independent suppliers in several markets
(see subsection 4.3.2). Contracts used are selling, licensing, and leasing.
Internalisation and contracting are the extreme organisation forms by which firms
assure the use of shared resources in multiple product markets. Strategic alliances
(e.g., joint ventures) are intermediate forms. Within transaction cost theory,
//itema/iAzr/OR //leon'ej argue that for many firm-specific resources the best
(transaction cost minimising) organisation form is for the firm to internalise the
use of these resources. That is, any economies in using these resources are
realised within the firm by using it in new activities (markets), rather than by
selling (or licensing) the services of the resource, or parts of the resource itself,
to other parties (e.g., incumbent firms in those markets). This is how Rugman
explains the multinational enterprise (MNE): j- };•:-iXi-q *!Ki; i>a«tb- ^ j-
'internalization theory demonstrates that the MNE is an organization which
uses its internal market to produce and distribute products in an efficient
manner in situations where a regular market fails to operate. (.) There are
many kinds of natural market failure associated with the pricing of
knowledge, or similar firm-specific intangible advantages. These occur in the
areas of technology, managerial skills, corporate organizational structures and
other aspects of the internal market of the firm. The firm, in short, is an
alternative to the market.' (Rugman, 1982, p. 11). _.._ _
Within strategic management, the resource-based view of the firm gives the same
explanation of diversification (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Ramanujam
and Varadarajan, 1989; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; and Montgomery and
Hariharan, 1991): .., . . .... . .„ ,,,,-,,A Guided Tour 17
'The prevailing theory of diversification .. is based on excess capacity of
productive factors. It argues that failure in the markets for these factors may
make diversification an efficient choice, although the factors are expected to
lose some efficiency in the transfer.' (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988, p.
623)
Throughout most of the book, I will focus on internalisation in multi-market firms
(see chapter 10 for strategic alliances in information technology industries).
2.4.2 Getting Durable Rents from Resources ••• *
The firm's second decision problem about resources is to defend their associated
rents against (potential) rivals and suppliers. A rent based on a unique (or scarce)
resource appears to be SKJ/amaWe only if the resource is not (costlessly) imitable.
Imitation will drive down prices, and thus reduce the value of the resource.
Whether the firm realises a rent also depends on a condition of û/?/w/ma£i7/rv,
/'.c., the firm bargains successfully over the rent with the suppliers of its
resources (e.g., employees) (Grant, 1991). The bargaining position of the
resource supplier improves if it can threaten to sell the resource elsewhere. This
will raise the resource's price, and thus determine which part of the rent the firm
will realise (/.e., value minus price), and which part the supplier will appropriate
(;.e., price minus cost). The resource's opportunity cost (the highest value of the
resource to any other firm) will equal its value if the buyer firms are
homogeneous. The rent will be zero as a result (chapter 6 will go into this with
more detail). W«erogerte/ry is, therefore, an important determinant of rents.
Among heterogeneous firms, a resource is _/7mj-5/?ec//îc if it attains its highest
value in one particular firm. The firm's bargaining position is considered strong if
a resource is firm-specific, as resource suppliers cannot credibly threaten to sell
their resource to someone else.
2.4.3 Competing for Resources
The core theory of the resource-based view of the firm assumes that there is a
given distribution of resources across firms. But how did firms get those resource
in the first place? Some important types of resources (such as experience) have
been accumulated over time through the firm's activities. Others, however, have
been bought in external factor markets. These resources may be subject to
competitive bidding between firms. If there is imperfect competition in input
markets, a rival may try to influence the quantity, quality, and price at which a
rival acquires its resources. Higher resource prices have distributional effects by
reducing the firm's rent, but may also affect product market competition. Salop
and Scheffman (1983) argue that an incumbent firm may deter entry, induce exit,
or reduce the entrant's scale by raising rivals' costs. They give several examples.
A firm may try to prevent its suppliers from supplying an entrant or fringe firm.
A capital-intensive dominant firm may negotiate high industry wages with the
union, which hurt its labour-intensive competitors most. Also, 'exclusive dealing
arrangements [with one's dealers] can raise small rivals' costs of distribution.'18 Chapter 2
(Salop and Scheffman, 1983, p. 267). Advertising and R&D raise rivals' costs if
rivals have to match these outlays. And finally, a firm may lobby to have the
government inflict costly regulation on its rivals as well as itself (rent-seeking).
In terms of figure 2.2, cost-raising by firm 1 shifts both its own and its rival's
reaction curve inwardly. The net effect on output levels and profits can be
positive as well as negative. Without further analysis one can only conclude that
at least one firm has to reduce its output level. Salop and Scheffman distinguish
two cases. Cto/-nji.ring cowiperirion (or 'prédation') occurs when the dominant
firm cost-raising strategy hurts its rivals. Their profits fall as the effect of a
higher price on their profits is overcompensated by their higher costs. Co.s/-
ra«z>ig co/Zitsion occurs when the rivals stand to gain: the increase in price
compensates for their higher costs. The real losers here are the consumers, who
foot the bill of this collusion. Strategic competition in (external and internal) input
markets thus affects both the firm's and its rivals' reaction curves in product
market competition. These actions reflect a "vertical" dimension in multi-market
competition.
Cost-raising competition hinges on an asymmetry between the preemptive firm
and its rivals. It raises its own costs less than it raises theirs. Several asymmetries
exist. For instance, if the dominant firm has a first-mover advantage, it may
preempt second movers by acquiring an input (e.g., a patent) which subsequently
raises entry costs. It may also have differential input requirements, e.g., due to its
different size, complementary resources, or degree of vertical integration. As a
consequence, an input price increase may raise its costs less than it raises its
rivals' costs. The wage-negotiation example above is an illustration. The
resource-based view argued, as noted above, that a firm may enter other product
markets in order to raise the rent from a scarce and efficient resource. This,
however, induces competition with other firms, whose reaction influences the
firm's rents.
2.5 HORIZONTALLY RELATED MARKETS
• ..•.»!;o,-->M -^ •;'•?»'.; ';;ir> ".%.:.
Potential entry may have several sources. The entry threat by established firms in
other (country or product) markets is of a different nature than new firm entry. It
therefore warrants a different response by incumbent firms. This point will
emerge as a key concern in this book. In particular, how should an incumbent
firm defend its stake against an established firm in a related market? The Ufa//
J/ree/yourna/ Europe (July 18, 1991, p. 1) nicely puts the key insight: r; ,
'U.S. Computer Firms Attempt an Invasion of Japan's PC Market - Success
Would Keep Rivals From Using Home Turf As a Global Springboard" ....,,
A strategy to defend one's home market by challenging one's competitor's home
market involves complicated interactions between these markets. These have been
modelled in detail only recently. The rise of Japanese competitors, who use their
safe home market as an entry platform, gave an impetus to these studies. The
business interest in European integration is motivated by the desire to develop the
common market into a 'global springboard'.A Guided Tour 19
Figure 2.3
Multi-market Interrelationships







Entry from market A into B
affects the investments in and
utilisation of the firm's
resources as well as product
market competition. Entry raises
resource utilisation, which may
impose a cost upon the home
market (an opportunity cost of
entry). It may also, however,
raise investments which may
have positive (spillover) effects
on the home market. Entry may
also raise competitive spirits in
the entry market, which may
lead to reciprocal entry into
one's home market. Entry may also set the stage for new, cross-market, forms of
collusion. This provides four key features that drive rivalry if firms meet in
multiple product markets. Figure 2.3 illustrates the framework.
(1) OppoTTKnzVy casr (>f e/tfry. Entry gives an opportunity cost, in the sense of
home market profits foregone, if the entrant has a binding capacity constraint that
forces it to withdraw capacity from its home market (Calem, 1988, p. 172). The
opportunity cost arises whenever entry diverts a resource from the home market,
i.e., reduces its availability to its original use. The entry opportunity cost is zero
if excess capacity is employed (Cairns and Mahabir, 1988) or if the resource has
a public good character. In the latter case, the resource involved can be used in
any number of activities without impairing its contribution to either:
'A distinctive characteristic of such [public or collective] goods is that they
are not "used up" in the process of being consumed or utilized as an input in
a production process.' (Oakland, 1987, p. 485). 'To be considered public a
good must also be of interest to more than one consumer or firm.' (p. 485).*
An f'/tf/rfe enrran/, /'.e., a firm within the set of related markets (in figure 2.1),
can eco/Kwiwe on mry COÏW either by using non-utilised resources of a private
good character (e.g., excess capacity) or by using resources with a public good
character (e.g., R&D). This may induce spillovers.
(2) Jlf u/ri-marfer Sp/7/ovm. A multi-market firm's products can be different along
three dimensions: (physical) product characteristics, location, and time (of
availability). Supplying multiple different products may create economies. Three
notable cases are economies of scope (if the products are physically different),
economies of scale (if physically identical products are traded at different
5. This is not to deny that many resources are neither strictly private goods nor
public goods. The concept of club goods has been developed in order to
understand intermediary cases (Oakland, 1987, p. 502).20 Chapter 2
locations), and learning-by-doing (if current production reduces the costs of goods
produced later). These economies include both demand effects (e.g., goodwill)
and supply effects (e.g., economies of scale). They are m«/«-mû/*ef j/M7fove#s if
a firm's actions (e.g., its output level) in market A affect the (marginal) payoffs
of its actions in market B and Wee ue/sa. That is, d*7r/<5S*dS* * 0, where 7t is a
firm's overall profit, and S' is its action (e.g., output level) in market i (= A,B)
(Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer, 1985, p. 493 and 509). Underlying these
spillovers is the use of a shared resource (for example, a brand name) (Teece,
1980). These shared resources are the core competences referred to above; the
associated spillovers create synergy (subsection 2.4.1). They provide an efficiency
motive to the multi-market enterprise (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982), such as
multinational firms (Caves, 1982) and diversified firms (Teece, 1982).
(3) One-i/Jerf an</ /Jeri/roca/ £/wry. Entry by an existing firm from market B into
market A is one-sided if it is not reciprocated by the incumbent firm(s) from
market A, and reciprocal entry if it is. Calem (1988) explicitly offers two
economic rationales for one-sided entry. First, the incumbent firm's entry cost is
sufficiently large to refrain from entering the potential entrant's market (Calem,
1988, p. 175). Second, legal or regulatory barriers may prevent incumbent firms
from being potential entrant into the rival's market (Calem, 1988, p. 182°).
However, one-sided entry is far from the only plausible case. Inside firms can
exert a neri/wca/ en/ry threat (e.g., Porter, 1980; Brander, 1981; Calem, 1988).
Entry decisions can be interdependent if an initial act of entry induces or deters
reciprocal entry (Bulow e/ a/., 1985, p. 506"). The initial entrant need not only
take into account the entry profit per se, but also the subsequent change in its
home market profits due to (induced or deterred) reciprocal entry.
Porter (1980, p. 90) summarises the strategic implications by arguing that
'[m]ultiple markets provide a way in which one firm can reward another for not
attacking it, or conversely, provide a way of disciplining a renegade.' Three
examples illustrate reciprocal entry (threats). First, incumbent firms in the entry
market may decide to enter the entrant's home market (Brander, 1981; and
Calem, 1988). This strategy of counterattack is a parry to the potential entrant's
entry attack (Yip, 1989). Second, Watson (1982) identifies counter-competitive
strategies that anticipate and preempt the potential rivals' entry move: counter-
competition entails actions (for example, entry into the potential entrants' home
market) that force the potential entrant to tie resources to her home market.
Third, hostage or foothold strategies can be employed to keep potential entrants in
check (Caves, 1982). A foothold in the potential entrants' home market signals
the ability to respond immediately to the potential entrants' entry strategy by
retaliation in her home market (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985).
(4) Mu///-/narfe; CoZ/as/on. Edwards (1955) proposed the hypothesis that firms
meeting in several markets recognise their interdependence and therefore may
decide to tune down competition. A history of multi-market competition with, for
example, a series of entry and reciprocal entry moves, may well lead to a
reduction in competition (Caves, 1982, pp. 103-107). The larger the number of
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collude (Feinberg, 1984). The ability to punish a firm that cheats in one market in
other product markets, even if it did not cheat there, reduces the gain of cheating,
which makes collusion more attractive. Multi-market collusion may have several
forms. For example, firms may establish exclusive spheres-of-influence, where
each firm is dominant firm or monopolist in one sphere while keeping out of
other spheres (Scherer, 1980, p. 340).
With these four features, multi-market competition has an impact on product
market competition (/.«., the location of reaction curves). Due to a positive multi-
market supply spillover (feature 2 above), production in market B may reduce
marginal costs in market A, which shifts the firm's reaction curve in A outward
(Bulow ef a/., 1985). Multi-market spillovers may, therefore, underlie the own
effect in figure 2.2 (from the perspective of market A). To illustrate the cross
effect, consider firm 1, the incumbent firm in product market A, and firm 2, the
incumbent firm in market B. Firm l's entry in market B may reduce firm 2's
profits there, thus reducing firm 2's opportunity cost of entry into market A
(features 1 and 3 above). This may shift firm 2's reaction curve in market A to
the left (the cross effect), which increases its output level in market A. Price fells
where it most hurts firm 1, in its home market A. Anticipating this, it may decide
against entry into market B (Bulow e/ a/., 1985).
The discussion of the vertical dimension (in the previous section) and the
horizontal dimension (in this section) of multi-market competition has given a
quick and dirty view of the main themes in this book. A recurring theme that
combines both dimensions is that a firm may earn rents from scarce resources by
applying them to multiple product markets. The next part of the book reviews the
historical antecedents of the framework.•':-•;". ;.: 'J '7!*
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It is a common place observation that many entrants are established firms in
other markets. Yet it has taken considerable time and effort before the
theoretical relevance of this observation became apparent. Two themes lurk
behind much of the discussion in this part. The first one is the extent to
which potential entrants are considered real players in the game. They can
be active players themselves (e.g., multinational firms) or passive 'players',
who merely respond to an incumbent firm, who does engage in strategic
behaviour. A second theme is that sunk (irrecoverable) costs have
ambiguous implications for entry. Sunk costs may constitute the core of an
entry barrier (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982). They may also, however,
refer to assets, such as a brand name or know how, that give rise to
economies of scope. As such, they may stimulate entry by multinational or
multiproduct firms. This gives rise to the paradox that sunk costs are both
associated with entry barriers and with entry by established firms in related
markets.U TANTECEDENTS: "
Established-firm Entry in Industrial Economics
Chapter 3 contains a survey that traces the genesis of the multi-market
competition framework from the 1930s onward. It explores how economists
discovered the importance of potential competition to incumbent firms'
strategies and market performance, and how they linked this to the identity of
the entry threat. Joe Bain and Philip Andrews are pioneers of two alternative
theories of industrial organisation. Whereas the former focuses on entry
deterrence, the latter rather focuses on entry, in particular the 'easy' entry by
established firms in related markets. The ease-of-entry approach is a forerunner
of the theory of perfectly contestable markets.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
A digression on Chamberlin's (1962; originally 1933) book may help to set the stage
for the pioneering literature. Chamberlin identified entry by firms new to the
industry as the main competitive constraint upon incumbent firms. His core model
is as follows. In an industry with differentiated products, each product entails an
individual downward sloping demand curve. Like monopolists, incumbent firms
maximise profits over their product's individual demand curve. Entry introduces
'competition' in this situation. An entrant acquires its own demand curve, while
reducing demand of the incumbent firms. Incumbent firms adjust to this by reducing
their level of output. Since an economy of scale exists, the contraction raises their
costs, to which they respond by raising their prices. A sequence of entry occurs up
to the point where an additional entrant would just fail to recover its costs. At this
point, incumbent firms are supposed to earn zero profits (/.e., Chamberlin's tangency
solution). The resulting equilibrium contains a plethora of differentiated products,
numerous firms earning zero profits, high prices, and output levels short of the cost
minimising levels ("excess capacity'). This model or vision placed imperfect
competition centre stage. It marked a conceptual break with the traditional
Marshallian approach, which opposed perfect competition to monopoly, while
treating imperfect competition with tools appropriate only to perfect competition
(Samuelson, 1985, p. 347). Chamberlin's book created the intellectual context for
subsequent analysis of industrial economics (as it came to be called). Shortcomings
of his theory partly inspired this research, and I will mention three in particular.
Kaldor (1935, p. 40), Clark (1940, p. 246), Harrod (1952, pp. 139-157), and
Bain (1956, p. 40) criticised Chamberlin's (tangency) model, arguing that established
firms anticipate entry, rather than adjusting to it afterwards. By giving up some
current profits incumbent firms may deter entry, which prevents a large loss of
profits in the future. Bain (1956) expanded upon this theme by the limit price theory.
The limit price deters (some) future entry, while being costly in the short-run as it
is lower than the monopoly price. In equilibrium positive profits can be earned if the26 Chapter 3
Chamberlinian assumptions of economies of scale and product differentiation hold
(two of Bain's entry barriers). Chamberlin, in contrast, concluded that incumbent
firms would earn zero profits. Bain's approach shifted attention from actual entry to
potential entry, and credited incumbent firms with foresight and strategic intent. It
suggested the contours of a theory of strategic behaviour, where firms choose current
actions to influence future decision making by rational rivals.
Chamberlin assumes each firm to supply a single product. This is evident from
his wngency jo/w/on: the revenue from the single product has to recover all costs
made by the firm, including the administrative overhead costs that are responsible
for the economies of scale. By implication, the entrants are presumably new firms,
for otherwise their entry would turn them into multiproduct firms. This topic, the
identity of the (potential) entrants, will loom large in this dissertation. Established-
firm entry implies that firms turn into multiproduct or multinational (i.e., multi-
market) firms. Economists took a long time to turn their attention to multiproduct
firms (e.g., Coase, 1946; Clemens, 1951; and Lanzillotti, 1954). They widened the
scope of firms' competitive moves to the choice of product line, the identification of
entry markets, and the possibility of cross-invasion into each other's territory (e.g.,
Lanzillotti, 1954, p. 471). Attention shifted, therefore, from incumbent firms' entry
deterring strategies to potential entrants' entry strategies.
Chamberlin's 'tangency solution' (1962, p. 82) makes the heroic assumption that
all firms, new and existing, have access to the same production process and product
technology. He discusses factor market imperfections in a later stage of the book
(1962, pp. 112, 264-5, and 303), while clearly considering them ancillary to the
book's main thrust. He limited his vision of diversity, product differentiation, and
imperfect competition to the product market: 'the vision of diversity and
unsystematism does not extend to the resources market.' (Stigler, 1968, p. 314). I
read Stigler as saying that the tangency solution assumes that input markets are
perfectly and purely competitive. That is, the input market is transparent ('perfect'),
inputs are freely mobile and homogeneous, and suppliers and buyers are many ('pure
competition') (Eaton and Eaton, 1990, p. 384). In that case, entrants may acquire
the same inputs at the same terms as incumbent firms do, /.e., they have the same
cost functions. If the input market is transparent, incumbent firms cannot derive an
advantage from their superior knowledge of the input market. If the inputs are
homogeneous, they are not a basis for differentiating production functions used by
new and established firms. If incumbent firms account for a small part of the total
input demand, they do not have the market power to change the terms upon which
input suppliers will serve new rivals.' These assumptions do not usually hold in the
real world, and least of all in situations where the product market is imperfectly
competitive. Fac/or mor/te/ //n/?e//ecmwtf may derive from factor heterogeneity,
small numbers of buyers and suppliers (e.g., bilateral monopoly bargaining
problems), information costs, or factor immobility. Kaldor (1935, pp. 44-45), in his
review of Chamberlin's book, referred to "institutional monopoly", /.e., i : .,UKJ
' ' [a]nything (. ) which imposes higher costs on one producer than another (whether
1. The latter condition is made explicitly by Chamberlin (1962, p. 85), although he
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UJ it is due to the possession of "unique" resources by one entrepreneur or whether
v it is merely due to "buyers' inertia" imposing a special "cost of entry" on new
i«. producers)', cos to.iwji.^ji.çûi,".^;u:o • ;,. \;d':'lv<i>&JM •'••'iqfr'dn^iRw.MÛ
Due to "institutional monopoly", entrants do not have access to inputs on the same
terms as incumbent firms. This 'may even be directly responsible for a large part of
market imperfection' (Kaldor, 1935, p. 45). Subsequent discussions bore out
Kaldor's intuition: factor market imperfections will turn out to be crucial for
understanding the strategic behaviour of incumbent firms and potential entrants.
Chamberlin, therefore, arrived at interesting views within a very tight theoretical
setting, which economists subsequently tried to break out of. Schematically, with
modifications where appropriate, two lines of thought can be identified (with
hindsight). The first one analyses entry barriers and their effect on profits (section
3.2). Joe Bain initiated a path-breaking effort to analyse potential entry. Much as
Adam Smith did to his precursors and contemporaries, Bain's analysis led to the
eclipse of earlier contributions, such as Kaldor's. I mention Kaldor in the next
section to give a historical background to the emergence of Bain's theory.
Subsequently, I turn to a predominantly British tradition, where Andrews and others
pioneered the importance of potential competition, while also pointing to existing
firms' entry strategies (section 3.3). This tradition denied that the entry barriers
identified by Kaldor and Bain protect the incumbents' profits. According to this
approach, positive profits can exist only if incumbents have cost advantages which
entrants cannot duplicate due to ownership of favourable brand names, patents,
natural resources, etc. This points to the importance of factor market imperfections
(see the next chapter). While Bain's approach appeared to focus on barriers to <fe
«ovo entry, Andrews' approach focused on factors that induce entry by established
firms. This led to confusion, as some variables, such as economies of scale, are
entry barriers in the former approach, while inducing entry according to the latter
approach. To the one who brought this to the fore, I christen this the Caves ' Paradox
(section 3.4). -.*. s ft^t <^;^:.->Kf» x, t :'-.•;•. •• wnv-<:-••.' v«," ,.?."• yvr.j
3.2 BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION . . ^ f., ,,^,
In this section I will discuss an early analysis of entry barriers by Kaldor, as well as
Bain's magnum opus.
3.2.1 Nicholas Kaidor "fa
Kaldor specified and criticised Chamberlin's analysis by exploring Hotelling's (1929)
location approach to product differentiation. Rather than adjusting to actual entry,
a far-sighted incumbent firm will anticipate potential competition (Kaldor, 1935, p.
40). He will charge a low price to secure his profits permanently. Kaldor's (1935)
and (1938) papers recognize three sources of 'permanent' profits: economies to
scale, product differentiation, and "institutional monopoly". If there are no
economies to scale, entry occurs until profits are competed away. If an economy of
scale exists due to an indivisibility, an entrant must enter at a large scale. But this
will drive prices down and convert profits into losses. Anticipating this, incumbent28 Chapter 3
firms can afford to earn profits, while an additional entrant would suffer losses. With
product differentiation, even small economies to scale suffice to protect an
incumbent's profits (Kaldor, 1938, p. 521).* The analyses of economies of scale and
product differentiation assume free entry, defined as (the possibility to offer)
identical products, absence of (preferences for) trade names, and identical cost
curves (p. 523). Kaldor (1938, p. 529) then suggests to use the term (institutional)
monopoly for "restrictions of entry", based on a unique advantage, the possession
of privileges, ownership of a patent, trade-name, or a natural resource. The concept
of imperfect competition could be reserved to denote free entry cases. In sum, a
foresighted incumbent can sustain profits if economies to scale, product
differentiation, or restrictions to free entry exist. One will recognize these as the
entry barriers later defined by Bain. -sn/.i -j^ .niDont
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3.2.2 Joe S. Bain
The fountainhead of modern industrial economics is Joe Bain's theory of barriers to
new competition. I will not attempt to summarise his work here, that has been better
done elsewhere (e.g., Osborne, 1964; Scherer, 1980; Gilbert, 1989; and Geroski,
Gilbert, and Jacquemin, 1990). I will rather highlight some points that are salient in
the context of this book. The same caveat, by the way, holds for the other theories
that I will discuss. From this point of view I will discuss the limit price model, the
conceptual framework of entry, the empirical tests, and the appendices to Bain's
(1956) book.
Bain, it should be noted, is familiar with established-firm entry: sn
l_u 'established firms operating in other industries frequently have the least
disadvantage of all potential entrants to a given industry in acquiring the requisite
;-. capital' (Bain, 1956, p. 215). t».. a-ii .«,- ,r -un.-
Entry may imply converting an existing plant previously used in another industry
(Bain, 1956, pp. 6-7). Import competition provides examples of this type of entry.
Bain's (1956, pp. 225-6) industry-specific questionnaires, from which the data in his
book are largely derived, did include a question about the category of organisations
that would present the most active "threat of entry." These explicitly refer to
different types of related firms (in downstream and other related markets).
Regrettably, he did not relate the answers he received to the question whether
economies of scale are an entry barrier. The key point, therefore, is not whether
Bain knew that entrants are often existing firms (they are, and he knew). The issue
is whether Bain appreciates the implications of this fact for his theory. He seems to
have thought, without explicit discussion, that entry by related firms could be
subsumed in the same conceptual framework or (theoretical or empirical) model as
2. This intuition has been vindicated by Eaton and Lipsey (1978). If the product is
homogeneous and economies of scale exist the same result holds (Nahata and Olson,
1989, p. 237). The incumbent's profits are very small, however, if their number is
very large, due to weak economies of scale. In this 'large group' case, Chamberlin's
proposition that entry reduces the incumbents' profits to zero is nearly correct.Antecedents 29
new firm entry. There are reasons, however, to disagree with this view, r",m>ï
I begin with Bain's limit price theory as rendered more precise by Modigliani
(1958). Bain (1956, p. 5) defines entry by '[a]n addition to industry capacity already
in use, plus emergence of a firm new to the industry. ' If entry raises the amount of
capacity in use, total output in the market increases by definition. By how much is
a moot issue. If the incumbents do not adjust their output levels (the Sylos'
Postulate), the entry level raises total market output pro ran/o. Anticipating this
outcome, a potential entrant faces a <fi/em/nû if economies of scale exist. If it enters
at a small scale, it has high unit costs, and if it enters at a large scale, it depresses
market price strongly. No level of entry may exist where the post-entry price
exceeds its average cost. The //miV owpw is the incumbent firm's minimum output
level where this dilemma forces the potential entrant to stay out of the market. The
associated (pre-entry) market price is the //wi/V price.
I submit that Bain's limit price theory is about <te novo entry: the entrant starts
from scratch. It can be a new firm, or the subsidiary of an unrelated conglomerate.
In the limit price model, the condition of entry is evaluated by the extent to which
the price exceeds the competitive long-run level of costs (Bain, 1956, pp. 3 and 6).
The economy of scale is an entry barrier precisely because the entrant is forced to
recover all costs associated with starting up production in the entry market (Kottke,
1962, 25°). Bain's (1956) discussion in his chapter 3 is clear about this point. The
entrant enters with a new plant or with as many new plants as it takes to exploit any
(plant- or firm-level) economies of scale. Distribution, product design, and sales
promotion are also started from the ground up. Being aware of the above mentioned
dilemma, the entrant may produce at a smaller scale than required to attain minimum
average costs. But there is no allowance in the discussion that the entrant's scale of
entry may help it to achieve an economy of scale based on inputs already in its use
elsewhere in the economy. Moreover, it is assumed that the entrant earns no profits
if it does not enter (a zero opportunity cost of entry). These characteristics entail t/e
novo entry.' Bain's analysis of de novo entry is as such innovative and important/
An established-firm entrant faces a different decision problem than a de «ovo
entrant: many of its investments are already bygones. It enters only if it can recover
the additional (marginal) costs imposed by entry. In an extreme case, no investments
are required to effectuate entry. Hence entry is profitable if marginal cost is
recovered (e.g., Clemens, 1951). Consider a situation with an economy of scale such
that marginal cost (= MC) is everywhere less than average cost (= AC).* No limit
price exists where AC < p < MC, i.e., where the incumbent firm earns profits and
entry is deterred. The limit price would imply negative profits to the incumbent
'•"'- ••''-'• -*43oi!"._- : .>'•-. • ;.*": :.'.!-."/•-."»?•?•<•;:•"•;:: • '1 .tjr ;•-.•>!•';«;-. • •%. -•*, >:
3. This may refer to small-scale entry by new firms (Gaskins, 1971) but is not
inconsistent per se with large-scale entry (Modigliani, 1958) backed, e.g., by a
conglomerate firm's financial resources.
4. It ushered in a debate on the use of the output level vis-à-vis the capacity level in
Dixit (1980), which in turn managed to integrate established-firm entry. I will
discuss this at greater length in chapter 8. •..••'!•;?>•;:;v'i! •. .;.!;•••:•
5. For instance, production requires a fixed cost F and a constant marginal cost MC.30 Chapter 3
firm.* The economy of scale, that is, induces entry by the established firm, rather
than deterring its entry (see subsection 3.4.3). This special case shows that Bain's
argument, economies of scale are an entry barrier, is based on the highly specific
premise of <fe now entry.
Next, consider Bain's co/ice/WKuZ/rumewo/vt. It does seem potentially inclusive
of established-firm entry. Bain subsumes different types of potential entrants into his
framework as follows. He introduces asymmetry by assuming that entrants hit the
market sequentially. He adds the assumption that a potential entrant's position in the
queue depends on the limit price required to deter its entry. Potential entrants are
ranked in increasing limit prices (the 'general condition of entry'). The incumbent
firm needs to quote the limit price associated with the first firm in the queue (the
most favoured entrant which induces the lowest limit price) in order to deter its entry
(the so-called 'immediate condition of entry'). Established firm entrants may be
given a prominent place in the queue, and thus are not inconsistent with this
framework. I have some reservations about this view, however.
Firstly, his conceptualisation appears incomplete. The notion (implied by the
example above) of a limit price with a negative profit margin is absent from Bain's
conceptualisation from 'easy' to 'blockaded' entry. In this framework, the limit price
guarantees at least zero profits (the easy entry case). A conceptualisation as general
as Bain's should not, however, exclude the possibility of entry by superior (e.g.,
lower cost, established) firms. In other words, Bain's specific limit price model gets
in the way of his generic classification of entry games.
Secondly, Bain's 'general condition of entry' concept assumes that the incumbent
firm plays the same entry deterrence game, the limit price game, with all potential
entrants. It makes an assumption of ^KflZ/Vu//vf symmetry of potential entrants. Only
a single quantitative difference (statistic) remains: the limit price induced by an
individual entrant. The general point has emerged, however, that different types of
potential entrants require different types of entry (deterrence) game. Chapter 2 has
suggested that the incumbent firm may respond to established firm entry in ways that
are not available had the entrant been a new firm. In particular, reciprocal entry may
be possible. Such strategic options differentiate the established firm entry game from
the new firm entry (deterrence) game.
Subsequently, let's turn to his empirical work. Bain's 'general condition of entry'
appears to defy operationalisation for the sake of empirical testing. The sequential
entry process above allowed that entrants would face entry barriers of different
magnitude. The empirical work in Bain (1956) and followers is far more restrictive.
It assumes that the (average) incumbent firms' economies of scale can serve as a
proxy for a potential entrant's economies of scale. This symmetry assumption implies
a testable implication. In a cross-sectional regression, profits (or price-cost margins)
will increase with (a measure of) the incumbent firm's economy of scale. This
consequence gave Bain's theory immense popularity among empirical economists.'
6. Kottke (1962, p. 43) notes the same result when an economy of scope rather than
scale exists.
7. For an overview of the empirical achievements inspired by Bain's theory, see for
instance Semmler (1984); Davies, Lyons, Dixon, and Geroski (1988); and Gilbert
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Without knowing anything about potential entrants, the effect of their entry threat on
incumbent firms' pricing can be traced. Data on incumbent firms can be used as
proxies for entry barriers that explain incumbent firms' performance. This symmetry
approach is inconsistent with the asymmetrical entry process noted above, which
suggested that Bain's theory could accommodate diverse types of potential entrants.
An obvious case where the symmetry assumption fails is the example above, where
a domestic firm competes with a foreign entrant: the former should recover all fixed
costs in its home market, whereas the latter only needs to recover entry set-up costs.*
One may grant that data limitations might explain why Bain had to test a simpler
(symmetry) version of his more general theory of entry. He aptly notes in the
introduction to his empirical work, 'our reach exceeds our grasp' (Bain, 1956, p.
42). Sure enough, but Bain might at least have been explicit about this reduction to
symmetry and its consequences.
Finally, in the appendix D on product differentiation barriers to entry, Bain
provides some institutional detail on barriers and actual entry into his 20 industries.
This material can fruitfully be interpreted, with hindsight, as evidence for entry by
acquisition (pp. 267 and 296), strategic groups (pp. 288-290, 297-308, 309 and 310)
with different entry barriers into the strategic groups (pp. 296 and 311) or similar
entry barrier height (p. 290), and mobility barriers (p. 308). Some characteristic
comments about established-firm entry stand out. Metal containers (tin cans) compete
with glass and fibre containers. The latter give rise to a 'threat of entry' or
'expanded competition' but, on the other hand, 'cans have invaded fields primarily
supplied by other containers -notably beer, coffee, and lubricating oil containers. '
(p. 273). The effective "barrier to entry" is probably quite low. In the soap industry,
'the most favored category of potential entrants would be firms already distributing
non-soap products through grocery and drug stores' (p. 284). This may apply to meat
packers who already sell meat to grocers and have achieved parity with the big three
suppliers of laundry soap and toilet-soap bars (p. 283). These comments show that,
contrary to Bain's theory in the main text, product differentiation and economies to
scale need not be entry barriers per re. Bain denotes the associated entry barrier as
'low' when entrants exist (according to answers to the questionnaires or previous
experience) who can circumvent the barrier by drawing upon their investments in
adjacent lines of business.
To conclude, Bain is aware of established firm entry but he keeps it out of his
framework. This is not to deny Bain's merits in other respects. As I noted before,
I will limit my discussion to the point relevant in this book. Moreover, my critique
has the benefit of hindsight, and cannot serve to belittle Bain's contribution to the
analytical landscape of his time. In contrast, however, established-firm entry is the
focal point of the ease-of-entry theory proposed by Philip Andrews and Elizabeth
Brunner, which is less well known than Bain's and was developed simultaneously.
So let us turn to their theory.
8. Note that in the period covered by Bain's data, circa 1951, entry by Japanese
firms had not yet mounted a threat to U.S. firms. For instance, imports of cars into
the U.S. accounted for less than 0.5% of total volume (Bain, 1956, p. 297). It may
be added that Americans were slow to understand the significance of the Japanese
threat. In this respect a focus on Je «ovo entry may not be innocuous.32 Chapter 3
3.3 THE EASE-OF-ENTRY APPROACH: a Forerunner of Contestability
I will first review the pioneers' contribution before turning to other economists of
the British tradition. . ^
3.3.1 P.W.S. Andrews and E. Brunner vSaraajôtwl'-. oA
Andrews and Brunner developed an industrial economics which may be labelled the
eore o/en/ry op/jroac/i (Andrews, 1949, 1964; Brunner, 1961; and Andrews and
Brunner, 1975).' The ease of entry approach emphasises potential competition by
existing firms:
'If the big business is important as a centre of economic power, it is also one of
the sources of competition. The business world should be seen as competitive in
the sense that in any market there will be a definite limit to the price which can
be charged, and that any business man who exceeds this will lose his market,
unless he is protected in some special way, as by legal restrictions. ' (Andrews,
1949, p. 172).
The entry threat that imposes this 'limit to the price' comes from established firms
in related markets:
'Andrews has pointed out the importance of crosi-enrry co/nperff/on, i.e. firms
established in other product markets who can move into this market. These may
be firms in quite a different industry which are seeking diversification. It may
be a firm integrating backwards to control its supply of materials, or integrating
forward to control its immediate market. It may be a firm already in the same
industry, but moving into a market which it was not in before. ' (Brunner, in her
book with Andrews, 1975, p. 39).
-;r V: .-•
The key insight of the ease of entry approach is the proposition that existing firms
with related assets and skills bypass entry barriers which are unsurmountable to other
potential entrants. For instance, new competition from businesses already established
elsewhere
'is likely to be not only effective but also likely to operate relatively quickly with
few of the impediments on which so much stress has been laid. ' (Andrews, 1964,
p. 78).
Andrews (1949, p. 172) points out that existing firm entrants may economise on
entry costs by using their existing overhead departments. Capital requirements may
deter entry by new firms but not by existing firms eager to expand into new markets.
9. See Robinson ( 1950) and Plant ( 1951 ) for critical reviews of Andrews ( 1949); and
Edwards (1955) and Bhagwati (1970) for surveys. Cairns and Mahabir (1988) gave
a sympathetic discussion that brought Andrews's theory back into the lime light. This
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The latter get finance on better terms (e.g., by retained earnings) than new firms
(Andrews, 1949, p. 171-172). By using existing resources, an established-firm
entrant can enter at a small scale without running into high average costs (Brunner,
1961). It thus escapes Bain's dilemma, that small scale entry raises costs and large
scale entry reduces the market price. Entry barriers, therefore, do not deter existing
firms the way they do new firms:
'Bain's 'barriers to entry' seem somewhat insignificant alongside the much more
obvious ease of entry by existing firms. The effective entry-forestalling price has
to be much lower than is suggested by the Bain criteria, because the most likely
new entrants are not such as would be inhibited by those barriers. ' (Brunner,
1961, p. 250). ._.,._..._^
As a result, the entry-forestalling price will not exceed unit cost by much. This may
explain full cost pricing with (close to) zero economic profits ('normal profits')
(Andrews, 1949, p. 174-5):
'The normal costing-margin will tend to be at such a level as will cover the
average indirect costs in the long run, and give a normal profit, in the sense of
the margin at which new businesses will enter the market.' (Andrews, 1949, p.
174)
The associated price, the normal costing price, differs from the full cost price if
there is a cost difference between incumbent firms and potential entrants. That is,
if C is the incumbent firm's unit cost, and E the unit entry cost, then the full cost
price is p = C and the normal costing price equals p = C + E. These different
pricing policies have been labelled the priestly code and the lay code, respectively:
the priestly code provides a normal level of profit; the lay code superimposes a
regard for the market, including potential entry (Robinson, 1950, p. 776).
Andrews and Brunner are rather informal about what exactly constitutes their
theory. The outcome they predict is similar to Bain's 'easy entry' case, where
economies to scale and other barriers are small such that the limit price is not much
above the long-run unit cost. It is then possible to read into their work the statement
that Bain's case of 'easy entry' predominates empirically. For example, 'entry is
much easier and may come more quickly than most economic analysis allows'
(Andrews and Brunner, 1975, p. 41). In that case, the appropriate theory is the limit
price theory, with the added notion that the firms leading the queue of potential
entrants induce a limit price close to the incumbent firm's average ('full') cost. Bain,
however, may conclude that in that case the incumbent firm will rather forego entry
deterrence. He may quote a higher price, an 'entry-inducing price', while accepting
that after an entry lag entrants will come in and cut into his profits (e.g., Bain, 1956,
p. 35).'" Profits would be transitional in nature. Andrews and Brunner might retort
10. Gaskins (1971) modeled this dynamic process in the spirit of Bain (1956, p. 35).
An incumbent firm may set a price (path) such that entry continuously erodes its
market share and profits. As a result, the incumbent firm may earn a larger
discounted profit flow than if it quotes the limit price forever.34 Chapter 3
that entry lags are sufficiently short to ignore the transitional profits. The limit price
(or full cost price) would be the profit maximising option.
This interpretation captures some characteristics of Andrews's and Brunner's
theory, but I propose to reject it. Austin Robinson's (1950, p. 777) interpretation of
Andrews's (1949) book better captures the spirit of their work:
,x ••-• ift) >rrnft
'It is clear that Mr. Andrews's account of the actions of firms makes them act
as if they assume that markets will be lost if price is raised above the potential
supply price of competitors.'!'! :wîi r '-'ivr/irvr • •/ijirsîfts?.'» * /i ••"&••
Andrews and Brunner believe (in now well-established industrial economic parlance)
that post-entry competition is a Bertrand game in prices rather than a Cournot game
in outputs:
'the analysis given here is in terms of an equilibrium of pnce, and not of
individual OM//?WM.' (Andrews, 1951, p. 166) [italics in original].
An entrant does not add his output level to the incumbent's, as in a Cournot model,
but rather replaces the incumbent, as in a Bertrand model. According to Edwards
(1955, p. 96), an incumbent firm should quote a 'right' price which 'is equal to the
average inclusive cost of producing the product in the most efficient manner'. If he
fails to do so,
"the new entrant is thereby enabled to quote a lower price, and a price which -if
the necessary scale of production can be achieved- it will be possible to maintain
in the long run and still earn a 'normal' profit." (p. 97) . ... _
Note the similarity with a perfectly contestable market where full cost pricing with
cost minimisation appears as a result of potential competition. In similar vein,
Robinson's quote above comes close to formulating a critérium of sustainable prices.
In this interpretation of Andrews and Brunner, they do present a theory substantially
different from Bain. They emerge as early contestability theorists. Andrews,
however, believed their theory to be compatible with risk, sunk costs, and efficiency
differences between firms (Andrews, 1949, p. 270-1). This raises doubts on the
validity of their theory: we know from contestable market theory that these
conditions contradict perfect contestability. Moreover, Andrews made rather strong
claims on the realism of his theory. Yet, in contrast to Bain, he did not develop a
consistent empirical research agenda. ' ' Another concern is that Andrews and Brunner
analyse only half the problem, so to speak. They do not face up to the multi-market
context that their theory really requires. '* They do not analyse the effects that entry
may have on the entrant's home market. Yet these feedbacks impact on the entrant's
11. Moreover, Robinson's (1950) and Plant's (1951) reviews of Andrews (1949)
book criticise in particular its lack of realism.
12. Andrews and Brunner (1975, p. 25) give a very short and sketchy view of the
interaction of prices between sub-markets. It does not look like a promising start of
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incentives to enter another market. <usr snt:i'*3£"iv< s!*;w ,r»fei r.a o.
To sum up, during their career Andrews and Brunner consistently developed the
theme that the entry threat has to be understood in the context of a specific type of
entrants (/'.c., existing firms). They fail, however, to conceptualise the problem in
a proper theory. ;
3.3.2 R.F. Harrod
Andrews and Brunner were not alone in voicing early contestability views. Another
proponent in the full cost pricing debate, Harrod (1952), integrated and further
developed the views by Andrews and Kaldor (1935). The incumbent firm will
anticipate entry, rather than adjust to actual entry as Chamberlin believed (Harrod,
1952, p. 146). Harrod gives a definition of entry barriers substantially identical to
the one in Bain (1956):
"It would seem natural to use the expression 'degree of monopoly' for the size
of the impediment to the appearance of competitors to a given entrepreneur; this
'degree of monopoly' would be measured by the rate of profit that could be
safely earned without provoking competition; with free entry the degree of
monopoly thus defined would be zero, whatever the slope of the particular short-
period demand curve." (Harrod, 1952, p. 172).
In quoting a price, the firm does not maximise short-run profits, but, rather, takes
into account the effect of a high price on future entry:
'If a price is charged that new competitors can undercut, the loss of potential
revenue due to the consequent loss of market must be subtracted from the
immediate revenue yielded by the price charged.' (Harrod, 1952, p. 150-1).
If entry is (relatively) free, the incumbent will, in order to deter entry, quote a low
price yielding only a normal profit, while choosing capacity to achieve lowest
production costs (p. 151). A higher price than the one yielding a normal profit (i.e.,
the full cost), is allowed for only if the incumbent firm has 'an advantage peculiar
to himself. That is, Harrod accepts only the 'institutional monopoly' or absolute cost
advantages among Kaldor's and Bain's entry barriers. Harrod's exposition is
inconsistent, however, as he still holds to Chamberlin's tangency solution (Harrod,
1952, p. 162). That is, in the equilibrium the firm's individual demand curve has the
same slope as the average cost curve. But this must mean (given a downward-sloping
demand curve) that the cost function is downward-sloping at the equilibrium output
level, i.e., production costs are not minimised. Lydall (1955, p. 302) noted this
inconsistency and amended the analysis.
3.3.3 H.F. Lydall :1"'"W ..>>•:••, > .::-:.;•"'•"' A .-... ;•- wv; .••••:•: .v; •: ::,.t- -!
.iv^-;iiki:-'«r.i.T-rr.i Vî.--.-! i*MD'> .''.M$»l.-<S">rïn " .s fii&CirW-"
Lydall (1955) argues that if a firm chooses a price with respect to the short-run
demand curve (given the number of firms), it may induce entry, which will shift the
firm's short-run demand curve inward. To prevent this, it will search for a price36 Chapter 3
which covers costs, while preventing entry. This is the no-en/ry ce/7/n^ price, i.e.,
'the maximum price which can be charged without provoking new entry.' (p. 301).
The 'ceiling' is equal to or just below the entrant's minimum average cost. If all
firms have identical cost curves (Chamberlin's 'heroic' assumption), the ceiling also
equals the incumbent firm's minimum average cost. A higher price would invite
entry; a lower price would lead to a loss. In equilibrium the demand curve will
intersect the cost curve at the point where unit cost is minimised, i.e., where the cost
curve is horizontal."'* The relationship to contestable market theory is evident:
« J<-:.\> ,-->,. •'•snfu. "' . A
'we have the same situation as under perfect competition: price will be at a
minimum, profits no more than normal and output at the optimum.' (Lydall,
1955, p. 302) -i:r«•«,-
Using this framework, Lydall makes two valuable points. First, the firm's
'immediate neighbours' in terms of product substitutes will be its most likely
potential entrants:
'If any firm raises its price above its own ceiling level it will attract the attention
of a potential competitor, not so much from outside the large group, but more
probably from a firm already operating in another part of the group.' (p. 305)
Second, if established and new suppliers have different cost curves, the incumbent
can quote a price equal to the entrant's minimum cost and still earn a profit. Long
run market power exists (or monopoly, in Lydall's words), if the incumbent firm can
raise price without losing all demand to entrants. The necessary condition for this is
that the incumbent raises the costs of entrants first. It can do so if
'the cost of launching a new product on the market depends on the policy of
existing firms.'(p. 304)
The monopolist raises rival's costs by buying a patent or by advertising: 'advertising
creates a barrier to new entry and as a consequence raises the price which can safely
be charged without provoking new entry.' (p. 308). It occurs to Lydall that
advertising also raises the firm's own cost, but 'it may still be profitable to advertise,
if the price ceiling rises more rapidly than average cost.' (p. 308). This view harks
back to Kaldor's 'institutional monopoly' (see section 3.1 and subsection 3.2.1), and
13. This situation may be a fluke, although Lydall does not discuss this.
Unsustainability problems arise if the demand curve cuts the cost curve elsewhere.
Contestability theorists later "solved" the problem by assuming cost curves with 'flat
bottoms' (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982, p. 29-36).
14. Ironically, this resurrects a tangency solution. The long-run demand curve is
horizontal at a price level equal to the entrants' minimum average cost. In
equilibrium it is tangent to the incumbent's average cost curve where the latter is
minimised (i.e., at the minimum, where the cost curve is flat). This is not
Chamberlin's tangency solution, featuring short-run demand curves and excess
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prefigures Salop and Scheffman's (1983) 'competition by raising rival's costs' (see
chapters 6 and 8). To illustrate, call c the incumbent's minimum unit costs, E(x) the
entrant's additional unit cost, x the incumbent's cost-raising investment (advertising,
patenting, ere), and D(.) the market demand curve. The incumbent's profits are it
= (p-c)D(p)-x, if entry is deterred and the incumbent is a monopolist. The no-entry
ceiling price is p = c+E(x). Lydall notes that this is not a given price, but depends
on the policy (here reflected by the variable x) of the established firms. Consistent
with Lydall's view, the incumbent firm chooses a price p such that
(3.1) p = c+E(x), 7i = E(x)D(c+E(x))-x, and x = argmax «.,*•. ..
If the entrants have an exogenous cost disadvantage of E, the incumbent may quote
a price p = c + E. Lydall argues that the incumbent firm does not have market power
(or monopoly) at this price, since if it raises price just a little above c+E, entry will
deprive it of all forthcoming demand. Hence market power exists if and only if the
incumbents can raise the entrants' costs.
'But under perfect market conditions existing firms have no power to influence
the cost of new entry. It is this power, not the sloping demand curve as such,
that marks the essential difference between monopoly and competition.' (p. 304)
Lydall, that is, distinguishes 'competition', where the entrant's cost function is
exogenous (5E/dx = 0), from 'monopoly', where the entrant's cost function is
endogenous and the incumbent firm has the ability to raise the entrant's costs (dE/dx
> 0). Only if the incumbents monopolize some factors, e.g., technical know how,
can they raise the no-entry ceiling price and earn above normal profits.
Lydall's paper is clearly thought-provoking. It constitutes, in my opinion, the
analytical apex of the ease-of-entry approach. His contribution encompasses both the
'horizontal' multi-market dimension, i.e., firms (potentially) compete across different
markets or market segments, and the 'vertical' dimension, i.e., firms compete in
input as well as product markets. It has taken a long time before its implications
have been understood.
3.3.4 Not much of a Paradigm ; «> •*•• > - * ,r . >'. 'i
Up to the 1960s, the trickle of papers on easy entry by established firms remained
outside of the mainstream of industrial economics, dominated by Bain's approach.
With hindsight, one can conclude that the interesting work by Andrews, Harrod,
Brunner, Lydall, and others, failed to develop a paradigm or research agenda."
Several possible explanations can be mentioned. The authors failed to disentangle
three dimensions in these debates. The first one is the identity of the entry threat.
15. When an appropriate paradigm finally appeared, in Baumol er a/. (1982), the
ancestors had been forgotten. In their book, Baumol e/ a/, did not try to relate their
work to these pioneers. Moreover, the book is overly formal and ignores the central
motivation in Andrews. It was up to Cairns and Mahabir (1988) to trace
contestability back to Andrews' work (see chapter 7 in part IV).38 Chapter 3
The authors did not develop a multi-market framework, which is the natural habitat
for a theory of established-firm entry. To put it differently, they failed to integrate
theories of multiproduct and multinational firms. The second one is the distinction
between competition in output levels (e.g., Bain), and in prices (e.g., Andrews). In
the latter, but not the former, the entrant can, by undercutting slightly the
incumbent's price, capture a large market demand without the dramatic price
reduction envisaged by Bain. This increases the urgency of the entry threat. Third,
prior to the advent of game theory, economists had the greatest difficulties in coming
to grips with the distinction between short-run instruments (e.g., price) and long-run
instruments (e.g., capacity)."" Progress along theoretical lines was, therefore,
barred, and Bain pointed in the correct direction by providing a paradigm for
empirical research. The British theorists remained predominantly oriented at the full
cost pricing debate, as to which price an incumbent firm will quote, given its
anticipation of quick and effective entry. Notwithstanding this orientation, they never
developed the kind of tight framework introduced by Baumol and others in 1982,
although Lydall came close. Theoretical giants like Kaldor and Harrod were basically
interested in macroeconomic growth theory; Andrews did have a life-long
commitment, but lacked the interest or ability to formalise the argument." The
subsequent section, however, shows that some empirical research did occur along
Andrews' lines. . ,> ans ^i acR "s'D
3.4 EMERGING EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS • ,.,:...
The great strength of Bain's theory relative to Andrews's was its susceptibility to
16. Hicks (1954) tries to complement Harrod (1952) on this point. His analysis is
very muddled and overlooks two implications of this analysis. First, price is not the
only instrument in competition. Capacity investments may be an instrument as well
through their influence on costs or demand. Second, he assumes without question
that the pre-entry price determines the scale and incidence of entry. The one point
the paper is still remembered for is the distinction between 5«c/cer.s (firms with a
long-run business orientation) and .jflarcfterc (with a short-run orientation).
17. Andrews (1949, p. 174) proposes price competition and rejects output
competition, saying that firms do not choose the output level where marginal cost
equals marginal revenue. His precise wording seems to have been misunderstood,
however, as an attack on profit maximisation (Robinson, 1950, p. 774). This gives
Andrews's work a distinctively heterodox flavour (Robinson, 1950, p. 771). Bain
cannot so be misunderstood. His model of competition in outputs fits well in the
Cournot tradition, where firms bring commodities to a market and a market clearing
price is established. The general public (at least among economists) may have felt
at home in Bain's (1956) book. In the 1950s economists did not sufficiently
appreciate the point that both price and output competition are compatible with profit
maximisation. For example, Modigliani (1958, p. 216") does refer to Andrews
(1949) but completely misses this point.
18. These arguments are only tentative. To understand more about the formation of
a paradigm, one should probably move beyond the history of ideas to a history of
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empirical testing. Some empirical implications did emerge, however.'o !;;>«• tè
3.4.1 H.H. Hines: Established-rum Entrants as a Strategic Group
Hines's (1957) paper, influential after more than a decade, first derived empirical
implications from Andrews's approach. It suggests what I may call
'an established firm may be able to overcome handicaps that might effectively
bar new-firm entrants'(pp. 134-135). 7»>-«i ^' ••!*• ;!<;»...-n u>i.>.!,»^
In explaining the advantages that established-firm entrants have, Hines casts his net
wider than Andrews and Brunner did in their early formulations. According to
Hines, established-firm entrants may have superior access to productive resources;
for example, they may gain access to technology by trading against some of their
own patents, use already-installed equipment and processes, and apply existing
managerial skills. They may also have superior access to product markets by using
existing facilities and brand names. Bureaucratic inertia may, however, work against
the existing firm entrant.
Hines's paper is somewhat of a classic because it is a pioneering statement of
what later came to be called jfra/eg/c gro«/J5 (Caves and Porter, 1977). He points
out that many markets show up a competitive fringe and an oligopolistic or
monopolistic core (two 'strategic groups'). He explores two consequences of this
view for the entry process. He begins by noting that different types of entrants enter
into different strategic groups. New firms usually enter at a small scale, and remain
locked in the competitive fringe. They cannot match the dominant firms' advertising
nor the width of their product line. On the other hand,
'established-firm entrants (because of their large size or the strength of their
brand or product appeal) might more probably move at once on a large scale into
the central core of the market, where they will immediately influence pricing
policies.'(Hines, 1957, p. 140) . -
This may be called W/m'j J«WU/ propos/n'on: when comparing actual entry by new
and established firms, the latter enter at a larger scale than the former. In a
parenthesis Hines then discusses what is now called the mocfe o/en/ry, that is, the
way in which a firm enters. He argues that established firms need not only enter by
setting up new facilities; they may also enter by buying up an incumbent firm or
some of its plants. Yip (1982b), whose book is largely dedicated to this issue, refers
to this as the choice between J/recf enrry and ac^MK/rion ewry. The take-over is then
a first step in the entry process; subsequently the new owner may enlarge the
acquired firm by adding its own resources. Moreover, Hines claims that the new
owner may support the acquired firm to leave the competitive fringe and enter the
oligopolistic core of the market. From the point of view of the dominant group, this
constitutes entry. Hines (1957, p. 145) here suggests an 'extension of the entry
concept' which was further developed by Caves and Porter (1977) as the /noM/iry
concept. Hines then suggests a r/»/ri pro/^mon: Entry by merger tends to disrupt40 Chapter 3
local tacit collusion. That is, » mo**»!'-.- :** tc
'the change in management is likely to be peculiarly disruptive of local restrictive
agreements. Administrative convenience may require the firm to set broad
national or regional policies, leaving little scope for local adaptation. ' (Hines,
1957, p. 44)" :<;^>-a
Hines' creative paper suggests that entry barriers are specific to, and also limit
mobility between, strategic groups. Moreover, there are strategic groups among
potential entrants. An intuitive ex ante set of groups is as follows. One group
contains new firm entrants, another established firms in related markets, and yet
another one contains, for instance, unrelated (conglomerate) businesses. The analogy
with strategic groups is fairly complete: it is easy to think of mobility barriers that
deter a potential entrant from shifting from one group (e.g., new firms) to another
(e.g., related entrants). Hines' paper implies a rich empirical research agenda.
3.4.2 Meanwhile at the Ottawa Bureau of Competition Policy •••..• . :.j*,iii*"s?i
Some tests exist of Hines' first proposition. These show that an Andrewsian approach
does have empirical implications. These came, however, long after Bain's approach
had spawned a huge empirical research tradition. This may be one factor explaining
Bain's popularity relative to Andrews's. Gorecki (1975), at the Ottawa Bureau of
Competition Policy, studies actual entry over a short period (1958-1963) in the U.K.
manufacturing sector. He distinguishes between entry by new firms ('specialists') and
diversifying firms. He finds that entry by diversifying firms is not responsive to
entry barriers (/.e., economies of scale by average plant size and product
differentiation by advertising outlay per firm), whereas entry by new firms is (p.
144). Gorecki's (1976) paper on the Canadian industry, which compares foreign and
domestic entrants, reaches similar conclusions. Shapiro (1983) confirms Gorecki's
(1976) results, while using a slightly different methodology and updated data on the
Canadian industry. He finds, among others, that R&D intensity has a positive effect
on foreign and a negative effect on domestic entry. In a study of entry by major
U.S. manufacturing corporations in 1973-1977, Montgomery and Hariharan (1991,
p. 84) find that 'While entry varies inversely with the size of the minimum efficient
scale plant (MES), the coefficients for capital intensity (CAPI), selling intensity
(SELL), and research and development intensity (RD) are not negative as traditional
entry barrier theory would predict.' As Mata (1991) argues, this research tradition
has not yet discovered a consistent pattern as to which explanatory variables ('entry
barriers') induce entry by some and deter entry by other strategic groups of entrants.
The need, however, to distinguish between strategic groups among entrants has been
clearly demonstrated.
Other tests have confirmed Hines' second proposition (Hause and Du Rietz,
1984; Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988; and Mata, 1991). Survivors among
new firms tend to remain smaller than the average incumbent firm, whereas
surviving diversifying entrants exceed the average size of incumbents (Dunne « a/.,
19. This is not to say that others may not have noted this before Hines did.Antecedents 41
1988, p. 512). This is consistent with mobility barriers that are specific to new-firm
entry. Berry (1974-5) finds that large, diversifying, firms enter in direct competition
with the large incumbent firms. This confirms Hines' suggestion that they enter the
dominant firms' strategic group. Berry (1974-5, p. 204) concludes that
'the market position of leading firms does appear protected in concentrated
industries from entry by other than large firms. That is the bad news. The good
news is that at least some of the diversifying activity of large firms may have
filled the gap.'
3.4.3 R.E. Caves: Taking Stock of the Debate ' •' *> t v ! •r--»i
With some empirical research addressing the implications of established firm entry,
it was possible to compare these results with Bain's. It was up to Caves to organise
the showdown. In analysing the multinational firm, Caves (1971) harks back to
Hines' ideas. First, he reiterates Bain's entry barriers. He then shows that a
multinational firm can overcome these entry barriers more easily than a new
domestic entrant can. In fact, the very factors which induce the multinational firm
to enter foreign markets are those listed by Bain as entry barriers. Economies of
scale are considered an entry barrier, yet they induce the multinational firm to enter
foreign markets in order to increase its production and reduce its average costs.
Product differentiation is another entry barrier; but often a firm decides to enter
foreign markets in order to exploit its superior product or brand name. The same
holds for absolute cost advantages imposed by the finance market on new firms or
ventures. The multinational firm may have an absolute cost advantage relative to a
domestic firm entrant as it can use retained earnings and may have a good credit
rating (Caves, 1971, p. 13). This is Caves' Paradox. Yip (1982b) dramatised the
Paradox by introducing the concept of 'gateways to entry' (i.e., inducements to
entry):
'the same variables giving rise to barriers can give rise to gateways to entry'
(Yip, 1982b, p. 10).
Caves' Paradox epitomises the debates between Bain's approach to industrial
economics and Andrews's. It revealed a fundamental ambiguity in Bain's concept of
entry barriers. This is a central problem in multi-market competition, and the next






>rfr•••-.'V- :«;'--/: KiU'". -v •.< ..4 CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND BEYOND: "—~""-~~-~
Sunk Costs, Factor Market Imperfections, and Transaction Costs
V
Chapter 4 reviews contestability theory, which has contributed greatly to the
development of multi-market competition. It (over-)emphasised the salience of
the entry threat, drove home the importance of economies of scope, and pointed
to the importance of factor market imperfections by showing the
(counterfactual) results if these are suppressed. Transaction cost economics also
demonstrated the importance of factor market imperfections by showing that in
their absence economies of scope would not, contrary to contestability ' s claim,
induce firms to become multi-product in scope. The chapter leads up to a
discussion of inducements to entry and barriers to entry which builds upon the
conceptual and empirical theories of the 1950s to 1980s and that provides a
starting point for the game theoretical analyses of multi-market competition in
the 1980s and 1990s, which are discussed in part III.
4.1 INTRODUCTION ,..,.
This chapter harks back to the 'Caves Paradox'. The Archimedean point in
unravelling the Paradox has been the crucial role played by sunk costs. The
contestable market theory is the natural point of departure for exploring this line of
reasoning. It conducts a thought experiment where absence of sunk costs is necessary
for absence of entry barriers. The extreme nature of the results inspired critiques
which further developed the concept and significance of sunk costs. Theories of
transaction cost economics and committed competition showed that sunk costs that
are firm- rather than product-specific induce rather than barr entry. I will
subsequently return to the Caves' paradox in the chapter's appraisal. Although this
chapter can be critical at times, in similar vein as the previous one, its main aim is
constructive. It tries to distil from the literature a sound conceptual basis for the
analysis of entry (deterrence) games in the subsequent part.
Section 4.2 reviews the debate on perfectly contestable markets, entry barriers,
sunk costs and transaction costs. Section 4.3 reviews the interaction between efficient
industry structures, economies of scope, firm-specific resources, and again
transaction costs. These two sections will indicate the importance of contestability
theory, notwithstanding the fundamental and justified critiques levelled against it. It
contributed, both directly and through the critiques which it provoked, to a clear
understanding of the concepts of sunk costs, entry barriers, and firm-specific
resources. These in turn provide the linchpin between the original debate on
established-firm entry in the previous chapter and the modern game theories in the
next part. Section 4.4 summarises the chapter.44 Chapter 4
4.2 THE THEORY OF PERFECTLY CONTESTABLE MARKETS *.-,<.2
Bain (1956) argued that economies to scale are an entry barrier. A position directly
opposite is implied by the contestable market theory.' It denies the existence of any
entry barriers other than those based on sunk costs. It thus forced a very sharp
distinction between perfect contestability, where sunk costs are absent, and imperfect
contestability, when sunk costs may exist. If sunk costs are absent, incumbent firms
deter entry by minimizing costs and quoting prices equal to minimum average
production costs. In a sustainable industry configuration the number of firms is such
that industry costs are minimised: no other number of firms can serve demand at
lower prices. The number of firms is, therefore, directly derived from industry
demand and cost functions (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982, pp. 109 and 116-7).
Sustainability requires efficiency (cost minimisation) if and only if potential entrants
exist which can undercut the incumbent firm's prices otherwise, duplicate its
production process, capture its market, and exit again when it responds by lowering
its prices ('hit-and-run entry').
As its title might have indicated, the (1982) book contains two related theories
rather than a single unified theory. Contestability is about incumbent firms which
anticipate (potential) entry by quoting an entry deterring price. Potential entrants, in
turn, have expectations about the post-entry situation. Call this theory I: the //jeory
0/ (jVnJ/œAfm/)' con/es/aWe mantm. Chapter 5 in Baumol e/ a/. (1982) develops a
theory of the cost-minimizing industry structure, assuming only that firms are
financially viable (a feasibility condition). This condition is postulated rather than
derived from 'more basic postulates about the behavior of firms and of
entrepreneurs' (i'.e., entry threats) (p. 98). That is, entry threats and sustainability
are absent from this theory (they are, indeed, not mentioned in chapter 5 of the
book). Call this theory II: a r/ieory o///w cow-ffH/iwHz/ng //w/itfrry wruaMre. It has
nothing to do with contestability. Panzar (1989) summarises this theory without,
indeed, even making passing reference to contestability. Note that theory II moves
beyond textbook expositions of cost and demand functions only by the elaborate
analysis of multiproduct firms and economies of scope.
The authors confuse both theories when defining the concept of sustainability.
Baumol e/a/. (1982, pp. 192-3) define sustainability as a vector of incumbent firm's
prices and outputs such that the monopolist recovers its costs and no potential entrant
can undercut the monopolist, sell a vector of quantities y', and recover its entry costs
E(y°). In Baumol « a/. (1983, p. 495) sustainability is defined as a vector of prices
and quantities such that costs are minimised and prices just cover costs. The
1. The book by Baumol er a/. (1982) is the canonical statement. A short summary
view is in Dixit (1982). For thoughtful criticisms see Shepherd (1984). Schwartz
(1986) and Farrell (1986) explore and reject the robustness of contestability to small
sunk costs and exit lags. Baumol er Û/. (1983) and (1986) respond to critiques. Some
extensions of the theory are Kim (1987) on the multi-product monopolist and Asheim
(1992) on resource markets. Calem (1988) and Cairns and Mahabir (1988) present
'revisionist' views. For an empirical test of the airline industry, Baumol er a/.'s
favoured example, see Hurdle, Johnson, Joskow, Werden, and Williams (1989), and
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definition ignores potential entrants and entry costs. The former definition is in line
with theory I, the latter with theory II. If there are entry costs, a vector of prices
with positive profits can be sustainable by the former definition, but is certainly
unsustainable by the latter definition. The two theories should, therefore, be strictly
distinguished. This interpretation of the book is consistent with Shepherd (1984, p.
572) who focuses on 'ultra-free entry' (i.e., theory I), which he argues 'is largely
separable from the multiproduct and sustainability analysis' (i.e., theory II).
The relationship between both theories is that incumbent firms choose products,
output levels, and prices so as to deter entry. In a /?etfêcr/)> contestable market (but
not in an imperfectly contestable market) it is proved that the decisions must induce
a cost-minimizing industry structure. The subtle differences between theories I and
II become apparent, therefore, when some form or other of imperfect contestability
holds. * Note that contestability in its single-product version does not need more than
text-book analyses of cost curves. The theory of efficient industry structures makes
a real contribution only in the multi-product case. So, in effect, the two theories are
independent. The remainder of this section discusses theory I (on contestable
markets), while the next section discusses economies of scope (from theory II). The
next subsection removes two obstacles to appreciate contestability's real contributions
which are discussed in subsection 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Misconceptions about Contestability Theory :. C- : <i>r>; ,; • K .?R
First, Baumol er a/. (1983) claim that contestability is a 'static' theory: wis or
'the static equilibrium theory of perfectly contestable markets contains no
assumptions whatever about the possibility of instantaneous entry or the ability
of new firms to exit more quickly than an incumbent can change its prices. Such
dynamic properties are best thought of as attempts to examine the plausibility and
range of applicability of the static equilibrium concepts.' (Baumol e/ a/., 1983,
p. 496)
Baumol er a/, here react to Weitzman (1983) and Schwartz and Reynolds' (1983)
critiques on contestability. I submit that this response is dishonest. It defends
contestability (theory I) by subtly putting theory II in its place. Contestability is
unalienably a theory about potential competition, and the 'hit-and-run' condition is
essential to it: -fr . ' • >-' • •• • ;; ., .:.-•>-•••.-=.•• -•.•-•..-
'The crucial feature of a contestable market is its vulnerability to hit-and-run
entry.' (Baumol, 1982, p. 4)
Any theory of incumbent firms that intend to deter potential entry has to face up to
expectations: it is dynamic by its very subject matter. When Baumol ef a/. (1982, p.
296) propose a 'general model of entry barriers', they correctly argue,
2. The book would have gained in clarity, therefore, if it would have presented a
theory of imperfect contestability. It was up to Schwartz (1986) to present a first
valiant attempt.46 Chapter 4
'Since entry must be viewed as an intertemporal process, our general model is
given at least a modicum of dynamic structure.' t:*?
Conversely, theory II is predicated on given cost and demand functions, ignoring
expectations, R&D, learning, e/c. Theory I, that is, is dy/ia/mc and theory II is
5/a//c. The latter two quotes differ strikingly from the first one in this subsection, as
if they are about different theories. Which is, in my opinion, precisely the case.
Theory II about an efficient market structure (the subject of the first quote) should
not be confused with theory I about contestability (the second and third quotes).
Secondly, Baumol er a/. (1982, pp. 13-4; and 1986, p. 339) emphasise that
contestability is a tenc/i/na/vt theory. For this statement to be acceptable in a
scientific context, it should be accompanied by (i) a rigorous definition of the
concept, (ii) a list of conditions a theory has to pass in order to qualify as
benchmark, and (iii) a proof that contestability theory indeed passes these conditions.
One will look in vein for this. The authors ajsm that contestability is a benchmark.
The bluntness of the assertion, its lack of proof, and the rather extreme nature of the
contestability exercise has, I believe, been responsible for the unfriendly reception
of contestability theory (e.g., Shepherd, 1984). In the absence of any reasonable
definition of benchmark in Baumol « a/. (1982), let me assert that a benchmark
theory has to submit to three conditions: (1) it has to be representative for the
situations (/.«., industries) that it is supposed to be benchmark for, (2) it has to be
realistic, and (3) it should generalise perfect competition.' There are some reasons
to believe that Baumol er a/. (1982) have these conditions in mind. Condition (1)
rules out a benchmark based on marginal cost prices: in industries with economies
of scale this would lead to losses. Firms are thus forced to defect from marginal cost
pricing - a benchmark may not abstract away from constraints that firms are forced
to live with. This shows that a benchmark cannot be defined in terms of outcomes
(e.g., marginal cost prices) but in terms of conditions: it should allow for salient
constraints that firms are subject to. Condition (2) shines through in the assertion that
one should abandon the 'unrealistic standard of perfect competition as the model for
market behavior' (Baumol « a/., 1982, p. 477). If perfect competition has to go
because it is unrealistic, then realism apparently is an important condition to impose
on benchmark theories. Condition (3) is consistent with the claim that perfect
contestability is a 'substantive generalization of the market that is perfectly
competitive.' (Baumol era/., 1982, p. 271)."
If conditions (1) to (3) define a benchmark theory, then the theory of perfectly
contestable markets cannot be claimed to be a benchmark. It seems to pass condition
(1) better than perfect competition, as it allows for economies of scale and scope.
3. Anyone who rejects this definition, is back to square one: in the absence of a
rigorous definition, there is no scientific basis to Baumol er a/.'s (1982, 1983 and
1986) claim that their theory represents a benchmark. Note that my approach to a
benchmark appears similar to Clark's (1940) motivation for a theory of workable
competition. He argues that concepts need to be formulated 'of the most desirable
forms of competition, selected from those that are practically possible, within the
limits set by conditions we cannot escape.' (Clark, 1940, p. 242).
4. A similar statement is in Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1983, p. 495). „,»,„,Contestable Markets 47
However, it embeds these economies in two conditions that exclude all cases of
interest: absence of sunk costs and an entrant's exit lag (t*) for which holds that 0
< t* < T, where T is the incumbent's price response lag (Baumol « a/., 1983, p.
493).* Perfect contestability, therefore, excludes most real world cases where
economies of scale exist.' For an unanswered critique on condition 2 (realism), see
Shepherd (1984), who concludes that 'ultra-free entry' seems an odd special case
rather than general theory. Baumol ef a/. (1983, p. 495) defend condition (3) by
arguing (a) that a perfectly competitive industry is always perfectly contestable, but
(b) not the other way round. Although both (a) and (b) seem meaningful statements,
(a) confuses theory I with theory II. A perfectly competitive market is always cost-
minimizing (theory II). A competitive industry need not be contestable if the number
of incumbent firms is sufficiently large to guarantee cost-minimisation and price-
taking behaviour. In this case acft<a/ competition dominates po/en/ia/ competition.
Competitive outcomes pertain (z'.e., theory II holds) even if entry barriers exclude
all potential competition (/.e., theory I is violated). Contestability fails to pass
conditions (1) and (2), therefore, with questionable justification as far as condition
(3) is concerned.
Contestability is not, therefore, a static theory of cost-minimising market
structures nor a benchmark. With the authors' misconceptions out of the way, let me
turn to other authors' more impartial views on contestability. Contestability is a
thought experiment (Ghemawat, 1991a, p. 26) which makes counterfactual
assumptions (Shepherd, 1984, p. 577; and Ghemawat, 1991b, p. 4). It throws a
revealing light on the real world not by analysing conditions directly, but by
analysing the outcomes when these conditions are absent. In the remainder of this
book I will share this view. In this context, Baumol « a/, did make important
contributions to the understanding of entry barriers (subsection 4.2.4) and efficiency
motives to entry (section 4.3).
4.2.2 An Assessment of Contestability's Contributions
The debates on contestability made two contributions which are relevant in this
context. First, the contestability discussions brought established-firm entry back to
the fore. Contestability theory can be seen as a formal statement of the ease-of-entry
approach. It revealed its, largely implicit, critical assumptions. Moreover, it went
beyond the ease-of-entry's concern for prices by exploring the consequences for
market structure. The relationship of contestability to the ease-of-entry approach did
not go unnoticed. The hit-and-run entry threat, which the incumbent firms fear so
much, implies that entry is fast and requires few (if any) commitments. Import
competition may come close to this ideal:
'imports have probably provided the most important form of new competition in
! industrial markets in advanced economies. They may offer the best chances for
applying Baumol « a/.'s approach' (Shepherd, 1984, p. 584).
5. See subsection 4.3.2 for the discussion that revealed the latter assumption.
6. Weitzman's (1983) critique, which I will discuss later on, is that perfect
contestability logically excludes a// cases where an economy of scale exists.48 Chapter 4
Shepherd (1984, p. 581) adds, however, that "imports have not taken large market
shares swiftly.' Imports point to established-firm entry. This ushered in Cairns and
Mahabir's (1988) rediscovery of the ease-of-entry approach. I will not push this point
here, as chapter 7 is dedicated to this issue. Cairns and Mahabir (1988), moreover,
suggest that established-firm entry is the linchpin between salient (perhaps hit-and-
run) entry threats (in contestability theory) and economies of scope (in efficient
industry theory). Another type of entry that may come close to hit-and-run entry is
entry by a firm established in a nearby strategic group, as Hines (1957) argued.
Hatten and Hatten (1987b) give some examples of this. They argue that strategic
groups with low mobility barriers inhabit niches that are (almost) contestable to
competitors in other strategic groups:
t
'the competitively more effective firms can enter and exit the weaker firms'
markets at will, and with very limited incremental investment given their total
it; resources. Such intra-industry studies of competition appear to be more apt sites
to research contestability than are the usual industrial organization multi-industry
studies.' (Hatten and Hatten, 1987b, p. 330)
Second, a perfectly contestable market is predicated on the absence of factor
market imperfections. Baumol er a/. (1982, p. 299) prove that if sunk costs are
absent and there is otherwise (ex awe) symmetry between incumbent firm and
potential entrant, then an entry barrier does not exist. If anything (e.g., economies
to scale) is to be an entry barrier, it has to involve sunk costs, therefore. s6v-y«
4.2.3 Sunk Costs
Consider their definition: , -^ -nt
Definition 4.1 Sunk costs: 'Let C(y,w,s) represent the short-run cost function,
applicable to plans for the flow of production, that occurs s units of time (years)
, in the future. Then K(w,s) are the costs sunk for at least s years, if C(y,w,s) =
K(w,s)+G(y,w,s), G(0,w,s) = 0.' (Baumol era/., 1982, p. 280)
Here y and w are the vectors of output quantities and input prices. If j increases to
infinity, K decreases to zero: in the long run all costs are variable (Baumol er a/.,
1982, p. 281). K(w,s) is the irreducible cost that remains if the firm decides now (t
= 0) that it will suspend production j periods from now (j.e., y, > 0 if t < s and
y, = 0 for t £ s). The intuition of this rather formal definition is that K(w,s) is the
loss incurred when selling the firm's resources at period s. A resource is sunk by
this definition if its resale value in the used factor market, the opportunity cost, is
less than its value to the firm (Gilbert, 1989, p. 521).
Baumol er a/. (1982) do not derive the sunk cost function from underlying
economic data. From a microeconomic point of view, this is unsatisfactory. The
important dimension is mufaM/zry of a factor. In a perfect factor market, a factor can
be traded without costs, delay, or loss of value. Imperfection of a factor market is
a denial of one or more perfecr/0/1 criteria, which were listed in section 3.1 as
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suppliers and buyers.
Transparency has a time and information dimension. Tentatively, the time
dependence of the sunk cost can be explained as follows. In a non-transparent
market, a firm faces a trade-off when liquidating its investment. If it liquidates
instantaneously, it is unlikely to find a trade partner willing to pay the asset's
original value. That is, a resale or exit loss occurs: the sunk cost. If the firm takes
more time to gather information on trading partners and prices, it may get a higher
price for its asset. Thus its loss, the sunk cost, decreases. If the liquidation (or exit)
lag is infinite, the sunk cost may (but need not) be zero. There is thus a trade-off
between sunk cost and exit lag (Baumol ef a/., 1982, p. 281; Shepherd, 1984, p.
577; and Schwartz, 1986, p. 41). The function K(w,s) represents the factor market
imperfection: the more the factor market approaches the perfect (Chamberlinian)
ideal, the smaller tf will be for any period 5.
Transparency is also violated if a factor is similar to an experience good in
marketing theory, /.«., if its quality cannot be observed prior to purchase. Lemons
may exist, that is, machines (or other factors or durable goods) can be 'good' or
'bad' (i.e., a lemon). A firm's attempt to sell a used machine may imply that it is
'bad', which reduces its sales price (p<,) below the new factor price p,,, such that p^
- Po < Pn - Pg> where p^ (p^) is the price of a machine which is known to be bad
(good). If Pb = p.,, no trade may occur at all: 'The cost of dishonesty, therefore, lies
not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated; the cost also must include
the loss incurred from driving legitimate business out of existence. ' (Akerlof, 1970,
p. 62). Tradability of (good) durable goods is impeded, therefore, which provides
an explanation of sunk costs: a factor which is 'good' entails a sunk cost of p,,-p,, as
it fails to distinguish itself from a 'bad' one.
Factor heterogeneity may give rise to a specific tradability problem, i.e.,
prodMc/-jpec(/ïc//y. The more product-specific a factor is, the less appropriate it is
to an alternative use. The smaller, therefore, is the opportunity cost ex /wsr
compared to the factor price er awe. This is a specific example of sunk costs. A
factor may have a price ?„ («c awe), but if it is completely product-specific, ex/wwr
it has no alternative use at all (/.£., p., = 0). Factor heterogeneity may also
exacerbate imperfections, such as transparency and small numbers. Small numbers
themselves may lead to bargaining problems.
As a result, factor market imperfections came to be understood as essential to
sustainable prices with positive profits (Ghemawat, 1991a, p. 26-41). This is a
counterfactual contribution by contestability, as the theory of contestable markets is
predicated on an assumption of perfectly competitive factor markets, /.<\, factor
prices are parametric. The concept of sunk costs ushered in a deeper understanding
of the meaning of barriers and inducements (efficiency motives) to entry. I will
discuss these extensively in the next two (sub)sections. >•
4.2.4 Entry Barriers
Several definitions exist of entry barriers (see Davies er a/., 1988, and Gilbert, 1989,
for useful surveys). Following Bain, some definitions associate entry barriers with
the incumbent firm's performance. Bain (1956, p. 3) defines the condition of entry
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> "the advantages of established sellers in an industry over potential entrant sellers,
4> these advantages being reflected in the extent to which established sellers can
i persistently raise their prices above a competitive level without attracting new
firms to enter the industry.' i v' ik tfw»* a-^-. jr4uv :
Similarly, Gilbert (1989, p. 478) 'takes the view that a barrier to entry is a rent that
is derived from incumbency.' This type of definition of entry barriers can be very
misleading (De Bondt, 1985, p. 144). Any definition that this or that factor
constitutes an entry barrier implies that there is an unambiguous (if stochastic) causal
link from that factor (e.g., economies of scale) to incumbent firms' profits. Such
links of causation probably do not exist. Whether an incumbent firm stands to gain
from say, economies of scale, depends on the entire context of the competitive game.
No individual aspect of the game can be singled out as an 'entry barrier'. This holds
especially in a multi-market context. Here, entry barriers in one market do not have
a one-to-one link to performance in that market. The outcome of an entry game
depends upon the conditions in both the entry market and the entrant's home market.
Prices differ when the game is one-sided entry or reciprocal entry. Performance,
therefore, depends on more factors than entry barriers that 'surround' a market.
Moreover, the effect of entry barriers on performance depends on which kind of
potential entrant confronts the incumbent firm. Barriers which deter new firms need
not deter established firms, as Andrews and others argued. Lack of awareness of this
fact created several paradoxes. Caves' Paradox is only one of them. Semmler (1984,
p. 124) notes that in a cross-section, an industry's entry barriers may explain high
profits; exit barriers may explain low profits due to overcapacity in slumps. Since
entry and exit barriers are almost identical ('sunk costs'), this makes the concept of
entry barrier ambiguous. I suggest, therefore, to use a concept of entry barrier that
is not a priori related to performance.
An alternative definition of entry barriers is based on entry costs (Baumol e/ a/.,
1982, p. 282). The classic statement is Stigler's (1968, p. 67):
'A barrier to entry may be defined as a cost of producing (at some or every rate
of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but
is not borne by firms already in the industry.'
This definition is not without ambiguities. Say, ex a/i/e the incumbent firm and the
potential entrant have the same (opportunity) costs and production function. Before
entry occurs, however, the incumbent firm sinks costs by an up-front investment.
This reduces its opportunity cost and thus creates a cost difference (ex/ww) with the
potential entrant (Gilbert, 1989, p. 491). An entry barrier arises in the ex/)Ott, but
not in the ex an/e interpretation of costs in Stigler's definition. Stigler's original
discussion (1968, pp. 67-70) ignores the issue of sunk costs, /.e., of timing; current
use of his definition leans towards an ex /wwr interpretation (Gilbert, 1989, p. 491,
seems a dissenter). Stigler's definition can be specified to
Definition 4.2 An entry barrier is an entry set-up cost, that is, a cost that (1) has
to be incurred prior to or during entry, (2) is a bygone to a going process or
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specific to the entry market. ••îassi'o
Ideally, one should abandon the concept of enrry turnery for the neutral en/ry cosw.
It is by no means clear in every case which costs constitute entry costs. In the real
world, as opposed to models, it is not clear when the entry process is completed and
the firm has established itself (Bain, 1956, pp. lO-l). Preliminary, one may define
the e/i/ry proem as over when the firm has achieved an equilibrium V/J-Û-V« its
competitors. E/i/ry cows are the set-up costs required during this process. They
pertain to transaction-specific inputs, /.«., inputs that are specific to the location, if
a firm enters a new country, and to the product, if a firm enters a new product
market. These inputs have no perfect alternative use within or outside the firm, and
are sunk (see conditions (3) and (4)). They introduce a cost asymmetry with the
incumbent firm. The incumbent's set-up costs are no longer part of its opportunity
cost, as they are sunk costs, but entry costs are part of the potential entrant's
opportunity costs.
Bain recognised the importance of entry costs. He traced the absolute cost
advantages of incumbents to factor markets. Absolute cost advantages arise if (I)
entry raises factor prices, (2) incumbents secure factors at lower prices than entrants,
or (3) established firms have access to better factors than entrants (Bain, 1956, pp.
14-6); (2) and (3) imply factor market imperfections. Bain considered this entry
barrier as separate from the other ones. The limit price model, moreover, centred
attention on the economy of scale entry barrier. The ease-of-entry approach,
however, insisted on imperfect factor markets as the only source of advantages for
incumbent firms. One may recall Kaldor's 'institutional monopoly' and the
incumbent's 'advantages peculiar to himself in Harrod. Lydall (1955) finally traced
the incumbent firm's profits exclusively to its ability to raise the entrant's cost
curved These authors made this barrier topical by flatly denying the relevance of any
other entry barrier, referring to established-firm entry for an explanation of this.
Their intuition seems to have been vindicated by the 1980s debates. The contestable
market theory likewise denied the existence of any entry barrier, such as economies
of scale, other than those based on factor market imperfections (giving rise to sunk
costs).
A shortcoming of previous definitions of entry barriers is their suggestion that
potential entrants are at a disadvantage relative to the incumbent firms. This
presumption is erroneous, as the advent of Japanese competition has established
beyond any doubt. The advantage of definition 4.2 is that it makes no such claim.
Obviously, even the most efficient entrant requires some entry set-up costs. But the
• if, s •••;;:-(»l-;»Lr'» ';:. •,.*..
7. Baumol « a/. (1982, pp. 293-296) analyse a similar situation as Lydall. They
focus on welfare consequences. Like Andrews before him, Lydall believes that the
contestability outcome is consistent with sunk investments costs (x). A combination
of (perfect) contestability with sunk (own cost reducing) investments has been called
a earner morte; (Van Witteloostuijn, 1990a and b). Baumol e; a/, express some
doubts on the consistency of their model when sunk costs exist that erect entry
barriers. They point out that recent literature has shown that such sunk costs can 'be
capable of producing various ancillary effects on the incumbent's incentives with
respect to price and output decisions.' (Baumol er Û/., 1982, p. 294°). . ... .52 Chapter 4
existence of entry barriers does not guarantee higher unit costs to the entrant or
excess profits to the incumbent. There is, therefore, no basis for a claim, as made
by Bain and Andrews, for instance, that entry barriers determine (or are identical
with) the incumbent firm's profit margin or (limit) price. I reiterate, therefore, that
entry barriers should not be defined in terms of (their effects on) performance.
This discussion is not to deny that in the context of different research questions
other definitions of barriers to entry may be more appropriate. Davies « a/. (1988,
p. 26-27) are almost unique in being careful to point this out. They rightly argue that
the research questions posed by Bain and Stigler differ markedly, which explains the
differences in their definitions. The same holds for the definitions in this chapter:
they have to be evaluated in terms of the concomitant research interest.This
discussion of entry barriers, therefore, leads to a recognition of the importance of
product- and location-specific (entry) costs, pertaining to inputs with an imperfect
alternative use in or outside of the firm. I shall now turn to inputs which do have
some alternative use. jjn
4.3 MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS AND FIRM-SPECIFIC RESOURCES jn&ttus
The book by Baumol « a/. (1982) did not only contribute to a better understanding
of entry barriers by the introduction of contestable markets (theory I). It also
explored efficiency motives for entry by multiproduct firms in its theory of efficient
industry structures (theory II). These are based on economies of scope. This inspired
a discussion between contestability and transaction cost economics about the
connection between economies of scope or scale and firms' entry, exit, and merger
strategies.
4.3.1 Economies of Scope •:•
,o
Multiproduct firms derive cost advantages from economies of scope.* In a two-
product case with products A,B, economies of scope exist if and only if Qq^qe) <
C(qA,O)+C(O,q,,): joint production is cheaper than separate production. For the
formal definition, consider a set S of n products, with a partition P of k (1 < k <
n) non-overlapping sub-sets Tj c S (i = 1,..,k). Assume that each sub-set T< contains
at least one product, and that S = o^Tj and qs = Sflji, where q$ (q^ is the output
vector for the product set S (TJ. Total costs are C(q). Then:
8. These are also called economies of jointness. They have been explored in the
context of perfect competition theory (e.g., Samuelson, 1966; Burmeister and
Turnovsky, 1971; Hirotaand Kuga, 1971; Hall, 1973; and Laitinen, 1980). The aim
of this work is to devise criteria that allow econometric tests to characterise
technology (e.g., economies of scale, and scope etc.) on data about costs and
quantities. These models assume perfect competition in factor and product markets,
thus excluding the imperfections which loomed large in the previous section. The
models are static, i.e., all inputs are treated as if they are acquired simultaneously.
These assumptions are orthogonal to the ones made in this book, and I will not,
therefore, pay attention to this literature. , iContestable Markets 53
Definition 4.3 A (dis)economy of scope exists at q$ with respect to the partition P
if and only if C(qs) < (>) I^(qJ (Baumol era/., 1982, p. 72).
The next chapter will feature a more detailed as well as a more general description,
which also embraces products which are complementary in consumption. For the
time being, the importance of economies of scope resides in the conditions they
originate from and in the implications they have for entry. »ttaôf a ^4i «sat-e :«syft
Baumol er a/. (1982, pp. 75-79) argue that the public good nature of factors is
the source of economies of scope. Say there are n products (i = l,..,n) to be
produced in quantities q<, which requires capital (or capital services) kj. If a factor
(k) is used in the production process of product i and j, the less production of i
reduces the factor's availability to product j, the more it is a public good. They
distinguish two extreme cases. Economies can be due to 'some factors of production
[which] are public inputs in the sense that, once they are acquired for use in
producing one good, they are available costlessly for use in the production of others.'
(op. cit., p. 76). The classic special case is joint production, where cattle is
slaughtered for meat, and rests are 'costlessly' (with respect to meat production)
available for leather and glue production. An economy of scope may also follow
from quasipublic inputs, /.e., inputs which when used in the production for one
product are not completely lost to the production of another product: 'Often, this
results because of indivisibilities or lumpiness in the plant of the productive
enterprise.' (op. cit., p. 77). Examples are overhead and idle capacity. Unlike pure
public goods, they have some congestion if using kj units of capital for product i
reduces the amount of capital available to product i, but by less than kj. In the
extreme case of complete congestion, capital is a /wre /jnva/e good: each product
consumes kj, and total capital required is k* = Ijkj. A similar explanation of a
diseconomy of scope might refer to public 'bads', such as pollution or exhausting
natural reserves.
Caves (1971) argued that these (quasi-)public inputs induce the multinational
firm's entry into other countries. A multinational firm may, e.g., benefit from using
know how in several markets (De Bondt, Sleuwaegen and Veugelers, 1988; and
Veugelers and Vanden Houte, 1990). If the inputs induce entry, and if they also give
rise to economies of scale (e.g., a plant) or product differentiation (e.g., a brand
name), they refute Bain's proposition that they are entry barriers, and support
Hines's claim to the contrary. This raises the question how entry relates to
economies of scope. The analysis in perfectly contestable market theory unleashed
a debate to be discussed subsequently. Transaction cost theory also developed
theories on firm's strategies and economies of scope, as the next two subsections
show. Yet another perspective, game theoretical industrial economics, is deferred to
the next part. ^ :.<};• y*,j;?:.'V:<.«j>,j - a»; !.*;• • -
4.3.2 Multiproduct Firms and Transaction Costs ib'fiw : , •ho* v^i C-CT
The basic insight relating economies of scope and the efficient industry theory is:
Proposition 4.1 An economy of scope 'is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of multi-product firms in perfectly contestable markets. ' (Baumol e/54 Chapter 4
a/., 1982, p. 71) 41
This proposition implies that economies of scope (and similar with economies of
scale) induce entry into related markets (or merger across markets) up to the point
where costs are minimised. The theories of contestable markets and efficient industry
structure introduce a dichotomy: sunk costs are entry barriers (definition 4.2), and
fixed costs that underlie economies of scale or scope induce entry. Caves' Paradox
is avoided by asserting that the fixed costs are not sunk (in a perfectly contestable
market). This dichotomy has, however, been challenged: costs are fixed only if they
are sunk as well. Moreover, firms exist to minimise transaction costs (Coase, 1937).
Critics of contestability theory extended the argument to multiproduct firms.
Teece (1980 and 1982) and Weitzman (1983) raise the question whether an
economy of scope or scale is realised within the firm -an internalisation solution- or
between firms by means of market transactions. In the former case, the firm
internalises the economy by entry into related markets. In the latter, it sells the
services of the resources which give rise to the economies in a factor market. The
latter solution, but not the first, incurs transaction costs. The authors find that if
factor markets are perfect, and by implication transaction costs absent,
'market arrangements and internal organization are perfect substitutes.' (Teece,
1982, p. 41)
That is, there is no compelling reason for a firm to internalise any economies by
entry if there are no transaction costs to save by excluding the factor market.
Weitzman and Teece explore the cases of single-product and multi-product firms,
respectively. I will summarise their findings in a conjecture: . : _._> ,,. -
«ut^t'-t^ Sin i.'fr'rn . • .-.V < K
Conjecture 4.1 If, in a perfectly contestable market, technology exhibits increasing
returns to scope (scale), then individual firms' cost functions exhibit constant
returns to scope (scale), if the associated (quasi-)public productive assets or their
services can be traded without (a) sunk costs and (b) transaction costs.
This is a conjecture, not a theorem. In the absence of a formal proof it is not yet
possible to be precise about the necessary and sufficient conditions. One may argue,
for instance, that conditions (a) and (b) are identical. The existence of transaction
costs explains why an investment is sunk: its liquidation entails a loss due to the
transaction costs. Moreover, a sunk cost is apparent only if the asset is traded and,
hence, can be treated as a transaction cost. The conjecture holds that sunk costs are
a necessary condition for the existence of increasing returns to scope (scale). The
conjecture is inconsistent with the 'sufficient' part of proposition 4.1. By implication,
contestability theorists face a dilemma. Either they grant that (quasi-) public
resources are sunk, in which case sunk costs underlie both the entry barriers and the
cost-minimizing inducements to entry (/.<?., Caves' Paradox rears its head). Or, the
(quasi-) public resources are tradeable in perfect factor markets, in which case
economies of scope or scale do not give rise to multi-product firms.
To demonstrate the conjecture, first consider a single-product, perfectly
contestable market with economies of scale. Contestable market theory dissociatesContestable Markets 55
fixed costs, which give rise to economies of scale, from sunk costs, which give rise
to exit barriers. Weitzman (1983) challenges this by arguing that without sunk costs
there can be no fixed costs. His proof is based on the assumption that factors can be
acquired without lags: facilities can be hired in a rental market for arbitrarily short
periods of time without either set-up or set-down lags or costs. Transaction costs are
absent, therefore, factor markets are perfect (in Chamberlin's sense), investments are
immediately and costlessly reversible, and sunk costs are absent.' An example may
illustrate his condensed proof. Say, the technically lowest-cost production level is y'
perpemx/ (e.g., 100,000 units per year). A small firm that supplies y units (e.g.,
1,000 units per year) is conventionally thought to produce at a flow of y per period,
at higher unit costs than y' because of the economy of scale. However, Weitzman
adds a clever twist by focusing on the time dimension. Production is a flow. The
small firm can hire the production facilities from a factor market for a y/y' period
of time. It produces at the optimal/7ow, y', if only during a shorter period. It has
to pay a rent to the factor market which is calculated on the basis of it producing the
optimal flow y'. As a result any firm, however small, has to pay the same rental rate
per unit of output. The individual firm, therefore, experiences constant returns to
scale. Weitzman does not ignore that an economy of scale exists, technically. The
economy is rather a Marshallian external economy at the level of the product market:
a higher market output reduces unit costs.
In their rejoinder to Weitzman, Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1983) deny that the
assumption of instantaneous access to factors holds in a perfectly contestable market.
They introduce in perfectly contestable market theory the ad /JOC assumption that lags
exist which rule out Weitzman's scenario without impairing the hit-and-run entry
threat. There must be a minimum time t* during which a firm must rent a production
factor. That is, they impose a specific form upon the sunk cost function: K(w,s) =
0, if s > t*, and K(w,s) > > 0, otherwise. Hit-and-run entry is still possible,
provided that t* < T, where T is the incumbent firm's price response lag. They
argue that 'successful entry may require commitment of assets to a particular market
for a nontrivial interval of time' which does not 'imply the presence of costs which
are sunk in any economically significant sense. ' (Baumol er a/., 1983, p. 493). Their
response amounts to the admission that economies of scale exist on/y i/entry requires
a (temporary) commitment.'" Because of the commitment period (t*), investment
decisions are not immediately and costlessly irreversible, /.e., there are sunk costs
(Baumol «a/., 1982, p. 280; Shepherd, 1984, p. 577; Schwartz, 1986, p. 41; and
Tirole, 1988, p. 307-308). Weitzman's rebuttal, therefore, holds: internalisation of
the economy of scale will not occur if the rental market is a perfect substitute for
internal organisation.
Second, consider a multi-product setting where an economy of scope stems from
a common (e.g., physical) input. Teece (1980, p. 226) states:
9. In terms of Baumol ef a/. (1982, p. 280): K(w,s) = 0, even if s = 0, i.e., for all
s>0.
10. Where a co/nm/r/nenr appears to be defined as (the combination of) a period
during which a decision cannot be reversed or a cost incurred when reverting a
decision.56 Chapter 4
'I submit that the facility with which the common input or its services can be
traded across markets will determine whether economies of scope will require
the enterprise to be multiproduct in its scope. '
He argues that
'In the absence of transactional difficulties, there is nothing to prevent one
individual or firm from procuring the physical asset in the requisite size to
m realize the economies in question and contracting to supply the services of this
asset to other individuals or firms. All parties could be independent, yet scope
..., economies could be fully realized.' (Teece, 1980, p. 231-2)
Market transactions are an efficient way to make the services of a common input
available to other firms if (1) the input is homogeneous rather than highly
specialised, (2) there are 'many' buyers and sellers, such that bilateral monopoly
problems are absent, and (3) there are no transaction costs which impede a
transaction which otherwise would be to the mutual benefit of both parties (Teece,
1980, pp. 227 and 232). In the ideal case of a purely and perfectly competitive input
market, an individual firm cannot improve upon a transacted outcome by
internalizing the use of the resource, e.g., by means of entry into a related market.
In Teece's example, a shepherd and an orchardist can jointly exploit a plot of land,
without the need to merge into a multi-product firm. The shepherd cannot improve
upon the outcome by entry into the orchardist's market. As in Weitzman's model,
at the level of the market there is a Marshallian external economy, whereas at the
level of the firm there are constant returns to scope. If economies of scale or scope
are to induce entry, one has to turn to a world where transaction costs do exist.
The upshot of this discussion is that if a link exists between economies of scope
(scale) and firm's entry and exit decisions, one has to leave the context of perfectly
contestable markets. Instead, one has to focus on resources which are imperfectly
tradeable, that is, on firm-specific resources:
Definition 4.4 A firm-specific resource is an asset that (i) has an alternative use
within the firm and thus is not completely product- and location-specific, and (ii)
••a,- it or its services are traded, if at all, in imperfect factor markets.
The next part explores the interaction among firm-specific resources, economies of




The chapter demonstrates the fundamental nature of Caves' Paradox, which joins
together a stream of literature within the mainstream of industrial economics (Bain)
and outside (e.g., Andrews). The internalisation argument shows that if a resource
has an alternative use within the firm, rather than outside of it, it may induce entry.
Contestability demonstrated that if a resource has no alternative use either within or
outside the firm, it is an entry barrier. Scale economies and product differentiationContestable Markets 57
(e.g., brand names) can thus be entry barriers, as Bain argued, or inducements to
entry, as Andrews and others argued. The Caves paradox dug up an underlying real
world problem: where do incumbent firms derive a sustainable competitive advantage
from, relative to potential entrants?
For a start, a firm can rank its factors along three dimensions (tradability,
product-specificity, and publicness). A factor's ranking along these dimensions may
have to be intuitive, and, moreover, these rankings are closely related. A higher
extent of product-specificity reduces the possibilities for an alternative use of the
factor, and thus reduces the number of buyers, which is one type of factor market
imperfection. Ranking factors along these lines may help management to 'zoom in'
on those factors which are specifically important to its entry decisions. The key
factors to focus on in entry (deterrence) strategies are imperfectly tradable. They
constitute commitments, and the associated investments are irreversible. ' ' Within this
class, the extent of product-specificity helps to distinguish firm-specific resources
(which are somewhat specific) from entry costs (which are completely specific).
Within the group of firm-specific resources, 'publicness' determines the extent to
which a factor's use in an entry market imposes an opportunity cost upon the home
market. These preliminary steps may help to identify factors that can serve as
commitments to particular decisions.
The chapter arrives at a symmetry between incumbent firms and potential
entrants: both players have commitments at stake in the competitive game. Entry
barriers point to incumbent firms' commitment to their product market, as their
original entry set-up costs are bygones. Firm-specific resources constitute the
potential entrants' commitment to entry into related product markets. This view
brings us one more step beyond Chamberlin's original vision. Bain and others made
the first step: they introduced incumbent firms with foresight and strategic intent.
The subsequent debate in the 1980s on firm-specific resources introduced entrants
(e.g., multinational firms) with similar foresight and strategic intent. It remained up
to the modern, game theoretical, industrial economics to formalise this idea
rigorously (chapter 5). Moreover, the debate on perfect contestability clearly pointed
to imperfect factor markets as the source of the (incumbents' and potential entrants')
commitments. Firms, whether incumbent firms or potential entrants, are wise to
nourish imperfect factor markets. Again, the 1980s ushered in a game-theoretical
approach that formalised this idea (chapter 6). ., .. .., ....•-.-. ,;
SS3H-I: "Jra i:-: :t~.- ••.••-:•• ..SN';. '.••..-•-:' ;::.o?.s.. -.-. •••..;•.•••": • .•••;,.-;ie •• • - .
5£»F. i « ;. JoC» >: .: . • "«: " ;•-.'••>•' : »!.R- ; •-:.--iS O> •• •- --'c."s M:'i •>' *"•-?'
»rreH" i;s iuii'.^: r^c-i--e ^ ?*.o :^;- <>"• •; c-;hf --vs^ -:yî>ec^îi-:-!:'.- '••;' hL-.-". r












This part discusses the key concepts and ideas of multi-market competition.
It expands the brief discussion in chapter 2. Its two chapters focus on two
dimensions of multi-market competition: the 'horizontal' dimension of
competition in multiple product markets (chapter 5) and the 'vertical'
dimension of competition in factor markets and product markets (chapter 6).
Although a strict dividing line cannot be drawn between the multi-market
framework in this part and the pioneers in the previous part, it may be useful to
point to their different shades of grey. The pioneering literature appears to share
three characteristics. First, competition centres on the product market
instruments: price and output level. Second, if incumbent firms anticipate entry at
all, their expectations are simple. Entrants expect the incumbent firms to maintain
either their pre-entry output or price level. The incumbent firms expect entrants to
behave as if they believe this. Third, analysis focuses on the links between market
structure (e.g., concentration, entry barriers) and market performance (i.e.,
market price and profit margin). The organising principle of these theories is the
structuralist interpretation of the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm
(Scherer, 1980, p. 6).
These characteristics point to an underlying inability to deal with time and
dynamics (Kreps and Spence, 1985). In a dynamic setting, structure is
endogenous as mergers, entry, and exit change market structure, and firms erect
entry barriers by investing in R&D and advertising. Feedback effects from
irreversible conduct to structure should be central (rather than ancillary) in an
analysis of strategic behaviour by firms. Game theory recognised this point.
The game-theoretical framework in this part is an instance of what has been
labelled srra/eg/c compc«Y/on (Ulph, 1987; and Shapiro, 1989) or com/m7/e</
co/nperirion (Caves, 1984). Thomas Schelling defined a jrra/eg/c move as an
action 'that influences the other person's choice, in a manner favourable to one's
self, by affecting the other person's expectations on how one's self will behave'
(quoted in Lyons, 1987, p. 63). A strategic move implies making a com/n/Tme/i/:
a not immediately and costlessly reversible decision. A firm's irreversible move
narrows its future choice set and thus affects other actors' expectations of how it
will act in the future. 7b</ay'5 zrrevmjWe derâ/onj create tomorrow's s/rucrt/rey.
7<jcric co7n/?er/f/on instead involves reversible decisions, that adjust to new
information fast and easy (Shapiro, 1989). Strategic competition games entail both
commitments (e.g., an investment) and tactic competition (e.g., by price setting).
In these games, firms anticipate that today's irreversible decisions set the stage60 Part 3
(i.e., form the structural setting) for tomorrow's decisions of themselves and of
their (potential) rivals. This does, of course, require complex systems of
expectation formation (e.g., Selten's perfect equilibrium concept). With
sophisticated expectations, game theory overcame the simple expectations in
pioneering industrial economics.
Since the 1970s, industrial economics has explored the commitment value of
numerous kinds of investments.' Irreversibility derives from the difficulty to sell
used factors, their services, or one's part of the contract through which they were
made available. A contract (e.g., a delivery contract with a consumer) is
irreversible if the parties are unable to renegotiate it. In the case of factor
markets, the important dimension is mufea/uï/Q' of a factor, its services, or
contract (see chapter 4). Since non-tradeability is an important feature of entry
costs and firm-specific resources, these can be analyzed as examples of
commitments.
The pioneers in industrial economics confused the issues (for lack of
appropriate analytical tools) by discussing strategic competition (e.g., entry
deterrence) in terms of tactical decision instruments (price or output). As parts III
and IV will demonstrate, this has numerous implications for multi-market
competition. At this point I would like to note that my intention is to integrate
new insights while retaining some of our existing, much older, concepts from the
'Weltanschauung' that we have been brought up with. I do not intend, therefore,
to rid us of either Bain or Chamberlin. But further work along their frameworks
does seem to run into decreasing returns. A striking difference between the early
pioneers and the recent flurry of game-theoretical industrial economics is the
change in method from conceptual and empirical to mathematical. Throughout
part III, I will follow the pioneers by offering a conceptual discussion. This is in
line with the dissertation's aim to present a conceptual framework of multi-market
competition. A mathematical treatment of some issues is deferred to appendices
and to part IV.
Chapter 5 (on horizontally related markets) and chapter 6 (on vertically
related markets) both focus on the shared, firm-specific resources whose
importance section 4.3 emphasised. Chapter 5 explores how a firm derives value
from these resources by applying them to a number of product markets. For
example, the use of a common input in the supply of different products leads to
1. Some recommended textbooks on industrial economics and game theory are
Scherer (1980), Davies, Lyons, Dixon and Geroski (1988), Tirole (1988), the
//am/fora* o/ Wiu/ràl Ogamzaz/o/i edited by Schmalensee and Willig (1989),
and Carlton and Perloff (1990). Some essays that attempt an overview of this
field are Caves (1984), De Bondt (1985), Kreps and Spence (1985), Geroski,
Phlips and Ulph (1985), Ulph (1987), Schmalensee (1988), Gilbert (1989),
Shapiro (1989), and Hendrikse (1991b). Papers that attempt to integrate the field
are Salop (1979), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Bulow, Geanakoplos and
Klemperer (1985), and Dixit (1986). Spence (1985), Porter (1985), and Neumann
(1988) evaluate policy recommendations to be derived from industrial
organisation.A Conceptual Framework 61
economies of scope. The associated expected profits induce firms to invest in
these shared resources. Chapter 6 shows that a firm may also raise the value
which it produces with a resource by combining it with complementary factors
that it may uniquely own. Either way, the more value a resource adds to a firm,
the higher the firm's incentive to acquire the shared resource. If (natural or
human) resources are scarce, rivals will bid for them. If the Coase theorem holds
in our world with transaction costs, resources will end up being used by the firm
that produces most value thereby. Multi-market firms may have an advantage in
this respect over single-market (domestic) firms or multinational firms that invest
on a market-by-market basis. A common element in both chapters is the
importance of complementarities: chapter 5 discusses complementary outputs,
where the associated products are complementary in a production process or in
their consumers' consumption process, and chapter 6 discusses complementary
inputs (i.e., production in teams). In management literature, both
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The 'horizontal' dimension of competition in multiple product markets in this
chapter shows that entrants can be committed to entry as much as incumbents
to entry deterrence. This may hold in particular for entrants that are
established firms whose commitments are based on shared resources that can
be applied in several product markets. The chapter ranks groups of markets
in terms of an increasing degree of relatedness from segmented markets, via
joined markets and other intermediate forms, to integrated markets.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 defined related markets as markets that are connected by any of three
links: shared participants (buyers or sellers), shared instruments, that is, shared
assets in production or consumption processes, and coordinated behaviour.
Venables (1990a) argues that the degree o/reteedncM increases if firms (are able
to) take more decisions from a global perspective (taking into account the entire
set of markets served) rather than from a local (single-product) perspective.
Economists usually relate the degree of relatedness to the familiar cross-
elasticities of supply and demand. Market relatedness can thus be defined in terms
of basic conditions (cross-elasticities and shared instruments), structures (shared
participants) or conduct (coordinated behaviour or global perspective of decision
making). This chapter uses Venables' behavioural approach as organising
principle to tie in the other elements (except cross-elasticities, which are deferred
to chapter 9). Figure 5.1 illustrates the setting.
At the lowest level of
relatedness, short of
unrelated markets, are
segmented markets. On the
demand side, these imply
independent market demand
functions due to the absence
of arbitrage trade, and prices
that can differ among
markets. On the supply side,
the necessary condition for
segmentation is constant
returns to scale: sales in one
market do not affect
(marginal) costs in another
market. To these structural
conditions Venables (1990a,
p. 23) adds behavioural
• •••: ;•'..•:•• '• ••-• . j- -*,: ' , , • =
Figure 5.1
Horizontally related markets









Finn 1 <> Firm 2
Shared resources
S64 Chapter 5
conditions: segmented markets have common suppliers who decide about product
market variables (e.g., output levels) on an 'unrelated', market-by-market basis.
Venables (1990a, p. 23) distinguishes the segmented markets from the i/i/egra/etf
/naritef hypothesis where, respectively,
'firms are permitted to select strategies for each national market, or merely to
choose a strategy at the world level. (.) Integration implies that producers set
a single quantity (or price) at the world level, and let arbitrageurs determine
the distribution of sales to national markets (.) At the other extreme,
segmented market behaviour, when combined with constant marginal costs,
implies that the game played between firms in one country is completely
separate from the game that the firms are playing in other countries'.
Venables (1990a) also distinguishes an intermediate case, which I propose to call
martetf where rsOi ( ju»H.W« I m i.c
'some of the firms' decisions are taken on an integrated, or worldwide, basis,
and others on a segmented market basis. The most natural variable in the
former category is firms' capacity choice, since a unit of capacity can be used
to supply any country. In the latter category, we may wish to leave some of
firms' market decisions (price or sales) to be taken on a national basis."
Integration of decision making can refer to investment decisions other than
capacity as well. A table summarises the proceedings of the chapter, while





























The chapter discusses markets in increasing relatedness, to begin with segmented
markets (section 5.2). In joined markets investments in shared resources create
links that will be formalised as multi-market spillovers, which build upon the
concept of economy of scope (in sections 5.3 and 5.4). Firms integrate strategic
intent across these markets if they respond in one market to actions undertaken by
a rival in another market. This may lead to coordinated behaviour across marketsHorizontally Related Markets 65
(in c00/tf//Jû/«/ moritcK) or to a coordinated withdrawal of each firm to a home
market (jpAew-qf-m/Zue/K*) (see section 5.5). The chapter reviews integrated
markets in section 5.6. An appraisal concludes the chapter. The 'links' in the
table are necessary conditions to achieve a particular degree of relatedness. They
are also necessary for the 'associated characteristics'. As a result, degrees of
market relatedness tend to go together with these characteristics.
5.2 SEGMENTED MARKETS
Segmented markets exhibit the lowest degree of relatedness:
Definition 5.1 Segmen/ed wiarte/j are defined by (1) the presence of some
common suppliers, (2) who have constant returns to scale; (3) independent
pricing is possible due to absence of arbitrage and due to localized demand.
j. -foni ;^r; is&j'iv.;*•*.••". .'«n.;.!,^•-*)'*>'•;
In international trade, segmented markets are regional or country markets linked
by exporters. Brander (1981) and the sequel in Brander and Krugman (1983)
develop the paradigm model of segmented markets. It can be summarised as
follows. There are two countries, A and B, and two firms, 1 and 2. There is
symmetry across markets and between firms. Firm 1 is the incumbent firm in
market A (/'.£., located in A), and likewise firm 2 in B. In each market, products
are homogeneous, and firms compete in outputs (Cournot duopoly). The demand
functions are independent. Marginal costs of production, c, are constant.
Exporting to the other market requires a constant unit transport cost or tariff, r.
Each firm chooses home and foreign sales, taking the rival's home and foreign
sales as given. Profit maximisation leads to straightforward results. In each
market, the incumbent firm has lower marginal costs (c) than the importer (c+t).
If the incumbent's monopoly price (p"") is less than the importer's unit cost (c+t),
the import level is zero, and the incumbent firm is monopolist. Otherwise, a
Cournot duopoly exists where the incumbent firm sells more than the importer.
The result is cro5J-/iu«/f>ig: identical products are exported from A to B and
imported from B into A. This is an important real world phenomenon in world
trade. The model suggests that this aspect of trade can best be understood in
terms of imperfect competition. It subsequently became the basis of new
international trade theories.' In a symmetric equilibrium, the model shows that the
prices in both countries will be equal. Each firm will, therefore, have a higher
profit margin in its home market than in its export market (where it incurs
transport costs). This result has been called rec/proca/ dK/npmg, if dumping is
defined as an f.o.b. price for exports below the domestic price (Brander and
Krugman, 1983, p. 316). This result critically depends on imperfect competition:
only then can different prices (net of transport cost, f.o.b.) exist while marginal
revenues (f.o.b.) in both markets are equal (as both are equal to the marginal cost
c). In perfect competition, a price taker will not sell in two markets
simultaneously if one market offers a higher price (f.o.b.) than the other.
1. See Helpman and Krugman (1989) for references and a survey of the
implications for trade policy. •,*««*-•, :^».»v-;.-- ••>.--.-o... a^v^n. .v\;?, .>•..,«'66 Chapter 5
Some characteristics of the model stand out. First, a demand shock in one
market will not affect another market. The assumptions of independent market
demand functions (no arbitrage) and constant marginal costs see to that.* Second,
it exhibits a prisoner's dilemma. Exporting to the foreign market is each firm's
dominant strategy (if p™ > c+t). Yet both firms would benefit it both decided not
to export: they would gain monopoly profits at home while losing export profits.
The net gain will be positive as the monopoly outcome saves on transport costs
and prevents erosion of profits by duopoly competition. Third, it is a one-stage,
one-shot game. It has been extended to two-stage games (section 5.3), which
explicitly introduce investment decisions and increasing returns to scale or scope.
The associated markets are called joined markets. The segmented markets game
has also been extended to repeated games (section 5.5), which show how
collusion may overcome the prisoner's dilemma. Collusion also leads to
associated market forms (coordinated markets and spheres-of-influence).
The natural interpretation of the reciprocal dumping model is to view markets
A and B as countries. However, they can also be different product markets.
Entry, that is, is associated with either adjustment cost in production, if the entry
market good is a technical substitute, or transport cost or tariffs, if the product is
exported. Entry is easy if these entry costs are low (Calem, 1988, p. 171). These
adjustment or export costs can be asymmetrical from markets A to B, and v/ce
versa. If we allow some asymmetry, the model may be used to introduce two
extreme cases. Say, unit transport costs differ per firm: t, < tj (for firm i = 1,2).
No entry at all occurs if p""-c < t,: each firm is monopolist in its home market. If
t, < p""-c < t2, o/ie-.s/</e</ en/ry occurs: firm 1 exports to market B, while firm 2
does not export to A (Calem, 1988, p. 175). If (t, <) t, < p°"-c, reriproca/ en/ry
occurs: each firm exports to the other firm's home market (Calem, 1988, p. 178).
This is the cross-hauling case of international trade theory.
The occurrence of one-sided or reciprocal entry raises the question what
triggers the existing firms' entry move(s)? A reduction in transport costs or tariffs
may induce entry (e.g., consider a decrease in t? from a level above p""-c to one
below p°*-c). European integration exhibits examples of this situation. Investments
in firm-specific resources that can be used in several country markets may give
rise to established-firm entry (see chapter 4 and the next section). If firms collude
to stay away from each other's home market, the breakdown of collusion may
induce reciprocal entry (section 5.5). If firms expand their market definition from
countries to continents or beyond, they may enter markets previously beyond their
intellectual horizon (chapter 9). Although it is unlikely that this change occurs on
conceptual grounds alone, it does mean that changes in business strategy can lead
to reciprocal entry. Privatisation of state monopolies with liberalisation of their
monopoly markets may induce reciprocal entry by the former monopolists into
their once protected national markets.'
2. Subsection 5.3.6 discusses a borderline case with joined markets where sales in
one market do affect costs or revenues in another market.
3. e.g., 'Cross-Channel Rivalry Highlights Opening Of EC Phone Industry' (77ie
S/reer Journa/ Europe, 1-8-92, p. 1 and 4).Horizontally Related Markets 67
5.3 JOINED MARKETS -vfr.ifejrfiivkfci -aftest» j*i3t-ie+.»4hsf4«n.*«
Joined markets represent a higher state of relatedness than segmented markets:
Definition 5.2 A pair of y'o/rad marfe» exists if (1) suppliers use shared
resources in both (all) markets, and (2) they invest in these resources while
t« anticipating this common use. (3) Arbitrage among these markets does not
occur such that prices may differ from one market to the next.
Condition (3) holds in segmented markets as well. The distinction between
segmented and joined markets is blurred since condition (1) is implicit in
segmented markets, where the common suppliers may use shared production
capacity for both home and entry markets. Moreover, condition (2) ignores cases
where shared resources do not reflect anticipation of multi-market use (see
subsection 5.3.6). Conditions (1) and (2) may give rise to multi-market spillovers
(or joint economies)." The current section begins with defining multi-market
spillovers and subsequently explores why multi-market spillover effects exist at
all. It will appear that multi-market spillovers are not so much important in their
own right; instead they are fingerprints pointing to the real dra/nar/s pmomte of
this section: shared resources. The link to these resources will also suggest a
taxonomy of multi-market spillovers. Finally, multi-market spillovers do play a
role in decision making: they identify the impact of a firm's position in one
market on its decisions in another market. lx»s-a ^-*S3''hafjqs -»!" .<»>*>'>
5.3.1 Définit ions of Multi-market Spillovers
In the Brander (1981) model, a demand change in one market, say A, will not
affect either cost or demand in market B. In joined markets this does not hold
because of multi-market spillover effects. This concept intends to generalise the
(dis)economy of scale or scope. It comes in a marginal and in a 'total' condition.
Definition 5.3 The marginal condition for a mM/rt-wiar/fcer ip///over is
where 7t is the firm's total profits in markets A and B, S' is its decision
instrument (e.g., the output level) in market j (= A,B), and drc/<3S® is the
marginal profitability of the decision S in market B (Bulow, Geanakoplos and
Klemperer, 1985, p. 493).
If the inequality condition holds, the action S* in market A affects the marginal
profitability (dn/dS*) of action S* in market B. The marginal profitability in turn
affects the choice of S*: the profit maximising firm raises S* up to the point
4. This explains the name joined markets. The meaning is similar to Shakun's
(1956) concept of cowp/ed mar&m, which are markets connected by advertising
campaigns for brand names. See subsection 5.4.4.68 Chapter 5
where it no longer raises its profits (i.e., where drc/dS* = 0). A change in market
A, e.g., a demand shock, affects not only S* but also, via S*'s impact on drc/<3S^,
the choice of S* in market B. •'
In the special case where two markets are completely independent from each
other except in the cost curves of its firms, Bulow er a/. (1985, p. 493) equate the
multi-market spillover to #C/dqN3q*, where C is a firm's total costs and q" is the
output level in market j (= A,B). If negative there is a weak cost
complementarity (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982, p. 74). The next definition
generalises their related concept of economy of scope (definition 4.3 in the
previous chapter) to include complementary products in consumption:
Definition 5.4 The 'total' condition for a positive (negative)
s/wV/over at the pair of variables (S*,S*) is 7i(S\S°) > (<) 7t(S*,O)+7i(O,S»).
Appendix 5.A compares these cost concepts in Baumol « a/. (1982). The next
subsection traces these spillovers back to assets that are public goods.
5.3.2 Spillovers and Public Goods »
Baumol ef a/. (1982) explain economies of scope from (quasi)public goods (see
subsection 4.3.1). Their analysis pertains to factors of production. It can be
extended to any capital asset that raises a firm's profits (gross of capital service
costs). The appendices 5.B and 5.C demonstrate this. They recount and generalise
their proofs that public goods lead to multi-market spillovers.
Six factors need to be taken into account for public goods to lead to
spillovers. The first one is product-specificity. If a capital good is completely
product-specific, it has no alternative use. It is then without meaning to ask how
alternative use would affect its current availability, that is, whether it is a private
good or a public good with respect to other products. Imperfect product-
specificity (also called firm-specificity) is thus a necessary condition for a
meaningful distinction between private and public goods. Moreover, if an
investment is completely product-specific, it does not influence the (marginal)
profitability in another market, and thus generates no multi-market spillover.
A second factor important for spillovers is a property called non-exclusion.
Public goods satisfy certain conditions (e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1987, pp.
483-4). First, it should be costly to exclude non-contributors from benefiting from
the resource (the erc/uî/o/i pmiri/?/e). This relates in particular to know how and
experience. These (intangible) assets spread (intentionally) within the firm but
may also leak (unintentionally) to other firms, thus making them more
competitive. The firm faces an appropriability problem: it does not recoup all
returns to its own investments in, for example, R&D. Solutions can be to
cooperate or merge with the rival firms (e.g., De Bondt and Veugelers, 1991).
Second, the resource should be made available to other product (markets) at little
or no opportunity costs. If investment k, for product j has an externality upon
product i, it raises the e/fec«'ve ca/j/fa/ K; from the dedicated investment k; to K,
= kj+alj,ikj (ij = l..n; where a * 0 is the externality). Appendix 5.C ranks
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increases from zero to unity. An externality is an opportunity to the firm: it may
exploit its resource in other markets without giving up its home market. This
aspect of public goods is the focus in this book. Appendix 5.C, however,
demonstrates that an externality leads to a multi-market spillover only in two
special cases. Both cases express the condition that exclusion must hold. The
economic content of this condition is centralisation: either there is a firm-specific
investment in public goods (a = 1 and Kj = K, for all i,j) or investments are
limited to some products, and other products free-ride on them (for example,
product i has kj = 0 and Kj = aL^kj).
Three, spillovers may occur through two avenues. One, a (demand) shock in
market A may affect the investment decision in a shared resource, which in turn
affects the profitability in market B. This generates the spillover in definition 5.3.
The variables S* and S* in the definitions above then refer to the firm's output
levels; the firm controls only one (global) investment decision (see appendix 5.C
for the reason of this assumption). Two, a shock in market A may affect the
utilisation of the (private or quasipublic) resource, which affects the profitability
in market B. Consider the former avenue. The implicit assumption is that the size
of the investment is endogenous. If investments are exogenous, e.g., a fixed plant
size, developments in market A cannot influence the size of the investment, and
thus do not transmit to market B. There is no spillover effect on the margin in the
other market, i.e., no spillover as measured by definition 5.3. Developments in
market A may influence the lumpy decision whether to invest at all, and this may
affect market B. Hence, a spillover as measured by definition 5.4 may exist. The
distinction of two avenues is also useful to understand the impact of imperfect
information.
Since imperfect information will affect both size and utilisation of an
investment, it too may affect the size of a spillover. Table 5.2 illustrates the
argument. ^ (j
Table 5.2
















Say firm 1 is active in markets A and B. Consider, on the one hand, a change
(increase) of demand in market A which the firm is able to anticipate when it
takes its investment decision. The firm will increase its investments in R&D,
advertising or capacity. Positive spillovers occur to market B if the resource is a
(quasi)public good. Higher advertisements, for example, may raise its sales in
market B as well. Anticipative investments in capacity (or another private good)70 Chapter 5
for market A prevent a capacity constraint on product B, such that no capacity-
induced spillover occurs. On the other hand, a change in A's demand curve may
also be unanticipated. Being unanticipated, it did not induce a larger investment in
the shared resource. The shock now affects the utilisation of the shared resource.
If the resource, e.g., advertising, is a pure public good, no spillover occurs to
market B. Higher sales in market A, given the unchanged level of advertising, do
not affect sales in market B. If the resource is a quasipublic or private good, e.g.,
capacity, the firm's increase of production of A raises its marginal costs in
market B. This example implies a negative spillover. Baumol « a/. (1982)
analyze the former case (see appendix 5.B). The table complements their results
with the case of unanticipated shocks. Section 8.6 and subsection 9.8.4 explore
the case of a private good (capacity).
The capital good market also affects spillovers. Pecuniary economies of scope
are absent if factor markets are perfect. When imperfect competition on the
demand side of the factor market is allowed, an increasing demand for capital
good kj for product i (e.g., because demand for i increases) affects capital good
prices and thus may affect investments kj for product j, and thus j's marginal
costs. A multi-market (multiproduct) spillover may result. This holds even if the
capital goods themselves are purely private goods or product-specific.
Finally, strategic competition affects investment motives and thus the size of
spillover effects. Baumol er a/. (1982) do not explore the strategic implications of
irreversible investments in shared resources. Instead they explore the cost-
minimising investments for given output levels. In a game with irreversible
investments, however, firms choose profit-maximising investments levels, and
then choose product market variables (output levels) given those investments.
They may invest in shared resources for the sake of making a commitment to
entry (deterrence) rather than to exploit a joint economy (spillover). In terms of
the latter (cost minimisation) objective, the commitment motive may lead firms to
over- or underinvest (see subsection 6.4.6). This reflects the setting of joined
markets in, among others, Venables (1990a). See subsection 5.3.5 and section
5.4. ,• .,-, "P> :
5.3.3 A Taxonomy of Multi-market Spillovers
The identity of the shared resource that underlies a multi-market spillover effect
may give rise to a taxonomy of spillovers. Shared resources may represent three
basic types of economic data: technology, consumer preferences, and information.;
5p///overj -,«.,., , ,. s
Supply spillovers occur if production processes use shared factors of production
or if the output of one process is an input in another process. A positive
(negative) multi-market supply spillover exists if the output in market B reduces
(raises) the (marginal or average) costs of producing for market A (i.e.,
economies of scale or scope). Given the discussion above and in the previous
chapter, let me just note that markets A and B are vertically related if definitions
5.3 or 5.4 indicate an integration (dis)economy.Horizontally Related Markets 71
Demand spillovers occur if the consumer's utility from consuming one product
depends on his (or someone else's) consumption of another good. A multi-market
demand spillover
'is positive if a firm's demand in one market is complementary to its demand
in the second ... and would be negative if selling more in one market hurts
prospects in the other' (Bulow « a/., 1985, p. 509).
Products A and B are complements (substitutes) in consumption, if the
consumer's marginal utility of product A increases (decreases) in his consumption
of product B. They are strict (or perfect) complements, if one product is useless
without the other (e.g., the left shoe and the right shoe in a pair of shoes).
Consumers are indifferent between perfect substitutes. When a firm starts selling
in another market, a demand spillover from its entry market makes itself felt as a
shift in its home market demand curve. That is, the demand functions are
interrelated (Coase, 1946).
Close substitutes in demand such as coffee and tea may have to be included in
one market; distant substitutes create a negative spillover across markets.'
Complementarity in consumption exists between such 'systemic' products as
cameras and films, computers and software, CD players and CDs. The
complementarity here reflects a technical need, which requires compatibility
between, e.g., a particular camera and film. That is, compatibility can be seen as
a requirement or specific case of (strict) complementarity in consumption or use.
Partly overlapping with these examples is the case of network externalities.
Products may be related by a joint network (e.g., telephone lines are also used for
fax machines), such that increasing demand for or diffusion of one product
increases the usefulness of the other. Distribution, advertising, and after sales
service may link demand of otherwise different products, if consumers prefer
widely distributed, advertised, or serviced products. Similar to the economies of
scope, therefore, a firm-specific resource may be the source of a demand
spillover.' If the shared resource is (product) information, a specific type of
spillovers can be mentioned, which cuts across the distinction between supply and
demand spillovers.
Af«/«-manfce/ //i/omia/zo;j S/wV/ovm
Actions in one market may signal an inalienable characteristic of a multi-market
firm that makes itself felt in all its markets. The signal may be received by
5. Chapter 9 further discusses market definition problems. *""• -"•
6. Consumers may derive utility U(.) not directly from a good, but from a
service, z(.), derived from using that good in conjunction with another good. For
example, Uj(z,(q*,qj'),Z2(qj*,qj''),..), where i is the consumer, A, B and P are
commodities, and z^ (j =1,2,..) are service functions. The good P is a public
good (e.g., a cable or phone network, advertising, ere.) that raises the utility
derived from consuming the A and B goods. Through P, consumer utility and
demand for A and B are related. -•-«>-•«•-.>«' ^.« --^ • .. • ?.72 Chapter 5
consumers, (potential) competitors, or by suppliers. Their response to the signal
may change the firm's marginal cost or revenue in a related market (hence a
multi-market spillover).
Consumer signalling is relevant for experience goods, i.e., goods whose
quality consumers cannot ascertain prior to purchase. Consumers may buy on the
basis of supplier's goodwill, e.g., a reputation for quality, which in turn reflects
the consumers' past experience with the firm's products. A firm may use the
goodwill which it has developed in one market to facilitate the introduction of a
new product. By selling the new product under its own brand name it signals its
quality. This is called u/n£re//a ftra/K/mg (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1988). Consumers
may also react to information about each other's behaviour. This may occur with
fashion or lifestyle goods. Consumers in one country may follow demand in a
lead market, a Z»a/u/wagon effect, or they may be appalled (and their utility may
be reduced) by a product's increasing popularity elsewhere, a jnoft effect. The
bandwagon (snob) effect is formally similar to a (dis)economy of scope in
demand, which can be derived from consumer utility functions (Kesteloot, 1990,
p. 171-4).
Predatory behaviour by an incumbent firm against entrants in one market may
generate a reputation for predatory behaviour in its other markets (Selten, 1978;
Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Phlips, 1988; and Levy,
1989). A monopolist may build up a reputation by exploiting the potential
entrants' uncertainty about its response to entry. It does so by price cutting upon
(early) entry as i/in all its markets price cutting is profitable (Kreps and Wilson,
1982) or as if it (has a small chance to) display(s) an aggressive reaction whether
profitable or not (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). Reputation may deter entry in
later markets, such that the firm enjoys monopoly profits there, which outweigh
the costs of price wars in its early markets. Similarly, a firm might develop
goodwill or a reputation for toughness with suppliers (e.g., employees) in one
market, with a view to using this reputation in other markets. The next two
subsections show that spillovers may influence decision making.
•> Ol JT3il.. .'«if,.-..
5.3.4 Multi-market Spillovers and Decision Making . •.. •' u - .. ><;T>C
Multi-market spillovers play a role in decision making both about product market
variables (production levels or prices) as well as about pre-competitive investment
levels (such as production capacity). This subsection centres on production levels;
the next one discusses investment decisions. Multi-market spillovers may affect a
'lumpy' decision, such as whether to enter a market. They may also affect an
incremental or marginal decision to adjust the output level to a small shock.
These two cases show when one will use either of the two definitions of multi-
market spillovers. Consider both cases in turn.
A lumpy decision such as entry can take several forms. In international trade,
entry may imply local investments (by a multinational enterprise) or local sales
(by an exporter). A multi-market firm may also come about by a merger of firms
in related markets. In all cases, the firm may realise a spillover by using a shared
resource in its new and existing markets. If the resource is not a pure public
good, entry into market j reduces its availability to activity (or market) i. TheHorizontally Related Markets 73
latter loss imposes an op/wrtM/HQ" catt 0/ enfry into market j (see chapters 2 and
7). Consider for example a monopoly firm in market A which enters market B. It
enters if 7t(A,B)-F > rc(A,0), where n(ij) is the maximum profit from activities
in markets i and j, and F is the (given, fixed) entry cost into market B. There are
two ways to decompose this decision problem. First, imagine for the sake of the
argument (which will be difficult in practice) that Jt(A,B) can be decomposed into
local profits 7c*(A,B)+7t*(A,B). Then, entry is profitable if:
(5.1) 7t*(A,B)-F > 7t(A,O)-7t*(A,B).
That is, the entry profit should exceed the opportunity cost of entry, where the
latter entails the loss of profits in market A due to entry into market B. The
opportunity cost of entry will be zero (the usual case in industrial economics
models) if the resources used in market B are either purely public or (in the case
of private goods) were not used in market A prior to entry (e.g., excess
capacity). A negative opportunity cost exists if entry into B actually raises profits
in market A. To introduce spillovers, decompose the entry decision problem
alternatively into ^44 -Tr**->.39*^8^-6 r/oj z'3"•':••* rA ./.. «!-.J, rtoqt.nsiJ
•' diï ut (J3)i"ii;'?:-$i£fîi.- "si.y,:>:'ïic.b
(5.2) 7t(A,B)-[7c(A,O) + 7t(O,B)] + 7t(0,B)-F > 0. *••* •*<» "* -^.rf .«fr .,... -i
That is, the established-firm's entry decision can be decomposed into the multi-
market spillover effect (definition 5.4) plus the <te novo entry profits. This
suggests a two-stage analysis for an entrant: first explore the entry profits as (/"the
new activity is independent, and then study the contribution the parent company
can make to the new activity by leveraging its spillovers.^ Equation (5.2) provides
the necessary condition for entry by acquisition: the established firm in market A
may acquire a local firm in market B (with a value of n(0,B)-F) and then enhance
its competitiveness by means of the spillover (see section 3.4.1).
A marginal output decision is called for when a small shock occurs in say,
market A. Increasing demand in A may induce the firm to raise its output level in
that market. Should it also adjust its output level in a related market, B? When
addressing this question, Bulow ef a/. (1985) discovered the importance of the
marginal multi-market spillovers in definition 5.3. The same analysis also ushered
in their concepts of strategic substitutes and complements, which received greater
attention by economists than the multi-market spillovers did. Appendix 5.D
recapitulates their analysis. Suffice it to say that if in response to a shock in
market A the firm increases its production level in that market, it will, if there is
a positive (negative) multi-market spillover, raise (reduce) its output level in
market B.
The following subsection explicitly links entry decisions to investment
decisions. Its special case of multinational firms demonstrates that both cost
minimisation motives (joint economies) as well as commitment motives determine
a firm's investment decision in shared resources.
7. The decomposition breaks down if the incumbent firm in market B responds
differently to </c novo entry than to established-firm entry (see subsection 6.7.2).74 Chapter 5
5.3.5 Spillovers and Investment Decisions by Multinational Enterprises j|
Theories of the multinational enterprise (MNE) distinguish three types of costs:
unit tariff and transport costs (t), firm-specific fixed costs (F), and plant-specific
fixed costs (G). This set-up reflects the dichotomy, discussed in chapter 4,
between firm-specific resources (F) that may induce entry, and product-specific
factors whose costs (G, t) serve as entry barriers. This subsection focuses on
models which assume these costs to be of given (exogenous) size (Horstmann and
Markusen, 1987, 1989 and 1992; and Veugelers, 1990).* Moreover, it assumes
that the firm-specific resource, e.g., know how, can be used without any costs in
all (both) markets served by the MNE. The firm-specific resource F combined
with constant marginal production costs gives a global economy of scale or scope
(see definition 5.4). A firm can prefer to serve its home market only, in which
case it is a domestic firm and incurs fixed costs F+G. If it serves the foreign
market as well, it may export, incurring transport costs or tariffs tX (if X is the
level of exports). It may also become an MNE by setting up a plant in the foreign
market. Compared to an exporter, the MNE incurs fixed costs G, while saving on
transport costs tX. An MNE's cost advantage over domestic firms is that two
domestic (single-market) firms incur fixed costs 2F+2G whereas the MNE incurs
F+2G. The higher F, the more likely that an MNE replaces domestic firms.
Moreover, if entry and exit is allowed, the higher F, the smaller the number of
firms sustained by given country demand curves. ^ j
Two specific cases have been explored. One, consider the case when
consumer needs across countries and products are homogeneous. Two firms,
located in different countries, may compete in the two markets (reciprocal entry).
First, however, they choose an entry mode, /.«., whether to export from the
home country or to invest in the host market, thus becoming an MNE. Call this
the MNE-MNE game (Dei, 1990; and Rowthorn, 1992). Dei focuses on the
prisoner's dilemma in the game. Becoming an MNE can be a dominant strategy
as the MNE's local production reduces its marginal costs in the foreign market,
and thus raises its gross profits.' If both choose to become an MNE, however,
each may lose more in its home market, by the other's incursion, than it gains in
the foreign market. Rowthorn (1992) shows that, depending on the size of, on the
one hand, the transport costs and tariffs, and, on the other hand, the plant-specific
costs, several outcomes are possible. Cross-hauling may occur (when both firms
export), cross-investments (when both firms become an MNE), as well as
intermediary cases.
Two, if consumer needs are heterogeneous, local firms may cater to local
consumers' specific needs (Ghemawat and Spence, 1986; and Veugelers, 1989).
Lets call this one-sided entry case the MNE-DOMESTIC game. The domestic
firm's differentiated product may give it an edge relative to the MNE's cost-
8. Krugman (1983) and Dei (1990) are similar models of the MNE, but they
ignore the plant-specific fixed cost. Rowthorn (1992) ignores the firm-specific
fixed cost.
9. In Dei (1990) this also raises the MNE's m profits as plant-specific fixed
costs are ignored.Horizontally Related Markets 75
efficiency derived from its firm-specific resource: *»—* «,_.._^_ /v^:. .k__..L..«
'global competitors try to exploit the similarities across countries, while
country-centered producers tend to be more responsive to the differences
among them.' (Ghemawat and Spence, 1986, p. 63) .nvswun ,»T*
Veugelers (1990) cuts across the MNE-MNE and the MNE-DOMESTIC games.
In her model, both firms in the game can choose to become either an MNE, by
investing in R&D to acquire a firm-specific asset, or to be a domestic, non-
exporting firm.'" Apart from the prisoner's dilemma referred to above, she shows
that a chicken dilemma exists when the size of the R&D outlay excludes more
than one MNE in equilibrium. The other firm chooses for the role of domestic
firm. Each firm prefers to be the MNE, but if the other firm chooses for the
MNE role, it is better to seek a niche and be a domestic firm.
Competition by MNEs shows that firm-specific resources have two
conceptually distinct effects in a multiple market context. First, they may
represent a joint economy relative to the situation where domestic firms invest
only in their home market. For instance, •«*$$«, j
'This jointness or public goods property [of firm-specific assets] gives rise to
the existence of multi-plant economies of scale in which one two-plant firm
has a cost advantage over two independently owned plants.' (Horstmann and
Markusen, 1989, pp. 46-7)
This is an efficiency-argument to multi-market firms. Second, firm-specific
resources represent a commitment that may improve the firm's competitive
position. That is, an MNE may buy resources to deter entry by potential domestic
firms. By buying a local plant it reduces its marginal costs by t (the exporter's
transport costs). This allows it to reduce price upon entry in its host market,
which deters entry, such that high prices may result:
'The problem that arises is that, while the MNE is technically efficient, it
often possesses considerable market power.' (Horstmann and Markusen,
1989, p. 47) w;;k-;Kn<..*3e'tv -. •• •«.*;." •si-siwn^î.f'î;
A firm may thus become an MNE even if exporting would give lower total costs
(if tX < G) but exporting would induce entry by a local firm.
These models made important contributions to the analysis of MNEs.
However, something is missing. Decisions by a firm to become an MNE or an
exporter have no repercussions in its home market. The assumptions of exogenous
investment levels (F, G), constant marginal costs, and segmented markets (on the
10. This is called an assignment game. In Horstmann and Markusen (1987), by
contrast, roles are exogenous. One firm is allowed to choose between export to a
host market and becoming an MNE by investing in the host market. In the host
market, a potential firm is constrained to become a (single-market) domestic firm
if it enters. Ki'U^tos?; asœqs rcna, _>~r. -*.;^wî-iaî9nwïflq.*tf?;-x»?j& J: «;76 Chapter 5
demand side) rule out feedback effects. Technically, these assumptions pertain to
segmented markets. These models underestimate the extent to which multinational
firms create linkages among national economies. The assumption of exogenous
firm-specific resources has the merit of being a simplifying modelling assumption.
There are, however, two reasons to think that investment outlays are rarely
exogenous. The number of inputs that make up an investment are usually
variable. If the inputs are complementary, more of one input (e.g., R&D
engineers) raises the contribution by other inputs. Second, in cases where the
number of inputs is fixed, e.g., a favourable location or natural resource, the
outlay on them rarely is fixed. Firms bid for scarce natural resources. As the next
chapter shows, the bid price depends on the value that the resource will have for
business users.
5.3.6 Segmented versus Joined Markets «s- >]h:
The models about MNEs reveal that the boundaries between segmented and joined
markets are blurred. Both have common suppliers who use shared resources,
although these are implicit in segmented market models. The reason for blurred
boundaries is that definitions 5.1 and 5.2 have two loopholes. One loophole is that
if the use of a shared resource was not anticipated by the firms at the time of
their investment decisions, the markets are not joined by definition 5.2. I will
refer to these markets as segmented. Note, however, that in this case events in
one market may affect the other market. Multi-market spillovers appear if exports
are so profitable that exporters ration sales to their home market in order to relax
capacity or other constraints on their exports (a negative multi-market spillover by
table 5.2). This modifies definition 5.1 by allowing for resource constraints.
Hence positive or negative (zero) spillovers cannot be used to define joined
(segmented) markets." If transport costs decrease and trade levels increase,
segmented markets can be classified in four types: they may exhibit no trade if
transport costs are sufficiently high (a case that overlaps with unrelated markets),
one-sided trade, or two-sided trade; finally resource constraints and spillovers
arise if trade levels have further risen due to falling transport costs (the case that
overlaps with joined markets). In the latter case, firms may adjust their
investment levels to their sales in multiple markets, and markets become joined.
Another loophole appears if the size of investments in firm-specific resources
is exogenous, as was assumed by the models above. In this case, the only
decision firms can take is whether to invest at all. The markets are still joined if
firms decide about these investments from a global point of view, that is, a new
firm is created and F+G are incurred with an MNE's view to entry profits as
well as home market profits. Markets are to be classified as segmented, however,
if the decision to invest is a bygone and the number of firms is given
exogenously: condition (2) of definition 5.2 then fails to hold. The next section
11. Another reason for not distinguishing segmented and joined markets on the
basis of multi-market spillovers is that there are two definitions of these spillovers
(see their different implications in appendix 5.A) and the size of spillovers is
ambiguous as it depends on whether shocks are anticipated (table 5.2).Horizontally Related Markets 77
explores strategic resources with an endogenous size, where the choice of
investment size creates a feedback effect between markets.
r
5.4 FIRM-SPECIFIC RESOURCES IN JOINED MARKETS
This section will discuss a wide variety of shared, firm-specific resources (see
definition 4.4 in subsection 4.3.2). It does not aspire to be exhaustive (e.g.,
Grant, 1991, p. 119). These resources may account for multi-market spillovers
or, as it has been understood within strategic management, synergy (see
subsection 2.4.1). They underlie the firm's choice of product markets. They are
what Barney (1986b, 1232) calls Mra/eg/c /ôcfors, being the resources that are
necessary for implementing a strategy. Since they provide potential access to a
wide variety of markets, they are core compere/ices, if they also qualify Prahalad
and Hamel's (1990, pp. 83-4) other conditions (see subsection 2.4.1).
5.4.1 Capacity
Capacity can be a firm-specific resource. First, it is ex /ww difficult to trade, as it
is often indivisible and immobile. Second, although it may be designed to produce
a specific product, it often can be used (or adapted) for distinct products. It may
be used to supply the same product to different countries, while incurring
transport costs, or it may be used to produce technically different products, while
incurring some adjustment costs. As Clemens (1951, p. 2) argued, in a path-
breaking article:
'What the firm has to sell is not a product, or even a line of products, but
rather its capacity to produce. '
Clemens explores the situation where the products are perfect substitutes in
production: producing one unit of A reduces capacity for B by one unit. In this
case, capacity is a private good. If the capacity constraint is binding, a product's
opportunity cost is no longer the direct marginal cost but the earnings foregone by
reducing capacity for other products." Firms may first invest in capacity and
then, given capacity, serve both country or product markets (Calem, 1988;
Anderson and Fischer, 1989; and Venables, 1990a) (see chapters 7 and 8).
12. Andrews (1951) seems to have missed this point. He argues that Marshall
used a broad market definition based on technical and demand substitutes
(Andrews, 1951, p. 143-4). All products within the broad industry can be
aggregated to a cost-based standard commodity [i.e., all products are perfect
substitutes in production]. This would have allowed Marshall to analyze the
industry in a homogeneous good context. This conclusion misses the point that
opportunity costs change. This argument may explain Andrews' exclusive focus
on single-product firms, whereas real world firms are multi-product firms.
Robinson (1950, p. 774-5") criticised Andrews on this point.78 Chapter 5
5.4.2 Experience : isi^sjJDfctaaÉii» «'es .::»«»^
Learning by doing gives rise to experience, which is a firm-specific asset, as
rivals may benefit only little from each other's experience (Dasgupta and Stiglitz,
1988). Experience is a sunk cost as there are numerous transaction costs in the
market for experience (Teece, 1982). Although it is usually considered to be
product-specific, it can be a public input in the production of a similar product
across countries. To exploit its experience the firm may sell its product in
numerous country markets. This has led to complicated trade issues (Dasgupta
and Stiglitz, 1988; Gruenspecht, 1988; and Dick, 1991). Learning by doing
implies that the production process jointly produces both commodities and (an
increase in) experience. New knowledge is a by-product of a production process.
The new knowledge, in turn, reduces the production costs of future production.
This implies that current production costs differ from economic costs: the latter
but not the former take the future cost-reductions into account (Spence, 1981).
This may induce the firm to quote a price below current production costs: by
increasing its current output it speeds up its learning process and thus increases
future profits.
In an international trade context, however, pricing below cost may be picked
up as dumping. Hence the controversies in numerous industries, such as
semiconductors. Gruenspecht (1988) and Dick (1991) argue that the dumping
allegation against Japanese semiconductor producers was misdirected. They define
dumping as a foreign producer's export price below its current production cost
('cost-of-production dumping'). They then show that if a learning curve exists as
steep as in the semiconductor industry, it may indeed be profitable in early stages
of the learning curve to quote a price below current production costs. This
practice thus need not have anything to do with a conscious attempt by Japanese
firms to drive their U.S. competitors out of business. Yet this has been the
motivation underlying dumping allegations."
5.4.3 R&D .IK." -: r,T< ••-: • •>; ;t ;..••.*?'•, ,; i*r^ -:jfc¥fo<farv:J ^ista-V} ,«•-••*/•
Know how is usually treated as a pure public good: its use in one market does not
reduce its availability in another market. This, however, is an abstraction as
transferring knowledge from product A to B does involve resource costs (Teece,
1977). That is, engineers must be involved in transferring their own know how to
market B. This implies that they are temporarily unavailable to market A: the
know how in producing market A has (temporarily) decreased. Know how
qualifies as a firm-specific resource. One explanation for this is that it is often
tacit (non-formalised), personal, and tied to routines (ways of doing things)
13. Berck and Perloff (1990) model a case where a foreign ('Japanese') firm does
quote prices so as to induce domestic ('U.S.') firms to contract. Learning does
not play a role here, however. Regretfully, the authors assume a leadership role
for the 'Japanese' firms, rather than deriving this from underlying data. It might
be, for instance, that 'Japanese' firms use their learning skill to acquire a
leadership role. . „.„..,. ,.„... .„„,.,. ». ,...^»_;^,»... „, ,^ ..,,.•..=.,.,,•«;;Horizontally Related Markets 79
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). Because of this, it is difficult to trade and the
associated factor market is imperfect (e.g., Teece, 1977 and 1980). Knowledge is
rarely completely product-specific. This holds obviously for basic research, but
much applied research has the same characteristic. Tentatively, one may say that
know how becomes increasingly product-specific as one moves from basic
research through applied research to product development. Firms may invest in
process innovation (or imitation) in order to reduce marginal costs. This case is
formally similar to investments in capacity (Brander and Spencer, 1983). Product
innovations raise demand for the product, which is similar to brand advertising.'*
Competition, again, can be a two-stage game: first the firms decide on R&D
levels and, next, they decide on their output levels. The latter product market
stage can be modeled as in Brander (1981). This set-up has been particularly
explored by the Leuven school (De Bondt, Sleuwaegen and Veugelers, 1988;
Veugelers, 1989a and 1990; and Veugelers and Vanden Houte, 1990). They are
careful to distinguish one-sided entry, where a foreign MNE enters a domestic
firm's home market, and reciprocal entry, where two firms develop into MNEs
and enter each other's home market.
R&D differs from capacity investments because of its inter-firm spillover
effects: one firm's R&D may support another firm's R&D (e.g., by diffusion of
the know how) or may hamper it (e.g., by patenting). This has several
ramifications for competition. A firm's R&D investments may encourage or
discourage its rival's R&D: R&D can be a strategic substitute or complement
(Bulow ef a/., 1985). This may either increase or reduce the incentives to commit
R&D. An inter-firm spillover may give firms an incentive to cooperate in R&D,
even if they (continue to) compete in the product (or country) markets. In a
single-market setting, four cases exist where the duopoly cooperate or compete in
R&D, and where they cooperate or compete in the product market. Cooperation
in R&D allows the firms to internalise the R&D spillovers, which raises their
incentive to do R&D. Cooperation in the product market raises price and thus the
return to R&D, but also reduces the output levels, which reduces the investment
motives. It appears that full cooperation (or merger) induces the highest R&D
levels, but the combination of R&D cooperation and subsequent product market
competition induces the highest consumer welfare (e.g., D'Aspremont and
Jacquemin, 1988). This raises thorny competition policy issues (e.g., Ordover and
Willig, 1985; De Bondt and Veugelers, 1989; and Jorde and Teece, 1991).
De Bondt, Sleuwaegen and Veugelers (1988) study one-sided entry by a
multinational firm in a market with a domestic firm. Entry by the multinational
reduces the domestic firm's output level and thus its R&D motive. On the other
hand, the spillover from the multinational firm's R&D on the domestic firm may
restore the domestic firm's costs, output level, and even R&D motive. They also
show that a cooperative R&D choice may either raise or reduce R&D levels.
Cooperation in the product market will raise R&D. Hence the investments in a
public good, such as R&D, depend both on the degree of spillovers (within the
14. Moreover, with linear demand and cost curves the analysis of cost reducing
and demand increasing R&D is formally identical (De Bondt and Veugelers,
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multinational firm among its markets and among the two rivals), and on
competition in the two decision stages of R&D and the product markets.
R&D that raises product quality has an economy of scale effect, such that a
global firm may have both higher quality and lower average costs than a domestic
firm. This is a 'paradox' encountered by (domestic) western firms competing with
(global) Japanese firms. Japanese firms confront their western rivals with
decreasing costs and steep learning curves (Pascale and Rohlen, 1983; Wernerfelt,
1984; Gruenspecht, 1988; Lieberman, 1989; Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990;
and Dick, 1991), increasing product quality and brand loyalty (Mannering and
Winston, 1991), and a global (investment in, e.g., R&D) strategy (Ronstadt and
Kramer, 1982; Levitt, 1983; Prahalad and Doz, 1987; and Willard and Savara,
1988).
Since R&D affects the firm's marginal cost or revenue worldwide, it will
affect trade patterns, as Brander's (1981) model would predict. The government
may give R&D subsidies with this outcome in mind (Spencer and Brander, 1983;
and Cheng, 1987). Given that both the domestic and the foreign firm earn
positive (quasi-)rents in the home market, the local government has a rent-shifting
rationale. It aims to shift rents from the foreign firm to the domestic firm. The
prospect of an R&D subsidy provides the domestic firm with a commitment to
raise R&D. This reduces the foreign firm's R&D (if R&D outlays are strategic
substitutes) and raises its marginal costs. That in turn raises the domestic firm's
profit and thus domestic welfare (if the loss in consumer surplus is not too big).
In the case of policy rivalry, both governments subsidise R&D, which reflects a
prisoner's dilemma in the policy game. 'The jointly optimal policy is to tax R&D
so as just to offset the negative effect of own R&D on the other firm's profit.'
(Spencer and Brander, 1983, p. 715). So far, I have discussed examples of multi-
market supply spillovers. The next case shows how a demand spillover arises.
5.4.4 Advertising, Goodwill, and Brand Names
Firms advertise to introduce products, to inform consumers of availability and
prices, and to improve brand name recognition. A brand name can be a
(quasi)public good if it is used for promoting different products. Advertising
clearly creates sunk costs, as the market for brand names is imperfect: brands are
heterogeneous, buyers and sellers are few, and numerous transaction costs exist.
Advertising can be product-specific, especially if it is informative of prices, e/c.,
but it can also be firm-specific, if it relates to brand names. In the latter case, it
develops a firm-specific resource (goodwill). The outcome can be similar to R&D
competition.
Many economists, however, explicitly focus on the fact that advertising and
brand names disseminate 'information'. Shakun (1965, p. 42) noted, and went on
to model, 'a situation in which the markets for different products are coupled in
the sense that advertising dollars spent in generating sales for one product have an
influence on the sales of another product.' Advertising campaigns may be
complementary, thus increasing their effectiveness. Shakun did not try to explain
the complementarity. This is what the theory of umbrella branding tries to achieve
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of, «.£., product quality (in the case of experience goods). If consumers buy one
of the firm's products, they can infer from it the quality of the firm's other,
products. This is what the common brand name, the umbrella, invites them to do.
Hence sales of one (high-quality) product may raise demand for another product
using the same brand name: umbrella branding suggests 'reputational economies
of scope" (Wernerfelt, 1988, p. 463). A firm's reputation for quality may be
based on its underlying technology, manufacturing capability, or other skills.
Even if the quality levels are technically independent, and consumers pool their
information of products carrying the same brand name, it is in the firm's interest
not to dilute a 'good' brand name by introducing a 'bad' product (Wernerfelt,
1988). This result, in turn, sustains the consumers' pooling of information. A
positive multi-market demand spillover is apparent, therefore.
An umbrella may backfire, as Sullivan (1990) has shown: an event (£.g., an
accident) that reduces one product's quality image, reduces demand for all
products associated by consumers with its brand. This implies that transferring the
brand name from an old (successful) product to a new one entails costs if the new
product may backfire on the old one. The brand name is, in this case, a
quasipublic good exhibiting some congestion, rather than a pure public good. If
the feedback from the new product to the old one is uncertain, it can be positive
(a /ia/o ejfecf) or negative (a /j/acfc-eye ç#ëc/) (Jensen, 1992, p. 198-9). The
introduction of a successful (failing) new product may give the innovator a good
(bad) reputation among consumers. Moreover, an inter-firm spillover arises if a
successful (failing) new product induces consumers to substitute (away from) the
innovator's old product for (to) its rival's old product (Jensen, 1992).'*
5.4.5 Reputation ..- »*
--rr r.
Reputation, like consumers' goodwill, is an incomplete information phenomenon:
a person's reputation is what others //im£ he is, rather than what he actually is -
which is different if the others' information is incomplete. Several cases of
informational multi-market spillovers have been explored (Dranove and Tan,
1990; Green and Laffont, 1990; Srinivasan, 1991; and Rotemberg and Saloner,
1991). A particular case is a multi-market firm's reputation for aggressiveness
(see subsection 5.3.2 for references). Here (and also in Green and Laffont, 1990,
and Srinivasan, 1991), the established firm itself is fully informed of both its own
costs and the potential entrants' costs. The established firm fools others, not
itself. The reputation problem is one-sided: new firms have no reputation as their
costs are known with certainty. This assumption is decidedly odd. How is the
incumbent firm going to acquire certainty about firms not yet in business,
15. Most other models of umbrella branding focus on a multi-product monopolist.
Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1992) do model competition between multi-product
firms. They model these as firms that supply 'different' products in subsequent
sub-periods within 'the period'. This does not strike me as a very convincing
analysis of what being multi-product is about, and moreover, the authors admit
that the assumption does not change the model's equilibrium 'structure' relative to
the single-product case.82 Chapter 5
whereas the latter are not completely informed about the incumbent firm, which
may have in been in business for decades?
If the entrant is a multi-market firm it too has a reputation to defend. Kreps
and Wilson (1982) explore the case where an incumbent firm tries to deter entry
into its N markets by an entrant, which enters these markets one by one.
Uncertainty is two-sided: both are uncertain about the other's payoffs. The
monopolist initially fights entry in order to build a reputation that fighting entry is
simply more profitable for it than accommodating entry. The entrant, in turn,
initially enters markets in order to build a reputation that entry is profitable for it
even if the monopolist fights. If, in fact, the monopolist's optimal response to
actual entry would be to acquiesce, it may give in after a while. If the entrant's
optimal response to a monopolist that fights is not to enter, it will after a while
give up entry. So both firms are involved in a game of chicken, where both
behave aggressively (i.e., the monopolist fights and the entrant enters) until one
of them gives up. If this is the monopolist, the entrant will enter all subsequent
markets, and the monopolist will accept this; if it is the entrant, the monopolist
has successfully defended its remaining markets. Reputation, therefore, is
worthwhile. It represents an investment in early play (where neither firm is
profitable due to their aggressive behaviour), which is recovered in later play.
In joined markets, the integrated (global) perspective is limited to investment
decisions. I now turn to markets where product market decisions are coordinated
across markets. First, I discuss cases where firms (collusively) decide to
coordinate product market decisions. The associated theories do not yet include
(shared) investment decisions. Next, I discuss integrated markets, where structural
conditions (arbitrage) enforce integration of product market decisions.
5.5 MULTI-MARKET COLLUSION
The one-shot Brander (1981) model exhibits a prisoner's dilemma: each firm
raises its profits by entry into the other firm's market, but, since both do this,
both destroy each other's monopoly profits (subsection 5.2). It seems obvious that
firms may try to solve the dilemma by tacit collusion. The theory of repeated
games has shown that if firms compete on a regular basis, they can sustain
cooperation by a credible threat to punish defection now by reverting (after an
observation lag) to a (temporary or infinite) punishment phase (e.g., Friedman,
1986). This argument does indeed apply to multi-market firms (Pinto, 1986;
Harrington, 1987; Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Kesteloot, 1990; and Fung,
1991). These models are part of a broader literature. I will first discuss the
history of the debate, and then the salient theories.
5.5.1 Live and Let Live
Edwards (1955, p. 335) ushered in the multi-market collusion theory:
'The interests of great enterprises are likely to touch at many points, and it
would be possible for each to mobilise at any one of these points a
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from unmitigated competitive attack upon another large enterprise at one point
of contact is likely to be slight as compared with the possible loss from
retaliatory action by that enterprise at many other points of contact. There is
an awareness that if competition against the large rival goes so far as to be
seriously troublesome, the logic of the situation may call for conversion of the
warfare into total war. Hence there is an incentive to //ve a/u/ /ef //ve, to
cultivate a cooperative spirit, and to recognize priorities of interest in the hope
of reciprocal recognition.' [italics added]
It is, ironically, the great competitive strength of conglomerate (large and
diversified) firms, plus their awareness of this, which prompts tacit collusion.
Multi-market collusion may thus be widespread; it is not related to market share
in individual product markets, but to corporate size ('bigness'). These views
received attention in the United States especially because of their consequences
for antitrust policy (Solomon, 1970; Adams, 1974; and Areeda and Turner,
1979). A conglomerate merger between banks located in different (regional)
banking markets should be opposed if they increase multi-market contact, even if
the merger does not per « change market power in a local market (Solomon,
1970, pp. 333-334).
Strategic management also recognises that even if markets are otherwise
unrelated, rivals may retaliate to one another's moves across the markets where
they meet. For example, a cross-parry occurs
'When one firm initiates a move in one area and a competitor responds in a
different area with one that affects the initiating firm .. This situation occurs
not infrequently when firms compete in different geographic areas or have
multiple product lines that do not completely overlap.' (Porter, 1980, p. 84).
The analyses below will show that retaliation is justly expected from profit
maximising firms involved in tacit multi-market collusion. Implicitly, then,
(strategic management) theorists who analyze retaliation strategies assume that
firms try to restore collusion (e.g., Caves, 1982, p. 107; and Cowling, 1982, p.
39). Two types of analysis of multi-market collusion have been developed: where
firms behave routinely, and where they explicitly maximise an objective function.
I discuss these in turn.
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5.5.2 Mutual Forbearance '
If a firm changes its output level, its rivals may respond by changing theirs as
well, in a fixed proportion of the former's action: firms may use conjectural
variations. If the firms meet in different markets, they may have cross-market
conjectural variations: firm j's output level in market B reacts to firm i's output
level in market A. The reaction is given by the variation R''BA = dqj*/dqj*
(Feinberg, 1984). This assumes that firms respond to each deviation (e.g., dq* >
0 and dq," > 0) separately, which is rather myopic. If a firm defects from a
collusive outcome, it will do so in all its markets (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990)
as, indeed, a conjectural variation model will predict. The size of the response84 Chapter 5
(the variations R) is given rather than the result of a maximising calculus, but,
given these variations, firms do adjust their output levels optimally to them.
Collusive results occur if the cross-market variations are positive: if one firm
increases its output level in market A, other firms 'retaliate' by likewise
increasing theirs in market B. This induces firms to limit their output levels: they
exhibit WJU/UÛ/ /orteara/ice (Feinberg, 1984, p. 244). Feinberg (1984, p. 248)
derives some useful hypotheses from his model: •&,.'Wista|pO$<s*|Niife-;* is
-,. 'the effect of mutual forbearance in restraining output should increase with
c increased multi-market contacts between firms, as either the number of firms
a per market (m) increases or the number of markets involved (n) expands. '
«
Empirical tests are based on this model (e.g., Feinberg, 1985; Alexander, 1985;
Gelfand and Spiller, 1987; and the experiment in Feinberg and Sherman, 1988).
They have been able to find cases where multi-market collusion seems to occur,
i.e., where the cross-market conjectural variations are significant and positive or
where the number of multi-market contacts restrains output, as predicted.
s net* -wgisrn a»
5.5.3 Repeated Games - " H
Unlike the previous theories, repeated games explore conditions where
cooperation, defection, and punishment are explicitly maximising actions. Multi-
market collusion may occur in the case of reciprocal entry (e.g., cross-hauling).
Multi-market collusion requires a global perspective: firms cooperate, defect, or
punish (if that) in o// markets. Consider the case where there are no links between
markets other than shared suppliers. In the case of complete symmetry between
markets and firms, multi-market collusion has no effect relative to single-market
collusion (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, p. 5). Collusion in multiple markets
simply multiplies identical costs and benefits of cooperation, defection, and
punishment with the number of identical markets. Hence the outcome is identical
to collusion in each market for itself. For multi-market collusion to have an
effect, markets should be asymmetric. Two cases present themselves.
5.5.4 Coordinated Markets ,n " .; «l^xs ips,ïf-^Majl"ironfi VITT"-»" Î
One asymmetry case is that multi-market firms use the potential to achieve
collusion in one market to sustain collusion in another market, which does not
sustain collusion by itself (Harrington, 1987; Tirole, 1988; and Bernheim and
Whinston, 1990). Say, punishment of a defector hits sufficiently hard to deter
defection in market A but not in market B. Separately, market A will show
collusion and market B will not. If some incumbents are active in both markets,
they may react to defection in market B by a punishment in both markets. This
may be sufficient to deter defection in market B. Formally, say profits from
cooperation are TI'C, from unilateral defection TI'Q, and from punishment 7t'p (i =
A,B). A prisoner's dilemma exists if rc'p < 7t'c < 7t'o. The time horizon is
infinite. Collusion yields profits of 7r\.+i*c from t=0 to infinite; defection at
t=0 gives 7t*o+rc*[> now and 7t\+7i% from t=l to infinite. Multi-marketHorizontally Related Markets 85
collusion is feasible if and only if "- j
• and das» (£)
(5.3)
where i is the interest rate. This is consistent with a situation where ((l+i)/i)7t*c
> 71% + (l/i)Ji\ (i.e., collusion is feasible in market A), and ((l+i)/i)7t^ <
7t*D + (l/i)t"p ('•«•» collusion is not feasible in market B).'* By pooling this
constraint across markets A and B, the slack collusion enforcement power in
market A is transferred to market B (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, p. 8; and
Srinivasan, 1991, p. 1547). These results underlie
Definition 5.5 Coo/tf/nû/ed marikm are (1) otherwise segmented markets, which
(2) are asymmetric as some sustain collusion by themselves and others do not,
and where (3) collusion is interdependent as collusion in at least one market is
sustainable only by the participants' threat to retaliate defection by suspending
collusion elsewhere.
In coordinated markets product market decisions are taken from an integrated,
global perspective.
5.5.5 Spheres-of-influence y\f*j a*îs:'ftn&uiui"» »'.»»«*>
Another asymmetry case occurs if each firm is most efficient in one market.
Suppose each of two firms is incumbent firm in one and entrant (exporter) to the
other market (Scherer, 1980; Pinto, 1986; Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; and
Fung, 1991). Because of transport costs, in each market the incumbent firm has
lower costs than the exporter. Otherwise, symmetry exists between the firms and
the markets. In isolation, markets A and B may each realise CO//OJ/VC marker
storing agree/nenw. In the case of multi-market contact, the firms may achieve a
jpAere5-o/-/>i/7«e/ice arrangement where each firm withdraws to its home market.
If a firm defects from a spheres-of-influence arrangement by one-sided entry into
the other player's 'sphere', the other will retaliate after a lag by reciprocal entry
into the defector's 'sphere' (Pinto, 1986)."
ÏJïSlt»:: fiW; TS'O ?n>;8 ifi':" 'to ;îtTîO'SCi
16. The asymmetry may have several causes. For example, one market may have
Cournot competition, whereas an other market may have Bertrand competition.
Another example is where one market may have multiple equilibria whereas
another has only one (Harrington, 1987). Also, one market may exhibit more
suppliers than the other one (see appendix 5.E), markets may have different
growth rates or fluctuating demand levels that are not perfectly correlated, and
defection may take longer to be detected in market B than in market A, thus
having a larger gain (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).
17. Pinto's punishment strategy implies a reversal to the one-shot Nash
equilibrium in the Brander (1981) Cournot model with cross-hauling. If instead
firms compete in prices (Bertrand), they will pre-empt reciprocal entry as each
(low-cost) incumbent firm reduces its price to the importer's higher cost level
(Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, p. 11-12). «.SÎHIK J86 Chapter 5
Definition 5.6 5/>terfcy-o/-i>!/7K£7Ktf are (1) otherwise segmented markets, where
(2) each firm selectively pulls out (partially or completely) from some markets
relative to the outcome in segmented markets, while (3) defending its own
allotted market(s) by a threat to invade or raise sales in a defector's 'sphere'.
The advantages of spheres-of-influence are that the home firm gains market
power and that lower exports save on transport costs.
Firms can divide their markets into spheres-of-influence along three
dimensions. In the geographical dimension, transport costs and tariffs create a
cost wedge between domestic firms and foreign rivals. The same holds for
adjustment costs imposed on foreign entrants if national product standards (e.g.,
about safety) differ. Firms may also delineate spheres along product market lines.
The asymmetry may again be based on adjustment costs. In a paper on the
information technology industry, Stoop (1992) suggests time as a third dimension.
Innovators and imitators may divide the product life cycle between them. In the
introduction and growth stage, the innovator earns a monopoly profit. As the
product matures, imitators enter the market. They reduce prices and destroy the
innovator's profits. The innovator may evacuate the market to the imitators, and
switch to new products. This allows the imitators to realise some profits. If the
imitation lag is sufficiently long, innovators recover their R&D outlays in the
initial stages of the product life cycle. In the mature stage of the product cycle,
imitators have lower earnings, but they also incur lower costs. By avoiding
competition between them both groups create temporal spheres-of-influence.
Pinto's (1986) model of spheres-of-influence is instructive. The setting is as in
Brander (1981). Say, firm 1, the home firm in market A, incurs a transport cost f
into market B. The reverse holds for firm 2, the home firm in market B. There is
symmetry of the firms and markets otherwise. In the case of collusion, each firm
is monopolist in its home market, produces the monopoly output level, x/'°\ and
earns the monopoly profit, 7i'-™<- (i = 1, 2; and j = A, B). If, e.g, firm 1 defects,
it enters market B with an output level that maximises its profit, given firm 2's
unsuspecting choice of the monopoly output level Xj"-"". Pinto calls the associated
entry profit (J). The other firm retaliates in the next period. In the case of a grim
trigger strategy, the reversal will be forever." Each firm then earns duopoly
profits; call their sum over both markets TU". Firm l's discounted profit flow from
collusion is ((l+i)/i)7i*'™c, where / is the interest rate. Its profits from defection
are 7t*"c-l-(t>+(l/i)7r*. It follows that collusion will occur if »' :.-.;<*r.
(5.4) i < R/<|>, ;•":•.: •it.O-;^)' ,;ï\ V , . .• , '". .;'• * >•••.*.,;• JS;*3 ïitf'iOlti*
where R = jr*-""c-n*. In the case of linear demand, Pinto shows that transport costs
raise R/<)>, and thus facilitate collusion (see appendix 9. A for a qualification). This
appears the most important conclusion of this research. Transport costs raise the
gains, R, of collusion (which saves transport costs) relative to competition and
reduce the one-shot gain of defection, <|>. A reduction of transport costs (e.g., due
": iff-»/ vifu
18. Pinto (1986) studies a variety, where firms revert to collusion after a while.
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to innovations) or tariffs (e.g., European integration) may, by the same argument,
weaken or even destroy the cartel." J»n * *
5.5.6 Interaction between Collusion and Relatedness jaiMfc-mrt c.aatJ. itriB
The two cases of coordinated markets and spheres-of-influence have a common
inspiration (collusion), but very different implications for relatedness of product
markets. Consider the implications of first demand shocks and next spillover
effects.
In the case of coordinated markets, common suppliers continue to serve both
markets. Subtle developments in one market may affect decision making in the
other market. For example, an increase in demand in one market may raise price
in the own market as well as in the other market (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990,
p. 8). The markets may behave as if they are integrated, therefore. In the case of
exclusive spheres-of-influence, trade ceases to occur among the markets. The
markets appear less related than in the case of segmented markets, where they
share (some) suppliers and reciprocal entry occurs. Firms act OJ // transport costs
are too high to warrant trade. Developments in one market will have no
implication at all in the other market provided that collusion remains intact.
Multi-market collusion among otherwise segmented markets may thus lead to
behaviour that mimics any of the other types of markets, ranging from unrelated
to integrated markets.
Multi-market spillovers may affect spheres-of-influence and coordinated
markets differently. If positive multi-market spillovers exist, the spheres-of-
influence arrangement may collapse. Due to the spillover, it will hold that TI**'
> 7r*j-t-7i*j (i = P,D), where 7t**" refers to joint and Jt*j+Jt', to separate
production (or firms) in markets A and B (definition 5.4). It is now possible that
(5.5) ((l+i)/i)7t*c < 7c*+»D+(l/i)jr*+V
Firms will cross-invade markets A and B if the efficiency advantage (the spillover
effect) outweighs the monopoly profits of a sphere-of-influence.
19. Bernheim and Whinston (1990, p. 13) have a different model, where firms
compete in prices (a Bertrand duopoly). They show that for an interest rate / less
than 100% multi-market collusion is always feasible, regardless of the transport
cost. In the absence of multi-market collusion, both firms collude in each market
separately. A price is chosen which grants the high-cost exporter a positive profit
and market share. Multi-market collusion rec/ucey price relative to single-market
collusion, as it excludes the high-cost exporter from the market. If / > 100%
(which suggests long lags), transport costs do raise the price level that an
incumbent firm may quote for its sphere-of-influence without inducing defection.
In the absence of multi-market collusion, no trade occurs either, as each firm
quotes an entry deterring price (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, p. 12). Both
results (for / < 100% and / > 100%) are paradoxical. Trade never occurs,
whatever the transport cost. It appears that Pinto's model has the more intuitive
results. • -•• •• '• ' • .. -•" .:«fKj-)H> 2: =v)!\{?"i; i. '.••!.'!•;88 Chapter 5
Spillovers may strengthen rather than weaken collusion in coordinated
markets. Kesteloot (1990) shows that if spillovers exist, multi-market collusion
has an effect relative to single-market collusion even if complete symmetry exists.
She has a two-market duopoly model with differentiated products, where each
firm chooses two prices, one for each product market. Multi-market collusion
implies a set of (2x2) prices that maximises the firms' joint profits. Snob and
bandwagon effects create international multi-market demand spillovers (see
subsection 5.3.2). Due to these spillovers, it is not optimal for firms to establish
exclusive spheres-of-influence, i.e., condition (5.5) holds.™ Negative spillovers
(i.e., a cross-market consumers' snob effect) increase the gains to cooperation,
defection, and punishment (Kesteloot, 1990, p. 191). The reason is that
cooperation raises prices, which reduces demand in one market and thus, by the
snob effect, raises demand in the other market. Paradoxically, collusion becomes
harder to maintain even though the gains to collusion increase, as the snob effect
raises the gains to defection even more. The opposite holds for positive spillovers
(i.e., a cross-market bandwagon effect): they facilitate collusion by reducing the
gains to defection even more than the gains to cooperation. This suggests that
positive multi-market spillovers may facilitate collusion in coordinated markets
while reducing the associated profit levels.
5.6 INTEGRATED MARKETS , .. ^.?; ^ w ^ H.« t
The previous sections explored cases where arbitrage trade is absent. Hence,
prices of the same good may differ across markets. This allows firms to develop
local market power. The highest degree of integration is attained in integrated
markets. Following Venables' (1990a, p. 23) definition, these reflect cases where
firms only control decisions on a global level. The firm does not control local
sales or prices due to arbitrage:
Definition 5.8 Markets are /n/egra/ed if arbitrageurs reduce price differentials
between markets until they are at most equal to the (arbitrageurs') unit
arbitrage costs. That is, p*;-t ^ P*; ^ P*i+t, for the prices of firm i's product
in market A (home market), B (foreign market), and a transport cost, tariff or
adjustment cost, t.
Theoretical literature (e.g., Venables, 1990a, p. 27), simulations (Smith and
Venables, 1988), and empirical literature (e.g., Spiller and Huang, 1986) may use
a narrower definition where markets are integrated if the constraints are binding,
such that r/,+t = p*,, when firm 1 trades from market A to B. Being subject to
arbitrage, the firm may choose a single (home) price, with arbitrageurs marking
this up with transport costs in the export market (the Bertrand model).
Alternatively, the producer may choose its total output level, with arbitrageurs
allocating these to local markets, until price differences are evened out (the
20. Her analysis differs from the ones in section 5.4 as she does not identify a
shared resource. Instead, demand functions are interrelated, that is, the segmented
markets assumption is dropped.Horizontally Related Markets 89
Cournot model). Relative to segmented or joined markets, the firm loses degrees
of freedom: instead of a price or output level for each market, it now controls
only the global price or output level. Moreover, the firm loses its local market
power. In the case of segmented markets its profit margin at home (p*;-c) exceeds
the profit margin abroad (p",-c-t), if markets are similar and p*j = p*;. With
binding arbitrage, however, p* = p^+t, such that its profit margin abroad equals
r/j-c. In other words, its ability to 'dump' abroad is destroyed. This leads to a
reduction of prices, relative to a segmented markets setting (Smith and Venables,
1988, p. 1522).
5.6.1 Interaction between Arbitrage and Relatedness ...-,; ; J
Integration will affect the two types of relatedness discussed in the previous
sections: collusion and shared resources. Firstly, integration enhances competition
as spheres-of-influence can no longer be formed. This illustrates that the ability to
prevent arbitrage trade is an important ingredient of a spheres-of-influence
arrangement. If European integration, for instance, transforms segmented or
joined markets into a single, integrated market, it will destroy spheres-of-
influence, raise competition, and reduce prices (as predicted).*' The effect of
integration on coordinated markets is difficult to judge, as coordinated markets
are asymmetric. It is difficult to see how integration affects asymmetric markets
prior to collusion. The unified market after integration may allow for collusion
(like the coordinated markets prior to integration), but collusion may also break
down. Considering the asymmetries in coordinated markets (e.g., number of
firms, growth rates, cyclical demand, and defection lags), any outcome is
possible. Appendix 5.E shows that arbitrage may reduce prices without dissolving
multi-market collusion.
Secondly, integration may affect the incentives to invest in firm-specific
resources, i.e., the size of the multi-market spillovers. Venables (1990a, p. 35)
shows that an integrated market gives rise to smaller capacity investments than a
segmented market, provided that the demand function is convex. The opposite
result holds if demand is concave. In the absence of information on real world
demand functions this is not, regrettably, an intuitive result.
5.7 APPRAISAL , -;:• j :• >j. •. • • v
Established firms need to assess their environment by ranking their (home and
potential entry) markets in terms of degree of relatedness or integration. To
complicate matters, this dimension is multi-faceted. Integration increases if basic
conditions change (such as arbitrage), structures (such as when common suppliers
emerge with spillovers), or conduct (for instance, collusion). Global firms that
/«/egra/e j/ra/eg/'c /«/en/ across markets (Prahalad and Doz, 1987) may do so to
exploit spillovers, to safeguard collusion, or to accommodate to arbitrage.
The chapter has discussed numerous aspects that impact on a firm's decision
to enter multiple product markets. Positive multi-market spillovers and firm-
21. I owe this comment to R. Veugelers.90 Chapter 5
specific resources (synergy) as well as low transport and tariff costs induce entry.
Negative multi-market spillovers, multi-market collusion of the spheres-of-
influence type, and high entry costs, on the other hand, are impediments to entry.
Entry costs arise due to product-specific resources, which need to be acquired in
factor markets which may be imperfect and, as the next chapter will show, may
have been rigged by the incumbent firm. Reciprocal entry may occur if the
inducements gain importance (e.g., by cost reductions due to innovations in
transport or communication media), or if the impediments lose significance (e.g.,
if spheres-of-influence break down).
This chapter may contribute to an understanding of the concept of the degree
of integration, and its implications for business behaviour. Impediments to
application of this framework are many. First, most models explore a two-firm,
two-market context. Real world cases exhibit, however, numerous firms in, say
five or six markets, whose activity patterns do not completely overlap: one firm
may be active in markets A, B, and C, another one in markets B, C, and E, etc
(Porter, 1985, p. 354). Secondly, the current modelling assumes that each public
input underlying a spillover can be studied separately. This is approximately
correct if each industry is dominated by a single public input (e.g., R&D or
advertising) (Ghemawat, 1991a, p. 28). But cases do exist where firms draw on
different public inputs (Porter, 1985, p. 355). Moreover, cases where firms invest
in public resources may coincide with forms of collusion. "Horizontal" and
"vertical" dimensions (in the next chapter) may likewise coincide. Decision
makers operate in fuzzy contexts, rather than the sharply delineated contexts in
game theory (Kreps and Spence, 1985, p. 353; and Saloner, 1991, p. 125).
Chapter 9 will explore one type of fuzziness in particular: the market definition
problem. Notwithstanding these caveats, strategic management may benefit from a
generous reading of these theories, as I hope to have shown.
I would like to end with the caveat that the statements in this chapter are
subject to the usual cererâ pariftitf condition. It remains to be seen how firms
respond to particular configurations of related markets, competition, sequence of
moves, information, ere. Part IV gives some game theoretic discussions to
illustrate this point. The conceptual framework in this chapter readily shows that
numerous configurations have not yet been thoroughly explored. More needs to
be done on the interaction between multi-market spillovers and collusion.
Economists have just begun to scratch the surface of the interaction between the
'integration' dimension of product markets and the product-specificity dimension
of factors. Part V will tentatively explore the dynamic process which underlies the
ranking of segmented, joined, and integrated markets. This gives rise to a
dynamic markets perspective, that may be applied to globalisation, convergence of
the computer and consumer electronics industries, and European integration.
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Appendix 5.A. Multiproduct cost concepts
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T;mv = 0, i*j
[-•weak cost
complementarity]
This appendix reviews a family tree of
cost concepts from Baumol cr c/.
(1982) used in subsection 5.3.1. A
concept which is more general than the
economy of scope is that of smc/
juftadaïflvify which holds if in
definition 4.3 the assumption is
dropped that the sub-sets Tj must be
non-overlapping (Baumol er a/., 1982,
pp. 17 and 71; see section 4.3.1).
Given that subadditivity is at the root of
the family tree, economies of scale are
in another branch. By dropping the
'non-overlapping' condition, strict
subadditivity may include economies of
scale in a single-product setting. If the
product sets S and Tj are allowed to completely overlap, i.e., S = T, =..= T^, it
is^possible for S to be a single product 'set'. Strict subadditivity follows if there
are global economies of scale (Baumol « a/., 1982, p. 22).
A different multiproduct cost concept is a weajfc cos/ comp/ewientan'ry, defined
as 3*C(q)/9q^5qB < 0, where q is a vector of outputs containing (at least) the
scalar quantities q^ and qg (Baumol « a/., 1982, p. 75 and 89). The upshot of
this concept is that if qg (weakly) reduces the marginal costs of product A
(dC/<9qJ, products A and B are (weakly) complementary in production. Baumol
er a/. (1982, p. 75) show some relationships between economies of scope and
weak cost complementarities that carry over to the relationship between
definitions 5.3 and 5.4. For example, analogous to their argument, if the profit
function is twice-differentiable, then a positive (negative) spillover by definition
5.3 is a sufficient condition for a positive (negative) spillover by definition 5.4.
Barring this special case, the two definitions can lead to different results.
Consider the cost function C^.qa) = F(A,B)+c(q*+qB)-dqAqB, where F(S) is
the fixed cost, which varies with the product set S (A,B,A+B), c is the constant
marginal cost, and d > 0. There is an economy of scope without cost
complementarity if F(A,B) < F(A) + F(B) and d = 0. That is, an economy of
scope exists, as F(A,B)+cqA+cqB < F(A)+cqA + F(B)+cqa, but a (strict) cost
complementarity does not exist, as dC/dq^ = c and ^C/ôq^^qB = 0. A cost
complementarity without an economy of scope exists if a diseconomy of
developing two products in one firm, F(A,B) > F(A)+F(B), exceeds a (slight)
cost complementarity (ô^C/ôq^^qB = -d < 0), such that C^.qs) >
£j(F(i,O)+cqj) (i = A,B). Which of these cost concepts is salient depends on the
context. See subsection 5.3.4 and appendix 5.D. i .-* ,,..».
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Appendix 5.B. A pure public good and a multi-market spillover -o
This appendix accompanies subsection 5.3.2 and prepares the ground for appendix
5.C. It reiterates how Baumol « a/. (1982, pp. 90-1) trace the multi-market
spillover in definition 5.3 back to public goods. ,
5.B7. A pure public good leads to a positive multi-market spillover
by definition 5.3.
P/w/ Consider a pure public good k such that ,&
(5.B1) II<y) - maxJZ,7i'(y,,k)-\|/(k)] ^ I^(y,,k-(y))-v(k'(y)).
The first-order and second-order conditions for optimality are: v*i
<> ••xn s
(5.B2) IX-v|/(k)k = 0; and
(5.B3) ZjTtVVtt < 0; -'.
where i = l,..,n; and the subscripts k, i and j refer to first-order derivatives (to k
and y, and y,, respectively) and kk, ik and ij refer to second-order derivatives. If
there are economies to scale in the production of capital goods, or pecuniary
economies in buying them, then vy^ < 0. Inequality (5.B3) implies that these
economies should be small or absent. From equation (5.B1) follows with the
envelope theorem that
;4s**v.
(5.B4) ri; = dn(y)/dy; = <; and
(5.B5) n, ^ dTKy)/5yify = <k*j (i * j);
where JC"J S d7tVdyi; it*» = ^7t'/ôy;3k; and k'j s ôk'/fy. We now need the
assumption that
(5.B6) 7t'a = ^7t'/ay,5k > 0; :in
that is, capital raises marginal profits. To sign k'j, partially differentiate the first-
order optimality condition (5.B2) with respect to y^.» , & »
(5.B7) #7tVdkdyi+ liJt'^ok/ayj-H/^ok/ayj = 0.
This gives . , . ... ..
/^ nûv ft L A vA\l . . *
This expression is positive as 7t'^ s cPjiVdkôyJ > 0 and ZiJt'tt-Vkk < 0Horizontally Related Markets 93
second-order condition in inequality 5.B3). The conclusion is that IT^ > 0, which
is definition 5.3 of a positive multi-market spillover.
Appendix 5.C. Quasipublic goods and a multi-market spillover
This appendix also accompanies subsection 5.3.2 and expands upon the previous
appendix. It shows that quasipublic capital goods lead to spillovers only if the
non-exclusion property holds. This result will give economic content to non-
exclusion. Modify the above approach as follows:
(5.C1) n(y) ^ maxM.^.[Zi'W(yi,Ki)-v(Zi'ki)], where K, s k,+aZj.,kj.
Call Kj the e/fecrive capita/ invested in product i (with terminology due to
Shakun, 1965), and call f(k,..k.:y,..yj = Zi*W(yi,Kj)-v(Ij'ki). If a = 1, Kj =
Z°kj, and equation (5.C1) reduces to one variable, k, as in appendix 5.B. The
individual kj are arbitrary. Hence, capital is a pure public good, and a positive
spillover exists. A spillover also arises if an investment kj affects the investment
ow/ay of investments kj, that is, if the capital cost function v exhibits pecuniary
(dis)economies of scale. In order to focus on the externality a, I henceforth
assume a constant unit capital goods price. Thus x^ = ô\|//ôkj is constant, and v^
= 0. Now derive the interior optimum of (5.C1) from the first-order optimality
conditions: &*•''#* >> V*'A
(5.C2) ôf/dkj = 0 = an'/ôkj+I^-aÔTtVdkj-M/fc; i = l..n.
This gives n equations in cfrt'/ôkj. Subtract two equations ôf/ôkj-df/dkj to get
57t*/5ki(l-a)+57t'/ôkj(a-l) = 0, from which follows that drcVdkj = ônVôkj (for all
i,j = l..n). Substitute this result in (5.C2) to find:
(5.C3) 57t7ôkj = Vk/(l+(n-l)a). +,.:... ; , ,:..„•*,:•..! ,,-,.= <"•: . ' ; /.
Since d7C'/dkj is a function of y, and K;, equation (5.C3) determines the n capital
levels Kj for given y,. This gives n equations -'^' ••''•.•''^••'C -'
(5.C4) kj+ W 'i '
from which the kj (i = l..n) are solved.
If a = 0, each good i gets the profit maximising capital investment k, without
any spillover to another product j. If a < 1, an externality arises from kj on Kj
(dKj = adkj). It is tempting to think that for a in (0,1) capital is a quasipublic
good with a positive spillover. This is not, however, the case:
5.C7. In the case of an interior solution (where all kj > 0) and an
incomplete externality (0 < a < 1), a small increase in output of product j
induces no spillover on product i (FIjj = 0).
/'TOO/. Introduce spillovers as follows. Imagine that the output of one product j,94 Chapter 5
yj, increases. A spillover exists if this raises drcVdyj for some or all products i (*
j), that is, r^j s d*ri(y)/dyidyj > 0. Recall that (5.C3) gives n equations in y, and
Kj. Differentiate these equations to Vj, taking all other yj as given and the K,j as
variables: ou:q».;E»iism-»ii;fn;fi !:niv^«»s:;y > •?:•*( tis
*/», ' a/ '
(5.C6) ^-^/^T^< =0. , .
From equation (5.C5) follows that " "' **•* " '^^ »f; ^
3t^y
(5.C7) <ûfj = "—^My,-; ^vfii ru. tt zszrs ^.Ifi ^.voilfqg A ..»u'xa --voiliq*
^^ ._ -o. u .?i :>, <; ,
a/ • — -
which is positive since TI^J = 5^7iV3k,5yj > 0, which is equivalent to assumption
(5.B6), and 7t^ = ^7iVôkj^ < 0, which underlies the second-order condition
(5-B3) with vj/^ = 0. Since d*7i'/dkjdyj = 0, equation (5.C6) gives
"•M-, • TO:"V
(5.C8) dK; = 0.
Hence, if y, increases, the firm raises Kj and keeps all K; (i * j) constant.
Therefore, the marginal profitability of product i is unaffected. There is no
spillover from product j on product i. (?£Z)
•» I • •- ••• /rV.'i;". (f ' ;'i
In order to prepare the ground for the next hypothesis where the externality does
lead to a spillover, the following lemma shows how the firm uses its instruments
k; (i = l,..,n) in order to raise Kj and leave all other Kj unchanged, «o; v< «L-vij
L^wwa. To raise K, and leave all other Kj unchanged, upon an increasing yj, the
firm raises kj and reduces all other kj. v :
/>roo/. Since Kj changes and all Kj remain constant, differentiate the n equations
in (5.C4) to Kji rssvi •••-* ^ ^ '•• • "'> -9 ts.iiort. ;.; 1370.iKji ^as
,.s n ••.01 .V^IJ i;iiu; G; .-iffqi;-:^ "' u .(^bv; -- y^^-
(5.C9) —-^oV; _£ = 0; (Vi *y)
(5 C10^ -^-+ V -^ = 1 '"'!.''•• ' """'""} '^ •5J''!Q<! W Ï»'JÎ«T:
Take any i,l (* j) and deduct l's equation in (5.C9) from i's equation there, to seeHorizontally Related Markets 95
that (dkj/ôKj-dtydKj)+a(ôk,/dKj-dkj/dKj) = 0, that is, dkj/SKj = ôtyôKj (V i,l
j) if a * 1. Substitute this in equations (5.C9) and (5.CIO) to get >? va
—rd+(n-2)«)+a-^ = 0; (V i * j)
5Jt dJt q ont ,i to:fv;q: to
(5.C12) -^•+('»-l)a-^r = !•*' Ws^o^ vlr..• ?«: ?IÏ,
Solve this to get :m.-.v44
f5 C131 -_i. = I^i •ifi'.'i
3A^ l(2)^(l) ^'t
(5.C14) —i = ^'^"
3^ l+(/j-2)a-a*(n-l) " ^
For any n > 1 and 0 < a < 1, the denominator is positive. Hence, the firm
raises kj and reduces all kj. ()££>
There is a knife-edge between an externality a in (0,1), where no spillover arises,
and a = 1, where appendix 5.B shows that a positive spillover does arise. This
proposition applies for example to a symmetry case where all investment levels
are equal and positive: no multi-market (or multiproduct) spillover arises.
So we have a paradox: capital is a quasipublic good with an externality a, but
without a multi-market spillover. The reason is that each product gets the amount
of effective capital K; where marginal costs equals marginal revenue. The effect
of the externality a is to reduce the marginal cost of Kj from vy,, (the marginal
cost of a unit of capital kj to v|/^/(l + (n-l)a). This marginal cost falls as either a
increases (the externality) or n-1 (the number of products an individual product
derives externalities from). Moreover, a higher a or n-1 raise the effective capital
K| invested in product i. This follows from equation (5.C3) and the assumption
that d*7i'/dkj* < 0, J.e., ôrc'/ôk; is downward sloping in Kj for a given yj. But each
good pays for its own capital, Kj. Hence, there is no public-ness involved here."
A defining characteristic of a public good is the failure of exclusion (the
ficc/itfio/i pn'«c/p/e): capital is a public good if, when investing in Kj, one cannot
prevent product i from benefiting as well. There are two routes to build non-
exclusion into the model above. First, if a = 1 then all Kj (i = l..n) are identical
(= Ejkj): hence the increase of one capital stock Kj (to accommodate an
increasing output level y^) raises the other capital stocks as well. Second, for a <
22. In similar vein, Arrow (1985, pp. 510-1) shows that externalities can be
treated as separate commodities with their own price. They are therefore
consistent with a competitive equilibrium, and need not imply a market failure.
He then proposes two conditions which may account for any market failure; one
of them is the exclusion principle.96 Chapter 5
1, we need the additional constraints that kj £ 0, for all i = l..n. A spillover
arises by the following intuitive argument. Imagine that y, changes. The firm
intends to adjust its investments by raising kj and reducing all kj (i * j) such that
Kj increases and all K, remain constant (see the lemma). However, this may
require reducing some kj below zero. This is obviously impossible. Hence, if kj
drops to zero, the increase in kj raises Kj by adkj-k,. The increase in Kj raises the
marginal profitability of product i, and a positive spillover occurs. Hence the
positive spillover occurs not only because of the externality (a > 0) but also
because of non-exclusion: product j cannot prevent product i from free-riding
upon its investment kj. This argument restores the idea that a higher externality a
raises the spillover effect (FI,j). A spillover occurs if dKj = adkj-k; > 0, that is, if
dkj/kj > I/a. The higher a, the smaller I/a, the sooner this condition will be
met, and thus the more often a positive spillover will occur.
A/y/rar/ies/s 5. C7. In an asymmetric setting, where some products i are produced
without product-specific capital (yj > 0 and k; = 0) and another product j has
j ^ > 0 and kj > 0, a small increase of output j will have a positive spillover
on product i.
'' "' —-" --*; -1: ! > !• 5 fl V.-iP f < fl ^ae "''•"•
I will sketch a proof. Consider the problem: ^ ^ ^,
(5.C15) n(y) ^ maxM.^[ZiV(yi,ki+aZj.ikj)-v(Zi'kJ], subject to k, > 0, i = l..n.
Solve this using Kuhn-Tucker. The solution will have some kj* = 0, and some
kj* > 0. Reorder the sequence of products such that kj* = 0 for i = l..m, and
kj* > 0 for i = m + l..n. If m = 0, an interior solution exists and proposition
5.C1 shows that no spillover exists. Assume that m > 0. Consider now a new
problem, which imposes upon (5.C15) the additional constraints gj(k) = kj = 0,
for i = l..m. The solution to (5.C15) still applies, and so the maximum value
does not change but the function I~I(y) does change. We now have the
'constrained' problem:
(5.C16) IF(y) = maxt, ^[IjV(yj,kj+aIj,jkj)-M/(Ij''kj)], subject to kj = 0, i =
,,, l..m, and kj > 0, i = m+l..n.
The envelope theorem applied to this problem gives equation (5.B4), which now
gives the spillover effect
(5.C17) FFjj = d*nc(yy0y.3y. = 71^1^ where 7i^ju = #7t7ôyjdKj and
Since kj = 0 for i = l..m, it also holds that
(5.C18) dkj/dyj = o, for i = l..m, and j = l..n.{) .^>rsA .f»isv Tslima ni /,S
Now assume for convenience that n = 2. Consider the special case where m =Horizontally Related Markets
1, such that k, = 0." By equation (5.C18) ôk,/ôyj = 0, for j = 1, 2. Write the
Lagrange function to (5.C16): tduq 3taq * • J
(5.C19) L(k,,k2,X.:y,,yj) = Tc'(yi,
The first-order condition of the Lagrange to kj is
(5.C20) dL/dk, = 0 = aÔ7t'/ôk,+Ô7iV5k2-v.
Differentiate this condition to y2 (a parameter in this equation):
(5.C21) «^Vlx^ ÎI*^=-*^^I^Î* ii=n A .0.1
Since dk/dy, = 0 by equation (5.C18), equation (5.C21) gives
tÈsm vd eirii sioiqxs As» vs
(5.C22) •=-! =
Also, K,2 s dK,/dy2 = oki/oyj+a^V^z) = «(dki/dyz). Substitute this in
(5.C17) to get <'-"'A
-a
(5.C23) ay,ôy2 " ay,ôfc,ayjatj j#w'
0£ +
Thus, if a = 0, the spillover effect is zero, and if a > 0, there is a positive
spillover. This substantiates to some extent that as a increases, the spillover
increases (which is not to say that the expression in 5.C23 increases
monotonically in a). A thorny problem, however, is how dTF/5y,ôy2 relates to
^n/5y,5yj from the unconstrained (original) problem in equation (5.C4). The
generalised envelope theorem (Beavis and Dobbs, 1990, p. 113) shows that
3W73yj* < #Tl/dyi* (i = 1,2). So the solution to the 'constrained' problem may
be representative for the 'unconstrained' problem.
To conclude appendix 5.C. A higher externality a and more products n-1 to get
externalities from raise the amount of effective capital K, invested in any product
i. This raises the (marginal) profitability of each associated product. Furthermore,
this need not entail increasing capital outlays: if a increases, an increase of K, is
consistent with a decrease of k, for every product i and thus decreasing capital
outlays v|/(ZjlCi). A multi-market spillover arises by definition 5.3 only if an
23. Cases where m = 0 or m = 2 are trivial (in both cases there are no
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investment in Kj cannot possibly exclude product i from benefiting, that is, if
either capital is a pure public good (where Kj = KJ or if some products have no
product-specific investment (kj = 0, for at least one product). Both conditions
point to centralisation: either all investments are firm-specific rather than product-
specific (if a = 1) or investments are limited to some products, and other
products free-ride on them (where Kj = otEj,jkj). This book studies throughout
the former case where the firm controls a single firm-specific investment
decision. For the latter case with quasipublic capital goods, a positive spillover
occurs only if the products are asymmetric, which is a far more difficult situation
to study. Only in this case does a higher externality appear to some extent to raise
the multi-market spillover.
Appendix 5.D. A multi-market spillover and output decisions . , .^ .,
This appendix accompanies subsection 5.3.4 and recounts the analysis of multi-
market spillovers by Bulow ef û/. (1985). Spillovers provide information about the
question: (how) does a shock in market A affect decision making about market B?
Bulow e/ a/, explore this by tracing the consequences of a shock in one market.
Say, there are two markets m,n = A,B and two firms i,j = 1,2. Aggregate
profits of firm i are 7t'(qj*,qj^:Z*,qj*,qj*), where qj™ is the output level (or another
decision instrument) in market m and Z* is a shock in market A. The expected
value of Z* equals zero. The four first-order optimality conditions are:
(5.D1) ÔJt'/ôqi™ = 0, i = 1,2 and m = A,B.
A shock dZ* occurs, which raises the marginal profitability in market A by unity:
= 1. Totally differentiate the four equations (5.D1) to get, e.g., for
= 0: • :»-;:*.!•.•••• ' up--' r- • : ::-rs=.:r. -: ,* • - ••••,<
"-<**•"*•'• "'• -o I -o I -V2 I -o | J,|
CT71 • i4 Cr7l j B CTTt t#r>4 CT 71 t ^4 u it j £ /*
/•c ros OOi + OC7- + aZ + Off + Off- = 0.
This gives the system r '' , , . • \,, .V .-.-«' •

















The matrix P in (5.D3) is negative definite, which is the second-order condition
to (5.D1). Hence the determinant of P is positive. The matrix P has four types of
elements, with the following economic interpretation:
The elements c^Tt'/dq^ are negative as a consequence of P being negative
definite; this expresses decreasing returns.
The elements ôV/dq;*dq;* are the multi-market spillover effects.
There are also two competition effects in P. The elements d*7i7dqj"V3qj"' (i * j;
m = A,B) imply that an expansion of qj™ raises (if > 0) or reduces (if < 0) the
marginal profitability of q" (dn'/dq"). The decision variables <7 are called
strategic substitutes if the sign of ^n'/^q^ôqj"' is negative, and strategic
complements if the sign is positive. Bulow er a/. (1985) are mainly famous for
their analysis of strategic complements and substitutes.
The elements 5*7t7dqj°\5qj" (i * j; m * n) are inter-firm multi-market spillover
effects: sales by firm j in market n affect the (marginal) profitability of firm i in
market m. An analysis of inter-firm spillovers can be found in R&D literature,
where one firm's R&D leaks to other firms, who may use this knowledge in
another product market (e.g., De Bondt, Sleuwaegen and Veugelers, 1988). Also,
sales in one market may affect consumer preferences in another market through
bandwagon and snob effects (Kesteloot, 1990). •: ' • ^-'':"• -^;»!3(t,^^-uj
For a result some structure has to be imposed upon the problem. First
consider the special case where there are no multi-market spillovers: d*7i7dqj*<5qj®
= d*7t'/dqi"'ôq|° (i * j; m * n) = 0. Cramer's rule then gives that dq," = 0 and,
by symmetry, dq2* = 0. If there are no multi-market spillovers, a shock in one
market will not affect another market. This is an obvious and meaningful result.
Secondly, in order to focus on the (intra-firm) multi-market spillovers, equate
the competition effects to zero. This gives, using Cramer's rule
-' On O1B i':'Ji'î
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The second-order conditions imply that the determinant of P as well as the 2x2
matrix in (5.D4) are of positive sign and dV/dq,** < 0. A positive shock
translates therefore into an expansion of q,*.
(5-D5)
A'-'»
The sign of dq,^ equals the sign of dV/(3q,*<3q,*. A multi-market spillover implies
that a shock which changes q,* also has an effect in market B. With a positive
spillover, q," changes in the same direction as q,*.
Appendix 5.E. Coordinated markets with and without arbitrage trade
8,A •-
This appendix accompanies subsection 5.5.4. It extends the analysis by Bernheim
and Whinston (1990) of coordinated markets to a case where arbitrage occurs
between these markets.
Bernheim and Whinston (1990, pp. 7-8) explore a type of coordinated markets
where the asymmetry required is based on different number of incumbent firms.
In market A there are two firms (i = 1,2); in market B there are the same two
firms as well as some domestic firms (i = 3....N). In isolation, collusion is
sustainable in market A but unsustainable in B where the large number of firms
encourages defection. Firms 1 and 2 transfer their ability to encourage collusion
in A to B by reducing their market share in B until collusion becomes sustainable
there for both the two multi-market firms as well as for the N-2 domestic firms.
This appendix shows that arbitrage can make a difference to this result. I will first
reiterate the analysis in Bernheim and Whinston, and then add arbitrage.
Both markets have Bertrand competition. Marginal costs are c in both markets;
there are no capacity constraints. The demand functions are Q*(p) 0 = A,B).
Collusion in market A implies that both firms quote the monopoly price p\, with
aggregate profits IT\. Each firm earns 0.5iT\, and the flow of profits gives a
present value 0.5ITV(l-d). If firm i ( = 1,2) defects by a price just short of p\, it
takes the entire market, its sales are Q*(p*J, and its profits are approximately
IT\. The other firm punishes by shifting for ever to Bertrand pricing, with zero
profits (a so-called grim trigger strategy). Collusion is sustainable if !"!*„ <Horizontally Related Markets 101
0.5ITV(l-d)> th^ is, if 0.5 s 3. In market B, the same situation implies that
collusion is sustainable if n\, < (nVN)(l/(l-3)), that is, if N(l-3) < 1. If 0.5
< 5 and N(l-3) > 1, collusion is sustainable in A but not in B:
q .-v-:-vi SnatraH ,A a «
(5.E1) 0.5 <3; •
(5.E2) N(l-3) > 1.
Pro/ww/rio/i 5.E7. Multi-market collusion exists if
(5.E3) (N-2)(l-3) < 1.
/Voo/ (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, pp. 7-8). Say, collusion in B gives a price
p* and aggregate profits IP. The N-2 domestic firms agree on a market share Xj,
and the two multi-market firms agree on a market share X<~. The domestic firms
collude if IP < XJI*( 1/(1-3)), that is, if
>djjifi art; ^s"-? 5-nrrf! 30 ,.-rijiBi>;rix«r!
(5.E4) Xj > 1-3. . ., ,. ... .^.,^i;id i.s-iiancj 5T( .-n io stio ÎJî/tJ.'
The two multi-market firms can guarantee that the N-2 firms agree on collusion
by giving them market shares of 1-3. Thus the aggregate market share of the N-2
domestic firms is (N-2)(l-3), and the two multi-market firms reserve for
themselves l-(N-2)(l-3). Each multi-market firm takes a market share Xc = [1-
(N-2)(l-3)]/2. This is positive by (5.E3), but less than 1-3, as N(l-d) exceeds
unity by assumption (5.E2). The multi-market firms reduce their market shares
relative to domestic firms. Both now have a motive to defect, as by (5.E4),
defection occurs if X^ < 1-3. The multi-market firms make collusion sustainable,
however, by drawing in market A: each will punish defection in B by the other
multi-market firm by punishing in both markets. The loss of defection in both
markets is
(5.E5) n*_(l- 0.5/(1-3)) + rP(l-V0-3)) < 0.
Given p\ and IT\,, the firms raise p" and IP until equality holds in (5.E5). Since
(1- 0.5/(1-3)) < 0 by (5.El) and (l-V(l-d)) > 0 as X^ < 1-3, n* should be
positive. (See Bernheim and Whinston, 1990, p. 8, for the case when the implicit
constraint IP < n\ becomes binding.) The multi-market firms continue to earn
monopoly profits in A and now also earn some profits in B. CZiO
The multi-market firms do earn less in B than the domestic firms, who free-ride
on the formers' ability to punish each others' defection in A.
ma/vtm vv/7/i
Arbitrage implies that constraints are imposed upon prices:
(5.E6) pM < p° < p*+t.102 Chapter 5
J.E2 Arbitrage does not destroy multi-market collusion, but does
change prices.
f. If arbitrage exists from market B to A, Bertrand prices p* = c in market B
imply that the maximum price in A equals c+t, where t is the arbitrageurs'
constant marginal transport or adjustment cost. Collusion in A is still possible, by
(5.El), so the market price in A is indeed c+t. Given that, prices in B can
increase up to c+2t without invoking arbitrage from A to B. Given that, prices
can increase in A up to c+3t without invoking arbitrage from B to A, e/c. This
entails that equation (5.ES) has to be rewritten into
(5.E7) (p*-c)Q*(p*)(l- 0.5/(1-5)) + (p°-c)QV)(l-V(l-3)) = <*
with the additional constraints that p" < p^ (j = A,B), and p*-t < p* < p*+t.
Equation (5.E7) gives p* as an implicit function of p*; this is an increasing
function for p* < p^ (j = A,B) if the profit functions are single-peaked. For profit
maximisation, the firms seek the highest prices p" (along the implicit function)
until one or more constraints become binding. If one or both of the constraints p*
^ P*m 0 = A,B) are binding, the result is the same as in the non-arbitrage case.
If, however, p*-t ^ p" < p*+t is binding, prices result such that r/ < p\ and
p*+t = p^ or p*-t = p*. In this case, arbitrage has an effect: it does not dissolve
collusion, but it does reduce prices. Arbitrage trade is not inconsistent with
coordinated markets, but does reduce prices (as expected). Q£D
:if profits i"'\6 VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS
This chapter discusses competition in vertically related markets. These are
markets linked by firms that are buyers in one market (the input market) and
suppliers in the other (a product market). Actions in (imperfectly competitive)
input markets may provide instruments in product market competition. A firm
may make an irreversible acquisition of inputs in order to raise costs of rivals,
thus indirectly raising its own revenues even if the acquisition itself is costly.
The chapter explores the relationship between the industrial economic theory of
competition by raising rivals' costs and the resource-based view of the firm
within strategic management. Both approaches indicate that a firm derives a
competitive advantage from a team of complementary resources. This may be
an instrument in entry deterrence. The chapter explores both de novo entry and
established-firm entry, thus offering a synthesis with the previous chapter.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
A large class of competitive games has the following form: an incumbent firm makes
moves in its (external or internal) factor market which affect a (potential)
competitor's sufaegwenr moves in its product market. Figure 6.1 illustrates this idea.
If inputs are acquired before production takes place, the purchase or contracting of
inputs may be used as an instrument in order to affect the subsequent product market
competition. Two conditions determine the role which moves in factor markets can
play in competition.
First, the setting in
figure 6.1 implies more
than a time sequence. It
assumes that the
purchase or contract is
irreversible. If it is
reversible, the firm
effectively postpones its
decision until (after) the
product market decision
(e.g., output or price).
Two types of games
have explored how an
irreversible move in a
factor market can be a
strategic move. In co/nm/mien/ g<wrié?5, a firm's move influences competitors to its
advantage only because it is irreversible. For example, an incumbent firm's product-
specific inputs raise exit barriers, such that rivals know that it will remain in the
market even if it is no longer earning enough to recover its original investment
Figure 6.1












outlays. This may keep rivals out of the market, which is favourable to the
incumbent firm. In j/gra///ng ga/nes, a firm's actions in a factor market may reveal
information that has an effect upon the subsequent product market competition. It
signals its information (e.g., that its cost level is 'low') by making moves which
would not be profitable if its information would be different (e.g., if it had high
rather than low costs).
Secondly, if the factor market exhibits imperfect competition on the demand side,
the buyers of the factors are interdependent. The conditions (price, availability,
quality) under which one firm may purchase factors become dependent upon the
transactions by its product market rival. Since cost functions are based on these
conditions, each firm's cost function depends upon decisions by the other firm. Firms
may not only compete in the product market, but in a factor market as well.
The importance of irreversibility and interdependence can be demonstrated in a
counterfactual way by studying the effects when they are absent. The perfectly
contestable market is predicated on the assumptions that all investments are
reversible without costs or delays (they should adjust faster than prices), and that
factor markets are perfectly competitive with price-taking buyers and sellers. These
assumptions destroy the possibility for incumbent firms to deter entry while earning
positive profits. Chapter 4 was careful to point out that, justified critiques
notwithstanding, contestability's importance is its demonstration that the absence of
at least one of both conditions is necessary for profits. The case usually explored by
industrial economics is when investments are irreversible (e.g., because of imperfect
used factor markets). The remainder of the chapter studies the situation with an
imperfectly competitive new factor market where moves are irreversible.
The chapter develops an integrated approach which draws upon theories from
strategic management and industrial economics. The foundation is the strategic
management approach of the resource-based view of the firm (section 6.2). This is
a 'vertical' variety of multi-market competition with imperfect competition in the
factor market. Firms may earn rents from scarce resources. The next section
explores the sustainability of these rents (section 6.3). Given that scarce resources
give rise to sustainable rents, firms will compete for these resources. This may in
turn affect product market competition. Industrial economics has sought to explore
this in the theory of competition by raising rivals' costs (section 6.4). Rents do not
only affect competition; they also raise bargaining issues between the resource
supplier and the buyers (section 6.5). Section 6.6 gives examples of scarce
resources, rents, and cost-raising competition in a single product market. If entry
occurs, it is Je HOVO entry. The subsequent section allows for established-firm entry.
If a single-market and multi-market firm compete for a scarce resource, the multi-
market firm's advantage is that it derives value from an extensive use of the resource
in several product markets. Section 6.8 concludes the chapter. ..„,>. ...
!v;t:.<ki!< " "-"jn
6.2 THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW OF THE FIRM ii s\--o-,- :icfeav-m
The resource-based view of the firm argues that if a firm owns superior assets
(compared to product market rivals) it will earn economic profits or rents. Rents canVertically Related Markets 105
be defined as income in excess of costs needed to attract the factors of production.'
By implication, inter-firm profitability differences are partly explained by
heterogeneous factor endowments. Barney (1986b) calls the factors that are central
to a firm's competitive strategy and profitability «ra/^/c/ccrorj. These are, for
example, tangible assets such as production capacity and intangible assets such as
R&D (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991), the management team (Penrose, 1959), and
organisation culture (Barney, 1986a). Reviews of this new approach are Wernerfelt
(1984), Grant (1991), Ghemawat (1991b) and Peteraf (1993).*
The origin of the resource-based view is Ricardo's (1973) theory of rents in
agriculture. Corn is a homogeneous commodity, and the suppliers of corn (capitalist-
farmers) are price takers. They use land of different qualities. On marginal least-
quality land the unit production cost of corn equals the market price. Higher quality
lands have lower production costs. The difference between market price and
production cost on these (infra-marginal) lands is a rent. Competition between
farmers for a lease of good land drives up the lease price they are willing to pay up
to the point where the landlord who owns the good land appropriates the entire rent.
This theory combines the basic features of the resource-based view of the firm: the
product market is competitive, factors are heterogeneous, good factors are scarce and
generate a rent; bargaining between the supplier and the user (firm) of the resource
divides the rents between supplier income and user profits.
The resource-based view extends Ricardo's theory. It moves beyond land to all
factors that satisfy certain conditions (what these conditions are will become apparent
in the next sections). It also raises new issues: the sustainability of rent and the
endogenous size of the rent. A firm may increase rents by, first, forming a team to
combine a scarce resource with complementary resources, or, second, by
diversifying in order to use a shared resource in multiple product markets.
The first condition that rent-generating
factors must satisfy follows immediately from
Ricardian theory. A profit is a scarcity rent if
and only if competition would drive down the
market price and wipe out the rent if rivals












buyer power ; ••*<-* ••H$
endogenous service
(incomplete contracts)
1. The rent is the difference between the value of the resource and the cost of
contracting the resources to their use in the firm. If the cost is measured by the
opportunity cost (the revenue when the resource is sold, which is often equated to
the highest value of the resource in an alternative use), the associated rent is called
quasi-rent (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 269). The rent is positive if the resource
is used where it has the highest contribution (marginal product). This is an example
of the Coase theorem (Raiffa, 1982, p. 107).
2. Related insights can be found in Lippman and Rumelt (1982), Barney (1986b),
Aaker (1989), Reed and DeFilippi (1990), and Schoemaker (1990).106 Chapter 6
the incumbent firm or first mover did.' Rents arise, therefore, if competitors cannot
buy the resources required. For example, no factor market exists for them, the factor
market is imperfect, resources may be scarce or closely held, and no substitutes are
available. Factor market imperfections are therefore a necessary condition for firms
earning scarcity rents.
The resource-based view raises the following three topics, which the next
sections will discuss: the sustainability of rent, the effect of competition for scarce
resources on product market competition, and bargaining with the resource supplier
about the distribution of the rent.
6.3 SUSTAINABLE RENTS
Rents are sustainable if the scarcity upon which they are based continues after the
rent-generating potential of the resource has become apparent. Processes such as
substitution and imitation reduce the scarcity. Impediments to imitation and
substitution in turn defend the sustainability of the rent. These impediments are
sometimes called resonrce-pos/non fowrâ/s (Wernerfelt, 1984) or, due to Richard
Rumelt, «o/a/mg mec/jamswis (Teece, 1984). Important examples of these
impediments are barriers to imitation and government regulation.
fit? i3i9{-i>fl&>sa!ac
6.3.1 Barriers to Imitation
Barriers to imitation are usually related to limited information. First, imitation is
difficult if know how is tacit and personal. Second, it may be difficult to identify
which resources among the many used by a firm are responsible for its competitive
success. Cowip/ex/ry (of the team-like interaction between resources required for the
firm's success) and non-ttwupare/icy (as to which resource is responsible for a
particular aspect of performance) give rise to the w/icerra/'/i /m«a/H7/ry problem,
where potential entrants stay out of the market for fear of buying the wrong
(combination of) resources (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). Third, it may take time and
experience to build a team out of separate resources. Each firm is a unique
combination of complementary resources. Penrose, who initiated this idea, focused
on the management team with experience in working together: 'such management
cannot be hired in the market-place' (Penrose, 1959, p. 46). These impediments act
as an entry barrier such that incumbent firms continue to earn rents.
Imperfect information may improve sustainability of rents also in another way.
Rents may be protected by a contract between the resource supplier (e.g., a union)
and the user (e.g., a firm). Contracts can be reversible if the parties renegotiate or
voluntarily dissolve the contract. Rents based on a contract are sustainable only if
second movers are unable to create conditions where the initial parties consent in
renegotiation or dissolution. If one party suggests the dissolution of a contract, the
other may fear to be ripped off. (This is why a contract is signed to begin with.) If
3. If rivals can buy resources in the same conditions as the incumbent firm or first
mover did, i.e., if there is no interdependence in the factor market, then any non-
transitory profit should result from irreversible (e.g., commitment or signalling)
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uncertainty exists, it may be difficult for the other to distinguish a renegotiation
which is mutually beneficial from one which is not. This may prevent the
renegotiation, which in turn buttresses its commitment value (Dewatripont, 1987).
The impediments that buttress a resource's continued scarcity may naturally
follow from its identity, as in the cases above. However, a scarcity of rents may also
be deliberately created or sustained. Government actions may have the desired (and
perhaps intended) effect of creating scarce, rent-generating, resources.
6.3.2 Regulation and Rent-seeking
Incumbent economic actors may lobby with the government to impose regulation that
prevents or limits entry, thus turning the status and regulatory approval of an
incumbent firm into a scarce resource. For instance, Carr and Mathewson (1988)
discuss cases in Scottish banking (1795-1882) and U.S. lawyers' firms where some
incumbent firms had a limited liability charter. Unlimited liability is to the advantage
of creditors who in the case of the firm's bankruptcy can safeguard their loans by
appropriating the shareholders' personal property. This effect reduces the costs of
debt. However, to avoid loss of their property, owners of an unlimited liability firm
will both monitor management (to reduce the risk of bankruptcy) as well as each
other (to see to it that each is able to bear part of the costs of eventual bankruptcy).
The net effect of low interest rates and high monitoring costs seems to be to reduce
the value of unlimited liability to shareholders (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.
331). In the Scottish example, incumbent banks with a limited liability charter had
succeeded in convincing the government of the need to impose unlimited liability
upon entrants. The lower marginal revenue of equity in unlimited liability (due to the
monitoring costs) reduces the provision of deposits. This prevents the interest rate
on deposits from falling. As a result, owners of a scarce limited liability charter
realise a sustainable rent (Carr and Mathewson, 1988, p. 772).
Maijoor and Van Witteloostuijn (1993) have an empirical study of the Dutch
audit market. Government regulation initiated between 1967 and 1983 had increased
demand for accounting while allowing the organisation of accountants to self-regulate
the registration of new accountants. Accountants and their organisations had actively
participated in the political process that led to these regulations. Incomes of partners
of accounting firms, which had increased before 1967 at lower rates than those of
other professionals, began to catch up after 1967. This suggests that regulation
turned accounting services into a scarce factor, while partners of the accounting
firms appropriated some of these rents.
6.3.3 Tariffs and Quota « :< ti na/a ,js.>frsm luqni Ls/r&ixa ft» rti âoçn; vu J
If international trade exhibits symmetry between two countries and firms, the firms
may attempt to escape reciprocal dumping (see section 5.3) by means of COZ/KJ/OH
ty ra«/ng nva/i' catts. Each firm will lobby with its local government to impose an
import tariff. One may think of tariffs and quota as scarce resources traded in a
political market. This raises the foreign rival's costs, and shifts some of its rent to
the home government. National welfare may increase therefore, by Brander and
Spencer's (1981) rent-shifting motive. If both firms do this, this may change their108 Chapter 6
situation. Previously, they may have been involved in cross-hauling. After the tariffs,
however, the extent of cross-hauling decreases. Firms may now revert to a spheres-
of-influence arrangement.'' They certainly gain from this, as duopoly gives way to
monopoly, and tariffs are avoided in the absence of trade. It remains to be seen how
governments react if they lose tariff revenues.
These subsections give some examples where conditions tend to keep a resource
scarce. Given that a scarce resource exists, firms bid for them, which may have an
effect on product market competition. Industrial economics explored this presumption
in a theory called compem/on fty raùi/ig riva/s' cos».
6.4 COMPETITION BY RAISING RIVALS' COSTS mwimuonl
As Lydall (1955, p. 304) stated, 'the [entrant's] cost of launching a new product on
the market depends on the policy of existing firms.' (see subsection 3.3.3). Firms
may deter entry by raising their (potential) rivals' costs. The main instrument is to
buy up scarce resources that rivals need to expand or enter. For instance, an
incumbent firm may acquire a (sleeping) patent. By doing so, it raises the costs to
a second mover. This may induce the latter to contract its output level or to stay out
of the market altogether. The rival may also try to buy the resource, however. This
raises the question which advantage the incumbent firm has, such that it can
profitably outbid its rivals. Four types of heterogeneity among rivals exist that may
help some to raise the costs of rivals without reducing their own profits. The
associated theories are different and, I suggest, complementary. .?. «i*al * ££
6.4.1 Cost-raising by a First-mover
Salop and Scheffman (1987) discuss three models which have in common that one
firm (e.g., an incumbent firm) moves ahead of other firm(s) (e.g., a potential
entrant). The first model assumes that the incumbent firm determines a parameter a
(e.g., an industry wage rate) that affects both its own and the entrant's costs. It
chooses a to deter entry or reduce the scale of a competitive fringe. An example is
that a capital-intensive dominant firm may negotiate high industry wages with the
union, which hurt its labour-intensive competitors most (see subsection 8.7.3). In the
second model both firms acquire inputs a that are competitively supplied at price a
with an upward sloping supply curve A(oc). The incumbent firm may acquire
excessive amounts of a (an 'over-buying' strategy) in order to raise its price a to the
entrant. This may raise the market price although it also increases the incumbent
firm's costs. A third model explores vertical integration: the incumbent may 'over-
buy' inputs in an external input market, even if it is cheaper to produce them
internally. This may raise the price of the external input, with similar effects as in
their second model.
Appendix 6. A has a modified version of the second, over-buying model (see also
subsections 8.7.1 and 8.7.2). It brings out some important features of competition
by raising rivals' costs. First, it is not imperative that the preemptive (cost-raising)
4. Remember that higher transport costs or tariffs facilitate a spheres-of-influence
arrangement, as Pinto (1986) shows (see subsection 5.5.5 and appendix 9. A).Vertically Related Markets 109
firm 1 has market power in the product market. It does raise the market price, but
indirectly through its impact on its rivals' unit costs and thus market price. Second,
there is a scarce resource a: because a is scarce, a greater demand for a by firm 1
raises the input price. Scarcity is implicit in the upward slope of the supply curve
A(ot). Third, firm 1 is a first-mover and a price setter in the input market.
In this approach the first mover preempts second movers by changing the factor
market conditions that they will face. In the next cases, two firms move
simultaneously in the factor market. They simultaneously bid for a scarce resource,
such as a distribution network, an ore deposit, a patent, or a contract with
consumers. Say firm 1 and firm 2 compete (or bid) for the resource. Call Vj the
value of the resource for firm i (= 1,2), which represents the difference in profit
between winning and losing the bid. In the case of complete information, the supplier
can auction its resource. If V, > V,, the firms will bid up until the bid equals Vj,
where firm 2 drops out, and firm 1 wins. Firm 1 appropriates a rent V,-Vj and pays
Vj to the resource supplier. This line of argument exists in three varieties, with
different explanations of the valuations Vj.
6.4.2 Cost-raising by a Firm with Market Power in the Product Market
Call profits 7tj(l,0) for firm i (= 1, 2) if firm 1 wins the bid and TC/0,1) if firm 2
wins the bid. A bid B, is profitable to firm 1 if and only if 7c,(l,0)-B, > K,(0,1), that
is, the profits minus the bid (if it wins) exceed its profits if the other firm wins. Its
maximum bid equals V, s 7t,(l,O)-7c,(O,l). Firm 2 bids Bj such that 7^(0,lJ-B^ >
7^(1,0), that is, 7i,(0,l)-7ij( 1,0) = Vj > B,. Firm 1 is able to win if TC,(1,0)-TC,(0,1)
= V, > VJ = 7Cj(0,l)-7C2(l,0), that is,
Firm 1 wins if industry profits when it wins are greater than the industry profits if
firm 2 wins the bid. The winner, therefore, is the one who induces the highest
industry profits. This result does not per 5e extend beyond two firms, as we will see.
A special case is where firm 1 is the incumbent firm and firm 2 is a potential
entrant. Assume that firm 2 is unable to enter if it does not win the bid for the scarce
resource, that is, 7^(1,0) = 0. In this case, equation (6.1) says that firm 1 wins the
bid if the monopoly profit (when the incumbent firm wins the bid) exceeds the total
duopoly profits (when the entrant wins). Intuition suggests that the condition will
hold: the duopoly competes away some of the monopoly profits. The incumbent firm
wins the bid and pays the entrant's highest price (V = 7^(0,1)). The condition
.y.«*j-.i> «f <--^>:fK-j"''j-tr 'tes ; &$?& y-a
(6.1a) 7t,( 1,0) > n,(
is called the <#îa>/icy e/Jecr and is, according to Tirole (1988, p. 348), the basis for
the persistence of monopoly. An implicit assumption is, however, that the incumbent
firm does not exit after loosing the bid. If it does, the entrant earns the monopoly
profit, and the inequality will not hold. That is, some exit barriers exist, such that
the entrant does not produce if the incumbent wins, but the incumbent does produce
if the entrant wins.110 Chapter 6
To introduce more than two firms, consider a market where all incumbent firms
are equal. Each firm's profit is 7t(n), where n is the number of active firms. Each
firm requires a natural resource, e.g., a mineral well. There are actually n+1 of
these wells. Both an established firm and a new firm bid for the (n+l)th well. The
incumbent firm will not use the second well (one well is enough for any output
level); it only bids for it to prevent entry. The incumbent firm's maximum bid is
7t(n)-n(n+l); the entrant's maximum bid is 7t(n+l). The incumbent firm wins, and
entry is deterred, only if
(6.1b) 7i(n) > 2;t(n+l).
In a symmetric Cournot model with linear demand, this condition holds only for n
= 1, that is, only for the case in equation (6. la) (see Carlton and Perloff, 1990, p.
271). In non-monopolised markets, each individual incumbent firm does not gain
enough from entry deterrence to be able to outbid a potential entrant. The incumbent
firm loses although it does (weakly) induce the largest industry profits: the efficiency
effect extended to n equal firms implies that n7i(n) > (n+ l)7t(n +1). The winner is
the one who has most to gain by winning the bid: it need not hold that the industry
as a whole also stands to gain.
Cases with more than two firms can still be allowed by introducing side-
payments. Call industry profits IT where i (= l..n) is the identity of the firm that
wins the bid. Rank a number of firms l,2,..n, such that IT >I~P >..> IT. Then firm
1 wins the bid and acquires the scarce resource as it can compensate both its rivals
and the resource supplier. Hence equation (6.1) readily generalises to any number
of firms. However, if side-payments are not allowed, it need not hold that the winner
is the one who induces the highest industry profits. In this approach, a firm realises
a higher rent or producer surplus, Vj-Vj, than a rival because it has more market
power. Having market power, it has most to lose and is thus most willing to win the
bid. The next subsection gives an alternative explanation of rent.
6.4.3 Cost-raising by Combining Complementary Resources
A firm may achieve greater value in using the factor than its rivals if it owns scarce
resources itself that complement that factor (Gilbert, 1989, p. 521-522). Asa result,
it may earn rents from using the factor in team with its complementary factors.
Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 770) define rea/n prodwc/Zo/j as follows:
Definition 6.1 Team production: the output level x = F(f,,..,fJ is team produced
by inputs fj and fj if d*F/ôfjdfj > 0 (i # j),
that is, a quantity fj of factor j raises the marginal productivity 5F/df; of factor i.*
The spécifie case Alchian and Demsetz (1972, p. 779) have in mind is a team of
employees, where '[t]here exist production techniques in which the Z obtained is
greater than if Xi and Xj had produced separable Z' (where Z is the output level and
5. If d*F/ôfjdfj < 0, inputs i and j are in congestion, and I prefer not to call them
a team.Vertically Related Markets 111
X are labour inputs). Another example of a team of inputs is referred to by Frumau
(1992, p. 98) as //irer/uutoge o/rec/irto/ogy û/rar, that is, several knowledge inputs
are required to develop a new product. For instance, Philips required competence in
electronics, mechanics and optics to develop and produce the compact disc.
Intuitively, team production requires complementary inputs, and I will assume when
speaking of complementary inputs that definition 6.1 holds.*
In order to explore the link between team production and rents, assume that the
production function (suppressing other factors) is F(r,f), with <?F/dfôr > 0. Each
firm / owns a given stock of firm-specific resources Tj as well as fj. Firms 1 and 2
are price takers in the product market (with price p). An additional unit of factor/
comes for sale. Each firm's highest bid equals its marginal revenue from a unit of
/ V, = p(<3F/df). If the firms are price takers in the factor market with price Pf,
then Vj = p(3F/df) = p,. Now assume an imperfect factor market. Using Taylor
expansion, assuming small differences and a smooth production function, the rent
VJ-VJ can be rewritten into p(r,-r2)5(5F/ôf)/5r plus a 'small' term, i.e.,
(6.2) V,-Vj « p(r,-r2)d*F/dfdr.*
Thus endowments r,-^ > 0 lead to V,-V, > 0 if ô*F/dfôr > 0. If, therefore, a firm
has developed unique skills (the factor r,), it is able to drive a hard bargain with the
suppliers of a complementary resource (i.e., the marginal unit of f): the latter earn
V2 (which is firm l's winning bid), and firm 1 earns VJ-VJ. Condition (6.2) refers
to differences in production endowments. In analogy with the three varieties of the
multi-market spillovers in chapter 5, a valuation difference may also result from
demand side effects, e.g., different brand name recognition, or from asymmetric
information. In this case, the approach is widened to allow for imperfect competition
in the product market.
6.4.4 Cost-raising by a Multi-market Firm
A firm may also derive greater value from a resource than others if it can apply the
resource to activities in multiple markets (see sections 5.3 and 5.4). If, for example,
6. To check this, define factors i and j as grow £utart7usij (com/?/ewie7i«,J if the firm
will increase (reduce) the use of the ith factor when the relative price of the jth
factor increases, taking into account that output may reduce upon an input price
increase (Henderson and Quandt, 1980, pp. 32 and 81). In the special case of a
profit maximizing, price-taking firm with two inputs and one output, inputs i and j
are gross complements if and only if they are team producing (d^F/dfidf, > 0), and
gross substitutes if d*F/dfjôfj < 0 (Henderson and Quandt, 1980, p. 81). Conversely,
Laitinen (1980, pp. 42 and 48-9) shows for the multiproduct firm, that if the
production function is additively separable in inputs rather than team producing
(d*F/dfjdfj = 0), no input is a specific substitute or complement (where .sped/ic
refers to the assumption that output is taken to be given, rather than variable as with
gross substitutes).
7. If r,-r2 is large, the expression is (V,-V2)/p = I,2''(d*F/dxdf)dx (see Baumol,
Panzar and Willig, 1982, p. 89, for the mathematics).112 Chapter 6
a shared resource allows a firm to realise a multi-market spillover, it may earn
7t(q*,qB), while if it fails to acquire the resource, it may earn 7t(q
where q* is the output level in market j (= A, B). The spillover effect,
(see definition 5.4.), equals the value which the firm derives from the resource. This
leads to a competitive advantage against rivals whose activities are limited to fewer
or smaller product markets. An extreme example is offered by one-sided entry from
a multi-market entrant against a domestic firm (see section 5.2 and subsection 5.3.4).
A rent may thus follow from the combination of a shared resource and a unique
access to (or incumbency in) many or large product markets. Since this case
integrates elements from horizontally and vertically related markets, I defer further
treatment to section 6.7.
6.4.5 Comparing the Four Types of Cost-raising Competition
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/4// varieties of the buyer heterogeneity in cost-raising competition can be traced back
to a first-mover advantage. In Salop and Scheffman's models, the incumbent's
advantage is the timing advantage that it acquires its factors before the entrant does.
In the other varieties, the incumbent firm and entrant may bid simultaneously. The
incumbent's advantage is that it owns firms-specific resources that either constitute
an exit barrier to its imperfectly competitive product market (condition 6.1), or
complements in production with the scarce resources (condition 6.2). A multi-market
firm may own product-specific resources that prevent entry into its home market,
thus forcing an asymmetry upon rivals (one-sided entry). In all cases the incumbent
firm has acquired at least some specific resources prior to entry.
In actual cases, competitors may exhibit a combination of these heterogeneity
(first move) conditions. A firm which has a market power disadvantage may yet win
a bidding auction if it has enough complementary resources to be able to generate
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where two firms, potential entrant 1 and incumbent firm 2, in market B vie for a
scarce resource (e.g., a distribution network). Only if firm 1 wins the bid does it
enter B. As condition (6.1) shows, the winner of the bid is the one who induces the
largest industry profits. The market power advantage of the incumbent firm 2 is the
efficiency effect. However, entry raises industry profits if the potential entrant's
marginal cost is sufficiently lower than firm 2's, e.g., due to learning in its home
market A.' The entrant, firm 1, will win the bid and enter the market. This reflects
a possible lesson from the entry by Japanese firms into the world market: having a
dominant market position is not enough if new rivals succeed in making more value
out of scarce resources.
Preemptive ownership of the scarce resource has different implications for the
incumbent firm in the cases above. In the case with condition 6.1, the resource may
not have an intrinsic use to the incumbent firm (e.g., a sleeping patent). The firm
buys the resource simply to prevent the entrant's entry, /.e., to protect its market
power. In the case of condition 6.2, the incumbent firm tries to appropriate the
scarce resource in order to reduce its costs which, given perfect competition in the
product market, translates directly into higher producer surplus. It clearly intends to
use the resource, and will win the bidding only if it generates a higher surplus using
the resource than would a rival. In agreement with Ricardo's rent theory and the
resource-based view of the firm, a competitive product market can exhibit rents.
Buying scarce resources preemptively creates profits (subsection 6.4.1) and by
assembling a team of complementary resources a firm can outbid rivals for scarce
complementary resources (subsection 6.4.3).
6.4.6 Cost-raising versus Other Competition Instruments
Three different games discussed in this section and in the introduction (competition
by commitment, signalling, or cost-raising) all imply that a firm acquires factors for
reasons additional to the technical reason that outputs require inputs. A distinction
arises between cost-minimising firms, which acquire inputs in order to minimise
costs given an output level, and profit-maximising firms, which exploit the strategic
potential that moves in factor markets may have relative to competitors. A profit
maximiser may over- or under-invest in factors relative to cost-minimisation.'
There is a difference between commitment and signalling strategies on the one
hand, and cost-raising strategies on the other. Commitment and signalling strategies
8. Say, products are homogeneous and the linear industry demand curve is p(X) =
A-BX with industry output X. The duopolists' constant marginal costs are q (i =
1,2). The Cournot industry profits n* are [(A+c,-2c2^ + (A+C2-2c,)^]/9B. Firm 2's
monopoly profit if firm 1 does not enter is IV = (A-cJ'MB. Then IP > IV iff c,
< (^-(A-cJ/lO. Recall that the monopoly price equals (A+C2)/2 and the monopoly
profit margin is (A-C2)/2. In order to win the bid, firm 1 should have a cost
difference, Cj-c,, of more than 20% of firm 2's monopoly profit margin.
9. Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985)
propose alternative benchmarks relative to which firms can be said to over- or
underinvest. These are not necessarily inconsistent (Klemperer, 1987, p. 104"). This
book uses both benchmarks, choosing for each case the one most appropriate,114 Chapter 6
(usually) share the condition that the incumbent firm and the entrant are not
interdependent in the factor market. They may have different factor markets, or the
input market may be perfectly competitive. The crucial assumption is that the move
in the factor market is irreversible, e.g., because the n$«/ factor market is imperfect.
Cost-raising strategies, instead, imply that both firms are interdependent in a factor
market. The crucial assumption is that the nw factor market is imperfectly
competitive on, at least, the demand side. A move by one firm (e.g., its demand for
intermediate inputs) affects the factor market conditions found by the other firm.
Competition by raising rivals' costs, therefore, is a case where (expected) product
market competition has an effect on the factor market (see figure 6.1). This
represents a higher degree of interdependence than on the basis of irreversibility
alone, where there is a unilateral influence from factor markets on the product













The sections above discussed one party that influences a firm's rents: its rivals.
I now turn to the suppliers of the associated rents. Industrial economics and strategic
management share some insights about bargaining between firms and their inputs
suppliers.
6.5 BARGAINING FOR RENTS WITH RESOURCE SUPPLIERS
Competition or bidding for scarce resources may pass over most of the rents to the
resource suppliers. '° Union bargaining, for instance, diverts a large part of monopoly
rents to employees (Schmalensee, 1988, p. 669-70; and Veugelers, 1989). A
bargaining process determines the distribution of the rents between the supplier(s) of
the resource and the firm with the winning bid. We need to distinguish two types of
resources: those whose service to the firm is exogenous, and those whose service (or
effort) is endogenous.
6.5.1 Resources with Exogenous Effort or Service
If the effort or service is exogenous, firms derive given values V> from the resource.
10. Ricardo's theory is the extreme case where the suppliers appropriate all rents.
The reason is that the farmers who compete for land are identical. Thus, from (6.2),
V|-Vj = 0, and farmers do not earn rents. If, however, some farmers would own
complementary factors (such as skill in working on fertile land), they would
appropriate part of the rent. This argument ushered in the emphasis on teams of
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Several models predict the bargaining outcome. In the bargaining model used above,
an ascending outcry auction, firm 1 bids up to Vj (the next highest bid) and earns
Vj-V, (Raiffa, 1982, p. 96). In the alternative case of cooperative Nash bargaining,
the resource supplier gets more than Vj. The supplier's outside option is Vj and firm
l's outside option equals 0. In the Nash bargaining solution, the joint rent V, is
distributed in w for the resource supplier and 7t for the firm such that V, = W+TC,
and w and 7t maximise the expression (w-VJOt-O) (Rasmusen, 1989, p. 231). The
supplier gets w = (V,+V2)/2, which exceeds V,. The buyer firm, of course, loses
by the same amount.
Both outcomes show that a firm appropriates a larger part of the rent when there
is more buyer asymmetry (i.e., the higher Vj-V,). They also indicate the importance
to the resource supplier of having an outside option (V,). The more product-specific
the resource, the lower its outside option. High mobility raises the outside option.
This explains the argument in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) that the monitor of the
team (the entrepreneur) will be the team's residual claimant. A residual exists
precisely because individual team members cannot earn as much outside of the team
as they can (marginally) produce inside. Theories have made it intuitive that the firm
appropriates a larger part of the employees' rents if success is based on team effort
rather than individual skill, if the individual employee's contribution is difficult to
identify by outside employers, or if skills are firm-specific (Grant, 1991, p. 129).
6.5.2 Resources with Endogenous Effort
The bargaining process above assumes that the price of the resource w does not
affect V,, the contribution of the resource to the firm's value. For some resources,
however, Vj depends on effort which in turn depends on the rewards w (Raiffa,
1982, p. 96-7). Examples of a resource with an endogenous effort are an employee,
manager, or another firm. The service or effort of these resources cannot be
contracted for and hence is not given in advance. It is an old point (going back to
Marx) that firms cannot buy labour; instead they buy labour power. A labour market
does not literally exist, therefore, which is a fairly extreme factor market
imperfection. In modern language: the labour contract is incomplete (does not specify
in advance the labour effort or service expected). Incentives or coercion are required
to assure that the service does come forth. VH«; .:nffr.i*WrvJki#i£>^iî.'*''.j 2*W*'
To focus on bargaining, ignore for now the presence of a product market rival
who bids against the incumbent firm. Principal-agent models analyze the situation
when the firm bargains with a resource supplier. Of particular interest is the property
rights view of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; and
Moore, 1992). It explores the firm as being the result of a vertical merger. The
reasoning assumes that the managers of two firms independently make investment
decisions in complementary factors (<\g., their own human capital). Each firm's
revenue depends on its own and on the other firm's investment. It appropriates part
of the income generated by the other firm's investment. This hold-up induces each
firm to underinvest. To avoid this, one firm acquires the other. The acquiring firm
has higher incentives to invest as it appropriates the entire income from its
investment. The manager of the acquired firm, however, loses his share in the
income; his incentives to invest decrease:116 Chapter 6
'a firm that purchases its supplier, thereby removing residual rights of control
from the manager of the supplying company, can distort the manager's incentives
sufficiently to make common ownership harmful.' (Grossman and Hart, 1986,
p. 692)
This implies the policy recommendation that ownership should go the manager whose
investment decision has the greatest impact on the joint income.
The property rights view focuses on (investment or effort) incentives of firms
with complementary resources. The analysis can be extended to the case where a
firm acquires a complementary resource with endogenous effort. Rotemberg and
Saloner (1991) explore a case where a contract that gives incentives to a newly
acquired resource (an employee) may reduce the incentives of the established
employees. This creates an advantage of being narrow, i.e., of turning down a
profitable opportunity because 'entering a new activity worsens performance on
existing activities.' (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1991, p. 6). They specifically centre
on R&D. Say activity a is the firm's core business and £ a new opportunity. Their
workers, A and B respectively, may develop a useful idea, which requires them to
exert effort e, with a probability of success P. Effort is non-contractible, e.g.,
because it cannot be observed by outsiders. Enforceability of the contract is assumed
to rest on implementation of the innovation, rather than on the innovation (idea)
itself. If B's idea is implemented to the detriment of A's idea, A gets no reward (a
one-sided spillover). If A anticipates this, A may not exert the effort. This is an
inefficiency.
'By choosing to be narrow, and focusing only on activity a, the firm commits
itself not to research innovations that could jeopardize the effort of its innovative
employee in activity a.' (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1991, p. 4)
This is a very specific story, but it points the way to a better understanding of why
mergers and multiproduct firms run into incentive problems. If product market
activities undermine the incentives of each other's employees, they are substitutes in
production, and the firm faces a (managerial) diseconomy of scope.
Strategic management explored the same bargaining problem as an exercise in
power (Mintzberg, 1983). The power of A is his ability to influence the behaviour
(e.g., effort) of another person B. Firm A will have power if B depends on a
resource owned by A (the dependency view of power). If firm A owns resources
complementary to those of an employee or firm B, A may have the power upon
acquiring B (or his factors) to induce him to provide effort or services. Agent B will
depend on A if A's resources are essential to B, concentrated in A's hands, and
nonsubstitutable (Mintzberg, 1983, p. 24). These conditions are consistent with those
mentioned earlier as giving rise to rents. Unlike the property rights view of the firm,
this approach also mentions non-economic incentives to induce B to spend effort in
ensuring the value of the acquisition (called V, above). Firm A should have the will
and the skill in using power to actually influence behaviour by B. Power may also
imply the charisma that makes followers willing to be led. These non-economic
factors may substitute for economic incentives. What remains yet to be done is to
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resources.
6.5.3 A Synthesis of Cost-raising Competition and the Resource-based View of
the Firm
The cost-raising theory and the resource-based view show that the gap between
industrial economics and strategic management is closing. Their theories can
fruitfully be considered as complementary. The vision that emerges from these
theories is as follows. Firms can derive a competitive advantage (/.e., an excess
profit or rent) from a first move in a resource market (see subsection 6.4.1), in a
product market (subsection 6.4.2), in a complementary resource (subsection 6.4.3),
or in a related product market (subsection 6.4.4). This must be an jrrevern7>/e move
that changes the structural conditions which rivals face in input markets. This refers
to //nper^c; (new or MseaV/ac/or mar&ett. Two additional characteristics single out
strategic resources that can be targeted for a cost-raising strategy. The first one is
that they must be scarce. By buying these resources the first mover either completely
preempts second movers (as in subsections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3), or it raises the price of
resources to second movers (see the first move model in 6.4.1). Secondly, the
second movers make an wennve are of these resources. Appendix 6. A shows that
the first mover's ability to raise price is directly proportional to the intensity of the
second movers' use of the resource (equation 6. A2). The other varieties feature cases
where the scarce resource raises the owner's profits and may be necessary for entry.
Furthermore, the distribution of the rent depends on bargaining with the resource
suppliers. A firm derives a bargaining advantage from being a./ïm mover or from
the Mg/ier va/ue which it generates from the resource than do its rivals (due to
market power, team production, or multi-market scale).
The resource-based research in strategic management suggests that management's
main task may be to create teams of complementary resources. The importance to
the firm of having a team of resources is, first, that teams raise the value generated
with a complementary resource, second, the complexity of teams raises the costs of
imitation ('uncertain instability') and enhances sustainability of the rent, and third,
the firm has a better bargaining position relative to individual resources if their skill
is specific to a team than if each resource has a transferable skill with its own
productivity. Strategic management theorists focus on these teams, and implicitly
have condition (6.2) in mind. Note that, as the next section will show, condition
(6.1) dominates in industrial economics. With some exaggeration, therefore, the
argument about condition (6.1) may be called the ecomwuc variery, and the one
about condition (6.2), the /nanû^eno/ var/ery. Building teams of complementary
resources may be a successful strategy that breaks through conventional entry
barriers. As the previous chapter argued, building on shared resources in the home
market (leading to multi-market spillovers) is also a possibly successful entry
strategy. Diversification, for example, allows a firm to raise the amount of rents
earned with a resource. Section 6.7 takes up the task of relating these insights. First
I discuss examples of scarce resources, rents, and cost-raising strategies.
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6.6 CASES OF SCARCE RESOURCES AND PRODUCT MARKET
COMPETITION
This section discusses several examples. Resources are not limited to factors of
production, but they include all contributions that the firms' stakeholders make to a
firm's activities (see section 2.2). Stakeholders include consumers, suppliers, the
government, unions, ere. The scarce resource can be tangible (e.g., a natural
resource) or intangible (e.g., a patent or contract). It may be strictly unique (e.g.,
a patent), or there may be imperfect substitutes or multiple suppliers with decreasing
returns to scale. The examples focus on a single product market. Interactions with
other product markets are ignored, which implies </e novo entry threats.
6.6.1 Capacity
Ghemawat (1990) explores a case where the supply of new durable, product-specific,
productive assets is limited. Two incumbent firms of unequal size bid for these
assets. If the large firm wins (state 1,0), the concentration ratio (CR) will be higher
than if the small firm wins (state 0,1):
(6.3a) CR(l,0) > CR(0,l).
At least in the special case of Bertrand competition with binding capacity constraints,
industry profits FI increase in the concentration ratio:
(6.3b) an/acR > o.
Together the conditions imply that equation (6.1) holds, and the larger firm wins the
bid. This raises the concentration ratio, a result which Ghemawat calls the snow*a//
e^ea (see subsection 8.7.2). He illustrates this with the U.S. market of titanium
dioxide, where Du Pont was the dominant supplier. In 1975 Du Pont considered two
strategies: maintain its share of U.S. industry capacity at 43% or grow to 55%. It
expected the growth strategy to lead to /t/gfter prices in the long run than the
maintain strategy. This illustrates that Du Pont increased its capacity in order to raise
its market power over smaller rivals. Another example, where indeed an auction
occurred, is given by Lieberman (1987, p. 623). In 1957 the U.S. government
auctioned a large low-cost magnesium plant. Prior to the auction, Dow Chemical [the
dominant supplier] stockpiled magnesium ingot. By 1957 the stock was up to
approximately two years of U.S. domestic consumption. Dow proved the sole bidder
of the auction and bought it for less than the original construction cost. Subsequently,
it closed the plant for four years in order to run down the stockpile.
6.6.2 Labour
Both collective as well as individual labour contracts can be instruments in cost-
raising. Consider both cases in turn. Williamson (1968) studies a case where a wage
agreement in the U.S. bituminous coal industry may have had the rationale of raising
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capital-intensive mines could afford to raise the industry-wage rate to the detriment
of small, labour-intensive mines.
Good employees are scarce and may be subject to 'poaching' by rival firms. The
difficulty for employers is that anti-slavery laws deter the writing of contracts that
prevent labour mobility to rivals. Instead, employers use incentives ('golden ties')
and ancillary contractual restrictions. Mori (1991) studies incentives when labour is
an experience good. He assumes that the incumbent employer knows his employees'
quality levels, but an entrant does not. The incumbent's job assignment can be
observed, and is a signal of employee quality. Assuming costless labour mobility, an
entrant might hire the incumbent's workers and give them the same assignment. To
distort the signal, the employer chooses an inefficient matching of worker quality and
job assignment. The misassignment reduces the incumbent's productivity, but would
reduce the entrant's productivity even more, provided the workers' skill is somewhat
firm-specific." The latter effect reduces the wage which the entrant is willing to pay
to the incumbent's workers. Since these offers are the workers' reservation wages
in bargaining with the incumbent firm, the incumbent earns a rent, called by Mori
an ;n/oAma//o«û/ îur/>/w.
A special case in the labour market are R&D engineers. Pakes and Nitzan (1983)
explore a situation where an entrepreneur hires a scientist to develop a marketable
product. Once the product or its technology is developed, the scientist may leave the
firm to exploit the idea himself in a rival enterprise. The semiconductor industry has
seen numerous examples where individual scientists or teams defected to form their
own enterprise. The entrepreneur faces the problem of developing an incentive
scheme for the scientist that prevents this defection. The solution is to make it costly
to switch to (or create) a rival firm by forfeiting a bonus. The wage contract implies
a low initial wage rate prior to the invention, and a high bonus paid when the time
is past that the scientist could defect. Due to condition (6.1), the monopolist can pay
a bonus which exceeds the bonus paid by a rival firm, or the profit earned by the
scientist in his own firm. The bonus raises the entry costs, therefore, and prevents
defection.'*
6.6.3 Intermediate Inputs " " " ''
The traditional result of vertical integration in intermediate price theory is that price
falls and welfare is enhanced (e.g., Davies, 1987, p. 89-92). This reasoning assumes
bilateral monopoly or (tight) oligopoly. Bilateral monopoly occasions the double
marginalisation problem, where the upstream firm adds a markup on its marginal
11. The incumbent firm may use the labour contract to raise the firm-specificity of
the employee's skills, e.g., by a provision that employees shall not transfer the
firm's customers or other relations to a new employer. -':o«a«C*« TaarssYi**-.?-*'
12. The discussion about equations (6. la) and (6.1b) also showed that monopoly is
the only situation where the innovator has higher profits than two rivals combined.
In non-monopolised markets, the innovating incumbent needs other bases than market
power to make the most attractive bid for the scientist. Alternatively, the firm may
write contracts to prevent (and use litigation in the case of) the scientist's use of its
knowledge (if identifiable) in another firm.120 Chapter 6
cost, and the successive downstream monopolist treats the resulting price as its
marginal cost, and adds its markup on top of it. A vertical merger between the
bilateral monopolists gives rise to an integrated firm. It chooses a downstream price
on the basis of the correct upstream marginal production cost, which is lower than
the one above, where the input price included a markup. Hence it chooses a lower
price than the unintegrated downstream firm. This raises both its own profits and
consumer welfare: vertical integration is efficient (Scherer, 1980, p. 300-3). Several
exceptions and counterarguments to this idea are based on cost-raising competition.
First, consider the situation where the dominant firm's product market rivals
acquire their inputs from the firm itself. The dominant firm raises the input price to
the rivals, while reducing the product market price through competing with them in
the product market (its own marginal costs are given). This entails a price squeeze
(Perry, 1989). Second, if an upstream and downstream firm merge, the merged firm
may cease to participate in the market for the intermediate (upstream) product. This
may raise the intermediate product price and thus raise the costs to unintegrated
downstream firms (Salinger, 1988; Ordover, Saloner and Salop, 1990; and Bolton
and Whinston, 1991). This may in turn raise the final good price. The merged firm's
increased efficiency may outweigh the rival's cost-raising effect, however, such that
industry price falls (Greenhut and Ohta, 1979; and Nahata and Olson, 1989).
Next, consider a situation where the dominant firm's product market rivals can
turn to unintegrated input suppliers. The dominant firm's decision not to buy from
these suppliers reduces the scale at which they operate (an 'under-buying' strategy,
Salop and Scheffman, 1987). If these suppliers face (external or internal) economies
of scale, the dominant firm's 'under-buying' will raise the input costs. It will,
thereby, raise the prices at which the dominant firm's (potential) rivals acquire
inputs. Entry costs are raised. For example, by setting up internal procurement
(supply) and allocation (demand) of inputs, an established firm (partially or
completely) excludes the external input market. If the firm involved is large or
innovative, the use of an internal market may actually prevent an external input
market from coming into existence. This may (prohibitively) raise entry costs. The
existence of (im)perfect input markets can thus be emfogenoMj to firm's strategies.
An example where a firm did not sufficiently appreciate this point is IBM's choice
of an operating system for its PCs (see chapter 1). By acquiring its operating system
from the upstart firm Microsoft, IBM inadvertently facilitated entry by new rivals
which could likewise buy MS-DOS rather than developing their own costly operating
system.
6.6.4 Product Promotion
Product promotion can be an instrument to raise the costs of introducing new
products (which is Lydall's, 1955, original example of cost-raising competition). It
is convenient to think of the input associated with this as the consumer's effort or
costs to experiment with a new product. Consider an experience good whose product
quality v (indicating the maximum price consumers would be willing to pay)
consumers can only ascertain «tpow. Say a pioneering brand name has a quality Vp
and price Pp (Schmalensee, 1982). Since the product is now well-known, consumers
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and a price p,,, where x reflects the costs of trying a new brand; e.g., with a
probability x < 1 the new product is useless with a quality v=0. The consumer
surplus is v-p, which consumers try to maximise. Consumers will try the new brand
name if it provides a larger consumer surplus than the pioneering product, i.e., if
(l-t)v»-p. > Vp-p,,, or
(6.4) (v-p),+xv. < (v-p)..
To prevent consumers from trying the new brand, the pioneer may raise the
consumer surplus, (v-p),, by raising its quality or reducing its price. More
interesting, perhaps, are attempts to raise xv,,. The cost xVa is a special case of a
consumer'sswirc/ii/ig coir. Airlines, e.g., have frequent flyer programs, which give
rewards or discounts to travellers (frequent flyers) who have flown more than a
certain number of miles with the airline. If a customer switches to a rival airline, she
discontinues building up mileage with the airline's frequent flyer program. She thus
forfeits the program's advantages. In similar vein, supermarkets provide stamps or
coupons to customers, which, when accumulated to a certain amount, give right to
a discount. These actions, therefore, impose switching costs upon consumers.
Consumers, in turn, will switch only if the entrant compensates these costs by
offering 'value for money'. This raises entry costs. This may have a counter-intuitive
effect on entry. Klemperer (1987) showed that switching costs tie consumers to the
incumbent firm as well as the other way round. In order to exploit its customers,
which it can because of the switching costs, the incumbent will quote a high price,
which induces new consumers to turn to entrants. This facilitates entry if new
consumers appear in the market. "
Contracts may also lead to consumer switching costs. Aghion and Bolton (1987)
explore a delivery contract between an incumbent firm and a consumer that specifies
for a future date a price and a fine (liquidated damages) if the consumer breaks the
contract. The fine is a kind of switching cost. The consumer switches to an entrant
only if the latter compensates her for the fine. This implies that the incumbent's fine
raises the entrant's costs. The potential entrant enters only if it is very efficient. In
that case, the incumbent firm sells nothing but does earn the fine. Hence the contract
does not per se deter entry, but it does shift surplus from the entrant to the
incumbent, who shares part of it with the consumer. The price, that is, is lower than
in the absence of an entry threat. The relevant 'factor' in this example is the
possibility to write a contract with a consumer.
If products are incompatible, consumers face switching costs when moving from
one to the other. Examples are 'systems', such as computer hardware and software,
video players and cassettes, e/c. The supplier of a new, improved, system, may
choose whether to be (in)compatible with older technology. Incompatibility locks out
the supplier(s) of the older technology, and thus reduces competition. It also forces
costs upon either consumers of the old technology, if they switch, or their suppliers,
13. This partly seems to explain why PC market leaders such as IBM continued for
such a long time to quote high prices in the face of massive entry. IBM may have
banked on the switching costs of its corporate clients, thereby losing new firms and
home users to its new rivals.122 Chapter 6
if they choose to develop adapters to make their technology compatible with the new
technology (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985 and 1986).
6.6.5 Intra-market Mergers and Acquisitions *> ssfts)-c t-
There is a twist to the argument about condition (6. lb) when merger is possible. Say
the entrant happens to own the (n+l)th well. An incumbent firm might now bid for
the entrant itself for a merger or takeover. Again, however, the same problem
appears. An incumbent firm gains 7t(n)-7t(n + l), if by winning the bid and merging
it reduces the number of independent firms from n+1 to n. Any alternative bid will
be less than or equal to 7t(n+1) (the entrant's profit). The profitability of a merger,
therefore, depends on exactly the same condition as the cost-raising condition (6. lb)!
A firm is itself a scarce resource that other firms can bid for. Potential entrants,
e.g., may effectuate entry by buying up a local incumbent firm. The market for
corporate control may, therefore, be a battlefield for (potential) product market
rivals.
Merger does not pay in a Cournot model if there are more than two firms around
(see subsection 6.4.2). The competitors of the merger are its only beneficiaries, as
the merged firms contract their output level, which raises the market price, to which
rivals respond by increasing their output level. This result reflects a difficult problem
in economics. Although mergers are not profitable by this argument, mergers do
occur, and rivals routinely protest against them, although they would benefit (Boyer,
1992). Moreover, mergers are indeed, expotf, often not as profitable as expected,
if at all, and they do reduce market shares (Scherer and Ross, 1990, p. 172-3).
Is there a case for profit-increasing mergers? Ghemawat's snowball effect
(subsection 6.6.1) shows that if a merger creates a dominant firm, it may allow the
firm to preempt rivals in acquiring additional capacity. By imposing a capacity
constraint on its rivals, the (merged) firm prevents that they expand their output in
order to free ride on its attempt to raise price. This invalidates the Cournot argument
against mergers (when n > 2). However, this merger is anticompetitive.
Management usually gives a procompetitive efficiency defense of mergers. A merger
of firms that supply complementary outputs may facilitate economies of scope (see
definition 4.3). A related argument centres on firms which merge in order to pool
complementary factors. '* A merger may also enhance efficiency if it takes the form
of a multidivisional enterprise with an internal capital market, as was proposed by
Williamson (1975). <j
The argument that merger reduces the merging firms' aggregate profits cannot
be ruled out. It can be turned into the opposite direction to explain why a firm might
split itself up in several independent, competing divisions (Vickers, 1985).
Divisionalisation pays off exactly in those situations (where 2n(n+1) > rc(n)) where
cost-raising competition against a new entrant would not be feasible. Managerial
motives such as a preference for growth go some way to explain non-profit
motivated mergers (Mueller, 1977).
14. This argument also explains (research) joint ventures. See Kay (1991) for why
firms might prefer a merger or takeover to a joint venture with an otherwise
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6.7 COST-RAISING COMPETITION WITH MULTIPLE PRODUCT
MARKETS
The cases studied in the previous section assumed <fe novo entry and a single-market
incumbent firm. Although the source and size of the rents that firms earn may differ
(due to first moves, market power, or team production), all firms did have in
common that they apply the resource only to one product market. A multi-market
firm, however, uses a shared resource in many markets. This raises the value of the
resource, and thus raises the bid the firm is willing to make for it. A positive multi-
market spillover facilitates entry if it breaks the conditions (6.1) and (6.2) which
underlie the incumbent firm's entry deterrence by a cost-raising strategy.
In exploring this idea, numerous cases present themselves. First, cost-raising
competition can be used in the case of reciprocal entry between markets, as well as
in the case of one-sided entry. Second, the scarce resource may be a shared resource
or a product-specific resource. While shared resources stimulate established-firm
entry (they induce a multi-market spillover), the need to buy product-specific
complementary factors raises entry costs (an entry barrier) (see definitions 4.2 and
4.4). This suggests two paths towards entry deterrence. An incumbent firm may buy
up a scarce shared resource in order to forestall the entry that is bound to occur
when a rival buys it and tries to realise the associated multi-market spillover by
entry. Alternatively, the incumbent may buy a complementary product-specific
resource in order to raise entry costs. Third, the basis of cost-raising competition
may be any of the three types identified in section 6.4. The next subsections explore
two cases. Both focus on one-sided entry, but differ in the other respects. Subsection
6.7.1 combines bidding for a shared resource with condition (6.2); and subsection
6.7.2 combines a product-specific resource with condition (6.1).
6.7.1 Bidding for a Shared Resource: Team Production versus Multi-market
Spillovers •-> - <.....—, .. ...... ~-,. --.i;
Consider a case where a new shared resource comes available that can be applied in
two markets. The introduction of the resource implies a process innovation. The
model in appendix 6.B shows that if the innovation is 'drastic' (in a sense to be made
clear), a new firm will win the bid rather than an established firm. The resource has
the given size K, it is unique and indivisible (<".g., an entrepreneur, entertainer, or
scientist, who wants to be employed in one firm only). The size of K may reflect the
labour hours offered.'* The supplier of K (e.g., the scientist himself) sells K to the
highest bidder. There are three potential bidders: a single-market incumbent firm,
an established multi-market firm, and a new firm. Each firm has a maximum bid Vj.
The winner gets the resource and pays a price equal to the next-highest bid; he
prevents its rival bidders from reducing their costs. The product market is
competitive and all candidate buyers bid simultaneously for the resource. The firms
derive value from K by combining it with complementary resources; hence the basis
15. The firm may treat the resource as a variable input k subject to the constraint
that k < K. I assume that any firm that wins the bid for K will use it to the full, i.e.,124 Chapter 6
of cost-raising is condition (6.2). .•*****:
Firm 1 is an incumbent firm in the product market (market A) and in an identical
market B. It can use K in both markets; K is its only shared resource. It buys all
other inputs for one activity (market) only. In the absence of K there is no technical
reason why firm 1 should be a multi-market firm: it may result from two single-
market incumbent firms that merge in order to use K. This is an example where an
innovation creates a spillover effect that may induce a cross-market merger. Firm 2
is a new firm. It enters the market only if it wins K, as prior to the introduction of
K the market was in equilibrium and entry was not profitable. Firm 2 enters only
market A: some lags exist that rule out that it enters two markets at the same time.
Firm 3 is an incumbent firm that will use K only in market A. Due to symmetry, it
is the representative incumbent firm in that market. Each firm earns a profit on K
that equals its maximum bid for K as in the absence of K each firm earns zero
profits.
The advantage of firm 1 is that it realises an economy of scope by using K in
two markets: it always outbids the single-market incumbent firm 3. The advantage
of firm 2 is that it has no previous commitments: it is able to buy inputs that are
team producing with K so as to draw maximum benefit from K. Condition (6.2) is
essential in this respect. The established firms, firms 1 and 3, do not have this
advantage. Being established, at least some of their inputs are inflexible. They may
be stuck with some inputs that may substitute for K rather than complement it. Their
inertia prevents them from making full advantage of K. Appendix 6.B assumes that
they cannot adjust their factors at all. Although this is extreme, it does highlight
some of the advantages and disadvantages of incumbent firms: while the incumbent
firm is 'large' in that it can be active in multiple markets, the new firm is more
flexible in the choice of its inputs. The appendix shows that the multi-market
incumbent firm will win the bidding for K if its economy of scope advantage
outweighs the inertia disadvantage. Moreover, it shows that inertia is the flip-size of
the new firm's ability to create a team of complementary resources.
6.7.2 Bidding for a Specific Resource: Market Power versus Multi-market
Spillovers
I now consider a case where a single-market incumbent firm and an established firm
potential entrant compete for a scarce resource. The resource is product-specific and
is necessary to realise entry. It may, for example, refer to a local distribution
network. The incumbent firm bids for it for the sole purpose of deterring entry. Its
bid is based on its domestic monopoly power, which it loses if entry occurs.
Condition (6.1) is now essential. The entrant bids for the resource since entry will
allow it to realise an economy of scope. There is a conflict between entry deterrence
based on cost-raising competition (condition 6.1) and entry based on a multi-market
spillover (definition 5.4). It can tentatively be explored as follows.
Say, firm 1 is an incumbent firm in market A, which considers entry into firm
2's home market, B. Due to one-.s/<ted enrry, the domestic firm 2 has no access to
market A (its output level qj thus refers to market B). Profit levels are 7t'(q,*,q,*,q2),
where i = 1,2. Two pairs of outcomes are to be compared: the case with Je rcovo
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firm not active in market A), and established-firm entry, where firm 1 exploits a
multi-market spillover. Denote the former case by lower-case symbols (q) and the
latter by upper-case symbols (Q). Firm 1 experiences a positive multi-market
spillover if 7t,(Qi\Q,*,Q2) > t,(Q,'\O,Q2)+7t,(O,Q,'',Q2), for some relevant output
levels by firm 2 (see definition 5.4). Firm 2, in turn, may try to defend its home
market by means of cost-raising competition. I will leave implicit which particular
cost-raising instrument firm 2 can use; it may, e.g., acquire a distribution network.
It can deter </e TIOVO entry (where q,* = 0) if condition (6.1) holds: ^(O.O^"") >
ti(0i1i^><h)+^2(0><li*»R2) with a monopoly (duopoly) output level, qj" (q2). Note that
it2(0,0,q2™) equals ^(qAO.qj""), ^ *e assume that firm 1 's production in market A
has no direct influence on firm 2's profits in B.
Firm 1 earns Jt,(Q,*,Q,*,Q2), if it wins the bid, and 7t,(q,*,O,q2"), if it loses the
bid, so its valuation is V, = ^(QAQACW-'^fai'SO.qj"'). If firm 2 wins, it earns
»t loses, its profit is ^(QAQ^QJ. Its valuation is V, =
,Q^,Q2)- Firm 1 wins the bid if V,-Vj > 0. This amounts to the
condition that entry should raise total profits in both industries: »
This is a two-market restatement of condition (6.1) that the firm that raises industry
profits most wins the bid. Rewrite this into:
(6.5) V.-Vj = A+B+C+D;
where:
A = *,(QAQ,'',Q2H*,(Q,'\0,Q2)+*,(0,Q,'',Q2)], the multi-market spillover
(definition 5.4);
B = ti(0,q,*,q2)+rt2(0,q,^,q2)-7t2(q,*,0,q2"'), where -B reflects condition 6.1 in
market B;
C = *,(QA0,Q2)+7C,(0,Q^Q2)Mrt,(qA0,q2'")+K,(0,q,'',q2)];
D = ^(QAQACW-^O.q,*^), fi™ 2s loss if the entrant is a multi- rather than
single-market firm. ^t,. .• -i"«v ,;^,-^
If firm 1 has a positive multi-market spillover, A > 0. If firm 2 has a cost-raising
advantage (the efficiency effect), B < 0. The signs of C and D are undetermined
and depend on the game-theoretic interaction between both firms. It will hold that
D < 0, if established-firm entry poses a greater threat to firm 2 than one-sided
entry."
Established-firm entry is feasible if A+B+C+D > 0. In the case of </e novo
entry into market B, the entrant's net profit if it wins the bid is rc,(0,q,",q2) minus
the incumbent firm 2's bid, ^(O-O.qa^-^CO.q^.Qî). '•«•. B (remember that
.O^™))- Thus (2e «ovo entry is feasible if B > 0. If both an
16. Due to the spillover and Q,* > 0, it may hold that Q,® > q,*. If the product
market B is characterised by strategic substitutes, e.g. with Cournot competition, the
increase of firm 1 's output in market B will reduce firm 2's outputs and profits, /.<
Q2 < q, and D < 0.126 •"' Chapter 6 ' - '
established-firm entrant and a de now entrant appear, the former would win the
bidding between them if V, = 7t,(Q,*,Q,'',Q2)-Jt,(q,*,O,q2"') exceeds Jti(0,q,®,q2), i.e.,
if A+C > 0. The table shows the following cases
Table 6.2
Entry into market B with cost-raising competition
De rtovo
entry feasible
Yes (B > 0)
No (B < 0)
Established-entry (from market A) feasible
Yes (A + B+C+D > 0)
Established-firm entry (A+C > 0);
De m?vo entry (A+C < 0)
Established-firm entry
No (A+B+C+D < 0)
De now? entry
Entry deterred
A possible outcome is that an established-firm enters a market inaccessible to a new
firm (if A+B+C + D > 0 and B < 0). It is also possible that a Je novo entrant
enters the market even though an established-firm entrant has a positive multi-market
spillover (if A > 0 and B > 0, and either A+B+C+D > 0 and A+C < 0 or
A+B+C+D < 0). A multi-market spillover, on the one hand, raises firm 1 's profit
and its willingness to make a bid (A > 0), but, on the other hand, both raises its
output levels (such that C < 0 is possible) and hurts firm 2, thus raising its
incentives to deter entry (if D < 0). To put it differently, 'weak' (de ziovoj entry
may arouse less resistance and may, therefore, be accommodated by the domestic
firm 2. This is similar to judo economics (Gelman and Salop, 1983)." To sum up:
the fact of a positive spillover (A > 0) does not guarantee success in entry against
a single-market incumbent firm. The established-firm's entry may fail either because
of the domestic firm's market power (if A+B+C+D < 0) or because of a new
firm's entry threat (if A + B+C + D > 0, B > 0, and A+C < 0). The next
subsections give examples of cost-raising competition with multiple product markets.
6.7.3 Multi-media Industries " "" '
Economies of scope based on the joint use of information inspire firms such as Sony
to develop into multi-media firms (see chapter 10 for more information). These firms
undertake entertainment activities in order to support new media, such as new
musical media (Sony's MiniDisc), new electronic media (Sony's Electronic Book),
or new computers (e.g., Microsoft's Multimedia PCs with Windows). This implies
a quest for individuals with both the skill and the imagination to explore the potential
of new technologies. These people are scarce resources. Several types of firms vie
for their services: traditional entertainment firms (such as Walt Disney), consumer
electronics firms (e.g., Sony), and computer firms (such as Microsoft). Apart from
17. Closely related is Judd's (1985) two-market model, where the incumbent firm
accommodates single-market entry (by exit from the entered market), but resists two-
market entry (by cutting price across the board).Vertically Related Markets 127
established firms also new firms manage to attract talent. Each firm offers both
material rewards (salaries) as well as immaterial ones (success, challenging ideas,
team work). The above analysis assumes that the firm that derives highest value from
these stars is able to offer them the best terms. The established entertainment firms
derive an advantage from the efficiency effect (condition 6.1). New firms with a
small, dedicated, and enthusiastic team benefit from complementarity (condition 6.2;
see appendix 6.B). The emerging information conglomerates such as Sony benefit
from combining multiple complementary products such as hardware and software
(condition 6.1c). For the latter firms, the costs of acquiring complementary factors
to, say entertainment stars, constitute entry costs (or mobility barriers) into the
emerging multi-media product market. For example, when Sony acquired Columbia
Pictures Entertainment, it induced Columbia's two top managers to stay with the
firm. It payed them higher salaries than all its incumbent senior managers in Japan
put together (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 280). This sent shock waves through
Sony's Japanese organisation. ïff^sm s*s ••ev/foi.^i:* i'i«$R-;,' n*
6.7.4 Cross-market Mergers and Acquisitions ar-f*'-***-- :^r^r»--:«.»/#,-i a *
Entry by acquisition is a case where a merger may hurt rivals (Hines, 1957) (see
subsection 6.6.5 where rivals benefit from a merger). If an existing firm in a related
market acquires an incumbent firm, the merger may pool its factors in order to
increase the firm's market share. According to Hines, this will have a procompetitive
effect. Rivals might complain in this case. The government may be susceptible to
complaints if the acquirer is a foreign firm. Yet consumers might benefit from more
competition and lower prices. Entry by established firms may also, however,
increase concentration by putting out of business small incumbent firms. Berry
(1974-5) confirmed that the procompetitive effect dominates. He finds that the higher
the market's initial concentration, the more entry by large firms reduces
concentration. The argument in subsection 6.7.2 underlines this effect (see table 6.2).
Even if an incumbent firm is able to deter entry by a new firm, it may not be able
to deter one-sided entry by a (foreign) established-firm (if B < 0 and A + B+C + D
> 0). By, for example, merging with a domestic firm, the established-firm entrant
facilitates its entry into the local market. The argument also showed, however, that
if the procompetitive effect is 'too large', the established-firm entry will be deterred.
That is, established-firm entry appeared to be feasible only if industry profits
(aggregated over the two markets) would increase (condition 6.1c). Thus the
procompetitive effect of established-firm entry should not be exaggerated: it can be
'second best' at most, in line with Berry's (1974-5, p. 204) conclusion that:
'the market position of leading firms does appear protected in concentrated
industries from entry by other than large firms. That is the bad news. The good
news is that at least some of the diversifying activity of large firms may have
filled the gap.' . . ..;•.,. ... . . . . .,.
6.7.5 International Trade
A one-sided entrant may raise the incumbent's costs in the special case where trade128 Chapter 6
occurs both in intermediate products (e.g., DRAM chips) and in final products (e.g.,
computers). Spencer and Jones (1992) explore this case. They assume that a 'foreign'
(e.g., Japanese) firm exports both an intermediate product and a final product to the
'home' market (e.g., the U.S.). The 'home' supplier of the final good can produce
its intermediate products itself; it can also buy them from the foreign firm. The
foreign firm has lower marginal production costs of the intermediate good than the
home firm (which appears to be the case with semiconductors). The intermediate
product exhibits, therefore, one-sided entry from the foreign country into the home
country. Thus the rivals in the final good market partake to some extent in the same
factor market, i.e., the foreign firm's internal production of the intermediate product.
If the foreign firm raises the export price of the intermediate good, it reduces its
sales (exports), but also raises the costs of the home supplier, and thereby raises the
market price of the final good." It may then expand its exports of the final good.
The home firm's government may mitigate this problem (a price squeeze) by raising
an import subsidy on the intermediate good, or an import tariff on the final good.
6.8 COMPETITIVE MOVES IN FACTOR MARKETS APPRAISED
Factor markets offer instruments which incumbent firms may use to deter entry. This
chapter may have shown that the resource-based view of the firm in conjunction with
cost-raising competition offer an integrated framework to understand numerous types
of competition. Firms compete with each other in all markets where they meet,
whether in input or product markets. Porter's (1980, p. 6) ewe/w/ed riva/ry concept
comes to mind. Multi-market competition should include both a horizontal and a
vertical dimension, which is the central message of this part of the book.
The framework integrates current research while suggesting some future research
issues. Vertical and horizontal multi-market competition may need further
integration. The success of entry, internationalisation, and mergers (a horizontal
development) may depend in large measure on the incentives of the employees (the
vertical dimension). The failure of many mergers to create value may be attributable
to internal incentive problems. Incentive schemes may also create inflexibility in
competition (which is the downside of their use as a commitment instrument). Since
many incentive schemes are dynamic (promising future promotions for current
effort), the need to realise these rewards makes the firm inflexible.
The framework can also be extended from factor markets to include the firm's
wider environment. Firms operate in social infrastructures: local education,
transport, services, government taxation and legislation, e/c. These bestow
externalities upon the firm: they provide it with inputs or they impose costs upon it.
Firms may try to deny each other access to these inputs or they may use their access
to impose costs upon each other. In the political arena, for instance, a firm, as we
have seen, may lobby with its government in order for it to impose costs upon
(foreign) rivals. The institutional context may be a threat to firms as well as an
opportunity. Pressure groups (e.g., consumer groups) may significantly affect the
terms of product market competition (e.g., product quality, safety standards, and
18. Notice that this widens the policy menu: one may now accuse the Japanese firms
of raising prices, as well as of dumping!Vertically Related Markets 129
environmental concerns), which may affect some firms more than others. An
important institutional difference between countries is the ability of incumbent
managers to protect themselves against hostile takeovers. Research along these lines
could, perhaps, be integrated in a multi-market framework.
Another future research issue is the strategic factor problem: which strategic
factors should a firm focus on? Economists usually view the commitment instrument
as determined by industry, with industries being different as to whether R&D,
product promotion, or capacity is the main instrument (Ghemawat, 1991a, p. 28).
The commitment instrument, however, often reflects choices made by firms. Firms
choose whether to make irreversible steps. They invest or lease factors; they make
or buy; they can hire employees for indefinite periods or on short-term contracts.
Entrepreneurial firms may use this freedom to change the dominant competition
instrument in the industry. In the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s,
competition in the PC industry appeared to shift from innovation to distribution. A
resource of increasing importance is information (see chapter 10). The next part of
the book delves deeper in some of the issues raised in this part. It may illustrate the
richness and usefulness of the multi-market competition framework.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 6.A. Cost-raising competition by competitive firms
The 'over-buying' model in Salop and Scheffman (1987) is illustrative for their
theory (see subsection 6.4.1). It can be restated as follows, where I assume a
competitive product market, whereas Salop and Scheffman, 1987, use a dominant
firm product market. A competitive product market brings out more clearly the
importance of imperfect competition on the (demand side of the) /oc/or market.
Moreover, it substantiates the three claims made in the associated subsection 6.4.1.
There are two firms, 1 and 2, both incumbent firms, where firm 1 is the first
mover and firm 2 represents m (> 1) homogeneous perfectly competitive firms in
the product market. All firms use an input a and inputs z, (i = l..n). The input
market of c is perfectly competitive on the supply side. The price of input a, a,
determines the competitive supply A(a). Due to decreasing returns in the supply of
a it holds that A^ s dA/Sa > 0 (a subscript to a function value will denote a first-
order derivative). Moreover, assume that A^ ^ d*A/da* < 0 (where two subscripts
imply a second-order derivative). All firms are price takers in the markets of the z
inputs. The game involves two stages. Firm 1 is the first mover in the market of
input o. It buys K units of a. Next firm 2 buys A* units of input Û as well as inputs
Z;* (i = l..n). Market clearing in the input market implies that A(a) = K+AV
When taking its investment decision firm 1 anticipates on this market clearing
condition: it is price setter in the input market, while firm 2 is price taker in the
input market. Firm 2 produces y quantities of output, where y = f (z*,A*). It
minimizes costs and earns zero profits. The product price /? equals its minimum
average cost.
In the second stage of the game, given the input prices r< and a, firm 2 solves
the problem:
(6.A1) p = min^djrjz'i+aA'yy, where y = fV,A*).
This gives solutions z^(a) 0 = l..n), A*(a), y(a), and p(a). The envelope theorem
gives
(6.A2) pa = dp/3a = AVy > 0.
This substantiates cost-raising competition: a higher input price a raises the product
price. Some additional assumptions must be made. First, A^ < 0 (because of
substitution) and A^ > 0 (substitution becomes more difficult at higher levels of
a, when the use of a has already been diminished strongly).™
19. This equation ignores for convenience the existence of multiple fringe firms.
With wi symmetrical fringe firms, where m can be very large, it would be more
appropriate to write A(a) = K+mA*.
20. It can be shown that p^ < 0 if A\ < 0 < dz/cta (/'.e., if the a and z inputs
are gross substitutes). That is, the ability to raise p through raising costs a decreases
when a is already high. As equation (6. A2) shows, the ideal cost-raising instrumentVertically Related Markets 131
The purchases of input a by firms 1 and 2 determine the input price a. From the
input market clearing condition A(cc)-A*(a)-K = 0 follows
(6.A3) a* = ôa/5K = 1/(A.-A'J,
Since A* > 0 and A^ < 0, it holds that o* > 0. If A^-A^ < 0 (e.g., A.»
< 0 and A*», > 0), it can also be shown to hold that a** s d*a/dK* > 0.
Anticipating these outcomes in the first stage, firm 1 solves the following
problem: max^^ n' = px-E^'raK, where there are i (= l..n) inputs Zj, and x =
f (z'.K), that is,
(6.A4) max^K n' = p{o)f(z',K)-Zir^,-aK.
The first-order conditions are
(6.A5) Sn'/Sz'j = pf»-rj = 0 (i = l..n), and
(6.A6) ôn'/ôK = (p«f-K)aK+pf'K-a = 0.
Does firm 1 'over-buy' K, that is, does it over-invest? Two benchmarks may be used
relative to which firm 1 over- or under-invests.*' First, consider the case where firm
1 ignores its influence on the product price.
5.v4/. Firm 1 over-invests relative to a cost-minimizing firm that is a
price setter in the factor market.
Proof. If firm 1 ignores its influence on the product price, it takes p^ = 0, and
equation (6.A6) changes into
.'II I» «111. loll 3IU til «USaiJ^B
(6.A7) pf'K-ot - KCXK = 0. . . {.s ", * f -, , ,s,X)H
ri EuriJ fai, X R3«1w
This benchmark implies that firm 1 minimizes cost by equating marginal revenue of
a unit of a, pf K, to the marginal cost, 5(aK)/5K (= a+KaJ. Since p^ > 0 by
equation (6.A2), equation (6.A6) implies that pf^-a - Ka^ < 0. Note that f*
decreases in K (due to diminishing returns in the production function), and a and
K(XK increase in K (since a^ > 0 and a^x > 0). Hence the function pfVo: - Ka«
decreases in K. Since pf'K-a - Ka,< = 0 in the non-strategic case and pf^-a - Ka^
< 0 in the strategic case, it follows that firm 1 strategically over-invests in K in
order to raise firm 2's costs and thus raise the product price p. Q£D wi
Second, consider the benchmark where firm 1 ignores both its influence on the
product price as well as its influence on the input price.
is one which is used intensively by the rivals. Raising a will reduce the a-intensity
of production.
21. In both cases the benchmark is the investment level that minimises total costs
given the output level that the strategic interaction leads to (Bulow er a/., 1985a).132 Chapter 6
Propos/non 5M2. Firm 1 over-invests, relative to a firm that ignores both its
influence on the product price as well as its influence on the input price, if and
only if it uses the input a less intensively than firm 2 does.
Proo/. The cost-minimizing price-taking firm chooses K such that pf K-ot = 0.
Compared with this benchmark, a cost-raising firm 1 may over-invest to raise p, but
it may also under-invest to prevent its investment from raising the input price a. The
sign of pf K-<* in (6.A6) depends on the sign of Paf-K since a^ > 0. Remember that
p^ = AVy (equation 6.A2), K = A', and P = x. Then, p^P-K = (AVy-A'/x)x. If
firm 1 uses the input a less intensively than firm 2 does, i.e., A'/x < A*/y, then
PaP-K > 0, and by equation (6.A6), pfV-<* < 0- Taking into account that f ^ and
-a decrease in K, firm 1 over-invests relative to the price-taking, cost-minimizing
benchmark, where pfV<* = 0- If firm 1 is relatively a-extensive, it will raise the
price of Û to raise the costs of rivals that are a-intensive. This result is similar to
Williamson (1968), where a capital-intensive mine dominates the labour market in
the coal industry. It raises industry wages in order to raise the costs of labour-
intensive mines, which in turn raises coal prices."
Appendix 6.B. Competition for a scarce resource in two competitive product markets
This appendix accompanies subsection 6.7.1. It studies the rents which different
firms may derive from the appearance of a new factor of production. The new factor
is a shared resource, and firms earn rents from the team effect (see subsection
6.4.3). Consider a market with pure competition. The market price is p, there are
m suppliers with an identical production function f(z,..zj, with n inputs Zj that are
traded in perfect factor markets at given factor prices r, (j = l..n). Decreasing
returns in the production function warrant finite (small) production levels. Moreover,
we take the special case where the incumbents' profits are zero. A new resource
appears in the market. It entails an innovation that induces a new production function
F(K,z,..zJ. Assume that F(0,z,..zJ = f(z,..zj. The function F has constant returns
when K is treated as a variable and thus has decreasing returns in the Z; while taking
K as fixed (Varian, 1984, p. 20). Thus both F(0,z,..zJ (= f(z,..zj) and F(K,z,..zJ
have decreasing returns in the Zj.
The ensuing model assumes that the introduction of K will not affect the market
price: the winner of the bid for K remains sufficiently small not to affect p." The
advantage of firm 1 relative to firm 3 is that firm 1 will earn a rent twice as large:
Jt, = 27tj, due to symmetry of product markets A and B. The advantage of firm 2
is that it buys inputs Zj in quantities that are optimal in terms of the production
function F(K,z,..zJ. To highlight this advantage, assume that the incumbent firms
1 and 3 are unable (at least in the short run) to adjust their input levels. Hence their
22. In Williamson's model, the difference in capital-intensities is exogenous.
Subsection 8.7.3 discusses a variety of his argument with imperfect competition in
the product market and an endogenous capital-intensity for identical technology.
23. None of the firms, therefore, tries to win the bidding for the pu/pore of raising
rivals' costs (although they have this effect). See appendix 6.A for the cost-raising
motive in perfect competition. , ... ,_AFTERWORD
What I hope this book has achieved is an integration of different perspectives,
theories, and models within industrial economics and strategic management. Its
content derives largely from industrial economics, while its research aim is
predominately inspired by strategic management, in particular Porter's (1980)
extended rivalry framework. It draws insights from contestability, transaction
cost theory, committed competition, competition by raising rivals' costs, and the
resource-based view of the firm, to mention its most important sources.
Integration also means that theories have been discussed not so much from the
perspective of their developers as from the central perspective in this book. This
may give the book its critical overtones here and there. The integrated framework
consists of two dimensions (the horizontal and vertical one). These are related in
terms of the institutional setting (chapter 2), through the common importance of
shared resources (section 4.3), by exploring interaction effects (section 6.7), and
in a basic model (section 8.3).
There are obvious limits to what a conceptual framework can contribute. It
focuses on links between theories rather than on further development of any
particular hypothesis. It is not testable in a clearly defined, empirical or logical
way. Its aim is to be useful in guiding research on multi-market firms. As is
often the case, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Current research is
usually characterised by streams focusing on specific topics, in particular,
vertical integration, multinationals, and diversified firms. Research also tends to
occur in rivalrous approaches (or paradigms), such as contestability, game
theory, and transaction cost economics. This book contains a plea to explore a
specific topic by drawing inspiration, ideas, and hypotheses from any of these
topical streams and paradigms. Synergies, that is, may exist in theory as well as
in fact. The framework's contribution may be to support synergies by facilitating
communication among different theories and theorists. I will next mention some
sources of the framework; a short summary reiterates some results, and a section
on future research closes off the book.
Sources
The contribution made by the source theories can be summarised as follows.
Transaction cost economics contributed especially to the analysis of shared
resources (e.g., internalisation theory). It showed that shared resources give an
efficiency rationale to the multi-market enterprise only if transaction costs exist in
the market(s) of these resources. Its emphasis on bounded rationality shines
through in the chapter on market definition, which argued that bounded
rationality has an effect on firms' decision making. Contestability contributed to
the analysis of shared resources (economies of scope) and established-firm entry
(to explain hit-and-run entry). Industrial economics contributed to multi-market
modelling (international trade models), committed competition (game theory),
and cost-raising competition. Theories on vertical integration contributed to the
latter topic as well. Theories of diversification and multinational firms brought
the importance of shared resources to the fore, as well as established-firm entry.
Theories on multinational firms also emphasised market definition (global versus
multidomestic firms). Strategic management contributed indirectly, to134 Chapter 6
(6.B6) Tt, = pF(K,z,..zJ-ZjrjZj. tffrfti ni
The first-order conditions are , . v f.
(6.B7) pF^(K,z,..zJ = Tj(j = l..n)/ ~
•
Insert equations (6.B7) in (6.B6) to get:
(6.B8) TCj = p[F(K,z,..zJ-E^(K,z,..zJ}zJ. •-• ,. . '
Since F(.) has constant returns in all factors, the Euler theorem applies, which gives
F(K,z,..zJ = FK(K,Z,..ZJK+E^(K,Z,..ZJZJ. Substitute this in (6.B8) to get
(6.B9) «, = PFK(K,Z,..ZJK. ' '-•'• ' ' v
We can now make comparisons between the firms. First, consider firms 2 and 3.
Firm 2 wins the bidding for the scarce resource K if the following expression is
positive: •* . • . • •;.•'•• ••" ^> • •• •"•• („-•*• ••-"••: - ' ^--J- ,•• <-
(6.B10) n,-», = P[FK(K,Z,..ZJK-{F(K,Z,*..O"F(0,Z,*..Z.')}]. .;. .-.nr-.
n 6.B7: Firm 2 wins, /.«., TV^J > 0, if firm 3's input vector (z,*..^*)
contains 'large' quantities of inputs, relative to firm 2's unconstrained choice of
(z,..zj, that are substitutes to K, and 'small' quantities of inputs that are
complementary to K.
/". Again use the Euler theorem on F() to replace the F(k,z,*..Zn*) (with k = 0,
K) in equation (6.B10) by F,<(k,z,*..Zn*)k+IjF,i(k,z,*..z,*)Zj*. Rearrange the result
to get
(6.B11) Ttj-Tij = p[AK-B],
where A = FK(K,z,..zJ-F,<(K,z,*..z/)andB = Ij{Fy(K,z,*..z/)-F^(O,z,*..z,*}Zj*.
First, explain A by using the mean value theorem for vectors (Salas and Hille, 1990,
p. 875)." The mean value theorem implies that there is an input vector c € IF*' in
between (K,z,*..z,*) and (K,z,..zJ such that (i) c = (l-X)(K,z,*..z/)+X(K,z,..zJ
with X e (0,1), and (ii) the number F,<(K,Z,..ZJ-FK(K,Z,*..O equals the dot
product (FKK(c),F^,(c),..,F^(c)).(K-K,z,-z,*,..,VZn*)'- That is,
/i nf)\ A _ c /V" v Y \ IT /V" •» * T *"* V U
{O.olZJ A = rj((Jv,Z]. .ZgJ'rK^HfZi .'Zp ^ — Z*:r
Thus part A of 7^-713 is positive if firm 2 raises demand relative to firm 3 (i.e., Zj-Zj*
> 0) for those inputs where F^(c) > 0, that is, that are team producing with K.
The same holds if firm 2 reduces demand (i.e., z,-Zj* < 0) for inputs where F^(c)
25. The theorem says that there always is a vector c in between any vectors a and
b such that f(b)-f(a) = Vf(c)(b-a), where Vf(c) is the gradient of f in the point c.Vertically Related Markets 135
< 0. The expression A indicates the inertia disadvantage of firm 3 or firm 2's
flexibility advantage.
Use integration to explore B: F^(K,z,*..z.*)-F^(0,z,*..z.*)
Jo%K(k,z,*..z.-)dk. Hence
(6.B13) B = Zj{F^(K,z,*..z.*)-F^(O,z,*..z.*}ij* = I,{/o%K(k,z,*..z.*)dk}Zj*.
Expression B indicates to what extent firm 3 is able to generate value from K using
its existing lineup of inputs z*. Ij{/o"FqK(k,z,*..Zo*)dk}Zj* contains negative
contributions by z>* that are substitutes of K such that F^ < 0. There are positive
contributions from those inputs with F^ > 0, /.e., that are complements to K. If K
implies a drastic innovation it may require a complete realignment of the input
vector: raising the use of some inputs and reducing the use of others. Firm 3,
however, is unable to make this adjustment. In such cases it is likely that B is small
or negative.
Both A and B in equation (6.B11) therefore tell the same story. They illustrate the
disadvantage of commitment: it may saddle the firm with fixed factors (if only in a
short run) that are inappropriate ex /wwr when team production with K is called for.
Turning to firm 1, I have ; -• • »;. : - '
Pro/ww/f/on 6.fl2. The multi-market firm wins the bidding from firm 2 if its
economy of scope advantage outweighs the inertia disadvantage.
/•TOO/. Compare firm l's highest bid to firm 2's bid: n,-^ = 27tj-7^ = 7t,-(7t2-nj).
It follows from equation 6.B9 and 6.Bll that TC, = P[FK(K,Z,*..Z/)K+B], Substitute
equation (6.B11) to get
(6.B14) 7t,-7tj = P[FK(K,Z,*..Z»*)K+2B-AK].
Firm 1 benefits from a multi-market spillover (economy of scope) in that it uses K
in two markets, thus earning 2713. It suffers from the same inertia problem as firm
3 does. That is, its rent depends on B = Ej{Jo*F^(k,z,*..Zn*)dk}zj*, which may be
negative. If B < 0, it is possible that ^ < 0. In this case, neither firm 1 nor firm
3 are motivated to engage in a bid for K. Even if B > 0, firm 1 still suffers from
firm 2's flexibility advantage A. If 271, > Ttj > TC, > 0, firm 1 wins the bid in a
case where a single-market incumbent firm loses against the new firm.*'
26. An interesting problem is to simulate a series of identical innovations K that hits
the market. Does the market price p decrease, and will this affect the identity of the
winner (firm 1 or 2)? Moreover, does the winner of a bid have the highest chance
of winning the next bid, that is. does Ghemawat's (1990) snowball effect hold?Oq t>-K aisrtî .0 >
f»m;' aril 1 •.,
' "mi-? .».T>ft)o rû =f-'i!
V*--.'. .-î*;i>: 'f*
'.JE."" : '-if: •-•
6ûî9fii srtl ^t/oibm A sriT :•
fi
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PART IV
SOME EXPLORATIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK
Part IV explores two competition instruments: price (chapter 7) and capacity
investments (chapter 8). It provides examples of the horizontal and vertical
dimension of multi-market competition, while further exploring Andrews'
and Bain's theories in a formal multi-market context. Both chapters
concentrate on production capacity as a shared resource. They differ in that
capacity is exogenous in chapter 7 and endogenous in chapter 8. Chapter 7
models a situation described by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), where
firms enter a newly profitable market using capacity which they did not
install for this purpose. This situation refers to segmented markets. If entry
imposes a capacity constraint on the home market, the markets are more
tightly linked than in the original segmented markets model in Brander
(1981) (see section 5.3.6). Chapter 8 explores numerous situations where a
firm invests in production capacity with a view to improving its situation in
product markets. This points to joined markets.••«• *
*>i. lye pot|io.'»rr siKj
8C/IK EXhTOKVJJOV.^ U4 J.HE t-JK^/IE/AOKK
b'/Kl IA7 RECIPROCAL ENTRY THREATS IN CONTESTABLE MARKETS —
Chapter 7 focuses on the horizontal dimension of multi-market competition.
It explores reciprocal entry between two contestable (product or country)
markets. Each market's incumbent firm acts as potential entrant into the
other market. Since the firms use existing capacity, no sunk costs are
(assumed to be) required for entry, which seems the most likely context for a
hit-and-run entry threat. The chapter explores the claim by Andrews (see
chapter 3) and contestability theory (see chapter 4) that an (established-firm)
entry threat inspires incumbent firms to deter entry by means of low (zero-
profit) prices. The model formalises and refutes this claim. It also has the
heuristic function of illustrating how entry decisions become interdependent:
each firm's entry decision depends upon an opportunity cost of entry which
is endogenous to the other firm's (simultaneous) entry decision.
7.1 INTRODUCTION'
Potential competition is an elusive concept in contestable market theory. It drives
decision making by incumbent firms. Yet if a 'feasible' and 'sustainable' market
outcome exists, incumbent firms will successfully deter entry, and the entry threat
will not materialise. This may explain the almost complete absence of potential
entrants in Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982). Shepherd (1984) and Cairns and
Mahabir (1988) question the existence of the hit-and-run entry threat: Do potential
entrants exist who are alert to enter almost instantaneously, and if so, do they
have sufficient capacity to replace the incumbent firm completely? Moreover, if
such firms exist, are they motivated to hit-and-run? By raising such questions
these authors shift emphasis from the incumbent firm to the potential entrant.
They argue that existing firms in related markets approach the hit-and-run ideal
more closely than either new firm entrants or unrelated existing firms such as
conglomerates. Since a related firm has already invested in capacity, it needs less
time and (sunk) entry costs than a completely new firm or unrelated
conglomerate. The salience of the entry threat may depend upon the source of
entry (Hines, 1957, pp. 132-133; Brunner, 1961, p. 250; and Scherer, 1980, pp.
248-250). These ideas gain cogency in the context of the multi-market
framework.
This chapter continues the work by Cairns and Mahabir (1988) and Calem
(1988) in developing a multi-market restatement of contestability theory. It
introduces a conceptual and formal middle ground that recognises the comments
by Shepherd (1984) and Cairns and Mahabir (1988), while staying close to the
contestable market theory. The model establishes the Bertrand analogue to
Calem's (1988) two-market Cournot model for the symmetric duopoly case. It
1. This chapter is largely based on Van Wegberg and Van Witteloostuijn (1993).140 Chapter 7
will appear that the capacity constraints are crucial for determining the outcomes
of the game. Particularly, perfect contestability results occur only if ftor/j firms
face sufficient excess capacity: both firms should be able to serve row/ demand in
both markets simultaneously. Moreover, ncir/i^r firm chooses an entry deterring
strategy if entry cost is sufficiently small and capacity restrictions are binding
(over both markets). A model offers a rationale for an unsustainable pricing
strategy. On the one hand, entry diminishes home market profits of the incumbent
firm. On the other hand, entry imposes excess capacity upon the incumbent firm
and diminishes the entrant's capacity to meet demand in her home market. The
latter two effects may create a profitable reciprocal entry opportunity into the
entrant's home market. The net effect may be that allowing entry raises profits.
The chapter is organised as follows. The following section reviews the
discussion of potential entrants and contestability. The next section gives an
illustration: the airline industry. The subsequent section introduces a model that
captures essential elements of the current debate on contestability. It is followed
by an appraisal. The final section concludes the argument.
7.2 CREDIBLE ENTRY THREATS
Chapter 3 gave an extensive review of the ease-of-entry approach (Andrews and
others). This approach argues that established-firm entry is sufficiently fast and
large-scale to capture the incumbent's market if the latter gives occasion by
setting a high price. To deter entry, the incumbent firm quotes a 'normal costing
price' that provides for normal profits (in an accounting sense) or zero profits (in
an economic sense). Formally, this proposition has been explored by and come to
be identified with the theory of perfectly contestable markets. Contestable market
theory is based upon a condition of free entry and costless exit (Baumol e/ a/.,
1982, p. 349). That is, there are no entry setup costs. Moreover, entry lags are
short. Any positive profit of incumbent firms attracts full-scale hit-and-run entry
before the incumbent can reply. As a consequence, price-cutting entrants snatch
away even temporary profit opportunities. Shepherd (1984) and Cairns and
Mahabir (1988) inquire into the source of a credible hit-and-run entry threat. If
potential entrants are new firms, they need time and sunk entry costs to build up
capacity. Presumably then, potential hit-and-run entrants are existing firms
transferring goods to, rather than investing in, the entry market (Shepherd, 1984,
p. 584). For example, import competition constitutes a major threat against
market shares of dominant firms (Scherer, 1980, pp. 241 and 249-250).
Cairns and Mahabir (1988) question the entry motive of an existing firm
(denoted by 'she' for convenience). Suppose she really devotes resources to
hit-and-run entry. By shipping goods to an entry market, she withdraws these
goods from her home market if she faces binding capacity constraints. This
induces excess demand in her home market, which in turn invites further entry by
entrants from other markets, provided any entry barriers are surmountable. These
entrants capture consumers deserted by the initial entrant. When she returns from
her hit-and-run activity, she may discover that she no longer has a home market
(Cairns and Mahabir, 1988, p. 271). Thus entry has an opportunity cost,
consisting of home market profits foregone, the size of which depends on theReciprocal Entry Threats 141
entrant's capacity constraint. An anticipative firm with a binding capacity
constraint will not give in to temporary entry opportunities.
This argument points to excess capacity as a source of credible entry threats.
If firms have excess capacity, they can hit-and-run while continuing to serve their
home market. Costly excess capacities are not sustainable in a contestable market,
however (Cairns and Mahabir, 1988, p. 271). If excess capacity involves a cost,
a lower-cost firm with capacity just right will prey upon a high-cost firm with
excess capacity. In similar vein as Penrose (1959), Cairns and Mahabir (1988, p.
273) point to sustainable sources of overcapacity. For example, excess capacity
may be due to indivisible equipment, in which case it does not impose avoidable
costs on the firm. This suggests that the presence in nearby markets of incumbent
firms with sustainable excess capacity is a necessary condition for hit-and-run
entry. I will substantiate this in a multi-market framework.
7.3 AN EXAMPLE: THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
In Baumol er a/. (1982) the airline industry is the darling example of a contestable
market:
because airline equipment (virtually "capital on wings") is so very freely
mobile, entry into the market can be fully reversible. In principle, faced with
a profitable opportunity in such a market, an entrant need merely fly his
airplane into the airport, undercut the incumbent's price, and fly the route
profitably. Then, should the incumbent respond with a sufficient price
reduction, the entrepreneur need only fly his airplane away to take advantage
of some other lucrative option -even if he only returns his rented aircraft or
resells it in the well-functioning secondary aircraft market. Thus, it is highly
plausible that air travel provides real examples of contestable markets.'
(Baumol er a/., 1982, p. 7).
The authors add that empirical work lends support to this view. The basic
argument is that
if«34,h'-tskws .wM Vi^jirO It» » fcwuusS -ij wtsfut.jp-! adJ îuods snmw
'In an industry whose firms use only capital on wheels (or wings), some or all
of that capital may be fixed, but it is not sunk.' (op. c/r., p. 292)
Airplanes and locomotives are mobile between routes, which implies that hit-and-
run entry is possible from one market (that is, route) to another. Because of this,
these assets represent fixed but not sunk costs.
The argument pertains to the deregulated U.S. airline industry. The airlines
responded to deregulation by developing hub-and-spoke networks. They replaced
direct long-haul routes by routes to the airline's hub and from there to the final
destination (perhaps through other hubs). Economies to scale can be realised by
transporting passengers with different ultimate destinations in the same plane
(Berry, 1992). These networks also, however, led to airport dominance: each
airline tries to dominate the airport that is its hub. Market power was further
developed by frequent-flyer programs (FFP). Travellers are promised a discount142 Chapter 7
or gift if they have flown a number of miles with the airline. This is especially
attractive for business travellers with a large mileage. In order not to forfeit their
FFP gift, frequent flyers are tempted to make their journeys with the same
airline. Travellers who are interested in an FFP, may prefer the airline whose hub
is at the nearest airport: it has most routes to offer for the traveller (Borenstein,
1991).
Most empirical research follows contestability in defining each city-pair route
as a relevant market. Berry (1992; p. 906) has a sample of entry events into 1219
U.S. city-pair routes. He records 4 cases of entry into a city-pair route by an
airline that did not yet serve any of the two cities; 45 cases of entry by an airline
that already flew on one city, and 232 cases where the entrant already flew on
both cities (but did not yet serve the route between them). This supports the
realism of the point of view in Baumol er a/. (1982) that the hit-and-run entrants
are established airlines in related (tangent) markets (city-pair routes). Consistent
with contestability, after deregulation, the announcement of a merger that will
raise concentration does not raise the returns to shareholders of bidding and
targeted airlines (Slovin, Sushka and Hudson, 1991). Before deregulation, a
merger would create excess returns to shareholders, which is consistent with the
view that concentration did raise prices. The results of some other tests are
inconsistent with contestability, however. Airport dominance (measured as overall
market share of flights from the hub) raises the airline's market share on any
route originating at its hub. Price differences with other airlines weaken but do
not destroy this effect (Borenstein, 1991). Hurdle, Johnson, Joskow, Werden and
Williams (1989) show that measures of concentration and the number of potential
entrants have a significant influence on fares, which is inconsistent with perfect
contestability.'
More recent events further lend support to the argument that the airline
industry is not contestable. Many airlines and the industry as a whole suffer
losses. Industry spokesmen even claim that the airline industry made a cumulative
loss over its entire history since the Wright brothers. Losses are inconsistent with
perfect contestability, where a firm exits the market as soon as price no longer
covers average costs. If deregulated airlines do not exhibit contestability, what is
wrong about the argument in Baumol « a/. (1982)? Most explanations are that
airlines grafted forms of market power (by hub-and-spoke networks, computer
reservation systems and FFPs) on a market structure which is otherwise
contestable. This argument is useful, but computer reservation systems and the
like are not the most immediate explanations of huge worldwide losses. Instead,
overcapacity is mentioned in the press. Following through this argument, I would
rather like to challenge the basic assumption that aircraft represent costs that are
fixed but not sunk. The "capital on wings" argument mistakes mobility for
fungibility. Airplanes are mobile between routes, but they have no alternative use
outside the airline industry (they are not fungible). Consider what happens if
g/oW demand for airline transportation falls. Firms will be unable to move
airplanes outside the industry and overcapacity will occur. Prices fall; they may
2. See Shepherd (1984) and Gilbert (1989, p. 121-123) for surveys which indicate
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still cover variable costs but not fixed costs. Firms may earn positive gross profits
but negative net profits (net of fixed costs). The fixed costs, that is, are sunk.
Note that neither a secondary aircraft market nor a rental market are of help here.
If demand declines globally, demand for secondary aircraft is likely to fall as
well. Moreover, who will run a rental market if airlines collectively return their
rented aircraft?!' The next section introduces a model with 'capital on wings' that
will appear to be sunk (and thus immobile) nevertheless. It explores a duopoly's
use of capital that is mobile between two product markets (where some transport
costs are allowed), but that has no alternative use outside the two markets. .q
7.4 HIT-AND-RUN ENTRY BETWEEN TWO MARKETS
The contestability model assumes that firms control prices only. This is a critical
and controversial assumption/ The problem is that a profit maximising rationing
rule instead chooses guan/fr/ej (scales of entry) such that marginal revenue minus
marginal cost is equated across markets (Clemens, 1951). Models where firms
control quantities do exist (see subsection 5.4.1 and the next chapter). In these
two-stage games firms first choose total capacity and subsequently choose output
levels for each market. Prices are determined in the product market, rather than
being quoted by the firms. A fully specified model would have firms choose
output (or capacity) levels as well as prices.' This chapter goes halfway by
analysing a model where (i) firms select quantities a/u/ prices in home and entry
markets for (ii) different levels of productive ca/rac/ry. The model focuses on two
dimensions: excess capacity and ease of entry (indicated by entry costs) of the
existing firm entrant. The amount of excess capacity required is a telling indicator
of the realism of the (multi-market interpretation of the) contestable market
theory.
duopo/y. A and B are two identical (country) markets of the same
tradeable consumer good. There are two firms. Firm 1 is the incumbent firm in
market A and likewise firm 2 in market B. Both have constant and identical unit
3. Baumol er a/. (1982, p. 281) note that a rental market does not eliminate the
commitment [or sunk cost] of the aircraft's user, but rather shifts the commitment
to the supplier in the rental market.
4. But this is also a time-honoured assumption. Consider Andrews (1949, p. 174):
'At that normal costing price, the business man will be prepared to supply
whatever his market will take, ignoring any extra-ordinary rise in his costs, so far
as his equipment and labour-force will let him.' Perry (1984) shows that if a
monopolist controls price and quantity simultaneously, in a setting otherwise
identical to a perfectly contestable market, he may choose a price-quantity
schedule such that he deters entry while earning positive profits.
5. Venables (1990a) explores several multi-market models. One comes close to
the one in this chapter by using Bertrand competition. However, it explores
differentiated products, since this allows demand to be continuous in the firm's
own price. The case of homogenous products seems, as yet, not to have been
explored.144 Chapter 7
production costs C (£ 0) and unit transport or entry costs E (> 0). The markets
will be pei/ecz/y conrewaZite if entry cost is zero and price equals average
production cost (E = 0 and p = C), and //npe^cc/Zy conter/aA/e, if the entry cost
is positive (but can be arbitrarily small) and price is set to deter entry (E > 0 and
p = C+E).' In each market the demand function D(p) is downward sloping in the
price, p, and bounded between 0, for p £ R, and D(0) < », for p = 0. The
profit functions (p-C)D(p) and (p-C-E)D(p) are single-peaked: that is, there is a
unique p™ which maximises net revenue, and for p < p™ net revenue increases in
p. This entails that (p-C)D'(p)+D(p) is downward sloping: that is,
(p-C)D"(p)+2D'(p) < 0 (similar for unit costs C+E). Primes (' and ") refer to
(first-order and second-order) derivatives. Linear (D" = 0) and concave demand
(D" < 0) are sufficient conditions. To give each firm an incentive to consider
prices in excess of C+E, I assume that C+E falls short of the monopoly price,
p™, which maximises the profit (p-C)D(p): E < p™-C. Capacities of both firms are
equal to K. For the sake of convenience, I assume that K > D'(C+E) (i = A,B):
that is, capacity restrictions are non-tond/ng if only one market is served against
the entrant's unit cost. To keep notation tractable, I use lower and upper case
letters to refer to markets A and B, respectively. Call x and X firm l's supply in
markets A and B, and, likewise, y and Y for firm 2. Prices are pi in market A
and Pj in market B (i = 1,2). Figure 7.1 summarises the crucial symbols.
The game evolves in three
subgames. The firms decide
on home market prices, p,
and P, (subgame 1), entry
market prices P, and p,
(subgame 2), and quantities
x, X, y, and Y (subgame 3).
In subgame 3 the firms
allocate their capacity to the
two markets and consumers
decide which firm to buy
from.^ Payoffs (profits)
accrue as a result. The
Figure 7.1
Two-market Model






marAretf assumption implies that in each
subgame the firms decide simultaneously (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer,
1985a, pp. 489-490). The markets are .regtfie/w«/: that is, prices may differ
6. The price p = C may be considered identical to the full cost price, if 'C
includes the cost of capital and the reward for the entrepreneur. The price p =
C+E may be equated with Andrews' 'normal costing price', which does allow
for a positive profit (if E > 0) as it expresses a 'regard for the market', i.e., the
salience of the entry threat if the firm raises its price (Robinson, 1950, p. 776).
7. One can think of two chain stores, which publish their new week's prices on
Saturday, and which stock their shops on monday morning. Consumers buy from
the incumbent store unless the entrant's store is lower-priced. The model assumes
centralised pricing: that is, the chain store, rather than local managers, sets prices
in both markets. This is one area where chain stores have different strategies.Reciprocal Entry Threats 145
between markets as there is no arbitrage trade (Brander and Krugman, 1983, p.
314; see subsection 5.3.6). Following the theory of contestable markets, in each
market the incumbent decides first. Hit-and-run entry occurs if an entrant
undercuts the incumbent's price (subgame 2) and captures his sales (subgame 3).
In an (im)perfectly contestable market hit-and-run does not actually occur. It
rather is a response to unsustainable pricing (out-of-equilibrium behaviour) by the
incumbent firm. A perfect equilibrium is the natural device for enquiring whether
the threat is effectuated when called for. .,*._,_, ^.... _ „
ra/jo/wng. Given the prices in a market, consumers buy from the lowest-
priced supplier up to his/her capacity. If any residual demand arises, they turn to
the other supplier. The literature has developed several «femand raz/ofting
5c/iewiey. I adopt the one in Levitan and Shubik (1972), which is, admittedly, the
easiest to use.* In this scheme, if the lowest-priced supplier i sells q, units,
residual demand for the highest-priced supplier j with price pj is D(pj)-q;. I use the
tie-breaking rule that if two firms quote the same price, all consumers turn to the
incumbent firm. Prédation therefore requires that the entrant strictly underprices
the incumbent firm. This resembles the Bertrand assumption in contestability
theory. The firm, for instance firm 1, anticipates individual demand levels d'(.)
(i = A,B) by the rule that
fD*(p,)ifp, < ft, and , - .... _ .
(7.1) d*(p,) = •{ -t-0 «j Î-K'ï < ,o -n/w<w
I max{D*(p,)-y,0} ifp, > ft, -
where y is firm 2's sales level in market A. i 'jesi/T «, £&,• jui'i ..&
Supply rariomng. The firms may meet more demand in both markets than they
can satisfy, given their capacity constraints (K). I use the following ^wpp/y
rario/H/ig rw/e. The firm will fully serve demand in its most profitable market. It
will then operate its residual capacity to supply the other market. The most
profitable market to firm 1 is its home market A if p,-C > P,-E-C. In the case of
a tie (if p,-C = P,-C-E) it prefers to sell in its home market. Thus the profit-
maximising supply schedule for, say, firm 1 is w ,/i '-••;'•, - <
f min{K,,d*(p,)} ifp, > P,-E, and ;i .; : -, j •--. </ • -;•*t*
(7.2) x = •{ u« •••* .HZS.' •viâ»-«8..-.E!^ . f • ->-l ,;s!w:
I min{K,-X,d*(p,)} if Pi < PpE, '•* .';-*- « ,.;tvi--.,'i .? u. O '
and similar for X in market B. Moreover, x = 0 if p, < C, and X = 0 if P, S
C+E. Thus the firm serves his most profitable market first, respects his capacity
8. This rule is also used by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and Gelman and Salop
(1983). Dixon (1987, p. 289) offers a number of rationales for this rationing rule,
including the unique connection between the Levitan and Shubik rationing rule
and the Cournot model. Davidson and Deneckere (1986) present a comparison
with another often employed scheme. .«ri^oui!146 Chapter 7
constraint (x+X £ K,), and avoids producing unsold goods (x < d*(p,)).
An equilibrium outcome of the game is (p,,P2,Pi,pj,x,X,y,Y). The question to be
answered is whether the entry-deterring prices in settings with perfect
contestability (C) and imperfect contestability (C+E) constitute equilibria in this
two-market game. An (im)perfectly contestable market equilibrium is associated
with p, = P, = C+E (where E may be zero), while the entrant's prices are not
below the incumbent's (P, > P,: that is, P, = P2+A2 with A, > 0). This gives
Dc/?m//0/i 7.7. A contestable market equilibrium is defined as
(C+E.C+E.C+E+AJ.C+E+AJ, D(C+E),0,0,D(C+E)) (A; £ 0, i = 1, 2).
5S'>V' «a-'». Jvsv...... iïsijo^-.'^v-,
I will identify values of E and K where neither firm will unilaterally defect from
this contestability equilibrium. If both firms quote a price equal to C+E in the
first stage, they will not underbid each other in the entry market game, since
doing so would entail a loss. In the third subgame each firm therefore faces home
market demand D(C+E). Thus any defection from the proposed equilibrium must
occur in the first subgame.'
Firm l's profits are as follows. In the proposed equilibrium, each firm's
profit margin equals E, with profits of ED(C+E). If firm 1 unilaterally defects in
the first stage by quoting a p, > C+E, firm 2 may prey upon firm 1 in the
second stage. Firm 2's supply in market A depends on relative profitability: that
is, upon whether p, > P,+E (= C+2E) or p? < P2+E. If, on the one hand, (ft
<) p, < P2+E = C+2E, firm 2 will serve her home market first and use her
excess capacity (K-D(C+E)), which is positive by assumption, for entry into
market A. This may be called /jama/ en/ry: firm 1 loses part of his home market
sales. Firm 2's profits are ED(C + E) + (p2-C-E)(K-D(C + E)), where firm 2 just
underbids firm 1 (p, = p,-e with E arbitrarily close to zero). This payoff exceeds
his profit for the strategy where firm 2 does not prey upon firm 1 (= ED(C + E)).
Firm 1 satisfies residual demand in his home market demand,
(D(p,)-(K-D(C+E)), with a profit equal to (p,-C)(D(p,) + D(C+E)-K).
Anticipating this in the first stage, firm 1 sets a price p, that maximises his profit,
subject to the constraints that C+E < p, < Pj+E (= C+2E). If, on the other
hand, p, (> p?) > Pj+E, firm 2 will first enter market A, serve all demand
D(pj), and satisfy her home market B by deploying her excess capacity (K-D(p2)),
where p, = Pi-e. This may be called ro/a/ en/ry: firm 1 loses all home market
sales. Firm 1 will satisfy residual demand in his entry market B. His profit equals
(P,-C-E)(D(P|) + D(p|-e)-K), which is maximised by an appropriate choice of pi
in the first and P, in the second stage. Obviously, firm 1 is interested in keeping
p, as low as possible in order to induce firm 2 to deploy as much of her capacity
as possible in market A. Thus p, = PJ + E+E = C+2E+E. This implies a profit
of (P,-C-E)(D(P,) + D(C+2E)-K), which firm 1 maximises by an appropriate
choice of P,. Firm l's profits rc' then equal
9. Subgame perfection implies that if firm 1 unilaterally defects in the first
subgame, firm 2 defects from the proposed equilibrium in the second and third
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f A) ED(C+E) if p, = C+E [entry deterrence],
(7.3) 7t' = •{ B) maXp,(p,-C)(D(p,)+D(C+E)-K) if C+E < p, ^ C+2E [partial
I entry],
I C) maxp,(P,-C-E)(D(P,)+D(C+2E)-K) if p, = C+2E+E [total
I entry].
This induces a proposition.
(7./J. If entry costs are zero (E = 0), the proposed perfectly
contestable market equilibrium (p, = P, = C) holds if, and only if, each
firm's capacity exceeds demand in £or/i markets: that is, K > 2D(C). (7.«7 If
entry costs are positive (E > 0), the proposed imperfectly contestable
equilibrium (p, = P2 = C+E) holds if, and only if, 'sufficient' excess
capacity exists.
Proo/. (7.i) The first option (7.3A) entails zero profits with sales of D(C). The
second option (7.3B) refers to an empty set (C < p, < C). The third option
(7.3C) entails positive profit and sales if, and only if, K < 2D(C). Thus, if K £
2D(C), the first option has zero profits and is the only one with positive sales. If
K < 2D(C), the third option is the only one with strictly positive profits. G.E.D.
Proof. (7.ii) The profit levels in Equation (7.3) are functions of E and K. Call
these functions Gj(E,K), with i = 1,2,3: for example, G,(E,K) = ED(C+E).
Firms defect from the contestable market outcome if at least one / (= 2,3) exists
such that G;(E,K) > G,(E,K). The SKMJ//Jfl*i7/ry yronrier, S{(E,K)}, contains the
(E.K)-values where each firm is just indifferent between obeying and defecting
from the contestable market outcome: S{(E,K)} = {(E,K) I 3 i G|(E,K) =
G,(E,K) and Vj (* i) G,(E,K) < G,(E,K), i,j = 2,3}. The frontier falls between
the curves K = D(C + E) and K = 2D(C + E). If K = D(C + E), then G,(E,K) <
G2(E,K), provided that the profit function (p-C)D(p) is single-peaked at p™. That
is, since C+E < p, < C+2E, it follows that G,(E,K) = ED(C+E) <
(p,-C)D(p,) < GjfE.K). Thus firm 1 defects from the proposed equilibrium: the
curve determined by K = D(C + E) is inward of the sustainability frontier. If K
= 2D(C+E), then 0 = G|(E,K) < G,(E,K) for E > 0 and 0 = G|(E,K) =
G,(E,K) with E = 0 for i = 2,3. Thus this curve is outward of the sustainability
frontier. Q.E.D.
3'.: ii • ,*WV;1:.. „,.• .-U.--:. . ..- • ;•• --S»,rti«
So, 'sufficient' excess capacity is required to sustain an imperfectly contestable
market equilibrium. The intuition can be clarified by choosing a specific
functional form of demand. Figure 7.2 illustrates the result for an example with
linear demand: D(p) = R-bp, where R,b > 0 (Appendix 7.A).
For the sake of convenience, call a:= R-bC and e:= bE. In the (K,e)-space,
the assumptions delineate an a/mùr/fr/e reg/0/1 (contained by points BEDFG)
enclosed by the lines E = p"-C (where e = >Aa) and K = D(C+E) (where K =
a-e). The curve BCAD is the sustainability frontier. On the line BF holds: K =148 Chapter 7
2D(C+E) (= 2(a-e)). In
areas 1 and 2 the contestable
market equilibrium is
reached.
In area 3 firms defect
from this proposed
equilibrium notwithstanding
excess capacity (D(C+E) <
K). Along the curve BC in
area 3, firm 1 defects by
inducing total entry by firm
2, and along CA and AD
firm 1 induces partial entry
by firm 2. The non-emptiness
of area 2 in this example
illustrates an interesting
point. In contestable market
theory the entry threat is
driven by the potential
entrant's ability to completely
duplicate the incumbent firm
(total entry). This suggests an
excess capacity for each
entrant equal to demand in
the incumbent's market
evaluated at the unit cost C+E: that is, K > 2D(C+E). Area 2 shows that if
excess capacity is below this level, the entrant may still induce the incumbent to
deter entry by a unit entry cost price (= C + E). Furthermore, the figure shows
that for given capacity an increase in unit entry cost may bring the firms from
area 3 to area 1 or 2: that is, an moms? in unit entry cost may facilitate entry
deterrence with unit cost prices (= C+E).
The proposition does not establish which prices firms will quote in area 3.
While being short of conclusive proof, I suggest that firms resort to a mixed
equilibrium. I first need a ... ,,..^^ . .=,... ., .^ ._.-,. ,, .--;••? r<>
. In area 3, a symmetric pure equilibrium does not exist. If a pure
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/ (see Appendix 7.B).
In a symmetric game each asymmetric equilibrium has its mirror image: that
is, there are pairs of these equilibria. If an equilibrium offers payoffs (V,W) to
firms 1 and 2, its mirror image equilibrium offers payoffs (W,V): that is, the
roles of both firms are simply changed. If V > W, it is impossible for both firms
to prefer the same equilibrium: firm 1 prefers the former and firm 2 the latter
equilibrium. This rules out the possibility that the firms have a compelling reason
to coordinate on a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. The outcome of the noncooperative
game is thus random. This is in striking contrast to the (im)perfectly contestableReciprocal Entry Threats 149
market outcome. Whether the randomised outcome is a (mixed) equilibrium is
another matter. A folk theorem among game theorists suggests that the number of
equilibria is uneven: that is, if there are two pure asymmetric equilibria, there
must be a third mixed equilibrium. I cannot, regrettably, prove this conjecture.'"
*s tr.'.î .?r..r. nr;n c=r;.-iu«- sr.- c-urni -i;--r
7.5 APPRAISAL ,,-•-; p--^ -..; -,-,-. .,? Cis u, m; .... .
What drives these results is that the firms' entry decisions in a multi-market
context are interdependent by an endogenous opporfM/i/ry cow (Calem, 1988, p.
172). Entry causes a loss of home market sales due to the reduction of home
market capacity (a direct effect) and the triggering of reciprocal entry (an indirect
effect). The indirect effect implies an endogenous opportunity cost of entry as it
makes firm l's opportunity cost of entry dependent upon firm 2's reciprocal entry
decision. For instance, firm l's scale of entry into market B, X, has two effects
upon his home market profits. Firstly, there is the <#recr o/jpo/tuni'ry cow that the
entry sales, X, reduce the residual capacity left to serve home market demand,
K,-X. The direct opportunity cost is the loss of profits, (p,-C)(d*(p,)-x) if sales x
fall short of demand d*(p,), provided that without entry firm 1 would have been
able to serve all forthcoming demand. Secondly, there is the /nd/recf oppo/Tum'O'
cow. The entry level, X, reduces firm 2's residual home market demand, d"(Pj),
and sales, Y, which raises firm 2's residual capacity, Kj-Y, to serve her entry
market A. This in turn raises firm 2's scale of reciprocal entry, y, which reduces
firm l's home market demand d*(p,)."
This chapter assumes symmetric ease of entry: that is, reciprocal entry. Real
world cases often show one-sided entry, however. For instance, entrants may
have protected home markets, as illustrated by Japanese firms. Indeed, models on
the multinational enterprise often assume that the multinational has a secure home
market (for example, Horstmann and Markusen, 1989). In the U.S., incursions
by protected entrants have induced pressures towards a strategic trade policy
which issues a demand for reciprocal access to the entrant's home market, while
threatening with protectionism otherwise (Yoffie and Milner, 1989, p. 113). In
terms of this model, contestable market outcomes pertain if the entrant (say, firm
2) has sufficient capacity to serve both her own protected home market B at the
profit-maximising price P™ as we// as the entry market A for a price equal to or
above the unit cost (C+E). Anticipating this, the incumbent in market A quotes
10. I do not apply Dasgupta and Maskin's (1986) existence proofs of mixed
equilibria for I read their theorems as applying to open-loop Nash equilibria
rather than closed-loop perfect equilibria.
11. This confirms Kaldor's (1935, p. 48) visionary statement on excess capacity-
induced entry by existing firms: 'Let us suppose that one of them finds it
profitable to produce another commodity, highly competitive with the products of
some other producers. These latter producers will now find the demand for their
products reduced; and //?« may make it profitable for them to engage in the
production of a second, or even a third, commodity -even if it was not profitable
before.' Kaldor (1935, pp. 48-49) observes that (in my terms) an endogenous
opportunity cost drives this process.150 Chapter 7
the entry-deterring price (= C+E). This results holds if D(C+E)+D(P") S K.
The contestable market outcome pertains, but only for the entry market A. Thus
contestability does not arise as a general (benchmark) case for fow/i markets.
7.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter supports in a formal context Cairns and Mahabir's (1988) critique on
contestability. (Im)perfect contestability requires sufficient excess capacity.
Otherwise, the possibility of hit-and-run entry does not force the incumbent to
quote a sustainable (zero entry profit) price. In the (plausible) case that
established firms do have excess capacity, but insufficiently to (almost totally)
replace one another, the claims by Andrews and by contestability theory that
entry-deterring (zero-profit) prices result, are rejected. It also rejects the
presumption that a (plausible) entry threat from established firms leads to the hit-
and-run result that the entrant replaces the incumbent firm. Rather than /ore/ enwy
where one entrant replaces the incumbent firm entirely, there is parr/a/ en/ry
where one entrant replaces only one product in the product line offered by an
incumbent firm.
Future research in this area can deal with several technical issues such as
different consumer rationing schemes, endogenous capacity choice, and fixed
rather than variable entry costs. Furthermore, it may be of interest to tie in other
aspects of multi-market competition. For instance, a positive multi-market
spillover can induce a firm to enter another market (Bulow er a/., 1985a). If firms
meet in several markets, they may try to extend collusion from one market to all
markets where they meet (Pinto, 1986; and Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).
Multi-market contact may increase the incidence of tacit collusion by facilitating
implicit transfer of signals through price cutting, output reduction and the like.
Future research may, for example, identify the capacity level necessary to prevent
multi-market collusion. «m«ii'f>u»u'ni a**-
... .
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APPENDICES
Appendix 7.A. Proposition (7.ii) illustrated for linear demand
Equation (7.3) implies that each firm compares the contestable market equilibrium
payoff ED(C+E) with prices (p,) equal to C+E to the defection payoffs
max,,,(p,-C)(D(p,) + D(C + E)-K) if C + E < p, £ C+2E and
maxp,(P,-C-E)(D(P,) + D(C+2E)-K) if p, = C+2E+E (e > 0). I will solve
these constrained maximisation programs, called program I and II respectively,
and then specialise by assuming a linear demand function, D(p) = R-bP (b > 0).
Assume that E > 0 (the proposition (7.i) gives the results when E = 0).
fw^rawi /. max,, (p,-C)(D(p,)+D(C+E)-K) if C + E < p, < C+2E [Equation
(7.3B)]. — - . v - . .
. '"i -= y lsril vifjfni nsrtl ^Intsitenôa ariT .«MnhMljKsG
Rewrite this problem into maXp (p-C)(D(p)+D(C+E)-K) subject to (i) p-(C+E) £
0, (ii) C+2E-p > 0 and (iii) D(p) + D(C + E)-K > 0. For the sake of convenience,
the strong inequality restriction p > C + E is transformed into the weak inequality
constraint p > C + E, which does not affect the results. The Lagrange function is
= (p-C)(D(p) + D(C + E)-K) + X,(p-C-E) + Xj(C+2E-p)
O <r 3
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are, given that the objective and the constraints are
concave functions (Beavis and Dobbs, 1990, p. 54),
):W .H-^O => (i c 0 < ^
(7.A2) dL/dp = (p-C)D'(p) + D(p)+D(C + E)-K+X,-Xj+XjD'(p) = 0,
p-C-E > 0,
C+2E-p > 0, '--•'?
D(p)+D(C+E)-K >0, .'i •••• <fe -
X, (p-C-E) =0, •-.*,: •aaî.-vtiOô
X,(C+2E-p) = 0,
^a(D(p)+D(C+E)-K) = 0, and 0 •- ,.< b,,i 0 < ^ ,0
X^ ^ 0 (i = 1,2,3). >i^.<»-< ,-t-:-il...-V .-as:*'*u«••«•<=: ;J <-^
Case 1: X, > 0, *2 > 0 and A, = 0. '"" '
A, > 0 => p-C-E = 0 and X2 > 0 =^> C+2E-p = 0, which gives a contradiction if
E > 0. _ J. ,'- - -1/^ --•:- -• - ,-,-. '- -i - - J. : . .
• -, Î,:.- ; - -i.i •?. . . ,.. K- ... «... I., !, ^
Case 2: X, > 0, X, = 0 and X, = 0. " J
>.,>0=>p = C+Eo7t = E(2D(C+E)-K). Moreover, 5L/ôp *
ED'(C+E)+2D(C + E)-K + X, = 0 => X, = K-2D(C + E)-ED'(C + E) > 0 => K >
2D(C+E)+ED'(C+E). Call this area /I in (E.K)-space. With linear demand,
D(p) = R-bp, the frontier equals K = 2D(C+E) + ED'(C + E) = 2(R-bC-bE)-bE
= 2(R-bC)-3bE = 2a-3e, where a: = R-bC and e: = bE. Hence, area /I equals
{e,K; K > 2a-3e}. ....... ... .„,,.,. .. - ., . ,. ...... ,..-^152 Chapter 7
Case 3: X, = 0, X, > 0 and Xj = 0. ,f D?C
Xj > 0 => p = C+2E => 7t = 2E(D(C+2E)+D(C+E)-K). Moreover,
ôL/ôp = 2ED'(C+2E)+D(C+2E)+D(C+E)-K-Xj = 0 => .^ ,,,
Xj = 2ED'(C+2E)+D(C+2E) + D(C+E)-K > 0 => ' I
K < 2ED'(C+2E) + D(C+2E)+D(C+E).
Call this area C in (E.K)-space. With linear demand this amounts to the frontier
K = 2(R-bC)-5bE = 2a-5e, which defines Cas the set {e,K; K £ 2a-5e}.
Case 4: X, = 0, X, = 0 and X, = 0.
X, = 0 => p 2 C+E, X, = 0 => C+2E > p and 5L/5p =
(p-C)D'(p)+D(p)+D(C+E)-K = 0, from which price and payoff follow. Note
that an internal solution must exist within the constraints. That is, dL/dp(C+E)
> 0 = 3L/5p(p) > 5L/dp(C+2E), knowing that 3L/<3p(p) is a downward-sloping
curve: d*L/ôp* = (p-C)D"(p)+2D'(p) < 0, by the assumption of single-
peakedness. The constraints then imply that
ED'(C+E)+2D(C+E)-K > 0 > 2ED'(C+2E) + D(C+2E)+D(C+E)-K, or
2ED'(C+2E)+D(C+2E) + D(C+E) < K < ED'(C+E)+2D(C + E). '
Call this area fl in (E.K)-space. With linear demand B is defined as {e,K; 2a-5e
< K < 2a-3e}.
Case 5: X, > 0, X^ > 0 and X, > 0.
X, > 0 => p-C-E = 0 and Xj > 0 => C+2E-p = 0, which gives a contradiction if
E > 0. ^ ^:-»v-e' : ';-^Eî •IV
Case 6: X, > 0, Xj = 0 and X3 > 0.
X, > 0 => p = C+E. With Xj > 0 this means that 2D(C+E)-K = 0 => 7t = 0.
Moreover,
ôL/ôp = ED'(C+E)+2D(C+E)-K+X, + XjD'(C+E) = 0 =>
ED'(C + E) + X, + XjD'(C + E) = 0 => (E+Xj)D'(C + E) + X, = 0.
Noting that X, > 0 and D'(C+E) < 0 this means that X, = -(E+Xj)D'(C+E)
> 0, which is consistent.
Case 7: X, = 0, Xj > 0 and Xj > 0. "- •'• ^ * • "*-^
Xj > 0 => p = C+2E. With X, > 0 this means that D(C+2E)+D(C+E)-K = 0.
Moreover,
dL/dp = 2ED'(C+2E)+D(C+2E) + D(C + E)-K+X2+XjD'(C+2E) = 0 =>
Xj = (Xj+2E)D'(C+2E).
With E > 0, Xj > 0 and D'(C+2E) < 0 this gives Xj < 0, a contradiction.
Case 8: X, = 0, Xj = 0 and Xj > 0. „, - ^ „„,.,,, ~ ^ ,u -- ^ .i ^
Xj > 0 •• D(p)+D(C + E)-K = 0. •" - "•
X, = 0 => p à C + E, Xj = 0 => C+2E > p and ôL/^p =
(p-C)D'(p)+D(p)+D(C+E)-K +XjD'(p) = 0 => X, = -(p-C). With p > C+E,
and so p > C, this means Xj < 0, which gives a contradiction.
",;-i-.- K uns ,•.. :-.T.}H .3ff •-;s tXtK IX'-H «:fi ->1*!iw ,»ï-sS •=••• 3<S€-('W-«)£ »Reciprocal Entry Threats MS
//. maxp, (P,-C-E)(D(P,)+D(C+2E)-K) if p, > C+2E [Equation
(7.3C)].
Rewrite the program into max, (p-C-E)(D(p)+D(C+2E)-K) subject to (i) p-C-E £
0 and (ii) D(p)+D(C+2E)-K > 0. The Lagrange is
(7.A3) L(p,X,,X,) =
(p-C-E)(D(p)+D(C+2E)-K) + X,(p-C-E) + X^(D(p)+D(C+2E)-K),
with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions that




Xî(D(p)-l-D(C+2E)-K) = 0, ands't (1 miff .raurrr î«u îôt .i.-ojsi ! ;
Xi^0(i = l,2). -.i'-jO .K «.->« ftr I ncijqo c.» IBCIS.',;
Case 1: A., = Oand X, > 0.
X, = 0 => p-C-E 2; 0 and X, > 0 => D(p) + D(C+2E)-K = 0. Moreover, <3L/ôp =
(p-C-E)D'(p)+X,D'(p) = 0 => X, = -(p-C-E) < 0, which gives a contradiction.
Case 2: X, > 0 and X, = 0.
X, > 0 => p = C+E and X, = 0 => D(C+E)+D(C+2E)-K > 0. Moreover, dL/dp
= D(C+E)+D(C+2E)-K + X, = 0 => 0 < X, = K-D(C + E)-D(C+2E), which is
a contradiction.
we;'. »
Case 3: X, > 0 and X, > 0.
X, > 0 => p = C + E and Xj > 0 => D(C+E)+D(C+2E)-K = 0 => K =
D(C + E)+D(C+2E) => 7i = 0. Moreover, dL/ôp = X,+X^D'(p) = 0. So, X../X,
= -D'(C+E) > 0, which is consistent.
Case 4: X, = 0 and X, = 0.
X, = 0=>p>C + EandX2 =0=> D(p)+D(C+2E)-K > 0. Moreover, ôL/ôp =
(p-C-E)D'(p)+D(p) + D(C+2E)-K = 0. The associated payoff is the interior
maximum. By assumption (p-C-E)D'(p)+D(p), and therefore 3L/<5p, is downward
sloping. At p = C + E it must hold that 0 < dL/dp. Therefore, 0 <
D(C+E) + D(C+2E)-K: that is, K < D(C + E) + D(C+2E). With linear demand
the frontier is K = 2(R-bC)-3bE = 2a-3e, which gives area D equal to {e,K; K
< 2a-3e}. This includes both areas fl and C of program I.
To sum up, the payoff of program II equals zero unless K <
D(C+E)+D(C+2E), which is area D. That is, solution of program I and II
shows that in the linear demand case three areas of interest exist: areas 4, fl, and
C. Defection is profitable if, and only if, the payoff of program I and/or II
exceeds the payoff ED(C + E) (= E(R-bC-bE)) with p, = C + E. I now proceed
with the linear demand case: D(p) = R-bP. The assumption D(C+E) < K can be154 Chapter 7
rewritten as a-e < K, and the assumption E < p"-C can be reformulated as e <
Via. This defines the odmraWc region {(e,K); e < Via and a-e < K}. Noting
that E = e/b and C = (R-a)/b the following equilibrium strategies per area can
be determined. J <H.C^ i; :.H-:>-*i) ^tsm oJni mrraoii irit s!hw.
: {e,K; 2a-3e < K}.
Firm 1 (and, along similar lines, firm 2) faces three options. Option 1: p, =
C+E with profits n' = ED(C+E) = e(a-e)/b. Option 2: p, = C+E+e <
C+2E (program I above) with profits rc* = E(2D(C+E)-K) = e(2(a-e)-K)/b.
Option 3: p, > C+2E (program II above) which does not lead to positive profits.
Firm 1 then faces the question: does TT* exceed JC'? J^-TC' = e(a-e-K)/b. By
assumption a-e = D(C+E) < K: therefore, n*-n' < 0. Firm 1 will not defect
from the contestable market equilibrium.
hri .-.fa. ,ar
/Irea B: {e,K; 2a-5e < K < 2a-3e}.
Firm 1 (and, for that matter, firm 2) faces three options (as above). Option 1:
identical to option 1 in area /4. Option 2: JI* = (2(R-bC)-bE-K)*/4b =
(2a-e-K)V4b. Option 3: 7^ = (2(R-bC)-3bE-K)V4b = (2a-3e-K)V4b. Jt' > ^ as
0 < 2a-3e-K < 2a-e-K (if e > 0). Firm l's problem is to choose option 1 or 2.
Define A: = 4b(rc*-7t') = (2a-e-K)Me(a-e) = K* + K(2e-4a)+5e*-8ae+4a*. A = 0
if, and only if, K,2 = 2a-e±2Ve(a-e). Since K < 2a-3e < 2a-e <
2a-e+2Ve(a-e) = Kj, Kj falls out of range. Thus firm 1 is indifferent between
obeying to or defecting from the equilibrium if, and only if, K = K, =
2a-e-2Ve(a-e); he defects if, and only if, K < K, (within the set B). K, intersects
fl's lower bound K = 2a-5e at (0,2a) and point A = (a/5,a). K, intersects fl's
upperbound K = 2a-3e at (0,2a) and point D = (Via.Via). In the admissible
region (where e < Via) K, is downward sloping as dK,/de = -l-(a-2e)/Ve(a-e)
< 0. At point A the slope is -5/2 and at point D the slope is -1.
C: {e,K; K S 2a-5e}.
Firm 1 (and, similar, firm 2) faces the three options as above. As for profits, TI'
in area C is identical to rc' in area ^, 7t* = 2e(2a-3e-K)/b and area C's TT* is
identical to area B's rc\ Firm 1 faces two problems, (i) Call A = 7t^-rt' =
e(3a-5e-2K)/b. Firm 1 is indifferent (A = 0) if K = (3a-5e)/2. Firm 1 defects if
[but not only if, see (ii)] K < (3a-5e)/2. (ii) Call A = 4b(7^-7t') =
(2a-3e-K)Me(a-e) = K*+K(6e-4a) + 13eM6ae+4a*. A = 0 if, and only if, K,,,
= 2a-3e±2Ve(a-e). K < 2a-5e < 2a-3e < 2a-3e+2Ve(a-e) = K,: therefore, K2 is
out of range. Firm 1 is indifferent in problem (ii) if, and only if, K = K, =
2a-3e-2Ve(a-e); he defects if, and only if, K < 2a-3e-2Ve(a-e). Problems (i) and
(ii) imply that firm 1 defects if, and only if, K < max{(3a-5e)/2,2a-3e-2>/e(a-e)}.
To find the maximum of the two upper bound frontiers it is instructive to know
that K,(0) = 2a, K,(a/5) = 3a/5 and K,(a) = -a. So, dK,/de = -3-(a-2e)/Ve(a-e),
and thus dK,/de(0) = -00. If e < a/2, then dK,/de < 0: that is, the frontier is
decreasing in e. The frontier is convex as <3*K,/de^ =
{2e(a-e) + Vi(a-2e)*}/e(a-e)"* > 0. K, intersects area C's upper boundary K =
2a-5e at the points B = (0,2a) and H = (Via,-Via). K, intersects the line K =
(3a-5e)/2 at point C = (a/17,a23/17) and (a,-a). The line K = (3a-5e)/2Reciprocal Entry Threats 155
intersects Cs upper boundary line K = 2a-5e at point A = (a/5,a). ' ?*'-= -
So, the areas -4, fl and C in (e.K)-space give the critical points A = (a/5,a), B =
(0,2a), C = (a/17,a23/17), D = ('Aa,'/ia), E = (0,a), F = ('Aa.a) and G =
('Aa,2a). Points B and C are on the curve K = 2a-3e-2Ve(a-e) (where program II
is the alternative to sustainable pricing: that is, 7t' = 7^ > 7t*). Points C and A
are on the line K = (3a-5e)/2 (where program I is the alternative to sustainable
pricing: that is, 7t' = rc* > 7t*). Points A and D are on the curve K =
2a-e-2Ve(a-e) (where program I is the alternative to sustainable pricing: that is, rc'
= 7T* > 7r*). Points D, F and G are on the line e = 'Aa and points E and D are
on the line K = a-e (both lines delimit the admissible region). The results are
summarised in figure 7.2 in the text. I conclude that within the admissible region
firm 1 defects for (e,K) values in the area 3, enclosed by points BCADE. He
does not defect from the contestable market equilibrium in area 2, enclosed by
points BCADF, and area 1, enclosed by points BFG.
Appendix 7.B. Proof of the lemma
Call the symmetric pure equilibrium (p,p,r,r,q,z,z,q). Home market prices
p will exceed the 'contestable' level of C+E (firms deviate from pricing equal to
C+E only if they can do better). Distinguish two cases.
Case (7aj r < C+£ < /? a/w/ (7*J C+£ < /> < r. In both cases, neither firm
sells in her entry market: it is not profitable (case la) or price is too high (case
lb). As a result, home market sales q = D(p), entry market sales z = 0, and
profits are (p-C)D(p). This cannot be an equilibrium, for each firm will defect in
the second stage by underbidding the other firm. In both cases, firm 1 will quote
a P, in entry market B such that C + E < P, < p. He continues to be the only
(case la) or the lowest-priced (case lb) supplier in his home market A (assuming
that firm 2 does not defect). In the third subgame the firm can choose to serve the
home market first, with sales D(p) and entry sales X = min{D(P,),K-D(p)}, or to
serve the entry market first, with entry sales X = D(P,) and home market sales x
= min{D(p),K-D ( P,) } . Profits are equal to
max{(p-C)D(p) + (P,-C-E)min{D(P,),K-D(p)}, (p-C)min{D(p),K-D(P,)}
+(P,-C-E)D(P,)}. This exceeds the equilibrium profit (p-C)D(p) as K-D(p) is
strictly positive (this follows from D(p) < D(C+E) < K). Firm 1 thus defects.
Case (2^ C+E < r < /?. Each firm is lowest-priced supplier in her entry
market. First use the demand rationing rule (7.1). Since r < p, consumer first
turn to the entrant and next to the incumbent firm:
d,*(p) = max{D*(p)-y,0}; '.*-;<}. Tst ••• .,;:«*.,
d* k(vt m '«•
();
dj*(p) = max{D^(p)-X,0}. *'*V- "-P* ;:v i: >v a <<vt-peti'u>f ->isirucn«nt is 'i? first
Secondly, use the supply rationing rule (7.2). Since r-E < r < p, each firm first
serves its home market and then its entry market:
x = min{K,d,*(p)}; ?;• 10 cap-'sal-stttefl»«.-:: !tni«;-'k^
X = min{K-x,d,"(r)};
Y = min{K,dAp);
* 1156 Chapter 7
y = min{K-Y,d/(r)}.
A lengthy development gives that entry market sales are z = D(r), home market
sales are q = 0, and equilibrium profits are 7f = (r-C-E)D(r). In the case of
unilateral defection by firm 1, however, firm 1 may quote a price p, = C+E,
while firm 2 continues to quote P, = p. In the second stage, firm 2 cannot
profitably underbid firm 1, p, = C+E < p,, and firm 1 will underbid firm 2 in
his home market, C+E < P, < p. Being lowest-priced supplier in both markets,
in the third stage firm 1 may either serve his home market or his entry market
first. He realises a (defection) profit rc^ =
max{ED(C + E) + (P,-C-E)min{K-D(C + E),D(P,)},
Emin{D(C+E),K-D(P,)}+(P,-C-E)D(P,)}, subject to P, < p. Since D(P,) <
D(C+E) < K, 7i* strictly exceeds the (constrained optimal) profit level 7T=: =
maxp(P-C-E)D(P) subject to P < p. This in turn weakly exceeds the equilibrium
profit TC* = (r-C-E)D(r) for r < p: as a default, firm 1 may choose P, = r, such
that 7U° = 7T°. Thus 7t* > re* > 7t*. Firm 1 will again defect. Both cases together
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CAPACITY AS A COMMITMENT INSTRUMENT ~
IN MULTI-MARKET COMPETITION'
Chapter 8 contains a discussion on capacity investments that acknowledges
both horizontal and vertical dimensions of multi-market competition. One of
its contributions is to integrate both dimensions in a unified reaction curve
format. The argument that capacity is an instrument in entry deterrence is a
development of (or critique on) Bain's limit price theory, which assumed that
the incumbent's owpu/ level is an instrument in entry deterrence. The
chapter explores models which formally introduced into this discussion the
notion that potential entrants can be established firms in related markets. As
chapter 3 argued, this cannot be incorporated into the limit price theory. In
particular, established-firm entry undermines the incumbent's ability to deter
entry. An established firm in a related market may use its existing (excess)
capacity for (potential) entry (the 'horizontal' multi-market dimension). An
incumbent firm may deter (new firm) entry by exploiting a first-mover
advantage in an input market (the 'vertical' dimension).
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial economists have argued that firms may use capacity investments as an
instrument in entry deterrence. Dixit (1980) summarised this argument in an
enticingly simple reaction curve format. A capacity investment transforms
variable costs into sunk costs, and thus reduces marginal costs. This makes the
firm more aggressive in product market competition with an entrant, that is, the
incumbent firm's reaction curve shifts outward. With these results in mind, the
incumbent firm may over- or under-invest in capacity relative to the case where
cost minimisation is its objective. These capacity-commitment models have shown
to be a rich framework to study potential entry by different types of entrants and
different entry deterrence strategies. This chapter gives an integrated treatment of
several games that have been developed in the literature. Economists explored the
horizontal multi-market setting where firms use capacity in multiple product or
country markets (e.g., Calem, 1988). Separately, they also explored the vertical
multi-market context where firms compete in a capital good market as well as in
the product market (e.g., Salop and Scheffman, 1983). The chapter will allow an
appraisal of the usefulness of capacity investments to entry deterrence in several
competition settings.
Section 8.2 discusses why capacity can be a competition instrument in the first
place. Section 8.3 introduces the basic capacity-commitment model using a multi-
market framework. It goes without saying that for cases where capacity is the
prevailing commitment instrument, one has to turn to capital-intensive industries.
1. This chapter is based on Van Wegberg (1993).â9(î158 Chapter 8
Section 8.4 illustrates the usefulness of a multi-market framework for the U.S.
steel industry. The subsequent sections build on the basic model while exploring
different competition settings. Section 8.5 focuses on <fe now entry. Section 8.6
focuses on existing firm entrants, e.g., importers, which implies a horizontal
multi-market setting. Section 8.7 discusses cases where incumbent and entrant
compete in an input as well as in the product market, which implies a vertical
multi-market setting. A firm's investment not only affects its product market
competitiveness, but may also affect the input price faced by a second mover or
</c now entrant. Section 8.8 summarises these insights, appraises empirical
evidence, and returns to the steel industry example.
8.2 CAPACITY INVESTMENTS AS IRREVERSIBLE MOVES
Bain (1962) argued that a firm's output level is its instrument in competition. His
limit price model is based upon the Sylos' postulate that a potential entrant
believes that upon entry the incumbent firm will stick to its pre-entry output level.
Anticipating this belief, the incumbent firm may choose a pre-entry output level
so as to deter entry. If one rejects the Sylos' postulate, the output level becomes
an ambiguous instrument in entry deterrence.^ As Dixit (1980) puts it:
'First, faced with an irrevocable fact of entry, the established firm will
usually find it best to make an accommodating output reduction. On the other
hand, it would like to threaten to respond to entry with a predatory increase in
output. Its problem is to make the latter threat credible given the prospective
: entrant's knowledge of the former fact.' (p. 95)
The pre-entry output level does not deter entry, therefore, because the entrant
expects that upon entry the incumbent firm will adjust its output level.'* Unlike
2. This is not to say that Bain really believed in the Sylos' Postulate as applying
to actual entrants. It merely represents a simplifying assumption which he needed
for his analysis.
3. Notwithstanding this critique, the Sylos' Postulate still appears occasionally.
Basu and Singh (1990) split up the entry decision into an 'entry' decision and a
'production start-up' decision. Prior to the 'entry' decision, the incumbent firm
chooses capacity. In between these decisions, the incumbent firm chooses its
output level. The entrant holds the Sylos' postulate (now dubbed a Stackelberg
assumption) that the incumbent firm does not revise its output level after the
entrant's 'start-up' decision. If the potential entrant decides to 'enter', the
incumbent firm chooses an output level which deters the entrant from actually
starting up production. In this setting the authors support the use of excess
capacity. A similar Stackelberg argument accounts for Spulber's (1981) result of
entry deterrence by excess capacity. These papers defy the Spence (1979) lesson
that a Stackelberg leadership position cannot be assumed. It has to be derived in a
perfect equilibrium from asymmetries in the competing firms' capacity investment
processes (a leader has a head start or can expand its capacity faster than a
follower). Leadership has to be credible. -> ^ iCapacity as a Commitment Instrument 159
Figure 8.1
Strategic Moves in Duopoly Competition
X2
(1) - Own effect
(2) - Cross effect
this, ,-';i;ir.:»r
output levels, (pre-entry) capacity investments do constitute an irreversible
decision. Investments are irreversible if capacity is firm-specific, that is, has no
(perfect) alternative use outside the firm. In the extreme case of complete
specificity, the opportunity cost of capacity is zero. This argument led to a shift
in the entry deterrence argument from the output level in Bain's theory, to
capacity investments and pre-commitments in the game-theoretical literature.
To see what a strategic
move may achieve, consider
a duopoly with firms 1 and
firm 2. Figure 8.1 illustrates.
Firm i's output level is X; and
its reaction curve is R, (i =
1,2). The Cournot
equilibrium is the intersection
C of the reaction curves. The
curves 7t' (j = 1,2,3) are
some of firm I's iso-profit
curves. The lower the iso-
profit curve, the higher firm
I's profit level, as they are
associated with lower output
levels of firm 2. Given that
firm 2 reacts to an output
choice by firm 1 by locating
along its reaction curve R^,
firm 1 would prefer to locate at the Stackelberg equilibrium S, which is on firm
I's lowest iso-profit curve still tangent to R2. If firm 1 chooses its output level
before firm 2, it might choose the level associated with point S. This carries no
weight, however, because of Dixit's argument above. A strategic move that
intends to induce rivals to accept outcome S rather than C has to be irreversible.
The figure suggests two types of strategic move. The capacity-commitment
model exploits the idea that firm I's investment reduces its marginal costs,
thereby shifting its reaction curve R, outward to R,', say. As a result, the
Cournot equilibrium shifts along R2 towards the point S. This is the own e$êc/.
Firm 1 may also try to shift firm 2's reaction curve downward, to R2', say. This
shifts the Cournot equilibrium along R, towards point D, which is located at the
same iso-profit curve (7tj) as point S. Firm 1 may, as we will see, achieve this if
its investments have effects in another (product or factor) market, which in turn
affect firm 2 to the effect that (given an output level for firm 1) its marginal costs
or revenue change. Firm I's investment thus has a crow ç#m. The argument
does not explain which instruments firm 1 has for a cross-effect. To know this,
more information is required about the context in which the firms compete. To
Xi
4. A high pre-entry output level or low price may signal to a potential entrant that
the incumbent firm has low costs. This may deter entry by firms that would enter
against a high-cost incumbent. Bain's limit price theory has accordingly been
developed into a signalling model (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1982).160 Chapter 8
bring out the underlying mechanism a full multi-market setting is required.
8.3 A BASIC MODEL
This section gives the assumptions of the generalised multi-market capacity-
commitment model. The basic idea is that an investment reduces marginal costs.
Two varieties exist of this argument. The narrow definition of capital refers to a
given amount of capacity. An upfront capacity investment kj transforms the
production costs (w+p)x; into sunk costs pkj and variable costs wx;, where Xj is
the output level, w the constant marginal production cost and 3 the unit capacity
cost (i = 1,2). Constant returns to scale are assumed throughout. The upfront
investment reduces marginal costs from w+3 to w, therefore, for output levels
within the capacity constraint. In a ftroûJ definition of 'capital', the commitment
instrument is any (in)tangible asset that reduces marginal costs for all output
levels. Productive capital and R&D are cases in point. Variable production costs
are Cfo.kJ, with
(C8.1) C'y = 5C'(Xi,ki)/5kj < 0, (investments reduce total variable costs), and
C'xiki s d*C'(Xj,kj)/<?Xiôkj < 0 (investments reduce marginal costs);
i
where a subscript C, refers to a first-order derivative and C,, to a second-order
derivative. On the demand side, revenues are R'(x,,X2):
(C8.2) R',j s dR'(x,,X2)/dXj < 0 (the products are (im)perfect substitutes), and
R'*i*j - ô*R'(x,,Xj)/ôx,5x2 < 0 ('he products are strategic substitutes);
where j * i; i,j = 1,2. For convenience, I assume homogeneous products and a
duopoly throughout. Write each firm's profit function as
(8.1) 7f = Rft
with revenue R in product market A (i = 1,2). The superscript B refers to a
product or factor market and V is a revenue or cost function. I will ignore the
market superscripts A,B when convenient. The firm's reaction curve follows from
profit maximisation (equation 8.2a), which also determines its investments and
thus its marginal costs (equation 8.2b):
(8.2a) drc7dXi = 0 = dR7dXj+ôV7ôXj-ôC7ôXj;
(8.2b) Ô7t7ôkj = 0 = dV7dk;-ôC7ôki.
The strategic effect of an investment, i.e., the shift of the reaction curve, can be
found by totally differentiating the first-order conditions (Dixit, 1986, p. 111):Capacity as a Commitment Instrument 161
(8.3a)
(8.3b)
An investment lq has an own-effect on firm i. Firm j's investment has a cross
effect on firm i (through dk,) only through market B 0V/ôXj3kj and oV/dlqdkj):
r/ie crosj-e^ecf « o mu/n-wianter ç#ècr. Both effects may entail a <//recf e#ècf on
a firm's marginal revenue or cost (equation 8.3a) or an /nrf/recf e^ecf through a
feedback effect from the output levels on the investment incentives (equation
8.3b).'
There are three specific cases to be discussed in this chapter. First, Vg' =
-Pkj, where p is the parametric price of a unit of capital. This case occurs if the
factor markets are perfectly competitive on the supply and demand sides.
Moreover, there is only one product market, A, which implies that the entrant is
a new firm, i.e., <fe novo entry occurs. This is the initial case studied by Dixit
(1980). Equations 8.3 (a and b) show that firm i's investment only has own
effects (ô*V'/ôXjdkj = dV/dkjdkj = 0). Firm I's investment reduces its own
marginal cost (in equation 8.3a - a direct effect). This raises its output level
(which in turn increases its investment by an indirect feedback effect in equation
8.3b) and reduces firm 2's marginal revenue. "'*'- ^""' **'-"'' ^i ' : i ')-',,;
The second case is the Aorizonfâ/ multi-market competition case, where the
firms sell in related product or country markets. Firm 2 is an established-firm
entrant, whose home market is market B. In case of symmetry both firms have
Vg' = Rg'(k,-x,,k2-X2)-Pkj, the revenue when firm i sells its excess capacity (k,-Xj)
in product market B, minus the capacity costs as above. Capacity can be used for
sales in either product market, if it is specific to the set of related markets as a
whole, rather than to any market in particular. In other words, it may be firm-
rather than product-specific. Each firm allocates its sales across markets A and B
such that at the margin the (net) revenues of selling a product are equal:
MRj*(x,,X2) = MRj*(k,-x,,k2-X2), which implies that the opportunity cost of
selling in market A consists of the marginal revenue of selling the product in
market B instead. Since k, affects firm I's sales in market B, it affects firm 2's
marginal revenue there, which constitutes its marginal cost in market A. This
implies the existence of direct and indirect cross effects (if cPRj'/ôXjdkj # 0 and
dV/akjdkj * 0).
In the case of vemca/ multi-market competition, firms compete in an input
market as well as in the product market. The input markets may be imperfectly
competitive rather than perfectly competitive as in Dixit (1980). For example, Vj'
5. Dixit (1986, p. 113) also uses these terms, with a different meaning however.162 Chapter 8
= -B(k,,k2), the sunk costs of acquiring k, units of capital, given investments kj
by the other firm. The incumbent firm may use its market power in the input
markets to raise entry costs. For instance, its demand for inputs may affect input
prices, which in turn shifts the second mover's reaction curve. This will affect
firm 2's investment decision and thus its marginal costs. There is an indirect cross
effect (d^B/dXjdkj = 0 and d*B/dk;3kj * 0). The mechanisms underlying vertical
and horizontal multi-market competition are, therefore, closely related. In both
cases firm 1 has a mechanism for a cross effect, which allows it to shift firm 2's
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Salop and Scheffman (1983)
Section 8.7
Table 8.1 relates these three cases of interest to some of the literature and the
sections where they are discussed. The next section gives an example. This
provides an institutional setting that may serve as a background for the subsequent
sections 8.5 to 8.7. .^ m ;.,
8.4 AN EXAMPLE: THE U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY
Capacity investments will be the central instrument in competition for capital-
intensive industries. These industries include food processing, textile fabrics,
basic metals and chemicals, stone and clay, and pulp and paper (Ghemawat,
1991, p. 28; from D.J. Collis). They produce fairly homogeneous commodities
(which rules out product characteristics as instruments in competition), the
technology is largely mature (which rules out R&D as an important instrument),
and the markets are quite concentrated (e.g., Lieberman, 1987, p. 612). These
industries inspired economists to develop the capacity-commitment models with
(usually) homogeneous products and given technology.
The U.S. steel industry is an example. In the first part of the century it was
dominated by 'Big Steel', i.e., large, integrated, full-line steel manufacturers,
such as U.S. Steel (the largest one), Bethlehem and Armco. U.S. Steel was the
long time price leader since its creation by merger in 1901 (Scherer, 1980, pp.
178-180). They derived a first-mover advantage from their capacity commitments.
They seem to have (had) few other advantages. Notwithstanding its size, forCapacity as a Commitment Instrument 163
instance, U.S. Steel did not have a cost advantage over smaller rivals (Scherer,
1980, p. 239). After the second world war Big Steel faced import competition
from foreign manufacturers. The importers' market share increased to nearly 20%
of the American market by 1968 (Scherer, 1980, p. 179) and 26% in the mid-
1980s (Fo/rwra, 9-3-92, p. 28). The steel industry responded by lobbying for
protectionism, which gave rise to a VER (voluntary export restraint) in 1984 to
limit imports to 20% of the market (77ie Econo/m.*/, 16-5-92, pp. 101-2).
Big Steel faced new domestic competition as well, however. Mini-mills arose,
such as Nucor Corp., Birmingham Steel, and Chaparral, which make steel from
scrap rather than from ore as the integrated steel makers do. The mini-mills
derive a cost advantage from being non-unionised, with wages a half and a third
of what unionised workers receive (77œ Econom/M, 16-5-92, pp. 101-2). Nucor,
moreover, is a very innovatory firm (Fortune, 24-2-1992, pp. 50-55). Import and
domestic competition caused excess capacity to which Big Steel reacted by closing
plants. This, however, is a costly affair. The U.S. steel manufacturers pioneered
internal labour markets from the mid-1890s on (Elbaum, 1983, p. 262). By 1980,
U.S. steel wages were almost double those in Japan and West Germany (77œ
Econo/m'sf, 16-5-92, pp. 101-2). Employee protection also means that closing
plants is costly due to the obligation to fund the pension liability. "One way
steelmakers minimise future pension obligations is to sell assets for a song rather
than shut them down. Geneva Steel, Weirton Steel, and Gulf States Steel are
composed of plants bought from the big integrated outfits' (Forf«n«, 23-3-1992,
p. 29). These "reconstituted mills' are an additional source of new competition.
Geneva Steel, for instance, was created in 1987 from a U.S. Steel mill after its
new owners gained concessions from the union which the latter had apparently
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for iron ore (mini-mills using scrap), and with new entrants (e.g., mini-mills) as
well as established-firm entrants (e.g., foreign steel makers). Backward
integration entry (by a buyer of steel) occurred when Nucor, originally a producer
of steel construction joists, started producing its own steel (Forrwne, 24-2-1992, p.
51). A multi-market framework points to the vertical interactions between the
r
U.S. integrated steel makers
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steel market and input markets, notably the labour market, the raw materials
markets (ore or scrap), and the markets for new and used capacity (the
reconstituted mills). It also points to the horizontal interaction between the U.S.
steel market and foreign countries (giving rise to import competition). The
subsequent sections show how dominant firms, such as Big Steel, may use
capacity as an instrument in these competition games.'
8.5 Z)£ W0V0 ENTRY
The initial capacity-commitment model features <te /IOVO entry where the potential
entrant invests from scratch, i.e., it is not committed to any capacity or output
level (Dixit, 1980).^ The incumbent firm is the first mover in the game: by the
time the entrant makes its (investment) move, the first mover has its investments
already in place. Both firms are price takers in the capacity input market, with a
unit capacity price p.
In the 'narrow' definition of capital as capacity, the upfront investment
reduces marginal costs from w+p to w (see section 8.3). Consider the special
case where entry is profitable if the incumbent firm's marginal cost is w+P, and
unprofitable if equal to w. To deter entry, the incumbent firm may commit
capacity in order to reduce its marginal cost to w. This implies a capacity such
that x,"* < k, , where x,^ is the duopoly output level if entry occurs. If firm 2 does
not enter, firm 1 produces its monopoly output level x,"\ Since in normal
conditions this quantity exceeds the duopoly output level, excess capacity is not
required to deter entry (j.e., x,** < k, < x,™). This model shows that the incumbent
firm may deter entry even though the entrant knows, contrary to the Sylos'
Postulate, that the incumbent firm will reduce its output level in the face of entry.
The point is, it will not reduce its output level enough to make entry worthwhile.
This gives the meaningful result that although capacity has a strategic role here,
this does not mean that excess capacity is required.* Lieberman (1987) tests (and
rejects) the hypothesis that firms use excess capacity as an entry barrier. His data
6. I will ignore competition among incumbent firms as well as competition by
substitutes for steel. In the latter case, I assume that there is no oligopolistic
interaction between steel makers and, say, plastics or ceramics makers.
7. Other relevant papers are Spence (1977 and 1979), Eaton and Lipsey (1979,
1980, and 1981), and Schmalensee (1981). Dixit (1986) provides an early
consolidation.
8. Dixit's model does not, of course, close the book on the 'excess capacity'
hypothesis. In a rather specific case with convex demand, output levels are
strategic complements (at least in a relevant range) rather than strategic substitutes
(Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer, 1985b). In that case, the incumbent firm
may expand its output upon entry (i.e., x,"" < X,**). Excess capacity (since x,™ <
X|* and x,"* < k,) is required to deter entry. Eaton and Lipsey (1981) resurrect the
excess capacity idea in a dynamic case with finitely durable ('radioactive') capital.
The incumbent firm chooses excess capacity knowing that if entry occurs, its
disinvestments take longer the larger its capacity. The incumbent firm does reduce
output upon entry but not fast enough to make entry profitable.Capacity as a Commitment Instrument 165
are a set of 38 chemical products over a 20 year period. Of these products, ten
had chronic excess capacity. In only three of these did excess capacity appeared
to have been created or used for the sake of entry deterrence. Entry occurred in
all but six products; the latter include titanium dioxide, a case to be discussed
later.
In the 'broad' definition of capital, total costs are TC = C'fa.kJ+Pkj. Given
an output level Xj, total costs are U-shaped in capital with a minimum where TC'H
= C'tj+P = 0. The game is a two-stage one: first firm 1 chooses k, and next
both firms choose their quantities Xj as well as k2. Since firm 2 cannot use capital
as a commitment instrument it chooses a capital stock to minimise its costs given
its output X2- In the first stage, firm l's investment shifts its reaction curve
outward by reducing its marginal costs. The result is called an over- fu/uter-J
/nvwmien/ relative to a benchmark where capital has no (perceived) commitment
value, e.g., because it is not observed by the rival.'
The (over-)investment result depends upon the type of product market
competition. If the products are strategic substitutes, e.g., in a Cournot duopoly,
the incumbent firm over-invests and the entrant anticipates this, either by reducing
its scale of entry (i.e., Bain's ineffectively impeded entry or partial entry
deterrence) or by backing out altogether (i.e., effectively impeded entry or total
entry deterrence). Under-investment results with Bertrand competition (Dixit,
1986) and a competitive product market (Dixon, 1985). In a Japanese recession
cartel, over-investment may occur (Matsui, 1989). Hall (1990) tests Dixit's
(1980) model [with the broad definition of capital] for the U.S. titanium dioxide
industry, with Du Pont as the preempting incumbent and its rivals as second
movers. Titanium dioxide is a bulk chemical. She finds that in the period 1972-
77, Du Pont increased its capacity in an effort to preempt at least some of its
rivals, namely those who had the potential to expand their market share in the
future.
8.6 COMPETITION IN MULTIPLE PRODUCT MARKETS ,. .*,
The ease-of-entry approach (see section 3.3) pointed to existing firms in related
markets as highly salient potential rivals. They may bypass entry barriers that
seem unsurmountable to other potential rivals such as new firms (Brunner, 1961,
p. 250). This raises the question whether capacity can still be used as an
instrument to deter entry if the entrants are existing rivals in related markets.
Fortunately, this game has been explored quite thoroughly by Calem (1988),
Anderson and Fischer (1989), and Venables (1990), who build on the segmented
markets model in Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983).
First consider the segmented markets model (Brander, 1981; and Brander and
Krugman, 1983) (see section 5.2 for the model and some notation). There are two
firms, 1 and 2 (denoted by subscripts), and two markets, A and B (denoted by
9. The benchmark for over- or underinvestment in this section and section 8.7 is
the investment level that would minimise costs given the output level that itself
arises because of strategic interaction. Bulow e/ a/. (1985) proposed this
benchmark. «•«;,, gv«.166 Chapter 8
superscripts). Firm 1 is the incumbent firm in A and firm 2 in B. The game is a
one-stage, two-market Cournot duopoly. Simultaneously each firm chooses sales
Xj* (i = 1,2; j = A,B) for both markets. Marginal costs c,-* are Cj in the home and
Cj+ti in the entry market, where q and tj are constant unit costs. The products are
homogeneous, and the inverse demand function is pXxj'+x,') 0 = A,B). The
firms treat the two markets as completely separate (see definition 5.1). Profits are
*i = £j[pi(x,'+xj')-Cj'-PJxj'; where Pi is the constant unit capacity cost. In each
market each firm maximises profits. The first-order condition for optimality
implies that marginal revenue, (3p*/9xj')Xj'+p', equals marginal cost, Cj"+P;.
Figure 8.1 can be interpreted as pertaining to market A. Call this the o/
Now introduce capacity investments. Each firm chooses capacity, k< (i = 1,2)
with costs C(kJ. This allows it to produce up to the capacity constraint with
marginal costs c^ + tj as above. If sales exceed the capacity constraint, the
marginal cost can be said to be infinite (which rules out sales beyond the capacity
constraint). If the investment implies complete preproduction, C; refers to
distribution costs and may be zero. Simultaneously firms choose capacity levels kj
and output levels (x,J), with the constraint that SjXj* < k; (i = 1,2; j = A,B). Call
this the 5/mu/ftzRi0us game (Anderson and Fischer, 1989). Assume that capacity
will be fully utilised, such that Xj* = kj-x*. By implication each firm has two
decision variables. For instance, given Xj* and k,, firm 1 chooses x,* and k, to
maximise its profits
(8.4) 7t, =
A similar equation holds for firm 2. Hence
(8.5a) 3>t,/3x,* = 0 = p,*x,*+p*-c,-Px°[k,-x,W-c.-t,],
(8.5b) ÔJi,/ôk, = 0 = p,*[k|-x,*]+p*-c,-t,-Ck,, and
(8.5c) a^ax/ = 0 = p,*x/+pM,-p,»[k,-x/]-p°. -.
This determines x,* as a reaction function of x/ (8.5a) and v/'ce versa for firm 2
(8.5c). The intersection of the reaction curves defines a Cournot equilibrium. If a
firm were to defect from the equilibrium, marginal revenue would fall below the
ejr awe marginal production cost, Ci+Cm, but for a small change it will still
exceed the ex /raw marginal cost, C;. Thus the firm will sell all output at the new
capacity level. This validates the full capacity utilisation assumption above.
Because of simultaneity, a firm's capacity decision has no effect on the other
firm's output decisions. In the absence of a strategic role, each firm chooses
output levels such that marginal revenue equals marginal cost (which follows from
8.5a and 8.5b). Capacity just equals the sum of these optimal sales levels. Since
this result also holds for the one-stage game, the outcome of the simultaneous
game is identical to the one-stage game if the segmented markets and constant
returns assumption hold. The latter implies that C(kJ = Pjkj.
••• Strategic moves come in if competition is a two-stage game. In the first
tfage, firms choose kj. Knowing each other's capacity in the second,
wage, the firms choose sales levels (x,->). This stage is identical to theCapacity as a Commitment Instrument 167
one-stage game, except for the binding capacity constraint. Call this the .
game (Calem, 1988; Anderson and Fischer, 1989; and Venables, 1990). The
second stage entails reaction curves in output levels, identical to equation (8.5a).
Given these second-stage reaction curves, in the first stage both firms choose a
capacity kj (i = 1,2). To find their effect, totally differentiate the first-order
conditions for both firms to the sales x,* and the capacities, k,. This gives:
<vv rma to nodoutwi A .imenoartJ
(8.6)
awo otm îâafcujm smorf e'M
Consider first the case when firms use their output levels rather than capacity
as competition instruments. If dk, = dkj = 0 and dx>* = -dx^ then equation 8.6
gives the slope of the reaction curves R, in figure 8.1. The diagonal elements in
the 2x2 matrix G in the left hand side in equation 8.6 can be characterised as G^
= 5*jij/ôx** and the off-diagonal elements as G^ = c^Tij/dx^dxj*. This gives the
familiar result that the slope of the reaction curve dx,*/dx/ = -G^/G,, (Tirole,
1988, p. 207). The reaction curves are downward sloping if sign (Gj/Gy) > 0.
The second-order conditions to equation 8.6 imply that G^ < 0. Also, G^ < 0 (i
* j) if demand is linear (pj = 0, j = A,B) or not 'too' convex (where p«' > 0).
If capacity is given and the capacity constraint is binding, the firm faces a
negative multi-market supply spillover. By raising its sales in market A from x,*
to x,*', firm 1 reduces capacity in market B from x," = k,-x,* to k,-x,* . That is,
the sales level x," is no longer possible. This raises the cost of the marginal unit
(x,*) from c,+t, to infinite. Increasing sales in A thus reduce the marginal
profitability in B from Ô7t,/dx,* to minus infinite, which entails a negative multi-
market spillover. If the capacity constraint is not binding, the spillover is zero:
sales can change in market A without effect on the profitability of the marginal
unit in market B.'°
With downward-sloping reaction curves, an increase in x,* reduces x,* and
thus (given kj) raises x,*: by increasing its home market sales, firm 1 reduces the
scale of entry in its market. This result is similar to Bain's limit output argument,
and the same critique by Dixit (1980) in section 8.2 holds: firm 1 does not have a
commitment to increase its home market sales. An irreversible move (an
investment) is required.
A change dkj > 0 in equation 8.6 represents a shift of the reaction curve Rj
(in figure 8.1). Total differentiation of firm l's profit function (8.4) gives
10. This validates table 5.2, where an unanticipated local demand shock (leading
to an increase of sales in one market) leads to a spillover effect if the shared
resource is a private good. .».--^ . .-^ . .;168 Chapter 8
The coefficient of dx,* equals zero because of equation 8.5a [which is an
application of the envelope theorem]. A reduction of firm 2's sales in market A
(dxj* < 0) raises firm l's aggregate profits if p»*x,*-p,*(k,-x,*) < 0. This is
plausible: due to equation (8.5a) p/x,*-p^(k,-x,*) equals p*-p*-t,, which is
negative if there is cross-market symmetry (p* = p^) and t, > 0, or if transport
costs t, are sufficiently large. If an investment by firm 1 induces firm 2 to opt out
of firm l's home market into its own home market B (dx,* < 0), firm l's
aggregate profits increase. There is a prisoners' dilemma as both firms would
benefit if each would back out to its home market. This result gives the rationale
for the .sp/ieres-o/Wn/Zwe/Jce hypothesis (Scherer, 1980, pp. 340-342; Bernheim
and Whinston, 1990; see subsection 5.5.5)." Equations (8.6) and (8.7) solve for
dx/\ and give drc, as a function of dkj.
I will first give an interpretation of the model in equations (8.4) to (8.7). In
line with section 8.3, (8.5c) can be rewritten as equality of the marginal
revenues, MR,' 0 = A,B)> net of marginal costs in both markets:
(8.5C) p,V+pW,1*,-*Vp'*«r •**» *^®:****
The right hand side, MR2*+t2> is firm 2's opportunity cost of entry in market A.
Whereas with <te novo entry firm 2's marginal cost of entry, C2 + P2+t2, is
exogenous to firm 1, in the case of related-firm entry its opportunity cost of entry
is endogenous to firm 1, which accounts for a strategic effect of capacity (Calem,
1988, p. 172). Firm l's investment changes its allocation dx,J (j = A,B). That is,
dk, > 0 -> dx,' > 0 -> dMRj' < 0. The investment reduces firm 2's marginal
revenue from export (MR,*), which is the classical own effect in figure 8.1. It
also reduces MR2*+t2, which is the cross effect. The investment may ra«e the
rival's opportunity cost of entry relative to its marginal revenue from entry if
dMR,* < dMR," < 0. It thereby reduces the scale of entry. Equation (8.6)
demonstrates this. Rewrite its second row into
,;•.--• ^ v^.<e -.i~-;ji i^ijf-K.
(8.6b') [p»*x/+p,*]dx,*-[p«»(k2-x/)+p,»]dx.» = -G^dx,*;
where dx," = dk,-dx,*, the arguments in brackets [] are identical to ôMRjVôx,' 0
= A,B), and dk, = 0 (unilateral defection by firm 1). The left hand side is
negative if dx,* = dx," and firm l's allocation reduces firm 2's marginal revenue
in market A relative to its marginal revenue in market B. If also G22 < 0, this
will opt firm 2 to move out of market A, /.c, dx,* < 0. Firm l's investment
may thus (partially) deter entry in market A by combining the own effect and the
cross effect. To see whether this is feasible, I will solve equations (8.6) and (8.7)
11. This argument shows that, if markets are otherwise equal, spheres-of-
influence are based on transport costs. <*»§ -u.-ivn<j :; «< *j-?*Capacity as a Commitment Instrument 169
for four special cases.
Case 7. Linear demand.
/•ropos/rio/! 8.7. Capacity does not qualify as a commitment instrument if demand
is linear. *' ' •^>*'4>H^H|«H'y-,if)iq* ^^VMt^T* "?*fe' ^>£*?»>
Substitute linear demand, where pj = 0 (j = A,B), into equation (8.6)
and use Cramer's rule to find « amwwuo -sn; ons aiituv «femjunniui an ?ert
With unilateral defection by firm 1 (dkj = 0), it follows that dx,* = 0. If demand
is linear, firm 1 is una/r/i to use capacity as a commitment instrument in
competition with firm 2 (Calem, 1988, p. 179; Anderson and Fischer, 1989, p.
175; and Venables, 1990, p. 30). Substitute dkj = 0 and dxj* = 0 in equation
(8.7) to find that«wnomwo--ems»
(8.9) dn, = [p,"(k,-x,*)+p»-c,-t,-p,]dk,.
The firms are in equilibrium if the expression in brackets equals zero, /.«., if
marginal revenue equals marginal cost: p,*(k,-x,*)+p* = c,+t,+P,. Since this is
also the condition of the one-stage and the simultaneous games, it follows that
their equilibrium outcomes pertain in this two-stage game as well.
The intuition is as follows (Venables, 1990, p. 36). If firm 1 increases its
capacity k,, it will adjust its allocation (x,') such that marginal revenue falls by
the same amount in both markets, thus preserving the equality in equation (8.5a).
With linear demand, marginal revenue is linear and downward sloping in
quantity: MR,' = p"+p,'X|\ where p,' is constant, and j = A,B. Assume
symmetric demand for the sake of the argument. Thus the reduction in marginal
revenue does not depend upon the level of quantities, which may differ as x,* >
x,* if t, > 0, but only on the change in output levels. An identical reduction in
marginal revenues requires identical sales' expansion in markets A and B: dx,* =
dx," (which equation (8.8) confirms if p/ = p/). But, again with linear demand,
this reduces firm 2's marginal revenues in both markets by an identical amount.
Thus firm 2 has no incentive to adjust its allocation if demand is linear.
Care 2. Cross-market symmetry.
Assume symmetry of the cost and demand functions. That is, q = c, tj = t, ft =
P and p*(x) = p(x) (i = 1,2 and j = A,B). It seems acceptable to assume that the
associated equilibrium is symmetric, that is, k, = k (i = 1,2), p,,,^,' = p^, (j =
A,B), x,* = x;* = k^-xA and x/ = x," = k,-x,\ It follows that x,* + Xj* = k.
Substitute these assumptions in equations (8.6) [using Cramer's rule] and (8.7) to
get
(8.10a) dx/ = '4(p,,/pJ(x,*-x/)dk,,170Chapter 8
(8.10b) dx,* = 'Adki-dxj*, and <- r , ^at«j {sioeo? T--»t
(8.10c) die, = p,(x/-x/)dx/+[p,(k,-x,*)+p-c-t-p]dk,. •'V"~P/ <*, '-
ÏB31Î,.,
Substitute equation (8.10a) in (8.10c) to find that
(8.11) du, =
ProposiftYwi 8.2. If there is intra-market symmetry (t = 0 and x,* = x,*), capital
has no commitment value and the outcome is identical to the simultaneous
game. •* • -•• ~-
Proo/ If x,* = X2*, firm 1 is both unable (equation 8.10a) and unwilling
(equation 8.10c) to affect firm 2's output level. In either case, the equilibrium is
attained, i.e., d7t,/dk, = 0, if p,(k,-x,*)+p = c+t+P, that is, combining this
with equation 8.5c', if in each market marginal revenue equals the (er an/e)
marginal cost. Since this is the condition underlying the one-stage and
simultaneous equilibrium, the simultaneous game outcome holds. In the
simultaneous game the intra-market symmetry, x,* = x?*, implies absence of
transport costs: t = 0. No entry deterrence occurs, and capacity has no
commitment value.
The adjustment (transport) cost t may indicate the product- (location-) specificity
of the firm's capacity. If t = 0, capacity is non-specific: it can without costs be
used for either (product or country) market. Non-specific capacity is, therefore,
not a commitment, which is consistent with the basic idea in capacity-commitment
models: :. u <«,•• a •«.}>•
'If capital is to be used as a vehicle for commitment, it is then clear that the
capital must be product-specific in some degree' (Eaton and Lipsey, 1981, p.
594).
If p,j * 0 and x,*-X2* * 0, equilibrium is attained if p,(krXi*)+p-c-t-P =
-'Ap^(x,*-X2*)^. If demand is concave, i.e., if p,, < 0, this implies that
p,(k,-x,*)+p > c+t+P, that is, marginal revenue exceeds the (ec anre) marginal
cost. Production, therefore, falls short of the outcome in the simultaneous game.
Each firm under-invests relative to the simultaneous game.'* If demand is convex,
/'.e., if p« > 0, then p,(k,-x,*)+p < c+t+P: sales exceed the level in the
simultaneous game, and firms over-invest relative to it. For intuitive explanations
of these results, I turn to two special cases of the symmetry case. They follow the
«fi •»& 3. .-.•-,.
12. As a benchmark for judging over- or underinvestment, used in this section,
the simultaneous game is a special case of the open /oo/> e<7u///^num, where firms
ignore (do not know) each other's investment choice when deciding about
production levels. Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) proposed this benchmark.Capacity as a Commitment Instrument 171
same route as Anderson and Fischer (1989)." That is, start with a possible
outcome and then find out whether this constitutes an equilibrium in the sequential
game.
Case i. The simultaneous equilibrium.
Anderson and Fischer (1989) explore the simultaneous equilibrium outcome.
Substitute equation (8.5b) in equation (8.10c) to get lei^aqe s
(8.12) dit, = p,(x,*-X2*)dxj\ «feKL&ià^i
Consider somewhat product-specific capital (t > 0) such that x,*-x/ > 0. Since
p, < 0, it follows from equation (8.12) that sign(d7i,) = -sign(dx2*). To see
whether dxj* < 0, turn to equations 8.10(a and b). Since (from equation 8.10a)
sign(dx2*) = -sign(p,,dk|), the following cases exist.
If demand is concave (/.e., p^ < 0), sign(dxj*) = sign(dk,). If firm 1 would
increase k,, it raises its export level: dx,* = dk,-dx,* = 'Adk, +dx,* (from
8.10b), where dx,* increases in k,. Since dx,* (= 'Adk,+dx2*) increases more
than dx,* (= Vidk,-dx2*), firm 2's marginal revenue in market A would increase
more than in market B. Firm 2 reacts to this by reallocating output (given its
capacity) out of its home market B into market A (dxj* > 0). £/wry induces
reriproca/ en/ry (see sections 2.5 and 5.2). The net effect in figure 8.1 is that
firm 2's reaction curve in market A, R2, shifts upward. This move may be very
unwelcome to firm 1, as total output increases in its most profitable market (the
home market A). In this case, firm 1 contracts its capacity relative to the
simultaneous outcome. Under-investment deters entry, /.e., reduces Xj* (equation
8.10a), which raises profits (equation 8.12). Trade (= x^+x,*) decreases as
well, which implies a (small) move towards spheres-of-influence.
If demand is convex (/.«., p^ > 0), firm l's over-investment reduces Xj* by
equation 8.10a, which raises firm l's profits by equation 8.12 (Anderson and
Fischer, 1989, p. 178; and Venables, 1990, p. 36). Entry by firm 1 into market
B induces firm 2 to (partially) exit from market A. Entry deterrence (in A) by
entry (into B), therefore, a paradox which has been called
13. Explicit solutions of the second stage and first stage of the game are
cumbersome and difficult to interpret. I am unable to prove in general that
capacity investments are strategic substitutes, /.e., that the first-stage reaction
curves in capacity are downward sloping. The following thought experiment
suggests that capacities are strategic substitutes in the special case where they
have no commitment value (that is, if demand is linear or transport costs are
zero). If firm 1, e.g., is informed of firm 2's capacity choice, it knows how
much sales firm 2 will have in each market (this does not depend on firm l's
capacity choice if capacity has no commitment value). It thus knows which output
levels it would like to offer in each market (given a Cournot duopoly) in the
absence of a binding capacity constraint. Its capacity choice aggregates these
output levels (again, this is because capacity has no commitment value). Since
output levels are usually strategic substitutes (see Bulow, Geanakoplos and
Klemperer, 1985b, for an exception), the same will hold for the capacity levels.172 Chapter 8
(Watson, 1982; section 2.5). That is, Rj in figure 8.1 shifts downward and firm 1
over-invests relative to the simultaneous equilibrium. The next question is whether
entry is completely deterred.
4. Entry deterrence.
If entry is deterred, x,* = k, = k, x," = 0, Xj' = k, = k, and X2* = 0. This is
again a special case of case 2 with t > 0. Substitute these assumptions in
equation (8.5a) to see whether firm 1 will defect in the second stage of the game
(for a given capacity level k). Defection (i.e., dx,* < 0 < dx,*) is profitable if
dn,/3x,* < 0, i.e., if p,k+t < 0. Entry will occur. To see if entry deterrence is
possible, assume a transport cost sufficiently high that this not hold, i.e., k <




Equation (8.13a) takes into account that x,* = 0, such that a change can only be
positive. If demand is linear, an investment by firm 1 (dk, > 0) will not affect
firm 2's output level (equation 8.13a). The same holds if demand is convex (p^
> 0) and firm 1 expands its capacity. In both cases, firm 1 will expand its output
level in order to export to market B, which is profitable if the monopolist's price
p exceeds the marginal export cost, c+t+P (equation 8.13b). This is the same
condition that underlies Brander's (1981) one-stage trade model. Capacity,
therefore, fails to deter entry. If, on the other hand, demand is concave (p^ <
0), an investment by firm 1 and associated entry induces reciprocal entry by firm
2: dxj* > 0 (equation 8.13a). This in turn reduces firm l's entry profit by
pjcdxj*, where k is firm l's sales level in market A (equation 8.13b). Entry, that
is, has an opportunity cost based on marginal production costs (c+t + P) plus
home market profits foregone. The entry profit is wiped out completely if
'/4p^k^+p-c-t-P < 0. This condition implies 'very' concave demand and 'high'
transport costs t, such that the monopoly price is close to the marginal export
cost. Complete entry deterrence is feasible only in this special case.
See table 8.2 for a
summary of the results
of all four cases,
assuming that t > 0.
Call m/" firm i's
market share in market
A, i.e., rtij* =
X;V(x,* + Xj*); k;* is
firm i's equilibrium
capital stock in the
simultaneous game,
and m* the associated
market share. #• *>?'..,•!: «sgw»^ m« -.jfïnfe'îj«8»;^«i8i|(ji»-:.î,'f.'ia»it?Jî.«
The main implication from these models is that import competition
undermines the commitment value of capacity. Only if t > 0 and demand is
Table 8.2
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convex, does firm 1 overinvest (some) capacity to deter entry (/.e., to reduce firm
2's sales in market A). In another special case, with concave demand, both firms
underinvest and may completely deter entry. The use of capacity as an entry
deterring instrument against, for instance, import competition is highly
circumscribed. This result differs rather starkly from the original capacity-
commitment model. It tallies rather well with Big Steel's vulnerability to import
competition after the war (see section 8.4).
The reason for these results is two-fold. First, the sequence of moves is
different than in the de novo capacity-commitment model. In the latter model, the
incumbent firm is the first mover: it invests before the entrant does. In a real
world setting, such as in international trade, entrants are often established firms in
other (product or country) markets. In this case, incumbent firm and potential
entrant play symmetrical roles. Both commit to capacity simultaneously, each in
its own home market. ••••<-.'.•
Second, capital is not completely product-specific. As equation 8.5c' shows,
the correct opportunity cost of selling at home is the marginal revenue abroad,
rather than the marginal production or distribution cost. A capacity investment
may reduce the marginal prodwcrio/i cost (from p+c to c) but it does not (per se)
reduce the opportunity cost. Hence it fails to make the incumbent firm aggressive
in its home market. The entrant knows this, and thus does not keep out of this
market. The possibility of 'output shifting' undermines the commitment to the
product market (Calem, 1988; and Anderson and Fischer, 1989). Capacity may
have an indirect effect, though, by changing the entrant's opportunity cost (which
is its home market marginal revenue, Ml^+tj). In particular, the incumbent
firm's investment may raise the entrant's opportunity cost of entry re/arive to its
marginal revenue of entry, thereby reducing its scale of entry. The next section
explores cases where the preemptive firm raises its rival's costs in afao/w/e terms.
8.7 VERTICAL MULTI-MARKET COMPETITION
Bain (1962) mentioned absolute cost advantages as a particular class of entry
barriers, which were important in the steel industry. He traced these advantages
to input market conditions, /.e., they arise if entry raises factor prices,
incumbents secure factors at lower prices than entrants, or established firms have
access to better factors than entrants (Bain, 1962, p. 14). He treats these cost
differences as given to firms. However, a far-seeing incumbent firm may exploit
these input market conditions in order to raise entry costs. If inputs need to be
acquired prior to production, the incumbent firm may as it were ambush the
entrant in the input market rather than in the product market (see subsections
3.3.3 and 6.4.1). This is salient only if the dominant firm and its (potential or
actual) rivals participate in the same input market. It may not hold if the rivals
are located in different regions or countries. Moreover, if the entrants are
established firms, they may already own the required assets. The cost-raising
strategy seems to aim at small rivals, a competitive fringe, or new (de novo)
potential rivals. I will first focus on the intermediate product market, then on the
capital goods market, and finally on the labour market.174 Chapter 8
8.7.1 Competition in the Intermediate Products Market
The dominant buyer of an intermediate product may affect the price charged to
rival buyers by the sheer quantity of its purchases. For example, the dominant
U.S. aluminum supplier Alcoa may have 'overbought' bauxite in order to raise its
rivals' costs (Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986, p. 236).''' The quantity of bauxite
which Alcoa buys in the open market depends, in turn, on its vertical integration.
In a make-or-buy context an investment reduces the demand for intermediate
goods in the external market. A dominant incumbent firm may use its investments
as an instrument to affect the external intermediate input price if the associated
input market is imperfectly competitive. I will explore this argument in a variety
of the cost-raising models in Salop and Scheffman (1983 and 1987) and Dixit
(1986) (see subsection 6.6.3). Firm i (= 1,2) can invest in capital kj to reduce the
variable production costs C'(qi,kJ. The quantity q> refers to the firm's production
of an intermediate input. The input can also be purchased in an external market,
in a quantity of y< units at price a. With a fixed proportions technology, one may
normalise such that one unit of output requires one intermediate input: x, =
qi+yi, where X; is the final good output. The intermediate product market is
competitive on the supply side, with a supply function a = A(y,+X2), where A is
a continuously differentiable function. In order to focus on market power in this
market, assume that both firms are price takers in the capital goods market. Thus
3 is a parameter. The first mover, firm 1, is partially integrated with profits as in
equation (8.1) with Vg' = -3kj-ay;:
(8.14a) 7t' = R'(x,,Xj)-C'(q,,k,)-3k,-ay,; with x, = q,+y,.
Firm 2, the second mover, is a new or small firm, which purchases all its inputs.
Its profits are
(8.14b) 7t* = R'(x,,X2)-ctX2.
In the first stage, firm 1 chooses k,; in the second stage, firm 1 chooses y, and q,
and firm 2 chooses X2. Profit maximisation in the second stage entails the first-
order conditions:
(8.15a) ÔK'/ay, = 0 = R'y,(y,+q,,x,)-A.,(y,+xJy,-A(y, + x,);
(8.15b) dJi'/aq, = 0 = R',,(y,+q,,Xj)-C,,(q,,k,); and
(8.15c) dirVftc, = 0 = R\j(y,+q,,x,)-A,a(
14. Lopatka and Godek (1992) criticise the view that Alcoa raised the costs of
electricity and bauxite to (potential) rival suppliers. They show that Alcoa was not
a dominant buyer of these inputs. They misconstrue the cost-raising argument as
implying the purchase of inputs which one does not use (/ft., p. 314). The model
in this chapter reiterates that the issue rather is the purchase of more (or less)
inputs than one would buy absent the cost-raising motive. But given a stock of
inputs, one will generally utilise them fully (as production will imply zero
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The second-order maximisation conditions (suppressing arguments) imply that
(8.16) R\,,,-A,i,iy,-2A,, < 0;
R'qlql"C,l,l < 0;
The first-order conditions implicitly define reaction curves. In the first stage, firm
1 anticipates on the shift of these reaction curves induced by its capacity






Call the 3*3 matrix D and its determinant A. In order to get stability of the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium in equation 8.15 assume that A > 0 (Dixit, 1986, p.
110). Before solving (8.17a), I will rewrite it for the sake of interpretation. Solve




The formula shows that firm l's investment dk, works both ways: it shifts its own
reaction curve, the top row, which is the own effect in figure 8.1, and it shifts
firm 2's reaction curve, the bottom row, which coincides with the cross effect.
The reason is that firm l's investment reduces its marginal production costs (the
own effect), which induces it to buy less in the external market. This in turn
affects firm 2's marginal costs (the cross effect). Applying Cramer's rule on
equation (8.17a) gives dx,/dk, = A-'C',,k,{(R^,-A,^,X2-A,,)R',,,,-
R^x2qi(R'yiyi-Ayiy,yi-2Ay,)}. Simplify this by taking into account that with
qyyyyy
homogeneous products,
A,, = A,. That is,
(8.18) dx,/dk, = -A'C',
= R^,,, R',,,, =R\,,,, A^, = A,,,, = A^, and
Total differentiation of firm l's profit function gives176 Chapter 8
(8.19) dTt' = (R,,-A,,y,-A)dy,+(RVC,,)dq,+(R^-A^y,)dx,-(C'k, + P)dk, =0.
The coefficients of dy, and dq, equal zero because of equation (8.15). For
convenience, assume that A^ = 0, such that Ay is a constant. Rewrite revenues:
R' = xj)(x,+X2), where p(.) is the downward sloping inverse demand function for
a homogeneous good. Then, R'yi,i-2R^,, = (x,-2x2)p,,. It follows that the
sign(dx2/dk,) = sign(Ay(x,-2x2)p«). This gives the result that a strategic or
indirect effect of k, on Xj is absent if and only if either (i) there are constant
returns in the intermediate product market (A^ = 0), (ii) firm 2 is sufficiently
small (x, = 2xj), or (iii) demand is linear (p« = 0). The implication for firm l's
profits is:
(8.20) dTt' = -{(R>a-A^y,)A-'C',,MA,(x,-2xj)p«+(C»,+P)}dk,.
The optimal capital stock implies that the coefficient of dk, equals zero, i.e.,
(8.21) 0,,+p = -(R',a-Aay,)A-'C',,MA,(x,-2xdp».
R'*2 < 0 (condition C8.2). R'^-A^yi will be negative if A^ is either positive or
negative but small in absolute size. The determinant A is positive. C',m < 0
(condition C8.1). In that case, sign(Cn + P) = -sign(Ay(x,-2x2)p^J =
-sign(dx2/dk|). In the case of Big Steel, over-investment and thus excessive
integration will occur with the following conditions. The fringe rivals are small,
i.e., x,-2x2 > 0. Demand for steel may be concave, i.e., p« < 0. The reason is
that steel has substitutes (e.g., aluminium, plastics, and ceramics). If the steel
price increases above a threshold, users may switch to a substitute. If these
thresholds hover around a similar steel price, steel demand may trail off strongly
at a higher price. Demand may be concave if demand is inelastic below that
price. Decreasing returns may exist in the raw material market (Ay > 0) if low-
cost ore deposits are scarce. As a result, C^+P > 0. The function Q, is
negative (condition C8.1) and increases in k, if
(C8.3) C'kt = #C(Xj,ki)/dkj2 > 0 (decreasing returns to investments).
A#è-u»«8?lfe'¥*eY.s.v ,1,'od r/h»*' ..;•• .rutrnr. jvr.i «'f mi* TP";I îrwotU slacmolt *'
Since C^, increases in k,, the fact that C,,,+P > 0 in the strategic case and
Cu + P = 0 in the cost-minimising case implies that firm 1 over-invests relative to
cost minimisation.
Figure 8.3 illustrates the case. Given firm 2's scale of entry, MR'' is firm l's
marginal revenue and S' is the marginal cost of the intermediate inputs bought.
An investment by firm 1 reduces its marginal production cost MC' (the figure
assumes constant returns). The firm will raise its production of the intermediate
input, q,, while buying less intermediate inputs (Ay, < 0). Because of the
reduced marginal cost it raises its supply by Ax,. The entrant suffers from the fall
in the market price (as Ax, > 0) but benefits from the reduced market price of
the intermediate product (as Ay, < 0). The own and cross effect partly cancel out
in this case. The net effect may be negative, as a concave demand curve implies

























scale of its entry. The
commitment value of capital
therefore entails a strategic
over-investment.'* With
convex demand, the entrant
might benefit, in which case
the firm may underinvest and
'overbuy' in order to raise
the entrant's costs and reduce
its output level (as dx^/dk, >
0).
If there are constant
returns to scale in the
intermediate product market,
i.e., Ay = 0, firm l's make-
or-buy decision and
associated investment level
cannot be used as instruments
in competition. This result differs from the Dixit (1980) model, where in the
absence of market power in input markets, firm 1 does commit to capital in order
to deter firm 2's entry. The reason is that in Dixit (1980) an investment reduces
the firm's marginal cost. In the above model, however, partial integration implies
that the firm's marginal cost equals the price of the externally acquired
intermediate product, a. If A^ = 0, the marginal cost of buying inputs is pegged
at a parametric a, which destroys the own effect. An investment reduces the
firm's marginal in-house production cost, C',,, which changes the firm's 'make-
or-buy' decision, y, versus q,, but it does not affect its marginal production cost,
a, and its total production, x,. Firm 1 chooses k, and x, to minimise production
costs without strategic implications. ._ •, ^
8.7.2 Competition in the Capital Goods Market
I will now suppress the intermediate product market altogether, in order to focus
on the capital goods market. If final good suppliers compete in (new) capacity,
they may be confronted with capacity constraints in the capital goods industry.
This provides the setting for Ghemawat's (1990) jnowèc// e^ècï, where two firms
simultaneously bid for a given supply of (e.g., newly produced) capital goods
(subsection 6.6.1).
A model has cost functions as in equation (8.1) with Vg' = -B(k,+k2)lCj,
15. Mr. Dixit points out (personal communication) that firm 1 may commit to
buying external resources by entering into a long-run contract with external
suppliers. A contract may indeed substitute for an over-investment in capital
goods as a commitment instrument. Some well-known problems stand in the way
of a contract as a commitment, however. First, contracts may be renegotiable,
and second, firm 1 might sell excess resources (acquired by the contract) to other
parties, e.g., to a new entrant. .i._ ... ,-.. . , _178 Chapter 8
which reflects a continuously differentiable supply function (3 = B(k,+k2>. The
capital goods market is competitive on the supply side. If there are decreasing
returns to scale, i.e., B,, > 0, the situation reflects capacity constraints in the
capital goods industry in similar vein as Ghemawat (1990). In the first stage of
the game, firm 1 chooses k, as before. In the second stage, firm 1 chooses x, and
firm 2 chooses X2 and k, simultaneously." Firm 2's capacity choice has no
strategic effect on firm l's output choice, that is, firm 2 chooses k, to minimise
its costs. Firm l's choice of k, is driven by three motivations: to reduce its costs,
to preempt firm 2, and to raise firm 2's costs. Consider the second stage first.
Call /*' = R'xi-C^, f«'i = R'mi-C'™, and ^ = R'^ (ij = 1,2) (omit the arguments
for convenience). The first-order conditions for profit maximisation, cfa'/dx; =
ôrcVSkj = 0, read j j \ j i we^nco aïs 3i3rtJ i:
-.(. ,• -•f.lr';. ~<h*^ :'>W'', 5LS3? 01 gf<V
(8.22a) /*' = 0, i = 1,2; and iy—] j ,.fc-,ai£r?T }-su:>ow a
j + B = 0. ' ' •••
The second-order maximisation conditions are p j hv3l }oam;.:avni
(8.22b) ^ < 0 (i = 1,2); and
In the first stage firm 1 explores the effect of dk, on the second-stage decision
variables by totally differentiating equations (8.22a). This gives:
(8.23) ^',dx,+/x'jdx,-C',,k,dk, = 0; / ,,ia -/H'-ir/m-.
^,dx,+/**2dx2-C*,<2k2dk2 = 0; and
= 0.
Rewrite equations (8.23) as a linear system of dx,, dxj and dk, in dk,. Call A the
determinant of the matrix, which is positive in order to guarantee stability of the
equilibrium in (8.22a). Cramer's rule gives itm;»;.»- .xti m noini^qtnoj i
(8.24) dx,/dk, = A-«{-M',<?du(Bm,k2 + BH)y,C',,H(C'uu+Baalt,+2Bu)}; and
dk,/dk, = A-'{-0»',MVM*i' ''^}
The But, factor shows firm l's cost-raising competition, the cross effect, and the
C'.n, factor the own effect. To find the optimal k,, firm 1 totally differentiates its
profits:
(8.25) dît' = /x'dx,+R'^dxj-Bkjk,dk2-[C'k,+Bk,k,+B]dk, = 0.
16. This implies the simplifying assumption that although investment decisions
(k,, k,) are sequential, pricing in the capital input market occurs simultaneously
(P = B(k,+k2)). See Salop and Scheffman (1987, p. 28) for a similar
assumption. Introducing time in the capital input markets makes for more
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Investments have a rival's cost raising effect as well as the own effect (indirectly
through dxj and dkj) as well as cost reduction (directly through dk,). Substitution
of equations (8.22a) and (8.24) in (8.25) gives the total effect. For convenience,
assume that the second derivative, B^, equals zero such that the first derivative,
Bi, is constant. Rewrite (8.25) into:
(8.26) C^, + P = ,,,,^, ,;,.
Stability of the product market competition implies that ^'i/*V^i/**2 > 0 (Dixit,
1980, p. 104), hence (Bj'k,(jt',/iVMV2) « positive. Conditions (C8.1) and
(C8.2) imply that RUM\C^+ViCU,)+k,^,C'^,C^ is negative.
Moreover, -R'^iCxmC^ is positive, if C'^ s c?C'(x,,kJ/3kj' > 0 (condition
C8.3). This gives rise to the following cases. If B^ > 0, the left hand side is
positive. Thus C'm+BJc, + B > 0. This implies over-investment relative to cost
minimisation, where Cu + BJc, +B = 0, since Cu+BJCi+B increases in k, (as
C'kui > 0, Bfc > 0 and B^ = 0). Thus if there are decreasing returns in the
capital goods industry, the first mover overinvests both in order to preempt the
second mover and to raise the costs at which it acquires capacity. This tallies with
Ghemawat's (1990) result. If B^ = 0, the left hand side is still positive. This
implies over-investment, that is, the outcome is identical to Dixit's (1980, pp.
103-104) model. If B^ < 0 there are increasing returns in the capital goods
industry. This may give firm 1 an incentive to underinvest. This runs counter,
however, to the commitment motive. If B^ is sufficiently strong, the left hand side
in equation (8.26) may be negative, with underinvestment as net outcome.
8.7.3 Competition by Raising Wage Costs
Nelson (1957) argues that labour unionisation resulting in higher wage rates might
raise the quasi-rents of coal mines. In general, he shows that industry profits
(quasi-rents) can increase if variable costs increase, even if the product market
and factor markets are competitive, /.e., firms are price takers, and if firms are
symmetric. His analysis is short-run, that is, entry is barred, and capital is fixed.
An increase in marginal (wage) costs raises the market price, and thus the
industry producer surplus (given an upward sloping marginal cost curve). In the
long run, of course, entry and investments (substituting for labour) will reduce the
quasi-rent until it just covers the fixed capital costs. The short-run assumption
implies that some imperfection (in factor and or product markets) must be
assumed. Moreover, the increase of the cost must be an unanticipated shock,
rather than deliberate firms' policy. Otherwise more firms would have entered the
market initially, expecting to recover their capital outlays from the windfall gain.
The analysis suggests that firms may raise the wage rate deliberately.
Williamson (1968) explored the Pennington case in the U.S. bituminous coal
industry, where large coal mines and the United Mine Workers union conspired
to raise the fringe firms' wage costs. They were able to do so since a wage
increase agreed upon with the union was imposed upon all U.S. coal mines. Since180 Chapter 8
the small mines were less capital-intensive than the large ones, a wage increase
would raise the former's unit costs more. This induced exit of small producers
such as the Pennington mine. Exit would raise the market price, which may have
overcompensated the large mines for the increasing wage rates, such that their
profits increased. It remains implicit, however, how capital-intensive firms
competed with labour-intensive firms to write a contract with the union that
specified an industry-wage rate.
Gollier (1991) proposes to integrate Williamson's theory into modern labour
economics (insider-outsider theory) and industrial organisation (entry deterrence).
His attempt is valiant but the implementation seems deficient. His model has n
homogeneous incumbent firms, and one potential entrant. Labour is the only
input, sunk costs are absent, and the product market is competitive. In the second
stage of the game, the entrant decides about entry taking as given the industry-
wide wage rate w and price p. Each incumbent firm (i = l..n) negotiates with a
firm-specific union about an insiders' wage rate w' (> w) and insiders'
employment level. In the first stage of the game, the incumbent firms negotiate
with a union to set an industry-wide minimum wage rate (w). Incumbent firms
have a motive to raise the industry-wide wage rate w above a market wage (w'):
by doing so they raise the entrant's cost. This reduces its output level and raises
the market price (see figure 2 in Gollier, 1991, p. 401). This is, however,
inconsistent with perfect competition where firms by definition assume that the
effect of an individual firm on the market price is negligible. In the special case
where Gollier (1991, p. 404) assumes that incumbent firms ignore the effect of
the entrant's output level on the market price, he correctly shows that incumbents
will not raise the industry-wide wage rate above the market wage rate.
Gollier's paper underplays the importance of asymmetry between incumbents
and entrant. Assume symmetry in that each firm has access to the same
technology. In that case, if w' > w, the incumbents' unit costs exceed those of
the entrant (£.g., Varian, 1984, p. 44). With perfect competition in the product
market, the incumbents' output and profit levels will be less than the entrant's.
The worst incumbents can do, therefore, is to set w such that w = w'. In this
symmetry case any step taken to hurt the entrant hurts the incumbents in the same
way. Entry deterrence will not occur, therefore. Entry deterrence will occur only
if the entrant is 'very inefficient with respect to the incumbent's technology'
(Gollier, 1991, p. 399). This is an ad /we imperfection in the factor markets,
considering that incumbent firms are assumed homogeneous. Moreover, if the
entrant is inefficient, why bother with it if its output level is even smaller than
those of the atomistic incumbents? These results appear to support my argument
that cost-raising competition (in the labour market) requires either imperfect
competition in the product market (such that incumbent firms really gain if entry
is deterred) or an imperfectly competitive factor market (e.g., if incumbents own
factors unavailable to entrants).
A model explores a case where both conditions occur. It is inspired by
Dewatripont (1987, p. 152) and integrates Williamson's insights with labour
economics (albeit in a perfunctory way) and industrial economics. Moreover, it
allows the preempting firm to choose its capital-intensity. In Williamson's case,
capital-intensity was exogenous. Mines with rich coal deposits would be capital-Capacity as a Commitment Instrument
intensive and those with poor deposits labour-intensive.
The dominant firm (1) chooses capital (k,) and an industry wage rate w.
Implicitly, the union imposes this wage on fringe firms as well. The industry
wage is subject to a lower boundary w°", the market wage. Assume one second
mover, firm 2." It chooses an investment and employment level (unobserved by
firm 1). Both firms compete in the product market as a Cournot duopoly with a
homogeneous product. In the absence of a strategic motive to influence firm 1 by
a choice of investment or employment level, firm 2 chooses the cost-minimising
technique and invests accordingly. Firm 1 may overinvest in order to preempt
firm 2 by reducing its marginal cost. By choosing a high wage (w > w"") it may
raise firm 2's marginal costs more than its own if its capital-intensity exceeds
firm 2's level. Firm l's profits are 7t, = R'(x,,X2)-wl,-Pk,, where x, = F(k,,l,),
and firm 2's profits are rc, = R*(x,,X2)-C*(w,X2), where C'(w,Xj) =
™ni2,k2{vvl2 + Pk2} subject to Xj = F^y. Given k,, firm l's short run cost
function is such that 1, = g(k,,x,) with F(k,,g(k,,x,)) = x,. Obvious conditions to
impose on g(.) are gk < 0, g, > 0, and g,,t, < 0 (investments reduce marginal
wage costs). In the first stage of the game firm 1 chooses its investment and wage
rate. In the second stage, profit maximisation implies the first-order conditions:
(8.27a) , = 0 = R',,-wgx,; and
The second-order conditions are




Equations (8.27a) imply reaction curves. In the first stage, firm 1 anticipates
these. It chooses k, to shift its own reaction curve outwards, and w to shift both
its own and firm 2's reaction curve inwards. Total differentiation of equations
(8.27a) gives:
(8.28) r
Assume that the determinant of the matrix in the left hand side A (=
[R'xui-wg,,,,][R\2x2-C\2x2]"R'xix2R\2xi) > 0» '•£•> own effects on revenue exceed
cross effects. Cramer's rule gives
(8.29) dxj = A-'([R',,,,-wg,,JC^wdw-R^,[g,,dw+wg,mdk,]). **
17. If the union and the dominant firm decide to maximise their joint interests,
e.g., with efficient bargaining, they act as an integrated firm which supplies an
input (labour) to a fringe firm (2) with which it competes in the product market.
This setting is conducive to a price squeeze on firm 2, which is similar to the
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Totally differentiate firm l's profit function:
(8.30) dn, = [R',,-wgx,]dx,-gdw-[wgk,+p]dk,+R'rfdxj.
The coefficient of dx, equals zero because of the first-order condition. Substitute
8.29 in 8.30:
,ïte fi lo s:>na2ck aril nï
(8.31) «fr, = ^[<-w^]C^-^,^
If the firm sets out from a situation where w = w°" and k, minimises costs (i.e.,
wgki+P = 0), then dk, > 0 raises profits as -{wg,,, + P+R'^A'R^,g,,k,w} =
-R'j2A"'R^,,wg,ni > 0. A wage increase, dw > 0, raises profits if the (positive)
cost-raising effect on firm 2, R'xjA'tR'xixi-wgxixiJC^»,, exceeds the (negative)
direct effect that firm l's marginal costs increase (-g < 0) with the indirect effect
that this raises firm 2's output (-R'x2A'R\2xig*i < 0)- Tim is the more likely the
more labour-intensive firm 2 is, /.«., the more impact the industry wage has on
its marginal costs by a higher C^», and the more capital-intensive firm 1 is, z'.e.,
the smaller g and g,,. Firm 1 is more capital-intensive than firm 2 as it is the
first-mover: it preempts firm 2 by an over-investment. This creates an asymmetry
which allows firm 1 to benefit from a wage increase which hurts firm 2.
8.8 APPRAISAL
The chapter shows that Dixit's (1980 and 1986) approach can accommodate a
wide range of multi-market situations. The multi-market framework shows that an
incumbent firm may try to beat the entrant between hammer and anvil, so to
speak, by reducing the marginal revenue of entry (the own effect) while raising
the marginal (opportunity) cost of entry (the cross effect). See table 8.3.
It also demonstrates the
importance of the precise
setting of competition,
similar to Porter's (1980)
extended rivalry. This
suggests that any models to
be tested should be context-
specific. For this reason, case
studies as Ghemawat (1984
and 1990) and Hall (1990) on
the U.S. titanium dioxide
industry are interesting.
Ghemawat and Caves (1986)
and Smiley (1988), on the
) swiftw îi/U ni
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other hand, are incapable of tailoring their models to specific industries because
of the diversity of their data. Ghemawat and Caves (1986) have a test on PIMS
data pertaining to North American manufacturing firms of non-durables. They
show that capital-intensity has a significantly negative impact on profitability. This
does not seem to accord with the capital-commitment story. Smiley (1988)
questioned managers about entry deterrence, and finds that in the case of new
products, '[e]ntry deterrence through advertising is most often followed
'frequently' (32%), followed by R&D preemption, building a reputation for
toughness, use of the learning curve, and capacity preemption. Again, the two
price preemption policies are used least often (3% and 2%).' (p. 173) This
suggests that capacity preemption is not terribly important to managers. But its
importance may differ starkly across industries. Evidence, therefore, seems
inconclusive. According to the foregoing analysis, this is indeed to be expected.
The overview offered by the chapter suggests that the commitment value of
capacity depends on at least six factors: (1) the competitiveness and the returns to
scale on the supply side of the input markets, (2) the first- and second-mover's
buyer market power in the input markets, (3) the product- or firm-specificity of
capital, e.g., transport and adjustment costs, (4) the slope of the demand curve,
(5) the identity of the entry threat, and (6) the sequence of moves. A change
along any dimension may completely overturn the commitment value of capacity.
Even if conditions (1) to (6) are suitable, moreover, a firm may prefer a
substitute commitment instrument (see e.g. note 17). These outcomes point to the
hazards of capacity commitments.
First, reciprocal entry models show that capacity commitments do not prevent
that firms are vulnerable to import competition. Second, entry barriers are also
exit barriers. Steel firms derive their commitment partly from the huge
(psychological, social and political) costs involved with cutting capacity and
employment. These exit barriers imply that overcapacity can plague the industry
for years (e.g., Morrison, 1988). The associated losses reduce the commitment
value of capital. Third, a commitment strategy may turn into 'clay feet' when the
institutional setting changes (Yip, 1982, p. 29). For instance, a firm l's wage
cost-raising strategy against firm 2 holds only if firm 2 is active in the same
labour market as firm 1. This condition obviously failed to hold for foreign
importers into the U.S. steel market. Importers, therefore, undermined the
wage-cost increasing approach by U.S. Big Steel. Steel makers from developing
countries such as Korea benefit from low wages. As they gained market share,
excess capacity arose in Big Steel. Given the threat of lay-offs, new domestic
firms were able to gain union concessions. Excess capacity induced entry (by
reconstituted mills) rather than deterring it. Big Steel's rigid labour practices had
turned into its clay feet as it could not (timely) accommodate changes in the U.S.
labour market. In an uncertain world firms face a trade-off between flexibility and
pre-commitment (Spencer and Brander, 1993). The upshot of the chapter,
therefore, is that capacity's use as a commitment instrument is highly precarious..y: vtlnsoi'îîn?h?ET WTFTVimON ANT* STRATEGY
PARTV
DYNAMIC MARKET BOUNDARIES
Part V discusses the interdependence between multi-market competition and
market definition. The use of shared resources and multi-market collusion
may blur existing market boundaries. Firms' market definitions may also
affect their entry decisions and thus have an effect on multi-market
competition. The part introduces a dynamic markets perspective that
indentifies causes of changing market boundaries (chapter 9). It then applies
these ideas, as well as the multi-market competition framework, to the
consumer electronics and computer industries (chapter 10).
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T5WHAM9 MARKET DEFINITION AND STRATEGY
The chapter will argue that markets do not exist in real life. Instead, markets
aggregate actual and potential transactions by combining products and
regions whose transactions are interdependent. The market definition debate
has mainly addressed the difficulty at which level to aggregate transactions.
Should markets be broad, that is, including products and regions which are
even slightly interdependent, or should they be narrow, including only highly
interdependent products and regions? The chapter endorses the view that
markets are subjective concepts. The aggregation level reflects a choice for
management and theorists. Multi-market competition also highlights the fact
that market definition is a dynamic process. Firms test their market definition
in competition. Their competitive moves (entry and exit, innovation) change
the underlying determinants of their market concepts. In particular, shared
resources (multi-market spillovers) and collusion affect market boundaries.
Market boundaries are changing occasionally, therefore.
9.1 INTRODUCTION -
"ltftb
The book has assumed throughout that markets are clearly defined. This is,
however, not usually the case. The chapter argues that a firm's (or economist's)
market definition captures his understanding of what the relevant customers,
substitute products, and (actual and potential) competitors are. Market definition
is instrumental in focusing attention on what is relevant, while suppressing from
view those consumers, products and firms which are of no direct concern. Market
definition is a device to reduce information overload, but it may put blinkers on.
It may inspire a firm to ignore developments outside its market (or business) that
may become of utmost importance to it. A theory of market definition is not,
therefore, a theory about an object called markets. It is a theory of decision
making. In particular, it addresses how strategists use a decision tool called
'market definition'. The chapter focuses on how the tool is used and should be
used in a multi-market setting.
The first part of the chapter reviews the literature on market definition. Since
this literature is enormous and scattered, it cannot try to be complete. It focuses
on two themes: how broad or narrow one should define markets, and which
proxies (empirical indicators) one should use to make market definition
operational. Section 9.2 discusses the definition of markets. This definition has
the basic problem that it is nonoperational. Economists are well aware of this,
and the subsequent sections describe their efforts to cope with it. Section 9.3
discusses the theoretical economics literature, section 9.4 the empirical literature,
section 9.5 antitrust, and section 9.6 strategic management. Section 9.7 compares
these strands of literature. It argues in favour of a subjective interpretation of
markets. For a contribution to these debates, the chapter then turns to multi-
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market competition. Section 9.8 discusses the effect of multi-market competition
on market boundaries. Section 9.9 combines the insights of the previous two
sections. It introduces the dynamic markets perspective, which centres on the
interdependence between the firms' market concepts and their multi-market
competition. The perspective focuses on the interaction between firms' decision
making, competition, interdependence across markets, and changing market
boundaries.
9.2 MARKET DEFINITION AND CROSS-ELASTICITIES
Economists use cross-elasticities to define markets. If two markets are completely
unrelated, output in one market will not react to prices in another market:
(ôq*/q*)/(Sp*/p^) = 0, where q is output and p is price for two products or
regions, A and B. If the cross-elasticities are non-zero, or at least sufficiently
large, A and B should be lumped into one market. If, for example, products A
and B are (im)perfect substitutes in demand, an increase of p* induces consumers
to switch to q*. that is, (dq*/q*)/(ôp'7p'') > 0. That is,
'An industry should embrace the maximum geographical area and the
maximum variety of productive activities in which there is strong long-run
substitution. If buyers can shift on a large scale from product or area B to A,
then the two should be combined. If producers can shift on a large scale from
B to A, again they should be combined. (.) All products or enterprises with
large long-run cross-elasticities of either supply or demand should be
combined into a single industry.' (Stigler, 1955, p. 4)
There are three problems with this approach. The first one is the threshold
problem. Market definition would be an exact science if one could define two
markets as different whose cross-elasticities are equal to zero or within some
thresholds, and as part of one integrated market otherwise. Call the thresholds t^
where i = s (supply) or = d (demand) and t., < 0 < t<. If both cross-elasticities
of demand and supply are within the thresholds, the two markets are different: t.j
< (dqj*/o/)/(dp*/p'') < t; (i = d,s). If one or both conditions do not hold, the
two products are aggregated in one market. However, strict threshold values
cannot be given. Stigler and Sherwin (1985, p. 562) argue that
'markets can show every level of interdependence from absolute homogeneity
to complete independence --the continuity of the conventional criteria of
cross-elasticities of demand and supply are enough to suggest that.'
By an appropriate choice of threshold values t,.)j, almost any pair of products A
and B can be construed to be in one market or in different markets.' Another
problem is the time scale: substitution takes time. The shorter the time horizon,
the less substitution one will observe, and the more one is inclined to consider
1. The exception is that if both cross-elasticities equal zero, the products are
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two goods as being in different markets. A third problem is that cross-elasticities
are not usually observed. Hence one will resort to proxies. These problems have
been subject of extended debates, as the next sections show.
9.3 MARKET BOUNDARIES IN ECONOMICS
The theoretical discussion about thresholds focuses among others on market
structure. In the case of pure and perfect competition, market definition seems
clear. Within a market the products are homogeneous. Consumers are indifferent
among them and buy the lowest-priced product without hesitation. Consequently,
the elasticity of substitution among the suppliers' products is infinite. The law of
one price holds: all transactions are in the same price. The infinite elasticity of
substitution and the uniform price delineate the market. This argument can be
extended somewhat. If products are homogeneous, but supplied or demanded at
different locations, transport costs modify the law of one price. Prices (f.o.b.)
may differ by the unit transport or arbitrage cost. This is the classical approach of
Cournot and Marshall (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985, p. 556; and Spiller and Huang,
1986). Furthermore, if products are different on the demand side, they may still
be aggregated in one market if they are homogeneous on the supply side.
Andrews (1951, pp. 143-4) argued that the Marshallian market is not narrow
(limited to products that are homogeneous on the demand side) but broad, since
differentiated products can be perfect substitutes in production.
Imperfect substitutes may exist, however, even in the case of perfect
competition and a uniform market price for homogeneous products. Examples are
coffee and tea, or different types of tea. Perfect competition, therefore, wrestles
with the problem of heterogeneous products, which blur the distinction between
markets.* Marshall already recognised the problem. Market definition may be ad
/!oc, as required by the problem at hand (Marshall, 1982, pp. 84°, 89", and 109";
and Triffin, 1949, p. 749). This is a reasonable point of view, but offers the
economist little in the way of guidelines.
Whereas in perfect competition theories market definition remained a
peripheral problem, monopolistic competition pushed the problem centre stage
(Chamberlin, 1933; and Triffin, 1949). Each supplier is the monopolist of its own
product. The competitors' products are imperfect substitutes. The infinite
elasticity of substitution and the uniform price can no longer serve to delineate the
market. Each product is bound to have an imperfect substitute of some kind.
Chamberlin (1962, p. 81) defined the grow/7 as 'a number of producers whose
goods are fairly close substitutes.' This seems a mere restatement of the
Marshallian industry, with little precision about how close 'fairly close' is (see
2. Marshall's argument groups products A and B in one market if p* = r/+t,
where t is the arbitrage or transport cost. If one groups in one market products
with heterogeneous locations, one should for consistency also group in one market
products with heterogeneous product characteristics. For example, A and B may
be physically different, and / is a psychological adjustment cost of consumers.
Consumers may buy a different brand of tea if it is sufficiently cheaper than their
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Stigler's, 1968, devastating comments). Robinson (1950, p. 17) defines the
market as a product 'homogeneous within itself and 'bounded on all sides by a
marked gap between itself and its closest substitutes. ' She does not explain why
products enclosed by a common gap would be homogeneous, and begged the
question: 'How much inelasticity of substitution shall be required before we call it
a gap?' (Triffin (1949, p. 86). It seems impossible to delineate markets
unambiguously such that products within a market have 'high' cross-elasticities
and products in different markets have 'low' cross-elasticities.
The problem to rigorously define market boundaries inspired two opposite
approaches. Kaldor (1935, p. 38-39) ranks products along a scale, such that
products nearby have high elasticities of substitution. Competition is localised
between a producer and its closest (potential) competitors on the scale. Each firm
develops a market concept that is appropriate for itself but not necessarily for
others. This ushered in the idea of </u/<v/</ua/ùe</ mar/tew. Kaldor (1942, p. 409)
defines a "competitive field," >.-.,.-.•>«!! v^roift •*!«•. i-'Xtff&^.'Vf.jj**;* fr,j.-;•";i>
'the boundaries of which need not be co-extensive to all members, or rather,
might vary with the position of any particular firm within the field.' <
For Kaldor, therefore, the market becomes a subjective, firm-specific concept,
rather than an object or fact. Each firm operates in a market which may include
other firms as well. The latter firms, however, have their own markets, which
may only partly overlap with the former market. Firm 2 may, for instance, be
active in the markets of firm 1 and firm 3. The products of 1 and 3 may not be
direct substitutes for each other. Firm 2 is a smuft/fer if its product is located in
between the products 1 and 3, i.e., if 2 is an imperfect substitute for both. In
Robinson's chain of substitutes, the straddler fills a 'marked gap' between
products 1 and 3. The result is ('nrf/rec/ com/œnrion between firms 1 and 3
through their influence upon firm 2 (Cooper, 1989). If the influence is sufficiently
weak, one will not include firms 1 and 3 in the same market. The construct of a
scale (consisting of line segments in DeGraba, 1987, and circles in Cooper, 1989)
is a special case, however. If firms locate on a single scale (/.e., a unique
characteristic of their products), each firm faces just two neighbours. If, however,
there are several scales (/.«., multidimensional products), firms may face
numerous neighbours. Moreover, even on one scale each firm may be
interdependent with firms far down the scale. Indirect competition assures this.
Kaldor's partial equilibrium approach may then lead to a non-exclusive and thus
non-operational market definition.
Triffin (1949) faced the same problem in Chamberlinian theory as Kaldor.
Like him he notes that market definition is an instrument to order the economic
environment:
'The Chamberlinian "group" veers definitely away from the old Marshallian
concept. It is no longer a definite economic entity, the existence of which has
merely to be recognized by the investigator; it is an analytical tool which may
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From this insight Triffin (1949) derived some unique insights. The critical
problem in applying this analytical tool are the threshold values of the cross-
elasticities. If the thresholds are sufficiently small, any two products may be
related. They may include the entire economy in one 'market.' Triffin faces a
tradeoff. He notes that Robinson recognised,
'the logical dilemma of paying attention either to the uniqueness of each
firm's product, or to the universal substitutability of all economic goods, in
their competition for the consumer's dollar.' (Triffin, 1949, p. 82)
Triffin cuts the Gordian knot by emphasising the 'general competitiveness
between non-homogeneous products'. He urges economists to use a general
equilibrium approach instead of a partial equilibrium approach (p. 86). Each
product competes with many others, which compete with yet others, and so on.
Market boundaries cannot be drawn as there is no end to the chain of substitutes,
nor are there marked gaps. Triffin's preference for general equilibrium theorising
can be interpreted as an argument in favour of cross-elasticity thresholds
sufficiently small (or zero) to include all products in one market (economy).
Triffin subsequently draws his famous conclusion. The market is not a useful
theoretical concept. Exit partial equilibrium theory! Considering the theoretical
contributions by industrial economics, Triffin throws away the baby with the bath
water. Yet his logic is flawless: if there is an error, it must be in his assumptions.
Triffin assumes that monopolistic firms and other decision makers find their way
in a general equilibrium world. They will optimise their objectives taking into
account all opportunities and threats, both present and future. Each decision
maker comprehends the whole canvass, fully aware of how its decisions interact
with and call forth decisions by other decision makers, including those not yet
active. This requires, of course, unbounded computational and intellectual
abilities. This assumption is I believe mistaken when discussing market definition.
Economists, for sure, at least most of them, including the present author, do not
have the required intellectual abilities! Triffin himself, by the way, does not
actually use general equilibrium modelling.
Triffin's approach is counterfactual. It describes the hypothetical situation
when rationality is perfect. No markets will be defined in this case. Indirectly, it
demonstrates rigorously that market definition is the progeny of constrained
rationality.' To have ushered in this conclusion is in my opinion Triffin's
contribution. This insight offers a solid foundation for the views espoused in the
later part of the chapter. Stigler (1968) fails to give Triffin this credit. Stigler
correctly notes that the counterfactual approach offers little help to positive
analysis. It creates a gap between theory, which requires a general equilibrium
context, and empirical work, which focuses on particular markets. Triffin
3. I avoid the term bounded rationality not to get mixed up in the debate on the
causes of the constraints. Bounded rationality centres on the human mind's
computational constraints similar to computers. This theory has been criticised for
ignoring nonrational thought processes (Mintzberg, 1989, p. 67-8), such as
motivational and emotional limits of rationality (Selten, 1990). *. j ... -192 Chapter 9
acknowledges that the Chamberlinian group is useful in empirical work: -••-•*
'we can, in this way, reduce to a manageable size the research work involved,
> without any serious loss in precision or exhaustiveness. ' (p. 88)
Kaldor and Triffin appear to have wrestled with a dilemma. On the one hand,
decision makers may focus attention on a narrow market because of limits in
gathering and processing information. On the other hand, a general equilibrium
context forces each decision maker to understand the interdependence among all
products, suppliers and consumers. Section 9.8 further elaborates the dilemma.
With the theoretical issues unsettled, market definition turned into an empirical
problem.
9.4 MARKET BOUNDARIES IN EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Since cross-elasticities are usually unobserved, economists resort to proxies. A
familiar proxy is the correlation between the prices of two goods (Kaldor, 1942,
p. 410; and Stigler and Sherwin, 1985). If the correlation coefficient is high
(close to unity), the two goods are considered to be in the same market. Stigler
and Sherwin (1985, pp. 566-7) argue that the proxy is useful as its data
requirements are modest: the time series of the two prices. The proxy is
appropriate, because a high cross-elasticity is likely to lead to correlated price
movements. The correlation can be spurious as it may be due to a common cause,
e.g., inflation or a price change of a common input. The authors propose a two-
step method that gets around this problem. First they regress both prices on the
common influence (e.g., the price level of a common input), and then they
correlate the residuals (which approximate the value added to the common input).
The theoretical argument for expecting correlation of values added is, however,
weaker than for prices (Stigler and Sherwin, 1985, p. 572).*
Since price correlations fail to paint the full picture, it is important to use
additional information. For example, large shipments between areas have been
used as indicator that both are in the same market. The same holds for price
differences between areas (or goods). If these are identical to arbitrage costs, the
areas can be included in one market. This approach is solidly based on Cournot
and Marshall's market definition. If transport costs are unknown, Spiller and
Huang (1986) have a method that gets around this problem. Their model does
have the drawback, however, that markets are either autarkic or integrated. It
does not appear to accommodate the intermediate situation of segmented or joined
markets. Moreover, for their model to work, each market has to behave as if it is
autarkic at some and integrated at other periods (Spiller and Huang, 1986, p.
136"). When market definition is not itself the topic of the research, economists
may resort to other proxies. For example, SIC industry classifications are used as
markets; the digit level used may depend upon availability of data (e.g., Dunne,
4. The correlation of prices seems an appropriate argument if the products are
imperfect substitutes. If they are complements, correlation of sales may be the
better proxy. . • • . :• •• •.,.•-.-, ;• • -nrnii i - •. • •• •• . .'.. : ,--Market Definition 193
Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988). An applied field that frequently dealt with market
definition, is antitrust. -» -• \i"-v; <•; KUIIU'IA .MS."* 'xcsm
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9.5 MARKET BOUNDARIES IN ANTITRUST ^Î • ilJRi-
U.S. antitrust literature searches for market definition which is operational and
useful for its aims. The 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines of the U.S.
Department of Justice are inspired by the aim to prevent mergers that may raise
prices. They ushered in 'antitrust markets', to be distinguished from 'economic
markets', that have been defined in the theoretical literature (section 9.2). The
Merger Guidelines define an 'antitrust market'
'such that "a hypothetical firm that was the only present and future seller of
these products ('the monopolist') could profitably impose a small but
significant and nontransitory increase in price - generally five percent lasting
one year."' (quoted by Jorde and Teece, 1991, p. 123). - . ,.
The antitrust market is thus a potential cartel. Scheffman and Spiller (1987) make
this approach operational by modelling the residual demand function of a potential
cartel. The cartel combines the suppliers in a region; it faces a competitive group
in another region. Their products are homogeneous, and can be shipped into each
region. Given the rival group's price, each group faces the residual demand.
Associated with the residual demand is an elasticity of demand. If the elasticity
remains below a threshold, the potential cartel could raise price by the threshold
indicated (e.g., a 5% increase). If a potential cartel has been defined, a merger
can be forbidden if it leads to an excessive increase of the concentration ratio
within the cartel. The maximum increase in concentration ratios allowed is made
precise by Herfindahl indices. Stigler and Sherwin (1985) criticise the two-step
approach in the Merger Guidelines: why not bypass the market definition issue,
and directly forbid a merger if it is expected to raise prices by more than a
threshold value (e.g., 5%)?! The antitrust approach does have the merit that it
relates the thresholds to an ulterior motive. Confronted with a proposed merger,
legislators trade off the interests of the firms involved, their rivals, and the
consumers. They should derive the thresholds from their preferences about the
tradeoff.
There are criticisms that antitrust leads to markets that are too narrowly
defined. In measuring cross-effects on prices, the Department of Justice uses one-
or two-year periods in its Merger Guidelines [see the quote above from Jorde and
Teece (1991)]. Jorde and Teece (1991) argue that these periods are too short. As
noted in section 9.2, the larger the time scale, the higher the amount of
substitution that can occur. In technologically dynamic markets, innovations take
time to spread through the market. Users have to acquire experience in using the
product, existing equipment has to be scrapped, and complementary assets have to
be installed. As a result, it may take years for buyers to switch to a new product
even if it is a superior substitute for an existing product. The one- and two-year
periods underestimate the substitution, and thus fail to include existing products
(which may be inferior substitutes) in the market of a new product. The new194 Chapter 9
product's market is narrowly defined and the innovator is alleged to have a large
market share. Antitrust is likely to be hostile to R&D and product market
cooperation between innovators. Jorde and Teece (1991) argue in favour of
adjusting antitrust regulation for high-tech industries. In particular, the time scale
has to be extended to four years, with the option of adjusting it to individual cases
(Jorde and Teece, 1991, p. 127). This point is well taken. Note, however, that if
the period is long, it may occur that the basic conditions (e.g., technology and
consumer preferences) change in the mean time. Innovations may change the
boundaries between markets (see section 9.8). Like antitrust, strategic
management theories have to deal with market definition.
9.6 MARKET BOUNDARIES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
Two themes loom as large in the strategic management literature as in economics
and antitrust: the importance of market definition, and which proxies to use for
cross-elasticities.
9.6.1 The Aims of Market Définition
Strategic management considers market definition an important part of decision
making. The importance can be illustrated by the consequences of errors. First,
firms may over- or underestimate the interdependence among markets. The
distinction between global firms and multidomestic firms hinges in part on
whether the firm defines the world market as integrated or joined markets (the
global view) or as segmented markets (the multidomestic view) (Hout, Porter,
Rudden, 1982; Levitt, 1983; Prahalad and Doz, 1987; and Yip, 1989). This
literature cautiously advocates a global view. Second, firms may ignore some
markets altogether. A strategy that acknowledges this may consist of entry into a
market that is outside the business definition of incumbent firms. For the
incumbent firms, the entrant is an 'over horizon competitor' (Clarke and Brennan,
1990, p. 12). The incumbents will not observe the entry as a threat to their
business, and will not respond. Their inertia may allow the entrant to encroach
upon the incumbent firms' market. Hatten and Hatten (1987a, p. 300) appreciate
this point when they write:
'Competition between companies ultimately comes down to competition
between concepts of what their business is. (.) Different concepts ensure
t competition without confrontation.'
Porter (1980) dissents from the view that market definition is important,
provided that the firm focuses broadly on competition. In the context of exrem/«/
nva/ry it is important to identify the players (see chapter 2):
».
! 'Any definition of an industry is essentially a choice of where to draw the line
> between established competitors and substitute products, between existing
• firms and potential entrants, and between existing firms and suppliers and
*; buyers. Drawing these lines is inherently a matter of degree and has little toMarket Definition 195
do with the choice of strategy.' (Porter, 1980, p. 32)
Porter here ignores that market definition is important for strategy formation
exactly because it is about identifying the firm's buyers, rivals, ere. Market
definition does not only draw the lines within the extended rivalry framework,
between existing firms and potential entrants, ere, but it also draws the lines
around the extended rivalry to set it off from the wider economy. Porter's
extended rivalry framework should be considered the basic argument in favour of
a broad market definition within strategic management.
Strategic management researchers usually urge a broad market definition
(analogous to small thresholds of the cross-elasticities). A narrow market
definition may imply a neglect of potential competitors or substitutes. The
arguments in favour of a broad market definition are based on substitution, which
is consistent with Stigler's definition (section 9.2). Levitt (1975) wrote a
well-known invective against 'marketing myopia' that firms get trapped by using
narrow market definitions. Managers may fail to notice or welcome the
appearance of substitute products. For instance, railroads 'let others take
customers away from them because they assumed themselves to be in the railroad
business rather than in the transportation business. (.) they were product-oriented
instead of customer-oriented.' (Levitt, 1975, p. 26). The firm, that is, should
have a broad market definition in terms of the demand side by focusing on the
utility that consumers derive from products. Cars, e.g., may serve for transport
as well as image. A firm should be imaginative, and include in its market non-
intuitive substitutes like mink coats to Cadillac cars (Drucker, 1977, p. 72). Grant
(1991) argues that firms should include in a market all products they could
conceivably produce using their resources. This entails a broad market definition
based on substitutes in production. Hatten and Hatten (1987a) prefer a broad
definition that identifies (im)perfect substitutes to a firm's products, as well as
possible sources of entry, e.g., existing firms in (supply or demand) related
markets. The latter have eliminated some entry costs (p. 92). They may have
different resources that are difficult to match by the incumbent. The incumbent
firm should be aware of firms which use Grant's diversifying approach. Strategic
management faces the usual problem of making market definition operational, that
is, of finding proxies for the cross-elasticities. « n
9.6.2 Identifying Firms' Market Definitions • ^
Abell (1980) proposes to identify market boundaries on the basis of firms' market
definitions, rather than the other way round. A firm's market definition can be
gleaned from the interdependence among three dimensions of competition:
competition ;n a market vwV/z instruments agû/njr competitors. First, the markets
served by a firm (the 'competing in' dimension) may indicate its business
definition. This is indicative especially if all competitors use the same market
definition (Abell, 1980). If firms' product lines do not completely overlap the
business may be defined as the union or cross-section of their activities.
Second, a firm may have a core competence or central resource, e.g., know
how or marketing skill (the 'competing wM' dimension). Its business is then the196 Chapter 9
collection of markets that may exploit this shared skill (Gilbert and Strebel, 1988;
and Grant, 1991). Some publicly available data can be used to identify what the
firm considers its central skill. Its R&D-intensity, advertising-intensity and other
data indicate its investments in its resources. Circumstantial evidence can also be
used. Investments or acquisitions to acquire public resources (e.g., a brand name
or patents) are moves by w/i/c/i a firm competes which may indicate the business
it thinks it is competing in. The internal organisation of the firm also reflects its
opinion on the importance of shared resources. A corporate firm will often
centralise the provision of a public resource (such as basic research) as it has
higher investment incentives than any of its individual business units. The latter
may ignore synergies among them (e.g., Clarke and Brennan, 1990, p. 11). This
centralisation in turn indicates which shared resources the firm considers of
paramount importance. These data may help to identify a firm's business.
Third, if a firm constitutes a strategic group with other firms, it is assumed to
resemble these firms (Caves and Porter, 1977, p. 250). It may, e.g., be
conjectured to have the same market definition (the 'competing aga/'/w'
dimension). If market boundaries expand, a firm will face new rivals in hitherto
different markets. This generates new challenges and requires new learning. To
facilitate this learning, Westney (1988) argues that firms may engage in
cooperative linkages with some of their new rivals. This argument can be turned
around to argue that new cooperative linkages and new partners may indicate that
a firm is redefining its industry. The next section compares the theories in the
previous sections.
9.7 RELATING THESE PERSPECTIVES ON MARKET DEFINITION
The economics and antitrust discussions and the strategic management discussion
differ markedly. They put forward different proxies for the enigmatic cross-
elasticities. To see why, consider the introduction of a new product. It will take
the firm two years to develop the product. Subsequently it may take four years
before all potential customers have decided whether to switch to the new product.
Following Jorde and Teece's (1991) argument, it is only after the four year
period that one can ascertain the market of the new product. The innovator,
however, has to estimate the extent of the market prior to its investment decision.
Strategic management looks six years ahead, whereas economics will look back,
six years from now. The proxies used by strategic management are predictive; the
proxies used by economics are descriptive. They should be considered
complementary: decisions which according to economics will (ultimately) affect
market definition, can be used as proxies by strategic management. Section 9.9
returns to this argument.
Antitrust seems to prefer narrow market definitions. Economics and strategic
management instead favour broad market definitions. If the market definition is
'too' broad, however, it loses its function:
'a market should not be the entire economy. In particular, it should allow
partial-equilibrium analysis. It should also allow a single description of the
main interactions among firms.' (Tirole, 1988, p. 12). :. ? us»*'•.".•* fc:, •••;-.*IMarket Definition 197
An appropriate threshold represents a tradeoff between constrained rationality
(which favours a narrow market definition) and the interdependence between
products (which favours a broad market definition). This is the basic dilemma in
theory and applied work (management).
The literature discussed in the previous sections appears to have some
common views as well. It largely agrees about the importance of research aims in
defining markets, the subjective choice of critical thresholds and time periods, and
the need to use proxies for unobserved cross-elasticities. These conclusions are
rather unsettling. They offer theorists too much latitude in defining markets. If,
for example, the cross-elasticity of demand (dq'Vq*)/(dp"Vp") between products A
and B were know to be 0.5, would you include both in one market? How does a
research aim translate into an appropriate threshold value? The conclusion of the
discussion must be: r/iere w no /ww/V/ve fou/s ro mar&v </ç/7/urion. One cannot
falsify a claim that two products are in one market. This suggests the conceptual
nature of markets. -H;*. a;ij>>,^ jor^jv^/îK:!^ *M;<iMi:t*ifl: ..:•»_•: .y eistvm
9.7.1 Markets are Concepts in the Managers' Minds
Markets are JuZyec//ve concepts used by theorists and participants to aggregate
transactions which in their perception belong together. A market indicates the
players' roles by identifying buyers and sellers, and by distinguishing actual from
potential competitors. It distinguishes close substitutes from (highly) imperfect
ones. It is a preliminary step to calculating market share, which firms consider an
important indicator of performance, and which antitrust officials consider an
indicator of market power. Market definition, in short, separates the part of the
economy that is of immediate concern from more remote areas. It economises on
information costs and focuses scarce computational abilities on those areas where
they have the highest payoff to a decision maker. Its key function is relevance in
decision making: ,*.™,..., i- ••--.•. ... . „. , -
'we explicitly define an 'industry' as any grouping of individual
manufacturing businesses which is relevant when we study the behaviour of
any one such business.' (Andrews, 1951, p. 168).
If information is costly, some concept of the market is required.
Market definition is about /ocwjmg attention to those products and processes
that have a (potential, long-run) effect on a firm's demand and supply. The theory
of perce/WMa/y?//m (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988) may provide an explanation.
This theory argues that people do not act upon the raw data of their environment
(stimuli). Instead, people act upon perceptions which they filter from the real
world. Filters bring relevant information to the foreground and push irrelevant
information to the background. 'The filtered information is less accurate but, if
the filtering is effective, more understandable.' (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988, p.
41). They distinguish two filters: noticing (scanning) and sensemaking
(interpreting). These filters imply distortions. Stimuli may not be noticed (brought
to one's attention) if they have certain characteristics (e.g., if they are familiar).
They may also be distorted if they clash with the observer's sensemaking.198 Chapter 9
Unwelcome information may be ignored. Market definition is a sensemaking
filter: by locating product B in A's market, B is judged to be important to A.
Cross-elasticities denote the size of the stimuli (i.e., the impact which a shock in
B has on A). This helps suppliers and buyers of A to focus on those products
which are relevant to them. Starbuck and Milliken note two characteristics of
filters which are relevant in this context. First, a filter that was appropriate in
some context may in other situations focus attention on unimportant, irrelevant
stimuli. Moreover, 'these types of filtering may persist over time and so
characterise organisations or individual executives.' (p. 44). These are two key
characteristics of firms' market definitions: they may inspire errors, and they are
slow to change. Competition without confrontation is an example where a firm
fails to notice the arrival of a new rival or fails to classify the other as a rival
(subsection 9.6.1).
The multi-market competition framework may contribute to market definition
in two ways. It shows how firms' decision making affects market boundaries
(section 9.8). It suggests a perspective that relates market definition to a firm's
decision making process in an iterative and interactive way (section 9.9).
9.8 MARKET BOUNDARIES IN MULTI-MARKET COMPETITION
The multi-market framework is an attempt to alleviate the dilemma noted in
sections 9.3 and 9.7. It tries to offer some of the advantages of general
equilibrium (i.e., the interdependence between markets) while respecting the
bounded rationality of decision making (by means of a partial equilibrium
context). By focusing on a set of related markets it may avoid the extremes of too
narrow or too broad market definitions. Among related markets, multi-market
competition affects the extent to which local demand or cost shocks in a market
spill over to other markets. Firms' (re)actions in multi-market competition, such
as investments, can be used in turn as proxies of their market definitions.
Multi-market competition suggests a three-step approach to (the analysis of)
decision making. Information costs induce the firm to delineate a multi-market
framework with the largest number of markets (n) that still allows Tirole's (1988,
p. 12) 'single description of the main interactions.' Given a product, the 'n-1'
products with highest cross-elasticities or proxies are joined with it in one market
or business. The critical threshold values are chosen implicitly to accommodate
this selection. In the context of joined markets, the firm identifies its core
competence and then selects markets where the investments in the competence can
be recovered. Finally, competition within this set can be analyzed using the game
theoretical tools discussed in parts III and IV. The first two steps in this approach
are probably <«/ Aoc. As the reader will have noticed, this book is limited to
studying interactions between two markets at a time. The reason for this is
bounded rationality. When better instruments become available, it will be possible
to extend the reasoning beyond two markets. Industrial economics progressed
from a focus on competition in one market in the period up to the 1970s, to
multi-market competition in the 1980s.Market Definition 199
9.8.1 Market Definition in Related Markets
Since markets are concepts used to order the real world, they are inherently
taxonomic. A market has to be understood relative to market segments and
businesses, where a 6iu;/ii£? is defined as a set of related markets. The business
is the setting of extended rivalry (Porter, 1980, p. 4; see section 2.2). By mariter
(fe/imnon I will henceforth mean the extended sense of identifying these segments,
markets, and businesses. Each prospective 'market' has cross-elasticities with
other 'markets' ranging from quite small to fairly large. This suggests that
markets can be grouped into larger units using a series of threshold values of the
cross-elasticities (Shepherd, 1985, p. 49). There is a hierarchy of markets with
increasing relatedness from market segment (where all products are close
substitutes) to the business (where most suppliers may be each other's potential
rather than actual rival). For example, if products are imperfect substitutes in
demand, a series of thresholds exists, 0 < t/ < t<i" < t/ for defining a business
(B), market (M), or market segment (S). If A and B have a cross-elasticity tj such
that t/ < tj < t/*, A and B are assumed in the same business but in different
markets.
Chapter 5 made market definition operational by distinguishing direct cross-
market links between prices and output levels (due to arbitrage or multi-market
collusion) and indirect links (through investments in shared resources). The
existence of arbitrage trade, for example, is a clear proxy for (and determinant
of) high cross-elasticities. In the case of integrated and coordinated markets,
prices move in the same directions, such that price correlations may be used as
proxies of the degree of integration. The next subsections discuss how links
between joined (e/c.) markets transmit local demand and cost shocks to other
markets. Each link affects market boundaries and is a proxy for market definition.
9.8.2 Segmented Markets
Common suppliers in segmented markets are a link that may transmit supply
shocks. Consider the Brander and Krugman (1983) trade model in chapter 5.
Assume that a small shock in one market raises marginal production costs of the
domestic firm by dq. As a result, prices will increase in both markets. In a
Cournot duopoly with linear demand, price in each market will increase by VbdCj,
provided that firm i's cost does not increase prohibitively, i.e., provided it
continues to export to the foreign market. The prices will correlate positively (and
perfectly, if exports continue). The common suppliers, price correlation, and
shipments between the markets may be proxies for supply-side cross-elasticities.
9.8.3 Joined Markets
A business may comprise the activities that use a shared resource. This is
consistent with Abell (1980, p. 197), who rather arbitrarily limits the shared
resource to technology. Investments in shared resources lead to multi-market
spillovers (see appendices 5.B and 5.C). These in turn transfer a local (demand)
shock in one market to a related market (appendix 5.D). This generates a non-200 Chapter 9
zero cross-elasticity as a change in price in one market coincides with a change in
quantities in the related market. The size of investments in shared resources can
therefore be a proxy for the existence of (moderately) high cross-elasticities. A
related proxy is the resource-intensity. If, for example, advertising is a shared
resource (with umbrella branding), advertising intensity (advertising over sales) is
a proxy for the cross-elasticities, and for the degree of integration or relatedness.
There are two counter-arguments to this approach. First, shared resources do not
necessarily lead to a spillover effect and, second, larger investments in a shared
resource may reduce costs or raise product quality such that sales increase: it can
not be excluded that a spillover reduces the resource-intensity.
Shared capacity investments may illustrate the former counter-argument.
Capacity investments may (but need not) transfer a local demand shock in one
market to another market. This in turn will affect market definition. Consider the
model in section 8.6. Say, a shock Z raises demand in market A. If it shifts
upward the demand function by a constant amount, price includes a variable Z
+x,*Z.
and profits include an amount x*Z. For firm 1 this gives:
(9.5) «, = Ip*(x,*+x,*)-c,]x,*+[p»(k,-x,*+krx,*Ki-t,][k,-x,*]-C(k,)
The mean of Z is zero; the distribution is unspecified. If the shock occurs in the
second stage of the game, the capacity investments have already been installed.
To solve the game, add Z to the second stage reaction curves d7i,/<?Xj* = 0 (see
equations 8.5) and totally differentiate these to the variables Xj* and Z. Since the
capacity levels are given in the second stage, dlq = 0. Cramer's rule then solves
dx* as functions of dZ. Call dX* = dx^+dx,^. It is straightforward that
(9.6) dX* = -2((p/+p,»)/lGl)dZ;
where G is the 2x2 matrix defined in equation (8.6), and the determinant | GI >
0. With given capacity levels this gives dX* s dx,*+dx2" = -dX*. Prices in both
markets change as a result: ^;f,^.
p p,pp
(9.7b) dp* = (l-2p/((p/+p,°)/
)dZ; and
G I ))dZ.
If the demand shock dZ is positive, supply increases in market A and decreases in
market B. Price increases in market B, but its sign in A is a priori unknown. The
shock has the direct effect of increasing price and the indirect effect of reducing it
through the output expansion. In the case of linear demand, it holds that dp* =
(1- %p//(p/+p,"))dZ, such that %dZ < dp* < dZ. Market definition is affected
as follows. Cross effects appear: dp*/dX" < 0 and dp"/dX* > 0. The cross
elasticities of supply are, therefore, unequal to zero. If they are of sufficient
magnitude, one might conclude that A and B belong in one market. It also follows
that dpVdZ > 0 for j = A,B. The prices are (perfectly) correlated, and again one
may conclude that both products belong in one market.
Now consider the case where the shock occurs before investment decisions
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shock. As case 1 in the previous chapter showed, with linear demand firms will
install capacity in each market up to the point where the et an/e marginal
production cost (which does not change) equals marginal revenue. Each firm
expands production capacity just enough to satisfy the increased demand in market
A. Sales in market B (lq-x*) remain unaffected. The shock in market A does not
transmit to market B. If demand is non-linear some transmission will occur as
each firm will reallocate part of its increased capital stock to market B.
A different case holds when the shared resource is a public good with
increasing returns. This case may illustrate the second counter-argument to using
resource-intensity as a proxy of cross-elasticities. Consider R&D investments by a
multinational firm which is active in markets A and B. Market B also features a
domestic non-exporting firm (De Bondt, Sleuwaegen and Veugelers, 1988). The
R&D produces know how which, for instance, reduces marginal costs. Apart
from the shared know how, the markets are unrelated. If the multinational firm
did not anticipate the shock when taking the investment decision, a positive
demand shock in A will raise the output level and profit in A, but will have no
effect in market B. If it did anticipate the shock, a positive shock will raise its
R&D. This will reduce marginal costs in both markets. Prices fall in market B
because of the reduced marginal costs. The price in market A may rise (because
of the demand shock) or fall (because of the R&D). Only in a freak case will the
cross-elasticity be (close to) zero. The multi-market spillover effect of R&D is
likely to raise the multinational firm's R&D relative to a domestic firm.
However, competition effects (Veugelers and Vanden Houte, 1990) and inter-firm
R&D-spillover effects (De Bondt « a/., 1988) determine whether this really
holds. Even if the multi-market spillover raises the multinational firm's R&D, it
need not raise its R&D-intensity, as they also raise its sales. Increasing
investments in shared resources indicate increasing (absolute values of the) cross-
elasticities and might be used as a proxy; the resource-intensity is, however, an
ambiguous signal of cross-elasticities.
These cases show that investments in shared resources may raise the cross-
elasticities of demand or supply. Market definition depends on the interplay of
shared resources (private or public goods, with constant or increasing returns),
information (unanticipated or anticipated shocks), and competition. Market
boundaries are fuzzy if markets are joined by shared resources. This is the
predominant reason why market definition becomes a pressing issue in the context
of multi-market competition. The size of these shared resources depends on the
investment decisions by multi-market firms. The po/en/m/ for spillovers is given
by structural conditions, i.e., technology, consumer preferences, and the state of
information. The realisation of multi-market spillover effects depends on firms'
strategies. Only these actual spillovers determine the cross-elasticities that define
markets. Thus if, for instance, firms do not invest in shared R&D processes, no
actual spillover arises. Empirical tests will then indicate that the markets are
unrelated. By way of example, General Motors carries different product lines in
the U.S. and in Europe, each requiring its own R&D. Few spillovers are realised,
and a test (and perhaps GM as well) would conclude that the markets are
unrelated. A Japanese or European firm that sells a single line of products
worldwide will draw different conclusions. Market definition may be a202 Chapter 9
self-fulfilling prophecy. ! .«t^-.bwrafe-?stt;>^te
9.8.4 Spheres-of-Influence
Firms establish spheres-of-influences by (partially or completely) withdrawing to
the market where each has an advantage from being the lowest-cost supplier (see
subsection 5.5.5). Market boundaries interact with spheres-of-influence. On the
one hand, exclusive influence-spheres lead to sharply delineated market
boundaries. If firms establish exclusive spheres-of-influence, a small local
(demand or cost) shock will not have an effect in the other market unless it
disrupts multi-market collusion. If market demand increases in market A, the
supplier in market B may prefer being active in that market while disrupting
spheres-of-influence to being monopolist in its market B. A demand shock in
market A will then have an effect in B as well: prices fall, demand levels
increase, and cross-elasticities are negative (see Appendix 9.A). If they are
sustainable, however, spheres-of-influence contribute to sharply delineated market
boundaries, and the absence of shipments can be construed as a proxy for low
cross-elasticities. On the other hand, a widely accepted, inter-subjective market
definition is helpful in delineating spheres-of-influence that firms will accept and
can abide by without explicitly colluding. Thus, market definition may help to
sustain collusion. The next section discusses the dynamics of market definition.
9.9 A DYNAMIC MARKETS PERSPECTIVE
The dy/wwmc /nanfcm perspective may integrate two points raised in the previous
sections. From multi-market competition theory (see the previous section) it
accepts that investments do not only change supply and demand conditions within
a market. They also spill over market boundaries, up to a point where they
change the boundaries between these markets. From the theory of perceptual
filters (section 9.7) it accepts that a firm acts upon its perception, i.e., upon facts
which are filtered (distorted) by its market definition. Moreover, a firm's market
concepts are dynamic, if it (slowly) adjusts them to its performance in
competition. The firm learns to use market definition to make predictions about
rivals, consumers, e/c, and to initiate its own decisions. Important aspects of
many learning theories are cfe/ayj (of adjustments) and /œterogene/ry (of economic
agents). These aspects may play a role in competition, where they create a
potential for losses (due to delayed adjustments) as well as profits (by exploiting
rivals' inflexible beliefs). Two well-known types of (opérant) learning are
reinforcement and extinction (e.g., Van Witteloostuijn, 1990c). Positive
reinforcement implies that successful market outcomes (profits) strengthen the
firm's belief in the correctness of its market definition and decision making
process. Its perceptual filters become more entrenched. Extinction implies that
adverse market outcomes (losses) raise doubts about its filters, and initiate a
search for alternatives.
The combination of these two starting points (investments and learning)
suggests a feedback between perceived market boundaries and the firm's basic
conditions (technology, preferences, legislation, e/c). This entails an iterativeMarket Definition 203
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process: perceived market boundaries -> decision making (c.^., R&D) -» basic
conditions (e.g., technology) -> market boundaries. Because of their individualised
markets, firms may use different market definitions (section 9.3). Competition
among heterogeneous firms affects the underlying determinants of market
boundaries and firms' perception of them. This adds an interactive aspect to
market definition. Market boundaries are subjective (within firms), inter-
subjective (if firms agree on market definition proxies and thresholds), but never
objective (i.e., pertaining to real world objects). The perspective is a descriptive204 Chapter 9
tool rather than a theory that allows testable predictions. ~ 1 j
A framework may help to identify the dynamic and subjective elements in
market definition. See figure 9.1. Causation in the framework is interactive and
iterative. The Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm in industrial economics
emphasises the flow of causation from basic conditions (technology, preferences,
the law, e/c), through market structure and conduct to performance (e.g., the
firm's payoffs) (Scherer, 1980). The flow runs from the 'most irreversible'
parameters from a firm's point of view to the 'least irreversible.' Game theory
has shown that strong feedbacks exist (the dashed lines) from conduct to market
structure. These feedbacks (e.g., through entry and entry deterrence) also impact
on technology (through R&D), and information (advertising, learning). It appears
appropriate, therefore, to consider market structure and the basic conditions as
given only in some intermediate run.
The basic conditions include the potential for multi-market spillovers. For
instance, technology may exhibit economies of scope. Whether firms use this
potential is a matter of choice.* Market definition plays an important role in the
individual firm's corporate strategy formation process. The difference between
global firms, multidomestic firms, and conglomerates (which are important
strategy types) is partly to be traced to their market definition. The firm may treat
its markets as integrated (using the same technology, product lines,
manufacturing, e/c., everywhere), segmented or joined (using some shared
resources), or unrelated (each market having its own resources). The firm's
decisions on entry and exit contribute to the history of the industry. They may
implement or defect from spheres-of-influence. They also set the stage for
investment decisions. These in turn affect actual multi-market spillovers.
Depending on the existence of multi-market collusion and the actual size of multi-
market spillover effects, local (demand or cost) shocks are transmitted to other
markets. This gives rise to observations of price correlation and shipments which
may affect or confirm firms' market definitions.
Firms may adjust their market definition if payoffs indicate that it plays a role
in success or failure. The normal life expectancy of a successful business
definition has been guessed at ten years (Drucker, 1977, p. 77). It may now be
less, as globalisation has sensitised firms to the importance of business definition.
Adjustment takes several forms. First, there is exit of established firms and entry
of new ones, with possibly new market definitions. Second, existing firms may
learn to adjust their definitions. Learning may occur at two levels. Given that a
firm uses particular proxies, new data will update its market definitions. The firm
may also learn from experience or imitation to use different proxies (and
associated theories). Data of prices and shipments may be of limited use if
investments are tailored to expectations of new developments and if substitution
suffers from long delays (section 9.5). The foregoing has shown the importance
5. Van Cayseele (1987), e.g., shows that firms may forego a potential economy
of scope (in R&D), if other conditions are more compelling.Market Definition 205
of circumstantial evidence (subsection 9.6.2).' The previous sections have come
up with the following proxies:
- the size of and investments in shared resources (subsection 9.8.3),
- internal organisation, especially centralised control over some shared
resources (subsection 9.6.2).
- new joint ventures and new partners (subsection 9.6.2),
^ acquisitions to enter new markets or acquire new resources (subsection 9.6.2),
- markets served, shipments, (reciprocal) entry and exit (subsection 9.8.4), and
- straddlers, i.e., intermediate products (section 9.3).
These proxies imply that a firm may interpret moves by other firms as signals of
changing market definitions. The feedback effects (shaded lines 11 to 14) imply
that markets are continuously being redefined. The overall picture is that market
definition is endogenous to firms' strategies. This counter-intuitive point of view
has been strongly emphasised by Abell (1980) (subsection 9.6.2). Of course, steps
(1) and (2) indicate that in a higher-order analysis data determine strategy, and
thus, market definition. Yet the impact of data is intermediated by the firms'
choices. This makes strategy an important factor in its own right (e.g., Prahalad
and Doz, 1987, p. 39). *w
9.9.1 Several Cases *ti- •'•*''-•: to «MWhitosTip-' s rt» jmraiKwc .ôà#M« *;--j»
The dynamic (iterative and interactive) process in the figure may accommodate a
diverse set of situations. The basic situation is one where disruptive external
shocks are absent and the feedbacks stabilise firms' market definitions and
strategies. Firms converge to a similar market definition which reproduces itself.
External shocks (e.g., new techniques, shifts in consumer preferences, entry) and
destabilising feedbacks (e.g., R&D which spills over market boundaries) may
disrupt market boundaries.
It is possible that the suppliers converge to similar market definitions. This may
occur if the basic conditions and market structure are stable (perhaps after an
initial adjustment process), and the feedbacks (10 to 14) stabilise the firms'
market definition and strategy (e.g., through the initial adjustment process). In
these cases, market definition can be considered inter-subjective. The firms'
individualised markets coincide with one another. The facts of the situation
(prices, shipments, sales) will confirm their market definition.
The case of multi-market collusion shows, moreover, that firms may have an
interest in sharing a common view. The western European market of soda ash is
an example. It displayed what appears like multi-market collusion of the spheres-
of-influence type. The suppliers distinguish a continental market from an Anglo-
6. These two level types of learning are examples of a corresponding learning
strategy and an incorporating learning strategy, respectively (Van Witteloostuijn,
1990c, pp. 192-3).206 Chapter 9
saxon market. Soda ash (sodium carbonate) is a bulky product, with high
transport costs, and production processes that exhibit high capital requirements
and economies of scale (Martin, 1961, p. 236). This suggests the existence of
sunk costs and associated exit barriers. These conditions may lead to a persistent
presence of incumbents, which facilitates tacit collusion. The persistence of the
market presence of firms in this market can be gleaned from the statement:
'The sales pattern established in the 19th century persists today. ICI has more
than 90 per cent of the UK and Irish soda ash markets and sells very little on
the continent. Solvay, conversely, has 70 per cent of the continental market.'
(77JC Fi/iû/icza/ 7ï/n«, 29-3-1991)
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The Belgian firm Solvay is the market leader in the western European soda ash
market since it invented the production process of synthetic soda ash in the 1860s.
Solvay and the U.K. firm ICI had a formal market-sharing agreement up to the
1960s; they claim that there is no longer any (multi-market) collusion between
them. Nevertheless in 1990 the E.C. fined ICI, Solvay as well as BASF for
operating a soda ash cartel (77ie F/nanc/a/ 7Yme$, 29-3-1991). As predicted by the
models discussed in chapter 5, the spheres-of-influence may be based on transport
costs, which may be considerable as soda ash is a bulk chemical. Moreover, low-
cost U.S. producers where kept out of the European market by an anti-dumping
duty of $65 per tonne on a current price of $200. The E.C. lifted the duty,
however. This entails changes in the basic conditions of the market (/.e., duties)
and market structure (entry by U.S. rivals) which may undermine the multi-
market collusion.
Perceptual filters, such as market concepts, may link behaviour into self-
reinforcing cycles (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988, p. 52). A group of firms may
commit to strategies which reinforce (e.g., through feedback 14 in the figure) the
market definition upon which their strategies are based. This may create a
window of opportunity for mavericks, that is, outsiders who do not partake in the
joint view and history. If they successfully encroach upon the established firms'
markets, market definition has to adjust. One-sided entry, for example, occurs if
the incumbent firm believes it has no profitable access to the entrant's home
market (section 5.2). Its belief is based on economic data that may have become
obsolete. The (established-firm) entry may alert the incumbent firm to the need of
updating its views.
The inertia of U.S. firms to entry by Japanese rivals and the ensuing debate
on global versus (multi)domestic firms are examples. Prahalad and Doz (1987)
illustrate this by the demise of the U.S. manufacturing industry of colour TVs. In
the 1960s and 1970s the U.S. manufacturers (RCA, GE, and Zenith) were
concerned with defending their home market. They failed to perceive of Japanese
competition as the cause of a shift from a local to a global TV industry. Being
limited to the U.S. market, they could not justify the investments which were
needed to compete with the Japanese suppliers. Moreover, U.S. colour television
set manufacturers did not initially perceive of the Japanese imports as aMarket Definition 207
competitive threat (Willard and Savara, 1988, pp. 61 and 69). They rather saw
the Japanese as filling up a gap in their product lines, which were centred on
large screens. This provides an example of Hatten and Hatten's (1987a, p. 300)
'competition without confrontation'. The difference in vision entailed a difference
in strategy. This led to one-sided entry by Japanese suppliers in the U.S. market,
and the subsequent overtaking of the U.S. firms by the Japanese competitors, to
Changes in the basic conditions may disrupt previously accepted market
boundaries. Product innovations may, for example, straddle two different product
markets. Cooper (1989) refers to vidéocassette recorders, which are substitutes
for home entertainment (e.g., stereos) and movies (theatres). This innovation
may, therefore, contribute to a breakdown of the market boundaries between
home entertainment and movies. These innovations can result from an exogenous
shock as well as from continuous R&D by the industries' suppliers (feedback 11).
The latter case is an example where the feedbacks themselves destabilise market
definition and firms' strategies.
These cases may be applied to other real-world examples. The economy
witnesses several processes where market boundaries are changing: globalisation,
European integration, the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), and
the convergence of banking and insurance. The next chapter has a case study
which applies the framework to the convergence of the computer and consumer
electronics industries. ';.••.
9.10 APPRAISAL ) .* n^aiav^t isnsfc TO
The chapter has noted the following points. Multi-market competition may
proceed in two steps. Constrained rationality arguments warrant firms to focus
attention on a subset of related markets. Within the subset, they may rationally
compete for customers with actual and potential suppliers (as analyzed by game
theory). Multi-market competition affects the extent to which local shocks are
transmitted to other markets. It will thus affect market definition. In a dynamic
setting, where firms invest and where they may establish spheres-of-influence,
market boundaries may change through time. This implies that markets are
transient phenomena.
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Appendix 9. A. Transmission of a Local Shock among Spheres-of-Influence
The multi-market collusion model in Pinto (1986) may illustrate that a large or
critical demand shock in market A may disrupt multi-market collusion in markets
A and B. In this case, a quantity shock in A is related to a price change in B, a
cross-elasticity of demand appears, and the markets seem related. To recap,
Pinto's model is as follows (see chapter 5). There are two markets, A and B, and
two firms, 1 and 2. The firms have constant marginal production costs c (> 0)
and transport costs f (> 0). Firm 1 is located in A and 2 in B. The output levels
are q^ (i = 1,2; j = A,B). Demand functions are PW+tbO 0 = A,B)- For
computational ease, they are assumed linear: P'(q) = a»-bq, where a>, b > 0. The
parameter a* indicates the size of demand, and will be subject to shocks. Firms
compete in outputs (Cournot).
In the case of duopoly competition in each market, the home output level is
(a*+t-c)/3b, for firm 1 in A and 2 in B; and the export level is (aJ-c-2t)/3b, for
firm 1 in B and 2 in A. A firm exports to the export market y if £t" > c+2t,
which I will assume. Prices P" are (ai+t+2c)/3. The profits are (a"+t-c)V9b in
the home market and (a"-c-2t)*/9b in the entry market.
In the case of exclusive spheres-of-influence, each firm is monopolist in its
home market, with an output level (aJ-c)/2b, price (a*+c)/2, and profits (a*-c)V4b.
Exports are zero. If a firm defects, it does so by exporting to its entry market.
The export level is the firm's best response to the unsuspecting rival's monopoly
output level. This gives an export level (a*-c-2t)/4b; price falls from the monopoly
level to (£t>+3c+2t)/4, and the export profits are (a*-c-2t)Vl6b. The punishment
consists of eternal reversion to Cournot duopoly competition in both markets.
(This assumption, of a grim trigger strategy, is for convenience. Pinto assumes a
temporary reversion to Cournot competition). The firm defects if n^-FI^ > 0,
e.g., firm 2 defects if:
()()(f|l > 0.
This expression increases in a*, the demand level in firm 2's export market, A:
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The expression is positive as by assumption a* > c+2t: a higher demand level in
A raises the temptation for firm 2 to defect by exporting to A. The gain of
defection increases towards infinity if a* increases to infinity: if market A grows
sufficiently large, defection will certainly happen. At the demand size a* where
firm 2 is indifferent about defection and collusion, a small increase of a* leads to
a collapse of collusion, that is, price falls in both markets from the monopoly
level (a*+c)/2 to the duopoly level (a>+t+2c)/3 (which is less than (a"+c)/2 if a"
> c+2t, as assumed). A demand increase in market A coincides with a price fall
in market B: the cross-elasticity of demand is negative, and the goods appear toMarket Definition 209
be complements. Note that this occurs only if collusion breaks down: before a
breakdown as well as after it (when the markets are segmented) a local demand
shock has no influence in the other market.
A cost shock, for example a change in the transport cost, has no influence
either as long as exclusive spheres-of-influence remain intact. The shock may
disrupt collusion:
(9.A3) 4aa4y
Pinto's (1986, p. 365) presumption is that low transport costs facilitate defection
(by two-way trade), that is, 5(n°-n^/ôt < 0. Equation (9.A3) bears this out in
special cases, e.g., if a* is at least half the size of a* and c and t are sufficiently
small. Pinto (1986) explores the symmetry case, a* = a", where this result is
likely, although still not guaranteed. If t changes such that collusion gives way to
defection, prices fall in both markets (even if transport costs rose).
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!••«• -. - -.-t-i.j«-:•..-.«v .;. içm10 THE CONVERGENCE OF INFORMATION INDUSTRIES
The topic of chapter 10 is the convergence of the information industries,
such as the consumer electronics and computer industries. Innovations create
new possibilities for shared resources (especially, information) and multi-
market spillovers. These in turn blur existing market boundaries and
encroach upon spheres-of-influence. The chapter uses some proxies and
concepts proposed in chapter 9. It may illustrate that market definition is an
important step in the strategy formation process. It also illustrates some
vertical and horizontal dimensions of multi-market competition (in parts III
and IV).
10.1 INTRODUCTION
The computer, telecommunication, consumer electronics, and entertainment
industries appear to converge into an //t/o/mar/on or /nuM/ned/a m</itffry. This
emerging market will change competition and consumer behaviour in information-
related industries. The main cause of the convergence process is the digitisation of
information. Digitisation converts several types of information (text, sound and
images) into digital code (bits). New products manipulate, mix, and transmit these
kinds of digital information. Information will flow more easily from one person to
another, from one medium (e.g., a photo negative) to another (e.g., a journal).
Consumers will benefit from the rapid (e.g., on-line) availability of enormous
amounts of information. To put this in historical perspective, transferring the
world's information to digital formats may be a revolution as much as the
introduction of writing thousands of years ago.
New information media mix characteristics of computers, consumer
electronics, and entertainment. They fill the 'marked gaps' between, for instance,
computers and consumer electronics. As a result they create a chain of substitutes
between previously unrelated products. If the interactions among these products
(captured by cross-effects of demand and prices) become strong, the previously
unrelated products may have to be grouped in the same market. Information that
is stored in digital format can be supplied in different media for different ends
and buyers. Information therefore develops into a shared resource that can be
used in several markets. This creates new occasions for positive multi-market
spillovers. As firms introduce products and techniques that cut across industries,
they tend to destroy established spheres-of-influences (markets or market
segments) in the computer, consumer electronics, and other related industries.
Competition intensifies as a result. These consequences break down the market
boundaries between these industries.
The previous chapter argued that markets do not exist. Instead, the market is
a concept used to classify information about products, prices and quantities as
highly relevant (within the market) or less relevant (outside the market). The212 Chapter 10
same holds for convergence: it is a belief that participating firms are acting upon
by making moves such as takeovers, strategic alliances, e/c. The chapter
documents some of these moves. It suggests that firms are indeed preparing
themselves for a major overhaul of these industries. There is no immediate
evidence that market boundaries are currently breaking down. Market definition
requires information on prices and production quantities. These data will come
available only after considerable lags. Proxies, or rather circumstantial evidence,
will have to be used. The moves (decisions) firms make can be used as proxies
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Competitive Moves
(Entry and exit, R&D, alliances)
discussion in this
chapter is preliminary. It
explores information
technology industries
throughout the 1980's and
1990's. Its aim is to
demonstrate the need for
more theoretical and
empirical work in the area
and to contribute to its
formulation. This case study
may also illustrate the
theories discussed in the
previous chapters. Figure
10.1 reflects the topics in
the chapter and their
interrelations. The chapter
will discuss convergence
(section 10.2) and some
technical and economic
aspects of digitisation
(section 10.3). It then
explores the consequences for market definition (section 10.4). Changes in market
definition are important as they affect the intensity of competition (section 10.5).
In particular, competition increases and margins have fallen. Firms anticipate or
respond to these changes by making competitive moves, such as mergers and
strategic alliances (section 10.6). Finally, the chapter turns to the required
evidence for finding convergence (section 10.7) and gives an appraisal (section
10.8).




(Prices, market share, profits)
As convergence proceeds it seems to affect an increasing number of industries.
By 1987 the convergence of the computer and telecommunication industries was
already discernible (Von Tunzelmann and Soete, 1987), as was the convergence
between the consumer electronics (audio and video), computer, and
telecommunication industries (AWC, 18-3-87). Currently, convergence is also
expected to involve education and entertainment (PC A/agaz/ne 27-10-92, p. 31)Information Industries 213
Expected progress of HDTV in the U.S.
Start of R&D 1986 <
Choice of a standard 1993
Product introduction 1995-6
Diffusion to 1 % of households 2002-3
Source: /tan/ieu Wee*, 27-4-92, p. 66.
and the media (77ie Wo// Srreer
/0U/7UZ/ Europe, 21-5-92, pp. 1
and 8).
The associated technologies
appear to undergo three stadia:
product and process
development (±mid 1980's-mid




products are in their introduction phase (e.g., multimedia computers, CD-i),
others are preparing introduction (e.g., PDA's, personal digital assistants), and
still others are in the research and development phase (e.g., HDTV, High
Definition Television). A proliferation of new products and processes is under
way. None of these seems to have reached a diffusion level where 1 % or more of
the households in a country owns one. Firms are preparing the convergence
process, but it has not yet transformed the marketplace. Convergence refers to
expectations, therefore, with considerable uncertainty about the likely outcomes.
According to Dave Nagel, head of Apple's Advanced Technology Group, "Right
now, the industry is throwing lots of things against the wall. What will stick isn't
clear." (5u5mes.y Wee*, 7-9-92, p. 54). The successful products will define the
direction the industry is going, who the winners and losers are, and which
standards for information processing, transmission, compression, e/c., will
become dominant.
The chapter will focus on the broad outlines of the convergence process. It
avoids predictions on issues as 1) the time frame over which convergence will
occur, 2) the size (revenues) which a unified information industry may have over
a specified laps of time, and 3) the identity of survivors, losers, and emerging
new players among the suppliers. For the participants these are the most pressing
questions. Prediction is difficult as the markets are turbulent and the success of
new products highly uncertain. The time frame and the size of the market will be
influenced by consumer adoption decisions, government standard setting activities
(e.g., in High Definition Television), and antitrust policy. Incompatible
information standards probably delay diffusion of new technology. Strategic
alliances have high failure rates. The chapter warrants the qualitative prediction
that there are two scenarios likely to emerge. ">.'"••?=• •"
First, convergence may lead to a new strategic group of products and
suppliers, called multimedia. This requires inputs from the converging industries;
its products may substitute for some of their existing products (e.g., emerging
video-phones may replace conventional telephones). This view of convergence is
consistent with a view that separate consumer electronics, computer,
telecommunication, and media industries will continue to exist. Niche players may
survive in these markets due to strong entry or mobility barriers.
Second, convergence may also have deeper effects, if it merges all constituent
markets into a single integrated /n/o/7norio« /«/«wry. John Sculley, the former
chief executive officer of Apple, seems to support this view. He expects that214 Chapter 10
computers, consumer electronics, telecommunications, and media & publishing
will converge into a $3 trillion 'megamarket' (Bi^nnesj Weefc, 25-5-92, pp. 69
and 71). In this case, all surviving and new firms should address the convergence
process. Niche players may survive only by supplying components, but they will
be unable to sustain in the consumer product market. These two scenarios imply
that a consensus about the salience of convergence may hide important differences
in firms' market definitions and strategies.
10.3 THE DIGITISATION PROCESS
Many barriers between types of information (e.g., the human voice, music, text
«c.) are breaking down as information is increasingly translated into digital form.
The code of the digital world, the 'bit' or binary digit, 0 or 1, is becoming the
unit of information. New media appear to store or process digital information.
Whereas LP records store music in analog format, the CD stores music in digital
format. The analog processing of video in television screens is expected to give
way within a decade to digital processing by HDTV systems.
Several innovations facilitate digitisation. Probably the most important one is
the decreasing cost of computing power as ever more powerful and fast chips are
developed (Bus/new Wee£, 6-3-89, p. 42). These chips speed up existing tasks,
but they also facilitate developments, such as graphical user interfaces (modeled
after the Macintosh), and new uses, such as desktop publishing. New video chips
can store, retrieve, compress, or process images. Digital video processors, e.g.,
mix video, graphics and text (Auri/ieu We&t, 24-8-92, pp. 54-5). These chips can
provide (decompress) television images sufficiently fast for the watcher to see a
flowing motion in full screen (so-called full motion video). No less important,
data compression software is reducing the amount of bits needed to store digital
information. Examples are pk.zip for text in MS-DOS computers, the PASC
compression code for music in the DCC, and the MPEG-code for full motion
pictures from a CD. Compression is a necessary stage to transferring, storing,
and reading digital information using today's media. The compact disk is
becoming the dominant medium for storing all kinds of digital data, rather than
just music. Cable TV and new, fibre-optic phone cables greatly increase the
capacity for data transmission into and from the house. The digitisation process
seems a technology-driven process where hardware suppliers are the initiators,
and software producers, consumers, governments and others respond, often with
considerable delays.
Digitisation, however, faces an important hurdle: incompatible data formats.
New information products need a standard for (de)coding (in and out of digital
code), formatting, and (de)compressing information. Incompatibility creates a
standard problem (Arthur, 1988; David, 1987; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Farrell
and Shapiro, 1992; and Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Unless a standard is legally
imposed, like television standards such as HDTV, private competition will
determine who the winners and losers are in the standards battle. Users and
software authors have to choose among the incompatible formats. Both groups
will try to anticipate each others' choices in order to choose the most widely
accepted format. The battle for a video standard (between Matsushita's VHS,Information Industries 215
Sony's Betamax and Philips's Video 2000) is legendary. VHS's victory
demonstrated most vividly that the standard that gets the most support early on is
likely to get most software, most users, which in turn attracts most software, e/c.
This virtuous circle means that standards introduce an economy of scale (a
network or bandwagon advantage) where there may only be one winner.' A
format battle ensues where each supplier tries to position (or sponsor) its format
as the most common one. The video war has brought home to firms that
introducing a new standard goes beyond introducing hardware. One has to
introduce software as well.
The history of the CD illustrates ongoing digitisation (P. Groen in CD P/itf,
1(1), 1992, p. 5). Philips's invention of the video long play (VLP, or laserdisc as
it was later called) introduced a new recording medium: a large disc read by
using laser technology. Movies (i.e., sound and images) could be stored in analog
format (CD P/MJ, 1(1), 1992, p. 4). As an offspring Philips cooperated with Sony
to develop the CD, which stores sound in digital format. In 1987 CD-Video
introduced digital sound to replace the analog sound of the VLP. The CD-Rom
(XA) and CD-i formats introduced digital images and text, as well as sound.
There is an increasing variety of incompatible standards for CD, for instance:
CD-Rom, CD-Rom XA, CD-i, CDTV ere. Information stored in CDTV format
cannot be read by a CD-i player and v/ce versa. Some compatibility exists in that
a modern Laserdisc player can play a VLP as well as its more recent offspring.
Laserdisc players and most other CD-based players or computers play CDs (/.e.,
CD audio). Moreover, there are some CD standards that bridge existing
standards, such as audio CD, Photo CD, and Video CD. The history of CD
formats also shows a trend towards miniaturisation. The large (30 cm) Laserdisc
gave rise to the CD (12 cm), which in turn occasioned Sony's even smaller Mini
Disc (6.4 cm). This reflects ongoing process innovations. The acceptance of the
CD in the early 1980's is partly based on its partisan support by Polygram,
Philips's music subsidiary. Software has to be available from the very start, and
making it requires huge outlays. This raises the costs of introducing new
products. The introduction of new media, such as DCC, MD and CD-i, and new
computer operating systems such as IBM's OS/2, illustrate this. mum
t. ••"•«ai»
10.4 THE EFFECT ON MARKET BOUNDARIES
The industries involved in the convergence process have in common that they deal
with information. They provide information (e.g., movies, music), process
information (e.g., computers), or transmit information (e.g., telecommunication,
broadcasting, cable TV). Digitisation ushers in innovations that affect market
boundaries in three ways. They alter the chain of substitutes that products are
located in, they create a potential for multi-market spillovers, and they create new
entry barriers. These three effects come about by three types of transformations
of production and consumption processes. New products can complement or
1. It need not be 'winner takes all' if losers can survive in a niche. Witness, e.g.,
the Commodore Amiga and the Atari ST computers, which are not MS-Dos
compatible.216 Chapter 10
substitute existing products in consumption. New products may also complement
(raise the profitability of) or substitute (reduce the profitability of) a firm's
existing product line, that is, they may give rise to positive or negative multi-
market spillovers (complementary outputs). Finally, process innovations may
create new factors that are complements or substitutes in production to existing
factors (complementary inputs). New complements or substitutes of these three
types will affect market boundaries. This suggests a simple framework for
convergence.* .,.-..., c^ u^,,.*,* -
10.4.1 A Framework for Convergence CD srtj Tn v~
Process innovations can provide complementary inputs or outputs (cases 1 and 2
below). Product innovations can be substitutes or complements in consumption to
existing products (cases 3 and 4). There are also intermediate cases (case 5).
Market A Market B
î
F,
7. Call firm 1 the incumbent supplier of
product A and firm 2 the incumbent supplier
of product B. Firm 1 uses a new resource or
factor F]. A distinguishing characteristic of the
innovation is that it can be used in market B as
well. Product B may be an existing product.
The joint use of F, inspires a positive multi-
market spillover between A and B, and A and
B become complementary outputs (see subsection 5.3.1, section 6.7 and appendix
6.B). Developments in market A will spill over to market B. If the
interdependence is sufficiently important, A and B converge into a new market.
Case 2. The entry into B or the development of B may require a complementary
resource F2 (complementary inputs; see definition 6.1). The market of factor Fj
may be imperfect or absent. Sunk costs may have to be incurred in order to
develop or acquire Fj. These sunk costs are en/ry earners or moluV/Q' Carriers for
the firm that enters market B (see subsections 4.2.4 and 6.7.2). They fortify
market boundaries.
Case 3. Product B may be a
new product without close
existing substitutes or
complements in consumption.
Firm 1 in A may develop B
using F, and F2, while firm 2
in market C may develop or
imitate B using its resource
F3 with Fj. Firms 1 and 2
begin to compete in a third
market (B) while previously






















2. See Von Tunzelmann and Soete (1987) for a convergence framework from a
diffusion perspective. .• !fl"-f.f$ï;ra»lInformation Industries 217
among them.
Case 4- Product B can be an imperfect substitute or complement for existing
products A and C. B is a straddler between A and C if it is a substitute (see
section 9.3) or a new interface if it complements A and C. The markets A and C
become related on the demand side by indirect competition (intermediated by B).
They may be pairwise related on the supply side as well (e.g., A and B through
F,). Several intermediate situations exist, such as case 5.
Care J. The innovation F, allows firm 1 to develop product B, which is an
imperfect substitute or complement for product C in consumption. Markets A and
C are now related through a combination of a technical interlinkage (as A and B
use F,) and through customers (who choose between B and C).
Some of these cases blur market boundaries (e.g., spillovers and straddlers),
while others (e.g., entry barriers) fortify market boundaries. The next subsections
discuss the effects on convergence of three factors in particular: spillovers,
product innovations, and mobility barriers.
10.4.2 Changing Potential for Multi-market Spillovers
Once information is digitised, any type of information
(e.g., voice) can be stored on the same digital media,
transmitted by the same channels, and processed by the
same products. Information can acquire alternative
uses. Its increasing importance is widely recognized:
'intellectual property is the asset for the '90s,' argues
W.N. Joy, co-founder of Sun Microsystems Inc. (77ie
Wa// S/reer Jowrna/ Europe, 29-4-1992, p. 1). The
returns to investments in information come from
transmitting information by a variety of (printed,
electronic) media to a variety of (personal or business)
users. That is, shared resources, such as information,
can be developed for the sake of several products, thus
reducing their costs or increasing their appeal. This creates a po/en//a/ positive
multi-market supply or demand spillover (case 1). This induces firms to
internalise these returns by being active in those media where its information can
be sold. Sarathy (1991, p. 127) explains horizontal integration (by mergers and
acquisitions) in the media industry primarily by the aim to realize the '[pjerceived
gains from selling ideas through books, record, films and TV programs'. He cites
Bertelsmann and Time Warner as evolving multimedia publishers.
Examples abound of a potential shared use of information. Libraries of
digitised sound, images (e.g., movies), and text, can become the basis of several
products (movies, video, games, encyclopedias, ere). Kodak's Photo CD system,
e.g., allows the consumer to store photos on CD, watch them on the television
set, and manipulate them with a computer. Pictures can be stored, retrieved, and
used like any other digital information. This reduces the adjustment costs of
transferring information from one medium (photo negatives) to another (e.g., a
computer). A database of photos can thus be created for alternative uses. An









1989. IHS is now 'buying up the electronic rights to images for its digital visual
library.' (/>C A/agaz/ne, 27-10-92, p. 31). The same holds for text. If ajournai
processes its news in digital form, it can with little additional costs store the news
in a database, accessible on-line to users. The possibility emerges that a
newspaper evolves into a multimedia enterprise using several distinct media to
provide access to the same information, i.e., the 'one source, multiple use'
strategy (Van Cuilenburg er a/., 1992, pp. 89-90). The 'multiple use' may refer
to joint exploitation of a journal and broadcasting (see case 1 above), as well as to
new products, such as newspapers on CD-ROM, fax news (which is faxed to
targeted users), videotext, and on-line services (see cases 3 and 4). Some U.S.
journals are beginning to develop into electronic libraries (The Vo/tofcran/, 17-8-
93, p. 15). A movie, to give another example, requires footage which can also be
used in videos, pay-per-view cable TV, games e/c. Sony is planning the
introduction of CD-Rom based video games. 'This is where owning a movie
studio is beginning to give Sony an edge, says Olaf Olafsson, president of Sony
Electronic Publishing Co. While producing movies, he says, Sony can shoot extra
footage for use in interactive video games.' (BUJJ>I£S5 Weefc, 7-9-92, p. 54).
Multi-market spillovers can also be based on shared manufacturing resources.
The trend toward portability and miniaturisation favours Japanese manufacturing
processes. Japanese firms have built up an enviable record of high quality
manufacturing and a talent for miniaturisation. These qualities are increasingly in
demand in numerous industries. Apple, e.g., signed up Sharp to produce its
Newton Personal Digital Assistant and Sony to develop and build its new
Powerbook portable computers.
f Technological change may create new as well as destroy existing multi-market
spillovers. Vacuum technology, for example, is used in light bulbs, television
sets, and X-rays (Frumau, 1992, p. 98 and 113). This induced the global market
leader in vacuum technology, Philips, to enter all three areas. The development of
LCDs, however, is expected by some industry observers to replace the
conventional vacuum tube (cathode ray tube) technology (77ie £conom;«, 15-8-92,
pp. 65-66). This would destroy the current basis of the positive spillover between
TV sets, on the one hand, and light bulbs and medical technology, on the other
hand. LCD technology, in turn, creates spillovers between product lines such as
pocket calculators, computer screens, and flat-panel TV sets.
The next table lists some factors that stimulate or impede the development of
positive multi-market spillovers. Multi-market spillovers arise because of the
digitisation process. It is stimulated by miniaturisation (which allows the use of
electronics in an increasing number of new and existing products), data
compression (which reduces the size of digital files to manageable size), and
product innovations (which generate potential spillovers). They allow the common
use (by new and existing products) of shared (manufacturing and informational)
resources. These spillovers will be wasted if data formats (standards) are
incompatible and if the internal organisation of firms stands in the way of
realising potential spillovers. Consumer inertia, which slows diffusion of new
products, and government regulation also constitute impediments to the
convergence process. These aspects affect the potential spillovers. It is up to














organisational boundaries within firms
(departments) and between firms
(organisational cultures, opportunism)
adoption inertia
antitrust legislation (e.g., which
prevents cross-ownership of multiple
media in the same region)
10.4.3 New Consumer Products i **> vu**»*,*s*îl
Digitisation makes possible a barrage of product innovations in the 1990's.
Successful innovations may create spillovers among themselves and with
established products (see cases 1, 3 to 4 in subsection 10.4.1). How valuable the
spillovers will be depends on the highly uncertain demand levels that the
innovations will encounter. Firms from traditionally different industries compete
with each other for access into the emerging markets. Interactive TV, for
example, connects the TV to the phone system. It will allow the user to choose
which programs to watch at which time, to call up information on a program or
event while the event appears on TV, to order products, or to exchange messages
by means of on-line services. The on-line services will turn TV sets and phone
lines into complements as both are needed to search through on-line databases.
These services may turn cable and phone lines into substitutes, as both lines may
in principle be used to connect the TV set to the outside world (see case 4).
Whereas phone companies upgrade the phone system to expand its transmission
capacity (e.g., by using fibre-optic cables), cable companies try to bypass the
phone lines altogether. Cable has the advantage over phone lines of having a far
larger data transmission capacity. However, 'Phone companies have a crucial skill
that the cable companies lack -experience in managing two-way communications.'
(Fortune, 2-11-92, p. 78). The market boundaries between phone companies
(telecommunication) and cable TV (broadcasting) are, therefore, breaking down.
If a new product straddles two markets which were previously unrelated, the
incumbent firms may compete in the supply of the new product (case 4). For
instance, multimedia systems, such as PC's, Commodore's CDTV and Philips's
CD-i, combine the techniques and functionality of computers with consumer
electronics. The software on these machines mixes characteristics of books
(education) with records and games (entertainment). Again market boundaries220 Chapter 10
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10.4.4 Mobility Barriers ;
Digitisation not only induces entry, but it may also raise entry costs (case 2).
Frumau's (1992, p. Ill) research confirms that 'business applications in general
need technology from more than one area.'
Associated with digitisation is increasing
co/np/eMfy, as new products need more
different types of technology (W. Dekker in
AWC, 11-2-87, p. 4). The ability to mix
(digital) sound, text, pictures, c/c., requires
know how about fields that used to be
different, such as audio, video, and I
photography. An important implication for
firms' strategies is the need to bundle _ ,,
activities or resources from several industries, "«* <*™"es
for instance, hardware and software. To I
remain or become active, firms need to put
digitisation
new complementarities
mobility barriers together these bundles (or teams). This
induces firms to acquire additional resources.
The associated sunk costs raise entry barriers
(see subsections 6.7.1 to 6.7.3). For instance, some consumer electronics firms
intend to enter the multimedia market. To implement this strategy, they acquire
firms with an expertise in entertainment at sometimes staggering costs. In 1988
and 1989 Sony, for example, acquired four U.S. entertainment firms for a total of
$5.63 billion (Sarathy, 1991, p. 140).
Innovations may also, however, reduce entry barriers. Innovations may allow
a firm with resources F, and Fj to enter a market that previously required it to
purchase a resource F3. Photography, for example, used to be a chemical process.
It is now gradually becoming an electronic process, which is to the advantage of
(Japanese) firms with experience in electronics (P. Nulty in ForfKne, 1-7-91, pp.
36-43; and Bus/new WeeJfc, 10-8-92, p. 26). Digitisation induces entry by creating
a potential for positive multi-market spillovers (subsection 10.4.2) and by
introducing new products (subsection 10.4.3), but it also raises entry barriers (this
subsection). How does it affect competition?
10.5 COMPETITION AND SPHERES-OF-INFLUENCE
Convergence between markets will change thé terms of competition. Innovations
spawned by the digitisation process may lead to product life cycles as short as in
the computer industry. The huge costs of developing complex products (which
involve complementary inputs and outputs) strongly urge firms to globalise their
business, i.e., to recover these outlays worldwide. These pressures mayInformation Industries 221
undermine geographical market boundaries and intensify competition.' Vanishing
market boundaries may coincide with a breakdown of spheres-of-influence. In the
context of European integration, Daems (1990, p. 43) argues that 'collusive
market sharing arrangements will break down as traditional market positions come
under pressures.' Similar developments seem to occur in the information
industries. Multi-market collusion gives way to multi-market competition. Firms
will, therefore, experience new competition originating in previously distant
markets.
As Stoop (1992, pp. 83-92)




leading to new competition
convincingly argues, electronics
firms (tacitly) colluded by creating
spheres-of-influence. They divided
their markets along three
dimensions: a geographic, a
product, and a timing dimension.
The geographic dimension refers to
firms' respect for each other's
original home market (esp. the
U.S., Japan, and the E.C.). The product dimension implies that firms focus on
particular products, e.g., IBM on computers and Philips on consumer electronics.
The timing dimension implies that innovators and imitators divide the product life
cycle between them. These economic foundations for spheres-of-influence have
been eroded, however. As a consequence, in all three dimensions, spheres-of-
influence have come under attack as rivals rethink their strategies.
The globalisation process undermines the geographic basis of influence-spheres/
Technological cost-reducing changes are among the drivers of this process. The
trend towards miniaturisation reduces the transport costs of highly valuable
(consumer) electronic products. Information technology has reduced the costs of
coordinating a worldwide operation. As consumer preferences become more
homogeneous across the globe, similar product lines can serve worldwide markets
with presumably few adjustment costs (Levitt, 1983). Although Levitt's contention
is controversial, the expansion of American fast food and beverage companies is
undeniable evidence. In particular the Japanese worldwide export success has
brought globalisation to the fore. It forced other firms to counter or anticipate
such moves. U.S. computer makers IBM, Apple, Compaq, and AST Research
Inc. are stepping up activities in Japan. They are trying to prevent being attacked
in the U.S. like the car and consumer-electronics industry:
'as with other industries, the Japanese are using that lock on their lucrative
home market as a springboard to become major competitors worldwide. Six
years ago, Japanese companies had virtually no presence in the U.S. Today
3. These arguments underlay Philips's strong support for the renaissance of
European integration in 1985.
4. See Stoop (1992) for an illustration.222 Chapter 10 1
they have nearly 10% of the total PC market (.) and about half of the rapidly
growing portable PC market.' (Ifte Wa// S/ree/ ./onma/ Europe, 18-7-1991, p.
1). <<>n zi
The U.S. firms seem to be aware of the problem. Mr. Lautenbach, head of
IBM's operations in Asia is quoted as saying 'Our most important competitors are
in Japan, and we have to fight them on their territory.(.) They implement their
technology first here, and it's important to compete against it first here. We can't
just wait for them to come to the U.S.' (77je WÛ// 5/reer /ou/na/ Europe, 18-7-
1991, p. 1). Reciprocal entry also occurs because of political developments.
Privatisation of state enterprises and liberalisation of their previous monopolies
open up national markets. This is particularly important in the telecommunication
industry. The French and British Telecom firms now enter each other's home
market (77ie Wa// 5/ree/ Journa/ Europe, 1-8-92, pp. 1 and 4). jnot
Convergence
Convergence encroaches on product-based influence-spheres. Positive multi-
market spillovers may induce firms to break with spheres-of-influence by
(reciprocal) entry into each other's product markets (subsection 10.4.2). For
example, Sony and Matsushita enter the entertainment industries. Apple, IBM and
Microsoft try to enter the home by introducing home software and home
computers. Convergence implies that these attempts differ from diversification
moves into unrelated fields. New products (straddlers) also undermine influence
spheres among established products (subsection 10.4.3).
Rapid imitation, finally, undermines spheres-of-influence based on product life
cycles. Product life cycles in the personal computer industry have shrunk to six
months (Buy/new Wee£, 31-8-92, p. 64). These short lags make it impossible for
innovators and imitators to coexist in different 'niches': innovators in the early
and imitators in the mature stadia (Stoop, 1992). Ever shorter imitation lags wipe
out innovator monopoly profits. This creates dilemmas for innovators. In order to
increase consumer acceptance of its CD-i format, Philips has defined it as a world
system. That is, firms can license the CD-i technology. Rivals may, therefore,
develop competing CD-i machines. The associated competition is expected to
reduce price and raise product quality (F/nanriee/e DagWad, 2-9-92, pp. 1 and
4). This prospect is attractive to users and software programmers alike. It may
convince them to favour the CD-i standard over proprietary standards. But it also
means that Philips facilitates imitation. Monopoly profits are rapidly eroded,
therefore. If it had chosen for a proprietary format, as Apple and Commodore did
with their multimedia computers, it would have the market to itself. Innovators
may find it an act of justice that shorter imitation lags reduce the imitators' profits
as well. The losses experienced by the British consumer electronics firm Amstrad
are indicative. Amstrad's forte is low-cost imitation of computer and consumer
electronics technology. According to 77;e Wa// Srreer /ourna/ Europe (29-7-92, p.
12), Amstrad now suffers as 'the delay between a product advance and an
affordable version by its creator has shrunk from several years to six months (.)Information Industries 223
That leaves little time for an outsider.' Analysts advise Amstrad to exit the
computer industry (27œ Wa// &reer 7ourna/ Europe, 5-10-92, p. 8).
10.6 MOVES FIRMS MAKE
The convergence process induces firms to make cross-market moves as they
introduce new products. Their entry into new markets has numerous implications.
Firms assemble new (teams of) resources to make entry possible. They adjust
their organisation by creating new divisions, such as Apple's new division
Personal Interactive Electronics that launches the Newton Personal Digital
Assistant. They also acquire, merge or form alliances with firms in different
information industries. As a result of cross-market moves, firms face a string of
related decision problems.
First, about the extent of their activities, which raises product innovation,
market selection, entry and exit choices. There appears to be a flurry of entry and
exit actions, and firms continuously reconsider their activities. Philips and Tandy,
for example, recently left the computer industry, and NEC is retreating from most
consumer electronics products (77?e Wa// 5/ree/ 7OU/TIÛ/ Europe, 22-4-1992, p. 4).
One reason for exit is that competition heats up as mobility barriers and spheres-
of-influence break down, and entry occurs. Another reason is that the shared
resources upon which multi-market spillovers are based are changing (see case 1
in subsection 10.4.1 and subsection 10.4.2). In PCs, e.g., R&D-based firms as
IBM have lost ground to distribution-based firms such as Dell. The second
decision problem is about the timing of entry and exit decisions. The appearance
of new market (segments), such as multimedia, leads to early entry by some
firms, and by waiting (late entry) strategies by other firms. Timing may depend
on the time it takes firms to accumulate the resources (e.g., experience) to make
entry profitable (Deneffe, 1993).
Third, how do firms create appropriate bundles of complementary resources
necessary to enter a new market? The next subsections focus on this issue, which
is a key input in the former decisions. I will discuss three methods to implement
entry. A firm may develop new resources through own R&D. It may acquire or
merge with a firm that owns complementary resources. Alternatively, it may set
up strategic alliances with firms that have such resources. I choose these three
because of their visibility (see the next section).
10.6.1 Internal Development ='"-"• 'fiftit^i';*'..--^^. - • : y&-;"ate'*-
Entry into a new market will be preceded by R&D into that area. By setting up
R&D, a firm develops the know how and the patents required for a sustainable
position in a new product market. This is an important method in R&D-intensive
industries such as computers and consumer electronics. The technological drive of
the convergence process primarily appears to consist of new combinations of
knowledge from different sciences (new complementary inputs) and of application
of knowledge in new fields (new multi-market spillovers). Cross-citations between
firms, patented technologies, or markets may provide clues about these
developments. According to bibliometric research within Philips, cross-citation of224 Chapter 10
articles and patents indicates the existence of clusters of technology areas within
information industry: mechanics, domestic, professional, picture tubes, imaging,
instruments, integrated circuits, data processing, communication and basic
materials (Frumau, 1992, p. 114). Firms can also be clustered on the basis of
their portfolio (i.e., the relative sales of the firm in each of six 'business areas' or
industries). Both indicators show for 1986 and 1981-1983, respectively, that there
is little overlap between the clusters. The convergence process is, therefore, of
more recent date and cannot yet be substantiated.'
10.6.2 Takeovers and Mergers
An acquisition or merger may be an indirect way to acquire a factor, owned by
the acquired firm. It can be a step in an entry process if the acquired firm serves
as a springboard in the new market. This argument may also explain why new or
small firms accept to be acquired. A large parent company may help to overcome
barriers to its growth. Mergers and acquisitions are often explained by synergies
that would raise the firms' joint performance (e.g., because of complementary
inputs or outputs). In particular the need to accompany new hardware products
with compatible software favours the development of multimedia firms. These are
active in entertainment and information industries, on the one hand, and hardware
industries such as consumer electronics, on the other hand. The simultaneous
introduction of new hardware and software is expected to speed up consumer
acceptance of an innovation. This, in turn, raises the probability of success given
the existence of the above mentioned, standard-based first-mover advantages and
short imitation lags. Sony and Matsushita are leading this process, following an
earlier example when Philips created its Polygram music subsidiary. Sony now
has two film-making units, Columbia Pictures and smaller Tristar Pictures Inc. As
flitf/HCM Weefc (7-9-92, p. 54) writes, 'Sony Corp. boasts a fuller cupboard of
ingredients than any other company trying to cook up a digital stew. '
Synergies are notoriously difficult to realise. Well-known problems with
mergers are different company cultures, conflict over the spoils of the merger,
frustrated career perspectives, e/c. Sony, for instance, has taken several years to
come to grips and reorganise its film industry (Biwmeii Wee/:, 7-9-92, pp. 44-
45). The evidence on mergers shows mixed results. Shareholders of the acquiring
firms do not gain on average; shareholders of the acquired firms do (Mueller,
1977; and Caves 1989). The acquiring firms may lose money; productivity may
not increase; the acquisition substitutes for internal growth, and market share may
decline. Moreover, even if successful, mergers and acquisitions may fall short of
producing a firm that owns all resources required to compete successfully in the
new emerging market(s). I now turn to strategic alliances as possible alternatives.
5. Similar work is by Hagedoorn and Schakenraad (1992) who cluster firms on
the basis of the intensity of their technology collaboration. They acknowledge the
importance of interlinkage (p. 166). Their report, however, allocates strategic
R&D joint ventures to either one of five fields (computers, industrial automation,
microelectronics, software, and telecommunications). It does not focus on joint
ventures that span across these fields.Information Industries 225
10.6.3 Strategic Alliances n-mrsi
Throughout the converging industries, firms are frantically forming, or at least
talking about, partnerships. Kodak, for instance, enlisted Philips's support in
developing the Photo CD system. The new HDTV systems being developed in
Europe and the U.S. are the product of joint ventures. A .smweg/c û///ance 'can
be defined as a bilateral or multilateral relationship characterised by the
commitment of two or more partner firms to a common goal.' (Jorde and Teece,
1991, p. 132). The alliance is strategic, if it has an effect on 'the long-term
product market positioning of at least one partner' (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad,
1992, p. 164). If the common goal is price-fixing or market-sharing, the
agreement is a cartel. In the convergence process the relevant alliances are
technology alliances, where exchange of technology is an important goal. As an
instrument to achieve a common goal, the strategic alliance is a substitute for
national planning or merger. 'The case for planning and industrial policy recedes
if a degree of operational and strategic coordination can be attained through
private agreements.' (Jorde and Teece, 1991, p. 133). The partners in strategic
alliances can be rivals, customers, suppliers, efc. The ability to maintain durable
relationships with stakeholders to one's advantage is a source of profits and,
therefore, an intangible resource (section 2.4). The growing importance of
strategic alliances is a source of change that benefits firms who have this
intangible resource. Japanese firms, especially, have long since nourished durable
relations with stakeholders. They have a known ability to benefit from these
alliances.
Partnerships seem to have several reasons. There may be a (technical) need to
bring together complementary factors (cf. Frumau's interlinkage of technology
areas). A partnership may help a firm to acquire the appropriate size, and share
the costs of a new venture. Moreover, team effort is required for speedy
development of new products. This is important as the speed of imitation has
gone up. Forming partnerships may be a means for a firm to capitalise on some
key resources in areas with which it is unfamiliar. Firms which own (an)
important resource(s) can use this as a basis to become partners in numerous
partnerships. That is, a partnership may internalise some externalities (multi-
market spillovers) which a firm's resources may induce in other markets. Sharp,
e.g., is too small compared with Sony and Matsushita to become a full-line
multimedia firm. For future growth it relies on its skill in opto-electronics (e.g.,
LCD screens and laser diodes for CD players), where is has accumulated know
how for decades (Buy/Hew Wee*, 29-4-91, pp. 52-3). In uncertainty about which
direction the industries are going, it is important to join several developments.
This spreads the risk but it does add to the firm's costs. The information industry,
that is, witnesses both competition (a breakdown of influence-spheres) and
cooperation between the participants. •«.;•<>*«*• si
Research partnerships require a smaller degree of commitment by the partners
than a merger or acquisition. Moreover, one can have numerous R&D joint
ventures but only so many mergers (given antitrust, for example). The ad hoc
nature of an R&D partnership may also, however, induce opportunistic behaviour
by partners. Firms may join the partnership to hedge their bets, or they may be226 Chapter 10
interested in acquiring some know how from the partner. Jacquemin (1988)
argues that R&D cooperation is advantageous because of (1) being more flexible
than merger and having more commitment value than a market transfer of
knowledge, (2) allowing risk-spreading between firms and risk-pooling over
several joint R&D projects, and (3) producing synergies by combining
complementary assets (i.e., positive R&D spillovers). On the down-side, he
argues that they are fragile and unstable, with many early breakups. Partner
selection is a problem as each partner may fear that the other one becomes a
powerful competitor. Contracts or an organisational design to prevent this may
give rise to high transaction costs.
Firms may try to overcome opportunism by building trust over time. The
literature on collusion has recognised this possibility. The sustainability of
collusive arrangements can be facilitated by an increased number of contacts over
time. Contact may increase through two avenues. First, the theoretical and
empirical literature on multi-marfce/ contact has explored the case of firms which,
by meeting in several product markets, can sustain multi-market collusion where
single-market cooperation would fail (e.g., Bernheim and Whinston, 1990).
Second, Edwards (1955) suggests that any form of contact may induce collusion.
A joint R&D project, for instance, provides firms with a contact point. Moreover,
it offers the firms involved an additional means of retaliation in the case of
opportunistic behaviour. R&D partnerships may go beyond coordination towards
tacit collusion in the product markets:
'technological partnerships tend to grow into complex systems of mutual
. accommodation among large business enterprises, within which the
permissible sphere of activity of each enterprise is defined with ever-
increasing precision as one agreement after another establishes a boundary, or
a mutually satisfactory joint occupancy, between that enterprise and some
other enterprise with reference to additional products and additional markets.'
(Edwards, 1955, p. 344)
As an example, Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 625) note that cross-licensing
agreements may be used as a 'fulcrum' for price-fixing and entry-excluding
cartels. To encompass these arguments, multi-market collusion theory can be
widened to multi-conwc/ collusion theory which includes multi-project encounters
(Van Wegberg and Van Witteloostuijn, 1993). The large number of alliances
between leading firms in the information industries, as documented by Hagedoorn
and Schakenraad (1992) and Frumau (1992), may thus be a vehicle to build trust
between the partners.
Apart from opportunism, R&D joint ventures may run into problems if close
ties exist between R&D and the product market. Spillovers may extend beyond
R&D to the production and marketing of the product. Speedy product
development may require interaction and coordination of R&D and product
market strategies (output, e/c). Smiw/w/ieoMJ R&D development and production
capacity investments may be technically efficient relative to sequential R&D and
production processes. Limiting cooperation to R&D deters such coordination
(Jacquemin, 1988, p. 553). R&D joint ventures may then continue to be lessInformation Industries 227
stable than full coordination (or merger) between firms or full competition. These
problems may explain the diversity of the organisational forms of firms' R&D
cooperation (see Table 10.2).
R&D development should also be co-aligned with potential buyers and
software makers. The DAT recorder, e.g., was killed (at least in Europe) by the
music industry's refusal to record music on DAT discs (77ie Econo/nm, 13-4-
1991, survey). Initially, DAT recorders did not have copy protection. The music
industry feared that it would loose royalties, as consumers or bootleggers could
easily make numerous (illegal) copies of music on DAT discs. The same problem
exists with cassettes, of course, but the high quality of DAT recorders made the
problem particularly acute. By the time DAT did have copy protection, it had lost
momentum, and Sony and Philips had announced alternative technologies (the
Mini Disc and Digital Compact Cassette, respectively). If the R&D strategy has
to be integrated with the interests of the firm's stakeholders, it is less likely that
cooperation is limited to R&D. <', *!**< isiirt/w
10.6.4 Costs of Implementing these Strategies *•'•
Solutions where a firm internalises new developments usually imply a costly
commitment to new products and technologies. Uncertainty about future revenues
may lead firms to prefer strategic alliances. Parent companies face a
'trade-off between synergy and interlinkage on the one side and the pressure
to focus and to go back to core activities on the other side' (Frumau, 1992, p.
97).
Pressures to go back to the core are based on mobility barriers (or entry costs).
First, there are the sunk costs of complementary resources. Acquisitions can be
costly, as the example of Sony shows (subsection 10.4.4). The owners of the
acquired firm may be able to appropriate a large part of the expected rent from
merging the acquiring and acquired firm (see chapter 6). The acquiring firm may
net the difference between its value (V,) derived from the acquisition and the next
best alternative (Vj). If each firm faces some close rivals, this difference may not
be large.'
Second, there are opportunity costs when a firm expands its activities.
Increasing employment levels create the danger of excessive hierarchy and low
responsiveness to market needs (Jorde and Teece, 1991). Coordination problems
further increase if the new activities make different demands upon the
organisation, its employees, incentives and rewards. Firms whose strengths are in
manufacturing may reward discipline. Firms in entertainment or software will
rather stress creativity and individualism. These differences are likely to pose
problems for 'hardware' firms (e.g., in computers or consumer electronics)
moving into 'software' (see subsection 6.7.3). Incompatible incentive schemes
may lead to negative multi-market spillovers or managerial diseconomies of scope
6. The argument is diluted if the acquiring firms play off potential acquisition
targets against each other.228 Chapter 10
(Rotemberg and Saloner, 1991; subsection 6.5.2). To prevent these conflicts, a
corporation may split up in divisions (e.g., telecommunication, computers, e/c).
Intra-organisation boundaries, however, hamper cross-market activities if the
latter benefit from employees moving easily across organisational boundaries
within the firm (Hatten and Hatten, 1987, p. 210). In Japan, e.g., the market
leaders in the telecommunication and computer industries lead in both areas.
Unlike western firms, which traditionally separate telecommunication and
computers,
'most large Japanese companies do not erect barriers between their various
businesses. Regular job rotation moves managers and technical staff between
different product divisions. (.) Marketing and sales staff also move back and
forth between télécoms and computers. Firms like Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi,
Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric and Oki do not consider télécoms and computers
to be separate businesses.' (77ie £co/iomw, 15-12-90, p. 60).
This suggests that internal organisation barriers constitute entry barriers.
Third, there are legal mobility barriers to the convergence process. Antitrust
litigation endows U.S. firms with different choice sets than European and
Japanese firms. The latter may face lower regulatory entry barriers. Cable TV
and phone companies, e.g., might want to cooperate in two-way data transmission
services between homes and (industry and government) databases. In the U.S.,
however: 'regulatory restrictions on the Bell operating companies rule out such
linkups now' (Mr. Barada, vice-president for corporate strategy at Pacific Telesis
Group, quoted in flas/new Wee/t, 7-9-92, p. 52). U.S. law prevents telephone
companies from providing cable-TV programming. Mr. A. Sikes, the chairman of
the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 'aims to break down the
regulatory barriers that have kept companies in each industry from either
cooperating or poaching on the other's turf.' (fbrtu/œ, 2-11-92, p. 78).
10.7 FINDING CONVERGENCE
The chapter has discussed causes and consequences of convergence. I now turn to
some available evidence. The convergence process can be tracked first by looking
at its technological causes. New products appear that straddle existing markets.
Existing or new resources can be used in several markets. Data limitations
probably stand in the way of tracking these developments in a quantitative way.
Patents and scientific papers may be the exception. In line with Frumau's (1992)
research, convergence may be hypothesised to imply an increase of cross-cluster
references in patent descriptions and in papers. The clusters can be identified with
separate fields of technology. Even without market convergence, however, the
existence of complementary resources implies that patents and papers will contain
cross-references. Hence an increase in cross-references may not be direct
evidence of convergence. A hypothesis can be formulated as
10.1. Convergence in the 1990's leads to a marked increase of cross-
cluster references in patent descriptions and in papers.Information Industries 229
Direct evidence on market boundaries should be based on prices and sales. For
example, correlation of the price movements of two products has been taken as
indicator that the two products belong in the same market. These data will
become available when the convergence process is already well under way. They
should be used in due course, therefore, but are of no avail in the current stage of
the process.




derived from the moves firms make. Actions
that firms take when they believe in
convergence may testify the extent to which
firms hold this belief. Does an increase in the
number of cross-market moves (mergers and
strategic alliances) indicate convergence?
Economists have uncovered numerous explanations of mergers (Mueller, 1977;
and Caves; 1989) and strategic alliances (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1992a,
1992b, and 1993). Convergence is at most one explanation. Other independent
variables may have an effect on or interact with it. Convergence suggests the
hypothesis:
10.2. Convergence indicates an increase in the number of cross-
market mergers plus strategic alliances (a) in absolute terms and (b) relative to
intra-market actions.
The hypothesis has to be made operational. The results will depend on market
definition. Problems arise as increasing difficulties in defining market boundaries
are the essence of convergence. One may interpret the expression 'cross-market'
in the hypothesis as referring to standard industry classifications. Evidence of
convergence might consist of an increase in the number of alliances and mergers
which do not fit in in traditional market definition (i.e., industry classification).
Evidence to test the hypothesis has not yet been collected, although some of the
data are publicly available. Table 10.2 may illustrate that many cross-market
strategic alliances and acquisitions emerged in the 1980's/1990's. I do not
currently have data to prove that their number has increased.
Care should be exercised when interpreting these moves as proxies of
convergence. An er an/e check that they do indicate convergence might consist of
studying public statements by entrepreneurs. If those firms most active in cross-
market movements publicly discuss the convergence process, there may be a link.
Apple, e.g., is active in this field and has spoken out clearly on its belief in
convergence (flitfrnew Wee/t, 25-5-92, p. 69). An ex /wwr check consists of
verifying predictions later by using data on prices and quantities. As I argued
above, these data are not yet available.
Hypothesis 10.2 does not address the issue whether firms will prefer strategic
alliances or mergers and takeovers. This is a separate, closely related topic.
Important determinants may be organisation structure (e.g., M-form), company
cultures, legislation, and national culture (see subsection 10.6.4). The chapter's
emphasis on positive multi-market spillovers suggests the importance of size.
Large firms face a different choice set than do medium-sized or small and startup230 Chapter 10
firms. A full analysis of the choice between merger and strategic alliance may
need an interdisciplinary research approach, with input from industrial economics,
strategic management, and sociology (e.g., company cultures). This chapter hopes
to add an ingredient to this mix of explanations.
10.8 APPRAISAL
This chapter explored the convergence process among the information industries.
Its starting point is the existence of several more or less clearly delineated
markets, such as the computer industry, consumer electronics, telecommunication,
and entertainment. Convergence implies a series of changes to this situation. Its
speed and sectoral extension depend on many drivers and impediments identified
in the chapter. The importance of complementary inputs, techniques, and
products, shows the interconnectedness among information products (subsection
10.4.1). Interconnectedness in turn partly explains why convergence is slow to
occur. The overall speed in an interconnected system is determined by laggard
elements in the system (Von Tunzelmann and Soete, 1987, p. 26). As a result,
higher degrees of interconnectedness may slow down progress. Other
impediments are factors that impede potential spillovers (Table 10.1), and
mobility barriers (subsection 10.4.4), including the costs of strategy
implementation (subsection 10.6.4). The internal organisation of firms,
incompatible standards, consumer adoption, government legislation, and
uncertainty should also be mentioned.
Due to convergence, the industries will intensify the joint use of resources,
such as R&D, manufacturing capacity, and information. This occurs by cross-
market actions such as strategic (technology) alliances and mergers. Products
appear that exist on the boundaries of these industries. These changes affect the
nature of competition as each market faces new competitors, which may originate
from related industries. This calls for a realignment of firms' activities. Many
will respond to intensified competition by exit from some product markets. Some
try to develop into multimedia firms in order to benefit from the shared use of
resources. Firms also rethink their R&D decisions. Increased competition may
lead to a withdrawal of R&D activities or to intensification. The convergence and
digitisation process are in turn driven by these decisions. Visions of the future and
market definitions held by key entrepreneurs and managers play a large role in
this process. This tallies with the view that markets are not realities; they rather
are concepts about what the relevant rivals, substitute products, and consumers
are. One corollary is that firms have heterogeneous market concepts,
expectations, and strategies. Convergence is a belief held by many firms. They
may impose this belief on others if it inspires them to actions whose performance
proves them justified. Although this is too early to judge, the chapter clearly













































































































8. The FCC is expected to choose an HDTV standard for the U.S. in 1993.AFTERWORD
What I hope this book has achieved is an integration of different perspectives,
theories, and models within industrial economics and strategic management. Its
content derives largely from industrial economics, while its research aim is
predominately inspired by strategic management, in particular Porter's (1980)
extended rivalry framework. It draws insights from contestability, transaction
cost theory, committed competition, competition by raising rivals' costs, and the
resource-based view of the firm, to mention its most important sources.
Integration also means that theories have been discussed not so much from the
perspective of their developers as from the central perspective in this book. This
may give the book its critical overtones here and there. The integrated framework
consists of two dimensions (the horizontal and vertical one). These are related in
terms of the institutional setting (chapter 2), through the common importance of
shared resources (section 4.3), by exploring interaction effects (section 6.7), and
in a basic model (section 8.3).
There are obvious limits to what a conceptual framework can contribute. It
focuses on links between theories rather than on further development of any
particular hypothesis. It is not testable in a clearly defined, empirical or logical
way. Its aim is to be useful in guiding research on multi-market firms. As is
often the case, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Current research is
usually characterised by streams focusing on specific topics, in particular,
vertical integration, multinationals, and diversified firms. Research also tends to
occur in rivalrous approaches (or paradigms), such as contestability, game
theory, and transaction cost economics. This book contains a plea to explore a
specific topic by drawing inspiration, ideas, and hypotheses from any of these
topical streams and paradigms. Synergies, that is, may exist in theory as well as
in fact. The framework's contribution may be to support synergies by facilitating
communication among different theories and theorists. I will next mention some
sources of the framework; a short summary reiterates some results, and a section
on future research closes off the book.
Sources
The contribution made by the source theories can be summarised as follows.
Transaction cost economics contributed especially to the analysis of shared
resources (e.g., internalisation theory). It showed that shared resources give an
efficiency rationale to the multi-market enterprise only if transaction costs exist in
the market(s) of these resources. Its emphasis on bounded rationality shines
through in the chapter on market definition, which argued that bounded
rationality has an effect on firms' decision making. Contestability contributed to
the analysis of shared resources (economies of scope) and established-firm entry
(to explain hit-and-run entry). Industrial economics contributed to multi-market
modelling (international trade models), committed competition (game theory),
and cost-raising competition. Theories on vertical integration contributed to the
latter topic as well. Theories of diversification and multinational firms brought
the importance of shared resources to the fore, as well as established-firm entry.
Theories on multinational firms also emphasised market definition (global versus
multidomestic firms). Strategic management contributed indirectly, to234Afterword
diversification and other fields, and directly, to the analysis of resources (the
resource-based view), market definition, and multi-market theory (extended
rivalry). m ons
S/K>/T Su/n/miry
Part II has shown how economists developed insights, step by step, on the issues
in this book. Research by Chamberlin demonstrated the importance of potential
competition. Bain, Andrews, Hines and others developed the implications of
heterogeneity of the potential entrants. This book tracked the implications of one
type of entrant especially -established firm entrants. The competitive advantage of
established-firm entrants consists of resources that they can use in their home as
well as entry markets. Assets such as plants, know how, and brand name
recognition, which initially appeared to be entry barriers to new firms, turned out :
to be inducements to entry for established firms (Caves' Paradox). Contestability
and transaction cost theory shed further light on the existence of economies of '
scope and scale based on such resources. These debates led to the conclusion that
imperfections in the markets for these resources are necessary for the emergence
of competitive advantage of multi-market firms. Competitive advantage thus has a
horizontal dimension (multiple product markets) as well as a vertical dimension
(imperfect factor market and product market). This result ushers in part III.
Part III develops the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Both largely draw on
game theory. Before the advent of game theory, economists did discuss entry by
established firms, but they did not analyze this in a multi-market setting. Their
results were rather limited, and often asserted rather than demonstrated. Game
theory changed this considerably. Brander (1981) developed a simple model that
has become the basic model in the horizontal dimension. It allows one to explore
the interaction between product markets in an increasing degree of integration.
The integration depends upon arbitrage trade, centralisation of decision making
(in particular, asset management) by firms, and upon the existence and form of
collusion. The vertical dimension draws together insights from industrial
economics (competition by raising rivals' costs) and strategic management (the
resource-based view of the firm). Firms use factor market imperfections in order
to preempt rivals. Competition thus shifts from the product market to a prior
stage, in the factor market. Especially strategic management theorists developed
an early intuition that competitive advantage is created by the firm's endowment
and management (including incentive systems) of its resources. Industrial
economics adds the insight that the value of resources has to be realised in
product market competition. There is increasing analysis of an intangible
resource: human capital. The incentives of employees, scientists, and managers
may determine whether positive multi-market spillovers appear at all. The lack of
success of many mergers further gives salience to this research topic.
Part IV focuses on production capacity as an example of a shared resource. It
uses the analytical instruments discussed in part III to explore some theories in
part II (especially chapter 7) and to further integrate theories (chapter 8). Chapter
7 shows the strong links between the theory of Andrews and Brunner of
contestability theory. Both theories depend upon the existence of a salient entry
threat which presumably originates in related markets. The related market itselfAfterword 235
remains implicit in their theories, however. The attempt to make this explicit
reveals the pitfalls of their arguments. Entry into a related market has
repercussions in the home market. These lead to opportunity costs of entry that
alter the payoffs. Zero profits and markup prices arise only by a fluke. As in the
airline example referred to by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), the model
starts with a g/ven amount of capacity that is 'waiting in the wings'. This
assumption is plausible, for if the entrant would yet have to order and install
capacity, it would unlikely be able to enter faster than the incumbent firm can
change its price. The use of existing capacity in home and entry markets,
however, creates a binding capacity constraint. This inspires the repercussions
above. Moreover, the fact that capital has an alternative use in a related market is
not enough to argue that it is a marginal rather than a sunk cost. The alternative
use of capital mitigates, but does not destroy the commitment value of capital.
Chapter 8 demonstrates the same point in a different setting (with competition
in quantities rather than prices). It integrates competition in horizontally and
vertically related markets in a unified setting. This gives a concise description of
multi-market competition. The horizontal version (with two product markets)
provides the basic logic for reciprocal entry, counter-competition, and spheres-of-
influence. The commitment value of capital is destroyed by either linear demand
or zero transport costs (i.e., absence of any product-specificity). In the
(plausible) absence of these assumptions, some commitment value remains. This
may shed further light on the airline case in chapter 7. If firms perfectly
anticipate each other's reciprocal entry threat (which they do in the models of
chapter 8), they may adjust their capacity choice. As a result, they avoid the
price cutting entry threat on the basis of excess capacity. An equilibrium with
zero profits (as expected by contestability) will not arise. Price cutting will occur
if, as in chapter 7, the demand has not been correctly anticipated when capacity
levels were chosen. This suggests that the price cutting that occurred in the U.S.
after airline deregulation did not express a transition to a contestable market.
Rather it expressed the results of unexpected capacity changes (through more
efficient hub-and-spoke networks and computer reservation systems), new entry,
and demand shocks (terrorism, wars, ere). Excess capacity is in part a
transitional phenomenon: it takes time before more efficient entrants drive out
established carriers. The vertical version demonstrates the cost-raising logic that
firms may over- or underinvest in order to use a factor market imperfection to
their advantage in a product market. This too integrates several models of
competition (in the markets of labour, capital goods, and intermediate products).
Part V uses the analytical instruments in part III to explore market definition
issues. The framework in part III addresses market definition (i.e., increasing
degrees of integration). Chapter 9 further develops this theme. It argues that
markets are concepts that do not refer to a real world object (unlike concepts
such as price, demand, ere). Markets are conceptual filters used to distinguish
relevant substitutes (within the market) from irrelevant ones (outside the market).
Firms' market definitions are the product of learning and thus are inherently
dynamic. The market process may give positive reinforcements to a firm's
market definitions if it is successful in the market. Inherent in the idea of
perceptual filters is, however, that firms will be insensitive to developments that236 Afterword
do not fit in with the filter. As a result, they will be slow to adjust. It is well
documented that European and American firms took a long time to realise that
Japanese firms constituted a competitive threat based on (among others) a
different market definition. Japanese firms, that is, are pioneers in the
globalisation process.
The final chapter (10) applies several ideas of previous chapters to the rich
case of information technology. It brings out the importance of firm-specific
resources (section 4.3), multi-market spillovers (section 5.3), multi-market
collusion (section S.S), and rents from scarce resources, such as firms and
employees (chapter 6). The convergence process induces firms to adjust their
strategies and market definitions. Their delays and lack of success allow for entry
by new firms which, in turn, may become subject to bidding (acquisitions) by
other firms. The interdependence among firms increases as spheres-of-influence
break down, standard setting leads to network economies, and entry into new
fields requires complementary skills and assets which few firms currently have.
All in all, the convergence process is the driving force of a wave of mergers and
strategic alliances. The chapter suggests that research should aim at explaining
firms' choices among alternative strategy instruments, in particular, mergers,
strategic alliances, and internal development. This brings me to the close of this
dissertation. What next? Clearly, the book should be able to guide research.
Fu/wre
Future research issues abound. Consider modelling first. Game theory, of course,
focuses on abstract settings. A game usually focuses on one commitment
instrument, a duopoly, and two markets. Clearly, many problems in the real
world cannot be reduced to such a setting. What if a firm can choose from two
or more commitment instruments? A firm, e.g., may invest in production
capacity while licensing technology from an R&D firm, or it may invest in R&D
while leasing production capacity. The theories discussed may also have to be
developed beyond the two-firm, two-market dimension. A new problem in a
3-firm model is, for instance, that two firms may be potential entrant into the
same market. If the entry profit is positive only in the case of entry by one firm,
the two potential entrants need to coordinate their entry decision (e.g., Nti,
1989). Multi-market firms raise specific issues in internal organisation. Firms
may have to balance positive multi-market spillovers from shared resources
against negative spillovers from adverse effects on incentives of employees and
managers. To analyze this suggests a coupling between the horizontal multi-
market dimension with the vertical dimension (relating, e.g., an internal labour
market and reward systems to performance in the product market). Another
research topic is competition among potential entrants and, especially,
competition between new entrants and established-firm entrants. New entrants
play a different game against the incumbents than established entrants. Section
6.7 gave an example of this line of work. Do new firm entrants and established
firm entrants compete with each other, or do they enter different niches? What
are the competitive advantages of new firms, and how do these stack up against
those of established entrants?
». Another direction of future research is to apply multi-market competition toAfterword 237
new tasks. Similar explorations as by chapter 8 on capacity investments can be
done about advertising and other decision instruments. These all raise particular
issues that cannot be addressed in one basic model. Multi-market competition can
be extended into multi-project competition, as in Van Wegberg and Van
Witteloostuijn (1993), where the focus is on firms' multiple joint R&D projects.
The ideas in part V may be relevant for convergence of banking and insurance,
globalisation and European integration. Van Witteloostuijn and Van Wegberg
(1991), for example, raise the issues of the E.C.'s '1992' project in a multi-
market context. These topics are certain to raise other issues not represented in
the framework in this book. In a metaphorical sense, these ideas may even be
relevant for the convergence of strategic management and industrial economics.
This dissertation may, for example be considered a straddler in between these
two fields. Multi-market competition seems the natural habitat to explore
decisions by firms to merge or to join in strategic alliances. The recent merger
wave in the EC and in the information industries is arguably related to
integration of markets.
The dynamic markets perspective refers both to exogenous (technological)
dynamics as endogenous dynamics. In the latter case, chapter 9 pointed to the
importance of learning and selection. These phenomena have been emphasised by
evolutionary theorists and population ecology. Their theories may be related to
the themes in this book. Firms act on the basis of (different) beliefs which give
rise to behavioural heterogeneity and market selection. Important decisions to
make are timing of entry and exit, as well as the degree of centralisation (leading
to a global view). Bounded rationality may lead to sluggish response to new
competition, inflexibility in market choice and centralisation (consider the
possibility of escalating commitment).
Future research may also apply the framework to specific topics and
industries. An example are mergers and strategic alliances. In particular, more
should be known about the choice between mergers and strategic alliances. Firms
may prefer a merger to gain ownership of important (complementary) resources.
Mergers, however, are costly and they may have adverse affects on incentives of
the firms' participants (e.g., employees). Alliances may be preferred if numerous
firms have to be involved. Standard setting cases come to mind, as well as cases
where ownership of complementary resources is fragmented across numerous
firms. The development of new combinations of a large number of highly
different resources indicates that complexity is an increasingly important
characteristic of information technology. This in turn suggests attention to
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.ASAMENVATTING
Dit boek bevat een conceptueel raamwerk dat, naar ik hoop, een integratie biedt
van verschillende perspectieven, theorieën en modellen in de industriële économie
en strategisch management. De inspiratie komt vooral van strategisch management
(m.n. Porter's uitgebreide rivaliteit), en de inhoud komt vooral uit de industriële
économie. Inzichten komen meer bepaald uit de théorie van de open markt,
transactiekosten-theorie, gecommitteerde concurrentie, concurrentie door het
verhogen van de kosten van rivalen, en de activa-gebaseerde visie op de
onderneming. Integratie betekent ook dat theorieën kritisch worden bediscussieerd
vanuit het centrale perspectief van dit boek. Het integratieve raamwerk
onderscheidt twee dimensies in concurrentie, de horizontale en de verticale
dimensie. Deze dimensies zijn verwant vanwege de institutionele context
(hoofdstuk 2), het belang van gedeelde activa (paragraaf 4.3), interactie-effecten
(paragraaf 6.7), en een basis-model (paragraaf 8.3).
Er zijn enige beperkingen aan het gebruik van een conceptueel raamwerk. Het
concentreert zich op relaties tussen theorieën, eerder dan op verdere ontwikkeling
van enige stelling. Het is niet testbaar. Het doel ervan is een gids te zijn bij
onderzoek naar multi-markt ondernemingen. Of het hieraan voldoet zal de
praktijk uit moeten wijzen. Een van de mogelijke bijdragen is synergie te
bevorderen tussen de genoemde perspectieven en theorieën. Synergieën kunnen
bijvoorbeeld ontstaan door betere communicatie. >
Deel I bevat een introductie op het boek. Hoofdstuk 1 motiveert het boek, en
hoofdstuk 2 bespreekt de kern-ideeën. Een Nederlandstalig artikel dat voor een
deel overlapt met dit hoofdstuk is Van Wegberg en Van Witteloostuijn (1991b).
Deel II van het boek beschrijft hoe economen stap voor stap tot kennis zijn
gekomen van de thema's in dit boek. Chamberlin toonde het belang aan van
toetreders in een markt. Bain, Andrews, Hines en anderen bouwden hierop voort.
Er zijn verschillende soorten toetreders, met ieder hun eigen karakteristieken, die
weer specifîeke readies oproepen van de zittende ondernemingen. Dit boek gaat
dan vooral in op één type toetreders: elders gevestigde ondernemingen. Hun
concurrentievoordeel bestaat uit de activa die ze zowel in hun thuis- als in hun
toetredings-markt kunnen inzetten. Het gaat hier om activa zoals fabrieken,
kennis, en merknamen. Dit zijn toetredingsdrempels voor nieuwe ondernemingen,
maar ze blijken eveneens toetreding uit te lokken door elders gevestigde
ondernemingen (de Caves' paradox). Met deze paradox sluit hoofdstuk 3 af, en
begint hoofdstuk 4. De open markt-theorie en de transactiekosten-theorie werkten
de gevolgen uit van deze activa voor schaal- en assorti mentsvoordelen. Deze
discussies leiden tot de conclusie dat imperfecties in de markt voor deze activa
noodzakelijk zijn voor een concurrentievoordeel van multi-markt ondernemingen.
Concurrentievoordeel heeft dus een horizontale dimensie (meerdere
goederenmarkten) als een verticale dimensie (imperfecte activa-markten en
goederenmarkt). Dit resultaat legt de grondslag voor deel III.
Deel III werkt de aanzetten van hoofdstuk 2 verder uit. Het behandelt de
horizontale dimensie van multi-markt concurrentie (hoofdstuk 5) en de verticale-1
--••ï
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dimensie (hoofdstuk 6). Hoofdstuk 5 neemt als uitgangspunt het befaamde artikel
van Brander (1981) over internationale handel. Dit beschrijft de interacties tussen
twee gesegmenteerde goederenmarkten. Vervolgens worden gevallen besproken
met een hogere graad van integratie. Zodra ondernemingen gedeelde activa gaan
inzetten in meerdere goederenmarkten, ontstaat reeds een grotere verbondenheid
van deze markten. Immers, ondernemingen zullen nog steeds in iedere markt
apart beslissen over prijzen of produktie-hoeveelheden, maar ze zullen op globaal
(geïntegreerd) niveau beslissen over hun investeringen in deze activa. Indien nu
ook nog goederen-arbitrage mogelijk wordt, zullen ook prijzen of produktie-
hoeveelheden op globaal niveau worden vastgesteld. Ondernemingen concurreren
globaal, en arbitrageurs vertalen deze beslissingen in verkoopniveaus in de
afzonderlijke markten (bijvoorbeeld, landen). In dit geval is de integratie
afgedwongen. Ondernemingen kunnen ook overgaan tot heimelijke samenwerking
in meerdere markten. Ze coordineren dan vrijwillig hun beslissingen in meerdere
markten.
Hoofdstuk 6 heeft als onderwerp de concurrentie in zowel factor- als
goederenmarkten. Deze verticale dimensie gaat uit van de mogelijkheid dat
ondernemingen hun concurrentie in de goederenmarkt reeds uitvechten in (een
van) hun factormarkten. Bij activa moet worden bedacht dat twee factormarkten
een rol spelen: de markt van nieuwe activa, en de markt voor gebruikte activa.
Stel nu dat de laatste markt-imperfecties (transactiekosten) bevat. Gebruikte activa
zijn moeilijk verhandelbaar, en investeringen in activa zijn onomkeerbare
beslissingen. In dit geval kunnen investeringen gebruikt worden in de
concurrentiestrijd als een strategisch middel. Twee 'spelen' in het bijzonder zijn
gecommitteerde concurrentie, waar het onomkeerbaar zijn van de investeringen
zelf al een strategisch voordeel oplevert, en signaal-concurrentie, waar een
onomkeerbare beslissing een signaal geeft van (geheime of niet verifieerbare)
informatie die de onderneming heeft over zichzelf. Stel nu dat ook de markt voor
nieuwe activa imperfect is (m.n., onvolledige concurrentie aan de aanbod- of
vraagzijde). In dit geval is een type concurrentie-strategie mogelijk dat genoemd
is 'concurrentie door de kosten van rivalen te verhogen' of kosten-verhogende
concurrentie. Een vooruitziende onderneming verricht aankopen in de activa-
markt met het doel latere aankopen door een (nieuwe) rivaal duurder te maken.
De hogere (produktie-) kosten van de rivaal vertalen zich dan wellicht in hogere
marktprijzen, tot voordeel van de eerst-handelende onderneming. Bij deze activa
kan het om machines en patenten gaan, maar ook om minder voor de hand
liggende activa. Ondernemingen kunnen zelf activa zijn waarom wordt gestreden,
evenals de gunst van de overheid of consumenten. Het hoofdstuk laat tenslotte
zien dat in de internationale concurrentie (waar de horizontale dimensie van multi-
markt concurrentie domineert) ook kosten-verhoging een rol speelt (de verticale
dimensie). De door Japanse ondernemingen gedomineerde markt voor geheugen-
chips wordt als voorbeeld genoemd. >a eub ft»*!
Deel IV is iets technischer dan de andere gedeelten van het boek. Hoofdstuk 7
grijpt terug op de discussie over P.W.S. Andrews in hoofdstuk 3 en open markten
in hoofdstuk 4. Het biedt een formalisering van de verbale argumentatie bij zowel
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uit angst voor snelle en grootschalige toetreding door gevestigde ondernemingen
op andere markten. Deze catégorie toetreders beschikt reeds over activa en kan
daarom (zo is de argumentatie) zowel snel als zonder extra (verzonken) kosten
toetreden. De critici Cairns en Mahabir (1988) wezen er reeds op dat deze
toetreders wel op kosten stuiten als ze deze activa onttrekken aan hun thuismarkt.
Het model toont aan dat dit effect inderdaad van belang is. Deze kosten maken
het de zittende producent mogelijk hoge prijzen te vragen (met positieve
winstmarges) zonder van de markt te worden verdreven door deze toetreders. Dit
resultaat staat haaks op de voorspelling van zowel Andrews als de open-markt
théorie. Het weerlegt deze onderbouwing van hun prijzen-theorie (met nul-
winsten).
Hoofdstuk 8 maakt gebruik van hoeveelheden-concurrentie in plaats van
prijsconcurrentie als in hoofdstuk 7, en het gaat uit van een capaciteitskeuze in
plaats van een gegeven capaciteit. Gegeven deze uitgangspunten, biedt het
hoofdstuk een geïntegreerde analyse van zowel horizontale als verticale multi-
markt concurrentie. De integratie houdt in dat bij beide types, een investering niet
enkel de eigen reactiecurve verplaatst (de normale eigenschap van strategisch
gedrag) maar ook de reactiecurve van de concurrent verplaatst (hetgeen een
typisch multi-markten effect is). De horizontale dimensie heeft een vergelijkbaar
uitgangspunt als hoofdstuk 7: twee ondernemingen concurreren in twee
goederenmarkten. Iedere onderneming maakt gebruik van één gedeelde produktie-
capaciteit. In deze context blijken capaciteitsinvesteringen geen strategische
gevolgen te hebben (op de reactiecurves) indien de marktvraagfunctie lineair is of
de transport- of aanpassingskosten nul zijn. Alleen als deze voorwaarden niet
opgaan, hetgeen overigens plausibel is, blijft enige strategische waarde over. Het
blijkt van de concaviteit of convexiteit van de vraagfunctie af te hangen of de
onderneming zou moeten over- of onderinvesteren. Dit biedt een (te) zwakke
basis om te kunnen stellen dat overinvestedngen in kapitaal een strategische
waarde hebben in het concurrentiespel. De verticale dimensie beschrijft de situatie
dat een onderneming anticipeert op toetreding door de kosten van een potentiële
toetreder te verhogen via acties in een factormarkt. Onderzocht worden de
arbeids-, grondstoffen- en kapitaalgoederenmarkten. Dit levert, in combinatie met
capaciteitsinvesteringen, concurrentieinstrumenten op tot voordeel van de zittende
producent en tot nadeel van de potentiële toetreder. Het hoofdstuk memoreert tot
slot de graverende nadelen van onomkeerbare investeringen in produktiecapaciteit.
De strategische waarde tegen een elders gevestigde toetreder is zwak, en het
risico is groot indien achteraf de marktvraag afwijkt van de verwachting. ••>".>
Hoofdstuk V begint met de constatering dat de horizontale dimensie een
marktdefinitie-probleem oproept. Een toenemende mate van integratie van
goederenmarkten impliceert immers dat de marktgrenzen vervagen. Hier zijn
tegenwoordig veel voorbeelden van te geven, zoals Europese integratie en
globalisering van de wereldekonomie. Hoofdstuk 9 bespreekt de théorie van
marktgrenzen in verschillende disciplines: algemene économie,
concurrentiepolitiek (Amerikaanse aw/mur politiek), empirische analyses en
strategisch management. De conclusie is dat markten niet bestaan als oft/men van
economisch onderzoek. Een markt is een subjectieve afbakening van transacties.272 Summary in Dutch
Doel ervan is besluitvorming te vergemakkelijken door relevante transacties te
onderscheiden van minder relevante transacties (een andere 'markt'). Reden voor
deze afbakening is de beperkte rationaliteit van beslissers, die versimpeling van
gegevens noodzakelijk maakt. Dit inzicht komt overeen met theorieën van leren
en rationaliteit, waarin nadruk wordt gelegd op de conceptuele 'filters' die
beslissers gebruiken om gegevens te ordenen, interpreteren en dergelijke.
Marktdefinitie is dus onderdeel van leer- en besluitvormingsprocessen. Een
belangrijke afweging voor beslissers is of ze een 'nauwe' of 'brede' marktdefinitie
moeten hanteren. Een nauwe marktdefinitie leidt tot lagere aggregatie en dus
minder verlies aan gegevens, maar kan wel tot verlies aan overzicht leiden. De
théorie van concurrentie in meerdere markten kan hierbij een middenweg
aanbieden, met een zekere mate aan aggregatie (in afzonderlijke markten) alsmede
analyse van de interactie tussen die markten (en dus voldoende detaillering). De
subjectieve interpretatie van markten betekent dat leerprocessen tot veranderende
marktgrenzen kunnen leiden. Dit is het uitgangspunt van het dynamische markten-
perspectief. Keuzes die ondernemingen maken op gebieden als onderzoek en
ontwikkeling kunnen eveneens tot verandering van marktgrenzen leiden.
Marktdefinitie, investeringsbeslissingen, en concurrentie-analyse zijn dus steeds
terugkerende elementen in het strategisch management van ondernemingen.
Hoofdstuk 10 illustreert zowel het dynamische-markten perspectief in het
voorafgaande hoofdstuk als het multi-marktraamwerk in de eerdere delen. Het
onderwerp is de convergentie van sectoren in de informatie-technologie: de
markten van computers, consumenten-elektronica, telecommunicatie, en media.
De grenzen tussen deze markten vervagen omdat ondernemingen nieuwe
produkten introduceren die niet langer duidelijk bij één markt zijn in te delen.
Drijfveer van dit procès is de digitalisering van informatie. Tekst, muziek, en
beelden worden omgezet in één uniforme code: de digitale computercode. Dit
maakt het mogelijk verschillende vormen van informatie te combineren in nieuwe,
multimediale toepassingen. Deze leiden tot integratie van audio, video, en
gedrukte media. De digitalisering van informatie maakt ook elektronische
verzending van berichten mogelijk. Het kernwoord is informatie. Eigenaars van
informatie (zoals films, muziek, boeken, ideeën) kunnen deze informatie in talloze
(nieuwe) media toepassen en combineren. Informatie wordt dus een vorm van
gedeelde activa. Dit beïnvloedt de concurrentie zoals de eerdere delen van dit
boek hebben beargumenteerd. Ondernemingen betreden meerdere markten, en ze
beslissen over investeringen in een globaal perspectief (g/oWweriwg) De
concurrentie neemt toe nu oude invloedssferen verloren gaan en nieuwe nog niet
zijn veroverd.
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department of the University of Limburg at Maastricht.Most modern firms compete in numerous markets both product
markets and factor markets. They often sell several product S
different countries. They face potential entrants into their markets
from abroad and from related product markets. Michael Porter has
called this extended rivalry. It is particularly important to our under-
standing of global competition.
This book integrates two perspectives about global competition The
first one is inward-oriented. It focuses on the firms resources such
as know how and brand names. Japanese competition illustrates that
relations with suppliers, customers and other stakeholders are also
important resources. How can a firm create most value (future profits)
from its resources'? Firstly, by combining resources that are comple-
mentary, for example, by combining employees in teams Secondly
by supplying products that make an intensive use of these resources'
To achieve this, the firm may enter and exit product markets until it
has aligned its resources and products. Shared resources may
induce a firm to enter related product markets. This prospect in turn
inspires the firm to invest in these resources. If these resources are
scarce (such as good employees), firms bid for them, thus extending
competition from product to resource markets.
The second perspective focuses on the competitive environment.
Entry into a related product market may induce a competitive re-
sponse from the domestic firms. For example, they may enter the
entrant's home market (reciprocal entry). If firms meet in multiple
product markets, they may develop an understanding that leads to
tacit collusion. It may be in the rivals' mutual interests to respect each
other's home market (spheres-of-influence).
Information technology shows examples of these competitive
dynamics. New technologies combine text, photos, film and music to
create new products. Information becomes a shared resource that
can be used for multiple media (books, films, videogames). New
products spawn a new industry (multimedia) and break down existing
market boundaries (convergence) and spheres-of-influence. Competi-
tion heats up as new and existing firms such as Microsoft, IBM and
AT&T enter each other's domains.
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